- UPDATE
- By JhanDavis@aol.com 11-24-99
-
- Jeff - Cy makes some good points. I've interlined this
exchange.
-
- [Cy] Actually, it is reported that the flight data recorder
shows eight seconds between autopilot disconnect and the yoke being pushed
forward and engine throttle down. If Mr. Batouty perceived a missile threat
which caused him to disconnect the autopilot, why wait eight seconds?
-
- [Jhan's response] True. Eight seconds is an eternity
for a fighter pilot to respond to a perceived threat. The fighter pilot
would react instantly, and his Commander would call it good tactical sense.
Also, there's usually one person in a fighter. Some fighters carry an extra
person who also performs Electronic Warfare Officer (EWO) duties, such
as alerting the pilot when the enemy achieves radar lock preparatory to
launching his missile. This warning tells the pilot he's about to become
toast if he doesn't perform a quick maneuver. Those fighter aircraft are
configured for fast maneuvering, and the Airmen are trained to put their
aircraft through them routinely. Unfortunately, the 767-300ER has no EWO
equipment and no EWO. The crew of Flt 990 had to rely on interpretation
of a situation which was developing in front of them.
-
- Back to the fighter pilot vs. the commercial pilot. Commercial
pilots must often react just the opposite of what you'd expect from a fighter
pilot. So, seeing that Mr. Batouty was plopped into the co-pilot's seat
to fly a large commercial aircraft, his reaction becomes a very reasonable
interval between autopilot disconnect and nose-down. In fact, I'm extremely
surprised that Mr. Batouty acted so quickly. Here's why: Commercial airline
pilots are in charge of transporting a huge population of individuals scattered
all around the inside of the plane. Some will be in the restroom, others
will be just lounging around. Most will unbuckle and remain unbuckled during
the cruise portion of the flight against all common sense. Also, the attendants
on those transcontinental flights will be all over the airplane as a matter
of serving the customers. The cockpit crew knows those folks by name. No
pilot is going to injure or kill folks he knows with a quick maneuver.
Now what about the relationship between the pilots and the passengers?
They're trained to treat those passengers like a loose stack of gold bricks
which *must* remain stacked through take-off, cruise and landing.
-
- You won't find a tenured airline pilot who routinely
jostles his passengers around. The airline CEO is impervious to reason
and will terminate any cockpit crew which does so, no matter what the explanation.
The name of the game is "smooth" and "easy does it."
The best airline pilot is the one who gets his plane up and down without
any bumps and with minimum fuel consumption. Impossible? No. I was on a
747 enjoying a missile-free flight from JFK to Frankfurt. The landing was
so smooth you couldn't tell the plane had touched tarmac except by looking
out the window. All of the passengers looked, and, sensing we were down,
spontaneously clapped and cheered. That kind of airmanship is possible,
though rarely achieved. Now let's ask the hard question: Why would Mr.
Batouty opt to end a stellar career *and* destroy the careers of the other
members of the cockpit crew? Remember, the airline CEO is going to can
the whole crew if it disturbs the passengers. Rule number one: never, never
upset the passengers. There's only one scenario which would result in Flt
990's profile:
-
- Airline cockpit crews observe "unidentifieds"
every working day. They take those unidentifieds in stride, and usually
it's only the cockpit crew who knows about them. Those crew members don't
react quickly to just any unidentified simply because they see (and hear
about) so many of them (from other crews which didn't report them either.
This is a very closed fraternity we're talking about here). In fact, cockpit
crews very seldom *ever* report unidentifieds. It's not good for the career.
So yes. Mr. Batouty would take a good long time to try to identify an unidentified.
He might even send folks out into the passenger spaces to attempt identification
as this thing was slipping behind his aircraft. Then, following airline
regulations, he'd disengage the autopilot and be prepared to take evasive
action if, and only if, the need arose. At this point, he was only dealing
with an object doing something strange within the limits of the vision
forward his cockpit windshield allowed him. I'm guessing that Flight 990's
unidentified approached from the east, got the attention of the cockpit
crew, and forced them to get the attention of Mr. Batouty. Why bring Mr.
Batouty into the picture? Arab custom: defer to the experience and training
of someone older than you are. Mr. Batouty trained pilots. So, a good Arab
flight crew would want him to see it and assess the possibility for danger
to the aircraft. This sounds strange to Americans, but respect for age
and authority is just another "Islamic fundamentalist" tradition.
Getting the opinion of Mr. Batouty on a possible unidentified hostile makes
perfect sense in the Arab tradition. The pilot and co-pilot deferred to
Mr. Batouty and the co-pilot put him in his own seat. That requires a situation
going on outside the aircraft worthy of analysis, not just the "standard-issue"
unidentified which zips past leaving the pilot and copilot bemused.
-
- [Cy] In a fighter aircraft, if an incoming missile is
detected or even suspected, evasive maneuvers are called for instantly.
Eight seconds is an eternity to an incoming missile. Count it out: "one
thousand-one, one thousand-two, one thousand-three..."
-
- [Jhan's response] What Cy states is proper procedure,
actually required procedure for a fighter aircraft. Now did I ever say
there was a missile threat to EgyptAir Flight 990? No. I stated quite clearly
that Mr. Batouty "perceived" a threat and took evasive action
based on the threat. We're getting ahead of ourselves. Let's backtrack.
-
- Mr. Batouty was flying a large civilian aircraft with
a lot of very well-placed personnel aboard. You don't change the operating
attitude of a large civilian aircraft unless you've got very, very good
reason to do so. Upsets the paying customers, who complain about the bumpiness,
and that's bad for business. Mr. Batouty's thoughts at this point were
not about diving. His sole intent was to identify an unidentified. Moving
along...
-
- If, according to the scenario I'm building, Mr. Batouty's
unidentified came in from the east and slowed as it was approaching 990,
Mr. Batouty no longer had an unidentified. Mr. Batouty now had an "unidentified
hostile." Remember, Mr. Batouty is making the call on this 'whatsit'
at the request of the normal cockpit crew. The cockpit crew have placed
him there specifically to assess the threat potential. So, this unidentified
now slips back behind the aircraft where the cockpit crew can't see it.
This is now a serious situation, because that unidentified was slowing
as it approached the aircraft. So Mr. Batouty immediately sends the other
members of the crew back into the passenger spaces to confirm the position
of the hostile. Their job was to observe, return, and report. He wanted
to know one and only one thing, is this fellow lining himself up back behind
his aircraft? Strange question for a commercial airline cockpit crew to
be asking. But it makes sense in one, and only one context. A context which
makes sense when an unidentified slows down and slips behind your commercial
aircraft. (Mr. Batouty had now painted this as an "unidentified hostile.")
-
- If you want to take down a civilian airliner, you do
it the way it's always been done. You get back of the airliner and slightly
below it, just like 805 (purportedly) did to KAL007 ("the target is
destroyed.") This lines you up to place your heat-seekers on a straight
course for one, or both, engines, depending on how many missiles you can
afford for the task. Good alignment is just good tactical sense, and you
get paid a bonus if you bring some missiles back.
-
- A word about the "behind and slightly below"
scenario. Every jet aircraft cruises slightly nose-up. So, to line-up with
another aircraft, you've got to be not only behind him, but slightly below
him, too. This alignment works just fine for aeriel refueling, too, which,
we trust, is done with a minimum of missiles fired. Back to the missiles.
-
- Like with the paper towels in the airport bathroom, the
keeper of the missiles is asking himself the question: "Why use two,
when one will do?" People who fire missiles at commercial aircraft
are also reponsible for properly managing their resources. Now back onboard
990. Mr. Batouty sees an unidentified decelerating as it closes on his
aircraft. He wants to know if this hostile is lining up behind him. He
dispatches his cockpit crew to the passenger cabin. And, he just might
make it easier for his spotters in back by rocking the aircraft gently
about its yaw axis. (Hey NTSB! Does the FDR show this?) The passengers
don't even know what's going on, thinking these two fellows have come out
of the cockpit just to mingle with the paying guests. Even Arab First-Class
passengers like it when the pilot and copilot come out to socialize. The
two guys quickly disappear back into the cockpit, leaving some well-healed
folks wondering...
-
- [Cy] Jhan further states: "For one thing, a Boeing
767-300 doesn't have the lateral maneuverability of an F-16. If an evasive
maneuver was required, there is only one direction which so heavy an aircraft
can take very quickly, and that's down."
-
- While it's very true that a Boeing 767 is not an F-16,
an experienced pilot making an evasive maneuver would want to alter as
many planes of direction as possible, as quickly as possible. In this case,
throttle up full, possibly a dive and a hard pull to the right or left.
Furthermore, a straight downward plunge risks bringing the aircraft into
other aircraft traffic occupying the flight lane at lower altitudes, which
further risks aircraft survivability.
-
- [Jhan's reponse] Mr. Batouty doesn't want to make this
maneuver. It's tearing him apart. He knows that the instant he abruptly
changes the aircraft's attitude he's destroyed his career which to this
point has been exemplary, and the careers of the pilot and copilot. This
will totally trash the inside of the plane, result in some deaths and injure
many. He doesn't want to do this. So he's going to do it as gently as possible.
Nothing fancy, because in a large commercial aircraft, the tail is the
weakest section. In fact, in the B-52, the tails sometimes fall off during
severe turbulence. Mr. Batouty is going to make sure his equipment keeps
its tail. Just a quick simple descent, so as to kill as few of the passengers
as possible. He's totally torn. The miracle is, he's made this decision
in just eight seconds since he's disengaged the autopilot. He also has
a pretty good idea what an unidentified behind his aircraft can do to his
equipment and passengers. "I've made my decision now." Makes
perfect sense. Hey, don't take it out of the report to satisfy political
correctness! It belongs there! "I place my faith in God." (He's
never performed this maneuver before in a 767-300ER.) As he pushes the
yoke forward, he knows he's destroying careers and destroying all sense
of order in the passenger spaces behind him. But it has to be this way.
-
- [Cy] Jhan says: "A seasoned pilot perceived a threat,
pointed his aircraft down and turned off those two big engines. When you
turn off those engines and point them straight down, that -65F air at flt
lvl 330 cools them quickly. The object is to kill your aircraft's thermal
signature before the missile kills you..."
-
- It wouldn't cool them fast enough. A pilot literally
has only a few seconds to react to a perceived missile threat. An experienced
pilot would know that.
-
- [Jhan's response] This pilot knows that, too, and is
praying he doesn't take a missile up his "tailpipe" before it
drops below the target acquisition circuit's heat-sensor threshold. Mr.
Batouty is taking a calculated risk. At this point, he's only destroyed
some careers and totally trashed the passenger spaces. The gamble appears
to have paid off the first time he performed this maneuver, because his
equipment remained intact for the recovery and 5,000 foot ascent.
-
- [Cy] Jhan says: "To get the aircraft nose up and
5,000 feet higher required an engine restart."
-
- No. Flight data recorder does not show that. Furthermore,
as I have stated in a previous letter, the aircraft is inherently a lifting
body. With Flight 990 at close to supersonic speeds, no additional power
would be required to nose the plane back up. The pilot would just "pull
up" on the yoke. I'll even go as far as to say that the aircraft may
have "nosed up" by itself, because of the lift on the wings at
that speed.
-
- Once the aircraft does "nose up", a plane will
bleed off a lot of speed and momentum.
-
- [Jhan's response] Cy's right, here. So I'll concede his
point. Yes, you push the nose down if you're getting into a stall, and
yes, the nose will come up by itself if the the aircraft is headed down
and gets up speed. That's caused by the shape of the wing. To keep the
aircraft going down required Mr. Batouty and the fellow in the pilot's
seat to actually push on the yoke while descending. "Help me pull"
refers to his decision to *very* quickly get the nose back up before he
gets his passengers wet. Again, this was a coordinated action on the part
of two men in separate seats. Thus the quick ascent. So I imagine the folks
at Boeing will be thrilled to know that their equipment can gain back some
5,000 feet after a quick descent, even without engines. Could the 767-300ER
maintain straight and level flight for a few seconds after the aircraft
got up to flt lvl 240? Possibly. The 757 is a very good glider, even fully
loaded. The 767 could share many of its operational attributes.
-
- [Cy] Jhan says: "The Egyptians aren't buying the
fabricated suicide story and they won't buy anything less than an explanation
which actually explains what happened."
-
- To characterize the "suicide story" as "fabricated"
at this point, shows a bias or a "spin", in my opinion. Right
now, there is a lot of speculation, a lot of reporting and mis-reporting
from unnamed insiders who are not saying anything on the record.
-
- It seems to me that the biggest obstacle the NTSB and
the FBI may face in concluding the Flight 990 investigation is the Egyptian
government in denial. It would almost be funny if the final report on EgyptAir
Flight 990 have to be negotiated between the Egyptian and U.S. governments
to be politically correct.
-
- [Jhan's response] The aircraft's flight profile, taken
in an evasive-maneuver context, makes more sense than the 'suicide' story.
The CVR depicts a concerted effort, not a cockpit struggle which would
have certainly resulted from a suicide attempt. Arabs know exactly how
to deal with stupidity and Mr. Batouty wouldn't have lasted 2 seconds if
he'd been "losing it." On the other hand, "pull with me"
shows some great teamwork. The rapid descent was a concerted effort. So
was the partial re-ascent. I find it regrettable that the Atlantic got
in the way of their second attempt to shake whatever they felt threatened
by.
-
- Will we ever know what they felt threatened by? Will
we ever find out exactly what's on the FDR and CVR tapes? Some relevant
clues are, in fact, on those tapes. Those tapes are very, very, real. Will
our government do the politically-expedient thing and filter the report
to match a preconceived scenario, or will they do the right thing and release
all the unvarnished data, even if it most of it doesn't make any sense
to Americans raised on 54 minutes of program content and 6 minutes of commercials
overridden by a trip to the fridge?
-
- The truth is on those tapes. Our government has the perfect
opportunity to establish the trust and confidence of the nation and of
the rest of the world based on how it handles this event.
-
- -------
-
- Dear Editor -
-
- A simple analysis of the flight profile of EgyptAir Flight
990 elicits more details than would appear on the surface.
-
- The man in the co-pilot's seat at nose-down, said to
be Gameel El-Batouty, was a seasoned veteran with many hours of flight
experience. Solving the mystery of the lost aircraft, crew and passengers
then turns upon Mr. Batouty and his perceptions, and only on those perceptions.
It doesn't matter what was outside the aircraft. All that matters is this
man's perceptions, as he was processing the input datastream from his position
within the aircraft.
-
- No one in his right mind would fly a passenger plane
according to the profile followed by Mr. El-Batouty. Unless he perceived
a threat to his aircraft and passengers of sufficient import to warrant
doing so.
-
- No sane person would turn off both engines, and then
proceed to fly the plane according to such a profile. Unless turning off
the engines was deemed the least of two very, very, bad choices.
-
- Let's recap.
-
- Flight 990 was proceeding on-profile at flight level
330. The man in the captain's seat left the cockpit. The man in the co-pilot's
seat left the cockpit. The man with the most flying experience was then
left in charge of the plane. Interesting.
-
- A bit later, Mr. Batouty disengages the autopilot, places
the aircraft into a dive and then turns off both engines. Again, interesting.
After a precipitous descent to flt lvl 190, two individuals finally manage
to nose the aircraft up, and ascend to flt lvl 240. Again, very interesting.
But for some reason, it becomes necessary to again nose the plane down,
whereupon it ends up at flt lvl 000, at which point, if the FDR data is
the real un-spun FDR data from the aircraft, and can be believed, the aircraft
*first* loses its structural integrity.
-
- What would cause a seasoned veteran flyer to maneuver
his aircraft in such a fashion? Let's assume for a moment that these maneuvers
were the result of a trained response to imminent threat. What would cause
an experienced flyer to perceive such a threat? For our purposes it really
doesn't matter. All that matters is that this experienced flyer perceived
a threat.
-
- The threat led him, according to his training, to do
two things you'd never do with a large civilian airframe: point the nose
hard down, and turn off the engines. Why nose hard-down? For one thing,
a Boeing 767-300 doesn't have the lateral maneuverability of an F-16. If
an evasive maneuver was required, there is only one direction which so
heavy an aircraft can take very quickly, and that's down. Which still leaves
us with "why turn the engines off?" Let's assume for an instant
that this seasoned flyer was actually engaged in an evasive maneuver. Again,
we don't know and we don't care for the moment what he was fleeing from,
or if he was actually fleeing from anything. But he did nose the plane
down and turn the engines off. And the only reason you'd turn the engines
off in a Boeing 767-300 is if you perceived a threat which you believed
would be greater leaving them on than turning them off. So, Mr. Batouty
turned them off as, again, the least of two very, very bad choices available
to him. Why?
-
- Aircraft engines generate a lot of thrust. That's why
we put those powerplants on the structures we call aircraft. But they also
generate a great deal of something else along with the thrust and that's
heat. Mr. Batouty obviously understood this, and turned the engines off
to minimize the amount of radiated heat. Again, whether the threat was
real or perceived makes no difference. Mr. Batouty followed a profile which
makes sense only if you're trying to get away from something that's after
you, that's looking for your thermal signature.
-
- So the ultimate solution to the "mystery" of
the loss of Flt 990 is no mystery at all. A seasoned pilot perceived a
threat, pointed his aircraft down and turned off those two big engines.
When you turn off those engines and point them straight down, that -65F
air at flt lvl 330 cools them quickly. The object is to kill your aircraft's
thermal signature before the missile kills you and sets your 990=007. At
some point in time, he thought the threat was over. He, with help recovered
the aircraft from the first dive, taking it from flt lvl 190 to flt lvl
240. To get the aircraft nose up and 5,000 feet higher required an engine
restart.
-
- He must have perceived the threat again, because he repeated
the maneuver, once again pointing his aircraft at the only object a missile
can't recover from if its following you and you're dropping below its sensor
threshold. The aircraft could potentially recover from another dive if
the pilot leveled it off just above the deck. A missile headed toward the
water isn't going to recover from getting wet and come back out of the
drink after you. And those engines were cold when the aircraft hit the
deck or there would have been a burning oil slick instead of a seawater-cold
slick.
-
- Mr. Batouty's response followed perfectly the profile
of an individual who, in response to a perceived missile threat, wished
to preserve the personnel and equipment in his trust. Any pilot, perceiving
the threat as Mr. Batouty did, would have followed exactly the same flight
profile, even if it made for a zero-g situation. Better a messy cabin and
some injured passengers than having your aircraft blown out of the sky.
-
- We may never know the exact nature of the threat which
Mr. Batouty perceived. But since those big planes don't have rear-view
mirrors, it makes sense that some individuals left the cockpit for a time
just before the nose-down. Were they looking out the windows on either
side of the aircraft's passenger space trying to find whatever they thought
posed a threat? We do know that sensitivity to other aircraft in your vicinity,
especially those flying really close to you at night, has increased since
the KAL 007 shootdown. Were the other individuals trying to identify the
threat? Was Mr. Batouty gently rotating the aircraft back and forth about
its yaw axis so the folks in back could have a better chance of seeing
whatever may have been interpreted as "the threat?"
-
- We'll never learn from the victims what transpired, or
whether the threat was real. They took that knowledge into the depths with
them. But we do owe it to the Egyptians to share the results of any radar
data and supporting technical intelligence showing an object in the vicinity
of that aircraft. The Egyptians aren't buying the fabricated suicide story
and they won't buy anything less than an explanation which actually explains
what happened. Right now, this is the only explanation on the street that's
doing any explaining.
-
- - Jhan Davis
-
-
- Comment
- From Cy Shinkawa <cshink@lava.net 11-21-99
-
- Jeff-
-
- I have problems with the "Heroically Trying To Dodge
Missiles" theory.
-
- There is this statement by Jhan Davis: "A bit later,
Mr. Batouty disengages the autopilot, places the aircraft into a dive and
then turns off both engines."
-
- Actually, it is reported that the flight data recorder
shows eight seconds between autopilot disconnect and the yoke being pushed
forward and engine throttle down. If Mr. Batouty perceived a missile threat
which caused him to disconnect the autopilot, why wait eight seconds? In
a fighter aircraft, if an incoming missile is detected or even suspected,
evasive maneuvers are called for instantly. Eight seconds is an eternity
to an incoming missile. Count it out: "one thousand-one, one thousand-two,
one thousand-three..."
-
- Jhan further states: "For one thing, a Boeing 767-300
doesn't have the lateral maneuverability of an F-16. If an evasive maneuver
was required, there is only one direction which so heavy an aircraft can
take very quickly, and that's down."
-
- While it's very true that a Boeing 767 is not an F-16,
an experienced pilot making an evasive maneuver would want to alter as
many planes of direction as possible, as quickly as possible. In this case,
throttle up full, possibly a dive and a hard pull to the right or left.
Furthermore, a straight downward plunge risks bringing the aircraft into
other aircraft traffic occupying the flight lane at lower altitudes, which
further risks aircraft survivability.
-
- Jhan says: "A seasoned pilot perceived a threat,
pointed his aircraft down and turned off those two big engines. When you
turn off those engines and point them straight down, that -65F air at flt
lvl 330 cools them quickly. The object is to kill your aircraft's thermal
signature before the missile kills you..."
-
- It wouldn't cool them fast enough. A pilot literally
has only a few seconds to react to a perceived missile threat. An experienced
pilot would know that.
-
- Jhan says: "To get the aircraft nose up and 5,000
feet higher required an engine restart."
-
- No. Flight data recorder does not show that. Furthermore,
as I have stated in a previous letter, the aircraft is inherently a lifting
body. With Flight 990 at close to supersonic speeds, no additional power
would be required to nose the plane back up. The pilot would just "pull
up" on the yoke. I'll even go as far as to say that the aircraft may
have "nosed up" by itself, because of the lift on the wings at
that speed.
-
- Once the aircraft does "nose up", a plane will
bleed off a lot of speed and momentum.
-
- Jhan says: "The Egyptians aren't buying the fabricated
suicide story and they won't buy anything less than an explanation which
actually explains what happened."
-
- To characterize the "suicide story" as "fabricated"
at this point, shows a bias or a "spin", in my opinion. Right
now, there is a lot of speculation, a lot of reporting and mis-reporting
from unnamed insiders who are not saying anything on the record.
-
- It seems to me that the biggest obstacle the NTSB and
the FBI may face in concluding the Flight 990 investigation is the Egyptian
government in denial. It would almost be funny if the final report on EgyptAir
Flight 990 have to be negotiated between the Egyptian and U.S. governments
to be politically correct.
-
- -Cy Shinkawa
-
-
-
- From George Belanus <gbelanus@1st.net 11-21-99
-
- Mr. Rense:
-
- I noted with great interest Cy Shinkawa's update to the
politically incorrect story on your website. What drew my interest was
the philosophical question Mr. Shinkawa postulated which has a direct bearing
on the public feels would be the proper response to school shootings: namely,
that even 20 years ago Americans would have no doubt been quick to take
harsh and appropriate response to forestall any such mass shootings.
-
- Mr. Shinkawa is very perceptive in realizing that a fundamental
change in outlook has obviously afflicted the American public. I can say
this because I was growing up and attending an elementary school in a small
town in the northern panhandle of West Virginia some 43 years ago (I'm
53 now, and please, no crass remarks about being a dumb hillbilly when
one reads the rest of this response. I've had some 20 years of news reporting
experience, picked up a college degree over the years, and traveled to
at least three foreign countries in these 53 years, and have managed to
learn something from all those experiences).
-
- The point is, I'm sure that nobody would have even thought
of going into a school at the time I was growing up and opening fire indiscriminitely.
It simply wasn't thought of at that time, and the climate just wasn't one
that would lend itself to getting away with it even if somebody had done
something like that.
-
- The reason nobody would have even thought of it was that
we had a much better consensus amongst the public at large then that this
was unacceptable behavior and there would be any number of bad occurrences
to the perpetrator if such an event would take place. And having the law
get on your case in relation to such a situation would probably be the
least of one's worries. A fairly good percentage of the people in that
small town were armed to one extent or another and also shared in that
consensus of what constituted unacceptable behavior. The local grapevine
was a good one with a short travel time and I feel certain that there would
have been no lack of armed volunteers for taking care of the problem at
the time it was happening, regardless of whether they were aiding local
area law enforcement officers in quelling the disturbance. And, failing
that, I remain sure that the prevailing view at the time would have resulted
in the perpetrator(s) being brought to justice and a legal penalty in the
form of incarceration or other appropriate penalty being meted out would
have occurred. The legal penalties no doubt would have been without the
much-ballyhooed rights of defendants that have emerged in the intervening
years, but I remain certain that justice would have been arrived at through
the legal system vis a vis the perpetrators.
-
- All in all, one was brought up in those days to not fly
in the face of recognized authority, and to not go against the informal
``code'' of what proper behavior was seen to be. One certainly did not
misbehave at school, for instance, or one would find oneself in the principal's
office for an administering of several whacks with a large wooden paddle
with holes cut in its working end, which stung more when it hit and had
the psychological effect of whistling through the air on its inbound flight
to one's posterior. This is probably the heart of the difference between
then and now. One then was raised to go by those common rules that had
been worked out over the years in this country on how persons conducted
themselves as citizens. The rules were not always written down in a law
book, either, hence the use of the term ``informal code.''
-
- This is the big difference between then and the modern
day ... then we had this common outlook of how things operated and it was
generally adhered to across the board. We also had things like blatant
racial discrimination and other ills which needed to be addressed and changed.
Some of these things, like the discrimination, have been addressed and
have, to some extent, changed over the years.
-
- But not all the changes have been for the good, as this
wave of school shootings is just one symptom of. I'd probably have some
deeper insight into how this came about if I had a few dollops of Jack
Daniels under my belt and could also type correctly, but sadly this is
not the case as I type this email.
-
- But I can give an approximation of the reasons for the
drastic changes we have had for the worse. Many years ago I was fortunate
enough to have read the book ``Something of Value,'' which was written
by Robert Ruark. Ruark was a professional hunter and safari guide in Africa
and had lived on that continent for some years, and did what I thought
was a credible job of writing that book as a somewhat fictionalized account
of the Mau Mau uprising in Kenya. How this book bears on the question at
hand is how the title was arrived at ... namely, an old Swahili saying
says that ``When one decides to get rid of the old ways, one must be sure
to have something of value to replace them with.'' Or words to that effect.
It's been some years since I've read that particular book, but the old
Swahili saying still holds true.
-
- Our present problem seems to be that nobody who attempted
to make these sweeping changes in America over the years had apparently
heard of that old saying from Africa, let alone tried to apply it. Consequently,
we're faced at present with another situation best summed up by a Laurel
and Hardy saying ... ``This is another fine mess you've gotten us into,
Stanley.''
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- One thing for sure is that the genie has been let out
of the bottle in certain ways and cannot be put back in, so that a return
to the days of the 1950s is no doubt an impossbility. But perhaps it is
still not too late to apply the lessons of the recent past to remedying
the current situation, beginning with the one basic problem ... there has
to be some way of setting up another common consensus in this country of
what constitutes unacceptable behavior and making it stick. School shootings
are among what could be called unacceptable behavior, with severe penalties
attached to being the perpetrators of such occurrences. Gun control is
another, along with the right of the people to have firearms at hand to
forestall any such occurrences in really drastic cases. I never heard of
the persons among us who went on sprees like this attempting such things
if they felt fairly sure they'd get shot back at in the process. And this
is just one ``for instance.'' The theory of a common consensus on acceptable
behavior across the board, the penalties for transgressions, and how to
set up a better life for this country's citizens could probably go far
toward remedying a lot of the ills we face as a country at present.
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- This is still the best country on the face of the earth
as far as I'm concerned, and is definitely worth salvaging despite the
hard times it has come upon. How to do that is beyond me at present, with
all the fragmentation in society we have at present and the current belief
in confrontational rather than consensus politics. Maybe some of the listeners
to the talk show and readers of the web page have some ideas on how to
bring this about.
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- George Belanus
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- EgyptAir990 Flight Profiled 20 Years Ago
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- By JhanDavis@aol.com 11-22-99
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-
- Twenty years ago, theater-goers were thrilled and bedazzled
as a sleek, fast passenger airliner performed acrobatics on the big screen,
which, up until EgyptAir 990, hadn't been duplicated, except by high-performance
fighters, such as the F-14, F-15 and F-16.
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- So get out your copy of "AIRPORT '79 -- The Concorde"
and replay it. Pay particular attention to the way the cockpit crew manages
the resource under their control. You won't see a lot of unnecessary talking.
But you will see pure professionalism, great teamwork, a lot of factfinding
requiring some members of the cockpit crew to be "out and about"
and a flight profile which very closely matches that taken twenty years
later by a real airliner piloted by folks who probably never received evasive-maneuver
training in front of the silver screen.
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- In the movies, the cockpit crew always pulls the airliner
up in time. And EgyptAir's flyers were also lucky. Once. Obviously inspired
by their very solidly constructed aircraft, they didn't hesitate to put
their equipment through yet another identical maneuver when they perceived
a return of the threat. Only the second time around, they encountered something
which the movie's script called for the 1979 cockpit crew to avoid. The
Atlantic.
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- Electronic media, take the cue.
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- - Jhan Davis
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