SIGHTINGS



Were EgyptAir 990
Pilots Heroically Trying
To Dodge Missiles?
Technical Intelligence and EgyptAir Flt 990
By Jhan Davis <JhanDavis@aol.com>
11-20-99

UPDATE
By JhanDavis@aol.com 11-24-99
 
Jeff - Cy makes some good points. I've interlined this exchange.
 
[Cy] Actually, it is reported that the flight data recorder shows eight seconds between autopilot disconnect and the yoke being pushed forward and engine throttle down. If Mr. Batouty perceived a missile threat which caused him to disconnect the autopilot, why wait eight seconds?
 
[Jhan's response] True. Eight seconds is an eternity for a fighter pilot to respond to a perceived threat. The fighter pilot would react instantly, and his Commander would call it good tactical sense. Also, there's usually one person in a fighter. Some fighters carry an extra person who also performs Electronic Warfare Officer (EWO) duties, such as alerting the pilot when the enemy achieves radar lock preparatory to launching his missile. This warning tells the pilot he's about to become toast if he doesn't perform a quick maneuver. Those fighter aircraft are configured for fast maneuvering, and the Airmen are trained to put their aircraft through them routinely. Unfortunately, the 767-300ER has no EWO equipment and no EWO. The crew of Flt 990 had to rely on interpretation of a situation which was developing in front of them.
 
Back to the fighter pilot vs. the commercial pilot. Commercial pilots must often react just the opposite of what you'd expect from a fighter pilot. So, seeing that Mr. Batouty was plopped into the co-pilot's seat to fly a large commercial aircraft, his reaction becomes a very reasonable interval between autopilot disconnect and nose-down. In fact, I'm extremely surprised that Mr. Batouty acted so quickly. Here's why: Commercial airline pilots are in charge of transporting a huge population of individuals scattered all around the inside of the plane. Some will be in the restroom, others will be just lounging around. Most will unbuckle and remain unbuckled during the cruise portion of the flight against all common sense. Also, the attendants on those transcontinental flights will be all over the airplane as a matter of serving the customers. The cockpit crew knows those folks by name. No pilot is going to injure or kill folks he knows with a quick maneuver. Now what about the relationship between the pilots and the passengers? They're trained to treat those passengers like a loose stack of gold bricks which *must* remain stacked through take-off, cruise and landing.
 
You won't find a tenured airline pilot who routinely jostles his passengers around. The airline CEO is impervious to reason and will terminate any cockpit crew which does so, no matter what the explanation. The name of the game is "smooth" and "easy does it." The best airline pilot is the one who gets his plane up and down without any bumps and with minimum fuel consumption. Impossible? No. I was on a 747 enjoying a missile-free flight from JFK to Frankfurt. The landing was so smooth you couldn't tell the plane had touched tarmac except by looking out the window. All of the passengers looked, and, sensing we were down, spontaneously clapped and cheered. That kind of airmanship is possible, though rarely achieved. Now let's ask the hard question: Why would Mr. Batouty opt to end a stellar career *and* destroy the careers of the other members of the cockpit crew? Remember, the airline CEO is going to can the whole crew if it disturbs the passengers. Rule number one: never, never upset the passengers. There's only one scenario which would result in Flt 990's profile:
 
Airline cockpit crews observe "unidentifieds" every working day. They take those unidentifieds in stride, and usually it's only the cockpit crew who knows about them. Those crew members don't react quickly to just any unidentified simply because they see (and hear about) so many of them (from other crews which didn't report them either. This is a very closed fraternity we're talking about here). In fact, cockpit crews very seldom *ever* report unidentifieds. It's not good for the career. So yes. Mr. Batouty would take a good long time to try to identify an unidentified. He might even send folks out into the passenger spaces to attempt identification as this thing was slipping behind his aircraft. Then, following airline regulations, he'd disengage the autopilot and be prepared to take evasive action if, and only if, the need arose. At this point, he was only dealing with an object doing something strange within the limits of the vision forward his cockpit windshield allowed him. I'm guessing that Flight 990's unidentified approached from the east, got the attention of the cockpit crew, and forced them to get the attention of Mr. Batouty. Why bring Mr. Batouty into the picture? Arab custom: defer to the experience and training of someone older than you are. Mr. Batouty trained pilots. So, a good Arab flight crew would want him to see it and assess the possibility for danger to the aircraft. This sounds strange to Americans, but respect for age and authority is just another "Islamic fundamentalist" tradition. Getting the opinion of Mr. Batouty on a possible unidentified hostile makes perfect sense in the Arab tradition. The pilot and co-pilot deferred to Mr. Batouty and the co-pilot put him in his own seat. That requires a situation going on outside the aircraft worthy of analysis, not just the "standard-issue" unidentified which zips past leaving the pilot and copilot bemused.
 
[Cy] In a fighter aircraft, if an incoming missile is detected or even suspected, evasive maneuvers are called for instantly. Eight seconds is an eternity to an incoming missile. Count it out: "one thousand-one, one thousand-two, one thousand-three..."
 
[Jhan's response] What Cy states is proper procedure, actually required procedure for a fighter aircraft. Now did I ever say there was a missile threat to EgyptAir Flight 990? No. I stated quite clearly that Mr. Batouty "perceived" a threat and took evasive action based on the threat. We're getting ahead of ourselves. Let's backtrack.
 
Mr. Batouty was flying a large civilian aircraft with a lot of very well-placed personnel aboard. You don't change the operating attitude of a large civilian aircraft unless you've got very, very good reason to do so. Upsets the paying customers, who complain about the bumpiness, and that's bad for business. Mr. Batouty's thoughts at this point were not about diving. His sole intent was to identify an unidentified. Moving along...
 
If, according to the scenario I'm building, Mr. Batouty's unidentified came in from the east and slowed as it was approaching 990, Mr. Batouty no longer had an unidentified. Mr. Batouty now had an "unidentified hostile." Remember, Mr. Batouty is making the call on this 'whatsit' at the request of the normal cockpit crew. The cockpit crew have placed him there specifically to assess the threat potential. So, this unidentified now slips back behind the aircraft where the cockpit crew can't see it. This is now a serious situation, because that unidentified was slowing as it approached the aircraft. So Mr. Batouty immediately sends the other members of the crew back into the passenger spaces to confirm the position of the hostile. Their job was to observe, return, and report. He wanted to know one and only one thing, is this fellow lining himself up back behind his aircraft? Strange question for a commercial airline cockpit crew to be asking. But it makes sense in one, and only one context. A context which makes sense when an unidentified slows down and slips behind your commercial aircraft. (Mr. Batouty had now painted this as an "unidentified hostile.")
 
If you want to take down a civilian airliner, you do it the way it's always been done. You get back of the airliner and slightly below it, just like 805 (purportedly) did to KAL007 ("the target is destroyed.") This lines you up to place your heat-seekers on a straight course for one, or both, engines, depending on how many missiles you can afford for the task. Good alignment is just good tactical sense, and you get paid a bonus if you bring some missiles back.
 
A word about the "behind and slightly below" scenario. Every jet aircraft cruises slightly nose-up. So, to line-up with another aircraft, you've got to be not only behind him, but slightly below him, too. This alignment works just fine for aeriel refueling, too, which, we trust, is done with a minimum of missiles fired. Back to the missiles.
 
Like with the paper towels in the airport bathroom, the keeper of the missiles is asking himself the question: "Why use two, when one will do?" People who fire missiles at commercial aircraft are also reponsible for properly managing their resources. Now back onboard 990. Mr. Batouty sees an unidentified decelerating as it closes on his aircraft. He wants to know if this hostile is lining up behind him. He dispatches his cockpit crew to the passenger cabin. And, he just might make it easier for his spotters in back by rocking the aircraft gently about its yaw axis. (Hey NTSB! Does the FDR show this?) The passengers don't even know what's going on, thinking these two fellows have come out of the cockpit just to mingle with the paying guests. Even Arab First-Class passengers like it when the pilot and copilot come out to socialize. The two guys quickly disappear back into the cockpit, leaving some well-healed folks wondering...
 
[Cy] Jhan further states: "For one thing, a Boeing 767-300 doesn't have the lateral maneuverability of an F-16. If an evasive maneuver was required, there is only one direction which so heavy an aircraft can take very quickly, and that's down."
 
While it's very true that a Boeing 767 is not an F-16, an experienced pilot making an evasive maneuver would want to alter as many planes of direction as possible, as quickly as possible. In this case, throttle up full, possibly a dive and a hard pull to the right or left. Furthermore, a straight downward plunge risks bringing the aircraft into other aircraft traffic occupying the flight lane at lower altitudes, which further risks aircraft survivability.
 
[Jhan's reponse] Mr. Batouty doesn't want to make this maneuver. It's tearing him apart. He knows that the instant he abruptly changes the aircraft's attitude he's destroyed his career which to this point has been exemplary, and the careers of the pilot and copilot. This will totally trash the inside of the plane, result in some deaths and injure many. He doesn't want to do this. So he's going to do it as gently as possible. Nothing fancy, because in a large commercial aircraft, the tail is the weakest section. In fact, in the B-52, the tails sometimes fall off during severe turbulence. Mr. Batouty is going to make sure his equipment keeps its tail. Just a quick simple descent, so as to kill as few of the passengers as possible. He's totally torn. The miracle is, he's made this decision in just eight seconds since he's disengaged the autopilot. He also has a pretty good idea what an unidentified behind his aircraft can do to his equipment and passengers. "I've made my decision now." Makes perfect sense. Hey, don't take it out of the report to satisfy political correctness! It belongs there! "I place my faith in God." (He's never performed this maneuver before in a 767-300ER.) As he pushes the yoke forward, he knows he's destroying careers and destroying all sense of order in the passenger spaces behind him. But it has to be this way.
 
[Cy] Jhan says: "A seasoned pilot perceived a threat, pointed his aircraft down and turned off those two big engines. When you turn off those engines and point them straight down, that -65F air at flt lvl 330 cools them quickly. The object is to kill your aircraft's thermal signature before the missile kills you..."
 
It wouldn't cool them fast enough. A pilot literally has only a few seconds to react to a perceived missile threat. An experienced pilot would know that.
 
[Jhan's response] This pilot knows that, too, and is praying he doesn't take a missile up his "tailpipe" before it drops below the target acquisition circuit's heat-sensor threshold. Mr. Batouty is taking a calculated risk. At this point, he's only destroyed some careers and totally trashed the passenger spaces. The gamble appears to have paid off the first time he performed this maneuver, because his equipment remained intact for the recovery and 5,000 foot ascent.
 
[Cy] Jhan says: "To get the aircraft nose up and 5,000 feet higher required an engine restart."
 
No. Flight data recorder does not show that. Furthermore, as I have stated in a previous letter, the aircraft is inherently a lifting body. With Flight 990 at close to supersonic speeds, no additional power would be required to nose the plane back up. The pilot would just "pull up" on the yoke. I'll even go as far as to say that the aircraft may have "nosed up" by itself, because of the lift on the wings at that speed.
 
Once the aircraft does "nose up", a plane will bleed off a lot of speed and momentum.
 
[Jhan's response] Cy's right, here. So I'll concede his point. Yes, you push the nose down if you're getting into a stall, and yes, the nose will come up by itself if the the aircraft is headed down and gets up speed. That's caused by the shape of the wing. To keep the aircraft going down required Mr. Batouty and the fellow in the pilot's seat to actually push on the yoke while descending. "Help me pull" refers to his decision to *very* quickly get the nose back up before he gets his passengers wet. Again, this was a coordinated action on the part of two men in separate seats. Thus the quick ascent. So I imagine the folks at Boeing will be thrilled to know that their equipment can gain back some 5,000 feet after a quick descent, even without engines. Could the 767-300ER maintain straight and level flight for a few seconds after the aircraft got up to flt lvl 240? Possibly. The 757 is a very good glider, even fully loaded. The 767 could share many of its operational attributes.
 
[Cy] Jhan says: "The Egyptians aren't buying the fabricated suicide story and they won't buy anything less than an explanation which actually explains what happened."
 
To characterize the "suicide story" as "fabricated" at this point, shows a bias or a "spin", in my opinion. Right now, there is a lot of speculation, a lot of reporting and mis-reporting from unnamed insiders who are not saying anything on the record.
 
It seems to me that the biggest obstacle the NTSB and the FBI may face in concluding the Flight 990 investigation is the Egyptian government in denial. It would almost be funny if the final report on EgyptAir Flight 990 have to be negotiated between the Egyptian and U.S. governments to be politically correct.
 
[Jhan's response] The aircraft's flight profile, taken in an evasive-maneuver context, makes more sense than the 'suicide' story. The CVR depicts a concerted effort, not a cockpit struggle which would have certainly resulted from a suicide attempt. Arabs know exactly how to deal with stupidity and Mr. Batouty wouldn't have lasted 2 seconds if he'd been "losing it." On the other hand, "pull with me" shows some great teamwork. The rapid descent was a concerted effort. So was the partial re-ascent. I find it regrettable that the Atlantic got in the way of their second attempt to shake whatever they felt threatened by.
 
Will we ever know what they felt threatened by? Will we ever find out exactly what's on the FDR and CVR tapes? Some relevant clues are, in fact, on those tapes. Those tapes are very, very, real. Will our government do the politically-expedient thing and filter the report to match a preconceived scenario, or will they do the right thing and release all the unvarnished data, even if it most of it doesn't make any sense to Americans raised on 54 minutes of program content and 6 minutes of commercials overridden by a trip to the fridge?
 
The truth is on those tapes. Our government has the perfect opportunity to establish the trust and confidence of the nation and of the rest of the world based on how it handles this event.
 
-------
 
Dear Editor -
 
A simple analysis of the flight profile of EgyptAir Flight 990 elicits more details than would appear on the surface.
 
The man in the co-pilot's seat at nose-down, said to be Gameel El-Batouty, was a seasoned veteran with many hours of flight experience. Solving the mystery of the lost aircraft, crew and passengers then turns upon Mr. Batouty and his perceptions, and only on those perceptions. It doesn't matter what was outside the aircraft. All that matters is this man's perceptions, as he was processing the input datastream from his position within the aircraft.
 
No one in his right mind would fly a passenger plane according to the profile followed by Mr. El-Batouty. Unless he perceived a threat to his aircraft and passengers of sufficient import to warrant doing so.
 
No sane person would turn off both engines, and then proceed to fly the plane according to such a profile. Unless turning off the engines was deemed the least of two very, very, bad choices.
 
Let's recap.
 
Flight 990 was proceeding on-profile at flight level 330. The man in the captain's seat left the cockpit. The man in the co-pilot's seat left the cockpit. The man with the most flying experience was then left in charge of the plane. Interesting.
 
A bit later, Mr. Batouty disengages the autopilot, places the aircraft into a dive and then turns off both engines. Again, interesting. After a precipitous descent to flt lvl 190, two individuals finally manage to nose the aircraft up, and ascend to flt lvl 240. Again, very interesting. But for some reason, it becomes necessary to again nose the plane down, whereupon it ends up at flt lvl 000, at which point, if the FDR data is the real un-spun FDR data from the aircraft, and can be believed, the aircraft *first* loses its structural integrity.
 
What would cause a seasoned veteran flyer to maneuver his aircraft in such a fashion? Let's assume for a moment that these maneuvers were the result of a trained response to imminent threat. What would cause an experienced flyer to perceive such a threat? For our purposes it really doesn't matter. All that matters is that this experienced flyer perceived a threat.
 
The threat led him, according to his training, to do two things you'd never do with a large civilian airframe: point the nose hard down, and turn off the engines. Why nose hard-down? For one thing, a Boeing 767-300 doesn't have the lateral maneuverability of an F-16. If an evasive maneuver was required, there is only one direction which so heavy an aircraft can take very quickly, and that's down. Which still leaves us with "why turn the engines off?" Let's assume for an instant that this seasoned flyer was actually engaged in an evasive maneuver. Again, we don't know and we don't care for the moment what he was fleeing from, or if he was actually fleeing from anything. But he did nose the plane down and turn the engines off. And the only reason you'd turn the engines off in a Boeing 767-300 is if you perceived a threat which you believed would be greater leaving them on than turning them off. So, Mr. Batouty turned them off as, again, the least of two very, very bad choices available to him. Why?
 
Aircraft engines generate a lot of thrust. That's why we put those powerplants on the structures we call aircraft. But they also generate a great deal of something else along with the thrust and that's heat. Mr. Batouty obviously understood this, and turned the engines off to minimize the amount of radiated heat. Again, whether the threat was real or perceived makes no difference. Mr. Batouty followed a profile which makes sense only if you're trying to get away from something that's after you, that's looking for your thermal signature.
 
So the ultimate solution to the "mystery" of the loss of Flt 990 is no mystery at all. A seasoned pilot perceived a threat, pointed his aircraft down and turned off those two big engines. When you turn off those engines and point them straight down, that -65F air at flt lvl 330 cools them quickly. The object is to kill your aircraft's thermal signature before the missile kills you and sets your 990=007. At some point in time, he thought the threat was over. He, with help recovered the aircraft from the first dive, taking it from flt lvl 190 to flt lvl 240. To get the aircraft nose up and 5,000 feet higher required an engine restart.
 
He must have perceived the threat again, because he repeated the maneuver, once again pointing his aircraft at the only object a missile can't recover from if its following you and you're dropping below its sensor threshold. The aircraft could potentially recover from another dive if the pilot leveled it off just above the deck. A missile headed toward the water isn't going to recover from getting wet and come back out of the drink after you. And those engines were cold when the aircraft hit the deck or there would have been a burning oil slick instead of a seawater-cold slick.
 
Mr. Batouty's response followed perfectly the profile of an individual who, in response to a perceived missile threat, wished to preserve the personnel and equipment in his trust. Any pilot, perceiving the threat as Mr. Batouty did, would have followed exactly the same flight profile, even if it made for a zero-g situation. Better a messy cabin and some injured passengers than having your aircraft blown out of the sky.
 
We may never know the exact nature of the threat which Mr. Batouty perceived. But since those big planes don't have rear-view mirrors, it makes sense that some individuals left the cockpit for a time just before the nose-down. Were they looking out the windows on either side of the aircraft's passenger space trying to find whatever they thought posed a threat? We do know that sensitivity to other aircraft in your vicinity, especially those flying really close to you at night, has increased since the KAL 007 shootdown. Were the other individuals trying to identify the threat? Was Mr. Batouty gently rotating the aircraft back and forth about its yaw axis so the folks in back could have a better chance of seeing whatever may have been interpreted as "the threat?"
 
We'll never learn from the victims what transpired, or whether the threat was real. They took that knowledge into the depths with them. But we do owe it to the Egyptians to share the results of any radar data and supporting technical intelligence showing an object in the vicinity of that aircraft. The Egyptians aren't buying the fabricated suicide story and they won't buy anything less than an explanation which actually explains what happened. Right now, this is the only explanation on the street that's doing any explaining.
 
- Jhan Davis
 
 
Comment
From Cy Shinkawa <cshink@lava.net 11-21-99
 
Jeff-
 
I have problems with the "Heroically Trying To Dodge Missiles" theory.
 
There is this statement by Jhan Davis: "A bit later, Mr. Batouty disengages the autopilot, places the aircraft into a dive and then turns off both engines."
 
Actually, it is reported that the flight data recorder shows eight seconds between autopilot disconnect and the yoke being pushed forward and engine throttle down. If Mr. Batouty perceived a missile threat which caused him to disconnect the autopilot, why wait eight seconds? In a fighter aircraft, if an incoming missile is detected or even suspected, evasive maneuvers are called for instantly. Eight seconds is an eternity to an incoming missile. Count it out: "one thousand-one, one thousand-two, one thousand-three..."
 
Jhan further states: "For one thing, a Boeing 767-300 doesn't have the lateral maneuverability of an F-16. If an evasive maneuver was required, there is only one direction which so heavy an aircraft can take very quickly, and that's down."
 
While it's very true that a Boeing 767 is not an F-16, an experienced pilot making an evasive maneuver would want to alter as many planes of direction as possible, as quickly as possible. In this case, throttle up full, possibly a dive and a hard pull to the right or left. Furthermore, a straight downward plunge risks bringing the aircraft into other aircraft traffic occupying the flight lane at lower altitudes, which further risks aircraft survivability.
 
Jhan says: "A seasoned pilot perceived a threat, pointed his aircraft down and turned off those two big engines. When you turn off those engines and point them straight down, that -65F air at flt lvl 330 cools them quickly. The object is to kill your aircraft's thermal signature before the missile kills you..."
 
It wouldn't cool them fast enough. A pilot literally has only a few seconds to react to a perceived missile threat. An experienced pilot would know that.
 
Jhan says: "To get the aircraft nose up and 5,000 feet higher required an engine restart."
 
No. Flight data recorder does not show that. Furthermore, as I have stated in a previous letter, the aircraft is inherently a lifting body. With Flight 990 at close to supersonic speeds, no additional power would be required to nose the plane back up. The pilot would just "pull up" on the yoke. I'll even go as far as to say that the aircraft may have "nosed up" by itself, because of the lift on the wings at that speed.
 
Once the aircraft does "nose up", a plane will bleed off a lot of speed and momentum.
 
Jhan says: "The Egyptians aren't buying the fabricated suicide story and they won't buy anything less than an explanation which actually explains what happened."
 
To characterize the "suicide story" as "fabricated" at this point, shows a bias or a "spin", in my opinion. Right now, there is a lot of speculation, a lot of reporting and mis-reporting from unnamed insiders who are not saying anything on the record.
 
It seems to me that the biggest obstacle the NTSB and the FBI may face in concluding the Flight 990 investigation is the Egyptian government in denial. It would almost be funny if the final report on EgyptAir Flight 990 have to be negotiated between the Egyptian and U.S. governments to be politically correct.
 
-Cy Shinkawa
 
 
 
From George Belanus <gbelanus@1st.net 11-21-99
 
Mr. Rense:
 
I noted with great interest Cy Shinkawa's update to the politically incorrect story on your website. What drew my interest was the philosophical question Mr. Shinkawa postulated which has a direct bearing on the public feels would be the proper response to school shootings: namely, that even 20 years ago Americans would have no doubt been quick to take harsh and appropriate response to forestall any such mass shootings.
 
Mr. Shinkawa is very perceptive in realizing that a fundamental change in outlook has obviously afflicted the American public. I can say this because I was growing up and attending an elementary school in a small town in the northern panhandle of West Virginia some 43 years ago (I'm 53 now, and please, no crass remarks about being a dumb hillbilly when one reads the rest of this response. I've had some 20 years of news reporting experience, picked up a college degree over the years, and traveled to at least three foreign countries in these 53 years, and have managed to learn something from all those experiences).
 
The point is, I'm sure that nobody would have even thought of going into a school at the time I was growing up and opening fire indiscriminitely. It simply wasn't thought of at that time, and the climate just wasn't one that would lend itself to getting away with it even if somebody had done something like that.
 
The reason nobody would have even thought of it was that we had a much better consensus amongst the public at large then that this was unacceptable behavior and there would be any number of bad occurrences to the perpetrator if such an event would take place. And having the law get on your case in relation to such a situation would probably be the least of one's worries. A fairly good percentage of the people in that small town were armed to one extent or another and also shared in that consensus of what constituted unacceptable behavior. The local grapevine was a good one with a short travel time and I feel certain that there would have been no lack of armed volunteers for taking care of the problem at the time it was happening, regardless of whether they were aiding local area law enforcement officers in quelling the disturbance. And, failing that, I remain sure that the prevailing view at the time would have resulted in the perpetrator(s) being brought to justice and a legal penalty in the form of incarceration or other appropriate penalty being meted out would have occurred. The legal penalties no doubt would have been without the much-ballyhooed rights of defendants that have emerged in the intervening years, but I remain certain that justice would have been arrived at through the legal system vis a vis the perpetrators.
 
All in all, one was brought up in those days to not fly in the face of recognized authority, and to not go against the informal ``code'' of what proper behavior was seen to be. One certainly did not misbehave at school, for instance, or one would find oneself in the principal's office for an administering of several whacks with a large wooden paddle with holes cut in its working end, which stung more when it hit and had the psychological effect of whistling through the air on its inbound flight to one's posterior. This is probably the heart of the difference between then and now. One then was raised to go by those common rules that had been worked out over the years in this country on how persons conducted themselves as citizens. The rules were not always written down in a law book, either, hence the use of the term ``informal code.''
 
This is the big difference between then and the modern day ... then we had this common outlook of how things operated and it was generally adhered to across the board. We also had things like blatant racial discrimination and other ills which needed to be addressed and changed. Some of these things, like the discrimination, have been addressed and have, to some extent, changed over the years.
 
But not all the changes have been for the good, as this wave of school shootings is just one symptom of. I'd probably have some deeper insight into how this came about if I had a few dollops of Jack Daniels under my belt and could also type correctly, but sadly this is not the case as I type this email.
 
But I can give an approximation of the reasons for the drastic changes we have had for the worse. Many years ago I was fortunate enough to have read the book ``Something of Value,'' which was written by Robert Ruark. Ruark was a professional hunter and safari guide in Africa and had lived on that continent for some years, and did what I thought was a credible job of writing that book as a somewhat fictionalized account of the Mau Mau uprising in Kenya. How this book bears on the question at hand is how the title was arrived at ... namely, an old Swahili saying says that ``When one decides to get rid of the old ways, one must be sure to have something of value to replace them with.'' Or words to that effect. It's been some years since I've read that particular book, but the old Swahili saying still holds true.
 
Our present problem seems to be that nobody who attempted to make these sweeping changes in America over the years had apparently heard of that old saying from Africa, let alone tried to apply it. Consequently, we're faced at present with another situation best summed up by a Laurel and Hardy saying ... ``This is another fine mess you've gotten us into, Stanley.''
 
One thing for sure is that the genie has been let out of the bottle in certain ways and cannot be put back in, so that a return to the days of the 1950s is no doubt an impossbility. But perhaps it is still not too late to apply the lessons of the recent past to remedying the current situation, beginning with the one basic problem ... there has to be some way of setting up another common consensus in this country of what constitutes unacceptable behavior and making it stick. School shootings are among what could be called unacceptable behavior, with severe penalties attached to being the perpetrators of such occurrences. Gun control is another, along with the right of the people to have firearms at hand to forestall any such occurrences in really drastic cases. I never heard of the persons among us who went on sprees like this attempting such things if they felt fairly sure they'd get shot back at in the process. And this is just one ``for instance.'' The theory of a common consensus on acceptable behavior across the board, the penalties for transgressions, and how to set up a better life for this country's citizens could probably go far toward remedying a lot of the ills we face as a country at present.
 
This is still the best country on the face of the earth as far as I'm concerned, and is definitely worth salvaging despite the hard times it has come upon. How to do that is beyond me at present, with all the fragmentation in society we have at present and the current belief in confrontational rather than consensus politics. Maybe some of the listeners to the talk show and readers of the web page have some ideas on how to bring this about.
 
George Belanus
 
 
 
EgyptAir990 Flight Profiled 20 Years Ago
 
By JhanDavis@aol.com 11-22-99
 
 
Twenty years ago, theater-goers were thrilled and bedazzled as a sleek, fast passenger airliner performed acrobatics on the big screen, which, up until EgyptAir 990, hadn't been duplicated, except by high-performance fighters, such as the F-14, F-15 and F-16.
 
So get out your copy of "AIRPORT '79 -- The Concorde" and replay it. Pay particular attention to the way the cockpit crew manages the resource under their control. You won't see a lot of unnecessary talking. But you will see pure professionalism, great teamwork, a lot of factfinding requiring some members of the cockpit crew to be "out and about" and a flight profile which very closely matches that taken twenty years later by a real airliner piloted by folks who probably never received evasive-maneuver training in front of the silver screen.
 
In the movies, the cockpit crew always pulls the airliner up in time. And EgyptAir's flyers were also lucky. Once. Obviously inspired by their very solidly constructed aircraft, they didn't hesitate to put their equipment through yet another identical maneuver when they perceived a return of the threat. Only the second time around, they encountered something which the movie's script called for the 1979 cockpit crew to avoid. The Atlantic.
 
Electronic media, take the cue.
 
- Jhan Davis





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