- One of about 5,000 members of pro-Kremlin Nashi movement
wearing cloak with portrait of President Putin
-
-
- If Time magazine had a "country of the year",
it would surely be Russia, despite its colourful competition, Iran and
Venezuela. All three have dominated headlines, tripping up the United States
in its 21st century drive for world hegemony. Venezuela held a referendum
2 December which failed by a whisker, while Russia held parliamentary elections
the same day confirming its transformation from a weak kleptocracy, servile
to US wishes, into a vigorous and confident opponent of the US.
-
- The triumph of President Vladimir Putin's United Russia
-- winning over 60 per cent to the Communists' 12, the Liberal Democratic
Party's nine and Just Russia's eight per cent -- paves the way for the
consolidation of what has been described by Ivan Krastev as "sovereign
democracy", a combination of directed democracy and nationalism, and
an antidote to the dangerous combination of populist pressure from below
and international pressure from above that destroyed the post-Communist
Ukrainian, Georgian and Kyrgyz regimes in so-called colour revolutions
over the past few years.
-
- In the regime of directed democracy that Putin inherited
from Boris Yeltsin, the newly formed post-Communist elites managed to control
the electoral process without the usual governing party of directed democracies,
such as, say, in Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Egypt and many other similar regimes.
Their moral authority derived solely from their allegiance to the liberal
democracy of the US and the international community, through various aid
programmes and pretences to "democracy building". They managed
to distract the teeming masses, feeding them "Bush legs" (the
ubiquitous cheap US chicken imports) and Western-style commercial pap.
Of the ex-Soviet countries, only Belarus managed to escape this scenario
with the election of its quirky, charismatic socialist leader Alexandr
Lukashenko.
-
- But this could hardly last forever, certainly not for
a country that inherited the heavy mantle of the Soviet Union. The backlash
to the crony capitalism and phony democracy of Yeltsin gave his appointed
successor a chance to wrest control from the powerful oligarchs, restore
the power of the state as the engine of economic and social development,
effectively nationalising the remaining elite power centres. Boris Berezovsky,
Putin's bête noire fuming in London, is a good example of the marginalisation
of the "offshore elite". Another is Mikhail Khodorkosky, in his
unfashionable striped uniform, learning to sew in a Russian jail.
-
- Yes, windfall oil revenues have been key to Russia's
rise from the ashes. And the tragedy of Chechnya continues to haunt the
Kremlin. The consolidation of the new order is due partly to luck and the
road has been rocky. But more important than oil is a powerful mass psychological
force at work. Putin's Russians -- and not only Russians, for this applies
to Tatars, Uzbeks, Georgians and dozens of other nationalities -- soon
tired of being lectured by the US as it proceeded to ignore Russia, and
as NATO swallowed up Russia's neighbours and former allies.
-
- Putin's genius was to be able to articulate the resurgence
of national pride, the return of the repressed, as people rallied to the
Soviet-style anti-imperialist standard which he hoisted. Unlike the boorish,
dipsomaniac Yeltsin, who welcomed US advisers to help him dismantle the
once powerful Soviet Union, Putin sent them packing and tapped into the
subliminal desire of the people to re-identify with a powerful state which
advocated law and order both at home and abroad.
-
- The Soviet national anthem was reinstated and people
began to take pride in their history. Putin decried the collapse of the
Soviet Union at the 60th anniversary of the victory over fascism in 2005
as "the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the century". History
books hastily written with American advisers in the 1990s were rewritten
to provide a less damning view of the Soviet past. At United Russia's eighth
party congress 1 October, Putin said a big victory for it would give him
the "moral authority" to hold the government and parliament accountable.
-
- Western liberals have reacted with feigned horror at
the elections, pointing at government control of the media, pre- election
intimidation of the liberal opposition and Soviet-style rallying around
Putin and United Russia (founded in 2001 as a merger of Fatherland -- all
Russia and the Unity Party of Russia). The OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions
and Human Rights announced it would boycott the elections, citing visa
delays. However, its Parliamentary Assembly (PA) got all the visas it asked
for (40) without any problem and sent an observer team which issued a rather
negative report 3 December, citing "merging of the state and a political
party", media bias in favour of Putin, difficulties "for new
and smaller parties to develop and compete effectively", and reports
of pre-election harassment of political parties. So the PA managed to give
the party line, so to speak.
-
- There is some truth and a certain irony to the argument
that the return of the repressed has brought with it Soviet-style repression
for those who continue to embrace Western-style liberalism. But the 1990s
experienced much worse intimidation and violence during the reign of the
robber barons. The difference was that it was private and mostly went unpunished.
It's much easier to point the finger now, but no one in their right mind
would go back to the crimes of the Yeltsin years. While the anti-Kremlin
journalist Anna Politovskaya was indeed murdered in 2006, her killers were
hunted down and prosecuted. What is important is that there are laws now
which function. And there is arguably more free thinking in Russia these
days than in the West.
-
- However, after the painful and unpredictable upheavals
resulting from the 1917 Russian revolution, the 1991 counter- revolution,
and the flirtation with Western-style liberalism in the 1990s, post-Yeltsin
Russia has developed a strong anti- revolutionism along with a fundamental
mistrust towards the two core concepts of liberal democracy -- the idea
of representation as the expression of the pluralist nature of the modern
society and the idea of popular sovereignty as the rule of the popular
will.
-
- A referendum in, say, Chechnya would no doubt advocate
independence, but it would also lead the way to the break-up of the Russian
Federation, and it is just not going to happen. A noisy parliament exacerbating
regional and ideological differences was tried and failed spectacularly
under Yeltsin. Hence creating a new political party is difficult and parliamentary
representation requires a seven per cent threshold vote. Anti-populism
and anti-pluralism characterise Russia today. "I voted for Putin because
Russia has become a strong country. I lived through that nightmare of the
Yeltsin era. It's like night and day," said Sergei Troshin after voting
for United Russia.
-
- Putin seems to thrive on populism, but it is a top-down
populism. People are sovereign here in as much as they identify with the
sovereign and vice versa, and in as much as the ruling elite in league
with him is perceived as embodying reason and the national welfare. Putin's
enormously popular phone-in meetings with citizens through live- hookup,
telephone, e-mail and text messaging are clearly a way to make sure the
people have a chance to actively identify with their sovereign.
-
- Elections are not so much an instrument for expressing
conflicting interests as for demonstrating the identity of the governors
and the governed; not so much a mechanism for representing people but for
representing and legitimating power in the eyes of the people. The concept
of sovereign democracy embodies Russia's ideological ambition to be "the
other Europe" -- an alternative to the European Union, just as the
Soviet Union was in its day, and just as Fidel Castro and Chavez's state
socialism embodies "the other Latin America" today.
-
- As enchantment with the model of liberal democracy erodes
-- just look at the farce of the current US presidential campaign -- the
attractiveness of these alternatives grows. A strong sovereign representing
the interests of the nation, backed by a loyal elite, smacks of feudalism,
but is beginning to look good in the 21st century.
- "My view is simply that the modus operandi of Russia
is enlightened conservatism," said eminent film director Viktor Mikhailkov,
an ardent supporter of Putin. "Why are people frightened of patriotism?
There's a lot of worrying among the intelligentsia about teaching the basics
of Orthodox culture. It's a hysteria. Russia needs authority. Maybe for
the so-called civilised world this sounds like nonsense. But chaos in Russia
is a catastrophe for everyone."
-
- In reply to Mikhailkov, Alexandr Gelman, a playwright
who rose to prominence during perestroika, says, "In the Soviet era
there was only one party but there were plays and books that supported
the idea of democracy. The less democracy, the more cultural figures matter.
If the tendency against democracy continues, cultural figures will gain
more influence."
-
- "Today we are successful in politics, economics,
arts, sciences, sports," trumpets the announcer in one advertisement,
accompanied by a brass band and images of Putin and other smiling Russians.
"We have reasons for pride. We enjoy respect and deference. We are
citizens of a great country, and we have great victories ahead. Putin's
plan is a victory for Russia!" Hokey maybe, but true.
-
- The problem, of course, is how power changes hands. So
far Putin has refused to pursue a constitutional amendment to allow him
a third term though there is pressure for him to do so. His push to make
United Russia the establishment party intends to guarantee stability. The
party is expected to convene on 17 December to name a candidate who will
run in the presidential elections next March. Sergei Markov, a political
analyst and United Russia member, said Putin was likely to endorse at least
two candidates.
-
- ***
- Eric Walberg is a Canadian journalist.
-
- You can reach him at
- www.geocities.com/walberg2002
-
- http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2007/874/in3.htm
|