SIGHTINGS



Another Costly Mars
Probe Apparently DOA
http://www.abcnews.go.com/wire/US/reuters19991204_1052.html
12-5-99

PASADENA, Calif. (Reuters) - Scientists on Saturday prepared tests to determine if the ominous silence of the Mars Polar Lander was caused by the spacecraft purposely turning itself off due to a minor malfunction or if the mission has been lost.
 
"We hope this is not going to be a big deal," said Laurie Leshin, a member of the mission's science team as she insisted that engineers remained upbeat about bringing the spacecraft back to life by making the first contact since it was scheduled to land safely on the Red Planet on Friday.
 
The three-legged, 639-pound lander failed to make contact with Earth in three attempts by NASA scientists on Friday.
 
Asked what happened, project manager Richard Cook said, "We just don't know." Cook said he hoped the craft had gone into a "safe mode" about 20 minutes after it had made a safe landing, explaining why it had failed to call home across 145 million miles of space.
 
He said the craft's onboard computer was programmed to go into a safe mode if one of the lander's many instruments had failed or was temporarily malfunctioning.
 
"If it was asleep, which in essence is what happens in a safe mode, then the lander would not be able to hear us when we sent instructions," Cook said.
 
The craft is programmed to stay in a safe mode for 18 hours and would not wake up until 6:30 p.m. PST on Saturday (9:30 p.m. EST).
 
A WAKE-UP CALL SCHEDULED
 
At that time, engineers at NASA's Jet Propulsion Laboratory in Pasadena will send a signal to the lander asking it if it is awake and commanding it to start scanning the Martian sky until its main antenna locks on Earth.
 
If there was to be a reply from the craft, Leshin said, it would come at about 8:30 p.m. PST on Saturday (11:30 p.m. EST).
 
She said that if the craft was still not able to receive commands, there is a built-in command sequence in the lander's onboard computer to tell it to switch to its Ultra High Frequency antenna on Sunday night and beam signals to the Mars Global Surveyor, a satellite orbiting Mars at an altitude of 250 miles.
 
If that succeeds, engineers can then order the craft to switch to backup systems to bypass whatever problems it has been having, Leshin said.
 
However, if that fails, "Then it's time to start worrying," Leshin said.
 
NASA scientists said they would continue to try to make contact after Sunday but that if there was still silence from Mars by next Thursday night, they might lose all hope for the mission.
 
The lander has a built-in clock and if it does not hear from Earth for six days it begins swapping between main and backup systems in its onboard computer and radio and then tries to contact Earth, officials said.
 
FATE OF MICROPROBES UNKNOWN
 
The plight of two grapefruit-sized microprobes that hitched a ride on the lander and then deliberately plummeted to the Martian surface, striking it at 400 miles per hour, looked even gloomier than that of the lander.
 
They have tiny, non-rechargeable batteries that could run out by Monday, officials said. The microprobes also have failed to respond to signals sent by the global surveyor. Scientists said they fear that if they do not hear anything by Monday, they will never learn the results of the experiment to learn whether delicate instruments can be protected by modern-day armor that can withstand a 400-mph impact.
 
The microprobes blasted through the Martian atmosphere on Friday for a landing in the south polar region of the planet.
 
The microprobes also were intended to compliment the lander in its search for water on Mars, seen as vital in determining whether the planet was ever capable of supporting life even in its most primitive forms. Water also is an invaluable resource for any future manned exploration of the planet.
 
There were fears that America may have lost its second space mission to Mars in three months.
 
If the lander and the two probes have been lost, it would represent a crushing blow to NASA's ambitious "faster, cheaper, better" space exploration program.
 
The Mars Climate Orbiter, a satellite and the lander's sister ship, which was to have helped its exploration of the Red Planet by acting as a relay station from the Martian surface to Earth, was lost in September through human error when scientists mixed up English and metric measurements.
 
 
 
Comment
 
By Jim Mortellaro <Jsmortell@aol.com 12-5-99
 
I graduated with a degree in Electronics Engineering from Manhattan College in 1966. While I had a number of job offers, the one I wanted very much was the one from Grumman Aircraft Engineering Corporation as it was then known, GAEC. The job was not a high paying one when I compared it with the other salary offers I received. But what clinched it for me was the work.
 
I was to be assigned to the OPG&C department, on the OAO spacecraft. Translation: Optics, Power, Guidance and Controls (OPG&C) and the Orbiting Astronomical Observatory (OAO) spacecraft. What an opportunity for a young guy straight out of college whose passion was astronomy and space. And of course, by this time, I knew straight away that I had interacted with creatures from another place, time or dimension. And the opportunity was almost a blessing.
 
A great astronomer in his own right, and a man who finally wound up working with Carl Sagan, took me under his wing. His name is Hank Courten. I hope the hell Hank is still with us, because when they made Hank, they broke the mold.
 
Hank was a biologist. Correct. He became an astronomer because his avocation was astronomy and he was damned good at it. Astronomy became his vocation. He loved it.
 
The OAO spacecraft was a stable platform from which experiments would look at the stars and study various phenomena. I recall that among others, Princeton University had an experiment on board. But in order to become a stable platform, the vehicle had to stabilize itself, look for stars which were it's target stars, lock onto them, and then reorient itself so that it's attitude was correct for the various instruments and experiments to be able to do their jobs and get the data needed for future spacecraft, such as Hubbell for example.
 
In those days (1966), we did not really know what the color temperature of the stars were. We did not even know what the actual stellar magnitudes were. In other words, a star of magnitude 2 here on the surface of the earth would be brighter once above the atmosphere. Not only that, but the "color" temperature was not known exactly, so that the photmultiplier tubes inside the star trackers may not recognize the target star. It was kind of a crap shoot. But then we knew that at the time and spent a great deal of time and money with our vendors who were making the star trackers, in an effort at working out these details to minimize the problem.
 
That was my job, initially.
 
After a while, I was assigned to the complete S&C (Stabilization and Control) system onboard OAO. I was the youngest engineer on the program and lapped it all up. There was, however, one big difference between me and the other engineers. I knew I didn't know shit. Whilst they knew they didn't know shit either, they never admitted it. So during test and integration time, when equipment was being placed on the spacecraft, the engineers would make stupid decisions which the technicians knew were wrong. But whenever a tech would make a suggestion, the engineer would usually bark at the guy and tell him to bug off.
 
Unfortunately, the technician was usually right, the engineer usually wrong and so, the turnover of engineers was high.
 
After a year or so, I was the only one left. My boss, a man named Bob Rennie whom I loved, said, "OK, kid, you're it!" Ooof! I felt that one in the gut. But the first thing I did was go to speak with the head technician. His name was Dale Jones and I shall never forget the man. I had a cup a Joe with him and said, right up front, in total innocence, "I don't know if I'm up to this job yet, aint got enough experience and I am scared shitless!"
 
He told me one thing. "Jim, listen to us when you are in doubt. We can bail your ass out and we'll all look like heroes." I told him that I would have to probably depend on him so much that all the techs would think I didn't know anything. Which was not likely, as I was the idiot who discovered one darlington pair of transistors in the Rate and Position Detection system. If that transistor failed, the spacecraft would never recover. Rate and Position Systems (RAPS) contained gyros, inertia wheels, error signals from the star trackers, dry nitrogen thrusters and a whole bunch of other stuff which, when combined, told the OAO how to get into the correct attitude.
 
This catastrophic failure modality was serious, and so I wrote a memo and sent it on down to NASA. The big wigs there decided to have a meeting about a fix to the problem and at these meetings, there were an endless number of speeches by the leading politicians who knew nothing at all (sorry NASA) about the spacecraft or it's problems. That's why they had Grumman. But they did like to make speeches.
 
So there I was, a 24 year old kid, in the presence of all my bosses at GAEC, all the NASA bigwigs, and many of the program managers from our various vendors. I recall Kollsman Instrument Corporation was there, Ball Aerospace and, of course, GE in King of Prussia Pennsylvania, where the OAO program manage had a big banner at the entrance to his office. It read, "If it works, don't change it!"
 
Good thinking.
 
Anyway, by the time all the speeches were done and the only guy who knew anything (rather, was supposed to know anything) about OAO, the head of the NASA engineering team, made his speech. I will never forget the day. Every word out of his mouth detracted from the sum total of human knowledge. And I was not happy. In fact, I was smoking Camel straights one after another and squirming in my seat. But the time came for this maroon to end his speech, which by the way, took place at NASA Goddard Spaceflight Center in Greenbelt, Maryland. He then said, "Well, are there any questions?"
 
My hand shot up into the air.
 
"Uh, what's the temperature of the sand?"
 
"Sand? Sand? What sand?" I had him confused. What the hell did sand have to do with this program? Was there something he didn't know about? He squirmed a little himself and asked again, this time, addressing the question to my boss.
 
"What sand, what temperature?"
 
And I responded, "The sand you have your head buried in! That sand!"
 
I got to keep my job and was referred to as "Little Hitler." As for my relationship with the OAO and technicians, it lasted until the launch. Never in the history of the program did an engineer last that long and never have an argument or bad words with the techs. Never. Of course they never changed the darlington pair. It was too expensive a project to retrofit and redesign the circuits. And besides, it was highly unlikely that this particular transistor would fail. Very reliable, well protected circuit.
 
Of course, the reason for the first failure was never known, but the symptoms were very much like those which would occur if this transistor set failed. Hmmm. At least we used feet in lieu of meters.
 
The second launch was more successful. The OAO settled nicely into orbit and stabilized. Unfortunately it went out of control, as I recall. But it could not have been that little device. That little darlington pair that Little Hitler almost lost his job over. Could it?
 
Nah!
 
Now, what were you guys saying about the Mars programs?
 
Jim Mortellaro
 
Note: Excerpted from a book as yet untitled, by Jim Mortellaro & Al Lehmburg on the abduction phenom... Copywrite 1999, Jim Mortellaro and Al Lehmburg


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