- www.konformist.com 8-18-99
-
- Note - This document first came to my attention nearly
10 years ago thanks to the landmark work of Dr. Robert Strecker, MD, and
his late brother, Theodore Strecker (mysterious 'suicide'). It was eventually
included in my book 'AIDS Exposed' and other similar publications. My
thanks to Robert Sterling for providing this net copy..
-
-
- DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS FOR 1970
-
- United States Senate Library
-
- HEARINGS before a SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Ninety-First Congress
-
- First Session
-
- Subcommittee on Department of Defense
-
- George H. Mahon, Texas, Chairman Robert L.F. Sikes, Florida,
Glenard P. Lipscomb, California Jamie D. Whitten, Mississippi William E.
Minshall, Ohio George W. Andrews, Alabama, John J. Rhodes, Arizona Daniel
J. Flood, Pennsylvania Glenn R. Davis, Wisconsin John M. Slack, West Virginia,
Joseph P. Addabbo, New York Frank E. Evans, Colorado
-
- Temporarily assigned H.B. 15090
-
-
- PART 5
-
- RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TEST, AND EVALUATION
-
- Department of the Army Statement of Director, Advanced
Research Project Agency Statement of Director, Defense Research and Engineering
-
- __________
-
- Printed for the use of the Committee on Appropriations
-
- U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE WASHINGTON : 1969 UNITED
STATES SENATE LIBRARY 129
-
- TUESDAY, JULY 1, 1969
-
- SYNTHETIC BIOLOGICAL AGENTS
-
- There are two things about the biological agent field
I would like to mention. One is the possibility of technological surprise.
Molecular biology is a field that is advancing very rapidly and eminent
biologists believe that within a period of 5 to 10 years it would be possible
to produce a synthetic biological agent, an agent that does not naturally
exist and for which no natural immunity could have been acquired.
-
- MR. SIKES. Are we doing any work in that field?
-
- DR. MACARTHUR. We are not.
-
- MR. SIKES. Why not? Lack of money or lack of interest?
-
- DR. MACARTHUR. Certainly not lack of interest.
-
- MR. SIKES. Would you provide for our records information
on what would be required, what the advantages of such a program would
be. The time and the cost involved?
-
- DR. MACARTHUR. We will be very happy to. The information
follows:
-
- The dramatic progress being made in the field of molecular
biology led us to investigate the relevance of this field of science to
biological warfare. A small group of experts considered this matter and
provided the following observations:
-
- 1. All biological agents up the the present time are
representatives of naturally-occurring disease, and are thus known by scientists
throughout the world. They are easily available to qualified scientists
for research, either for offensive or defensive purposes.
-
- 2. Within the next 5 to 10 years, it would probably be
possible to make a new infective microorganism which could differ in certain
important aspects from any known disease-causing organisms. Most important
of these is that it might be refractory to the immunological and therapeutic
processes upon when we depend to maintain our relative freedom from infectious
disease.
-
- 3. A research program to explore the feasibility of this
could be completed in approximately 5 years at a total cost of $10 million.
-
- 4. It would be very difficult to establish such a program.
Molecular biology is a relatively new science. There are not many highly
competent scientisis in the field., almost all are in university laboratories,
and they are generally adequately supported from sources other than DOD.
However, it was considered possible to initiate an adequate program through
the National Academy of sciences - National Research Council (NAS-NRC,
and tentative plans were made to initiate the program. However decreasing
funds in CB, growing criticism of the CB program., and our reluctance to
involve the NAS NRC in such a controversial endeavor have led us to postpone
it for the past 2 years.
-
- It is a highly controversial issue and there are many
who believe such research should not be undertaked lest it lead to yet
another method of massive killing of large populations. On the other hand,
without the sure scientific knowledge that such a weapon is possible, and
an understanding of the ways it could be done. there is little that can
be done to devise defensive measures. Should an enemy develop it there
is little doubt that this is an important area of potential military technological
inferiority in which there is no adequate research program.
|
