- V. The Role of Congress
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- This Commission has recommended substantial change in
Executive Branch institutions, change that is needed if America is to retain
its ability to lead the world and to assure the nation's safety. A number
of prominent leaders have exhausted themselves and frustrated their careers
by too aggressively seeking to reform the House or Senate. The Legislative
Branch, however, must change as well.
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- It is one thing to appeal to Congress to reform the State
Department or the Defense Department, quite another to call on Congress
to reform itself. Over the years since World War II, the Legislative Branch
has been reformed and modernized much less than the Executive Branch. Indeed,
the very nature of power in Congress makes it difficult for legislators
to reform their collective institution. Yet American national security
in the 21st century, and the prominent role of daily global involvement
that is the nature of American life in our generation, mandates a serious
reappraisal of both the individual and collective efforts of Congress and
its members.
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- Such a reappraisal must begin with a shared understanding
of the Legislative Branch's role in the development and assessment of post-Cold
War foreign policy. Divided Constitutional responsibilities require the
Executive and Legislature to work together in order for U.S. foreign policy
to have coherence. Yet the Executive Branch has at times informed rather
than consulted Congress. It has often treated Congress as an obstacle rather
than as a partner, seeking Congressional input mostly in times of crisis
rather than in an ongoing way that would yield support when crises occur.
For its part, Congress has not always taken full responsibility for educating
its members on foreign policy issues. It is not often receptive to consultation
with the Executive Branch, as well, and has sustained a structure that
undermines rather than strengthens its ability to fulfill its Constitutional
obligations in the foreign policy arena.
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- Several measures are needed to address these shortcomings
and they are described below. But as an immediate first step we recommend
that:
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- · 46: The Congressional leadership should conduct
a thorough bicameral, bipartisan review of the Legislative Branch relationship
to national security and foreign policy. The Speaker of the House, the
Majority and Minority leaders of the House, and the Majority and Minority
leaders of the Senate should form a bipartisan, bicameral working group
with select staff and outside advisory panels to review the totality of
Executive-Legislative relations in the real-time global information age
we are entering. Only by having the five most powerful members of the Congress
directly involved is there any hope of real reform. They should work methodically
for one year and, by the beginning of the second session of this Congress,
they should report on proposed reforms to be implemented by the next Congress.
The President, the Vice President, the National Security Advisor, and senior
cabinet officers should work directly with this unique panel to rethink
the structure of Executive-Legislative relations in the national security
and foreign policy domains. With that as a basis, reforms can and must
be undertaken in three crucial areas: improving the foreign policy and
national security expertise of individual members of Congress; undertaking
organizational and process changes within the Legislative Branch; and achieving
a sustained and effective Executive-Legislative dialogue on national security
issues.
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- Despite the range of foreign policy challenges facing
the United States, many current members of Congress are poorly informed
in this area. Their main electoral priorities are generally within domestic
policy; foreign policy concerns are often limited to issues of concern
to special interests or to prominent ethnic groups in their districts.
Once in office, attention to foreign policy issues generally focuses on
pending votes and looming crises. To build a broad base of informed and
involved members on foreign policy issues, we recommend the following:
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- · 47: Congressional and Executive Branch leaders
must build programs to encourage individual members to acquire knowledge
and experience in both national security and foreign policy.
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- In particular, this means that:
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- · The Congressional leadership should educate
its members on foreign policy and national security matters beyond the
freshman orientation provided for new members. Such education should emphasize
Congress' foreign policy roles and responsibilities. We must reinforce
the principle of minimal partisanship on foreign policy issues: that politics
stops at the water's edge. Effective education of members will ensure a
more knowledgeable debate and better partnership with the Executive Branch
on foreign policy issues. It also will allow members to become more effective
educators of their constituencies about the importance of national security
concerns.
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- · Members should be encouraged to travel overseas
for serious purposes and each member should get letters from the President
or from the head of their body formally asking them to undertake trips
in the national interest. A concerted effort should be made to distinguish
between junkets (pleasure trips at taxpayer expense) and the serious work
that members need to undertake to learn about the world. A major effort
should be made to ensure that every new member of Congress undertakes at
least one serious trip in his or her first term, and is involved in one
or more trips each year from the second term on.
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- · Legislature-to-legislature exchanges and visits
should be encouraged and expanded. More funding and staffing should be
provided to both accommodate foreign legislators visiting the United States
and to encourage American legislators and their spouses to visit foreign
legislatures. Much is to be gained by strengthening the institutions of
democracy and by improving understanding among elected officials. This
should get a much greater emphasis and much more institutional support
than it currently does.
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- · The wargaming center at the National Defense
University should be expanded so that virtually every member of Congress
can participate in one or more war games per two- year cycle. By role-modeling
key decision-makers (American and foreign), members of Congress will acquire
a better understanding of the limits of American power, and of the reality
that any action the United States takes invariably has multiple permutations
abroad. Giving members of Congress a reason to learn about a region, about
the procedures and systems of Executive Branch decision-making, and about
crisis interactions will lead eventually to a more sophisticated Legislative
Branch. On occasion, particularly useful or insightful games should lead
to a meeting between the participating Congressmen and Senators and key
Executive Branch officials.
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- Members' increased fluency in national security issues
is a positive step but one that must be accompanied by structural reforms
that address how Congress organizes itself and conducts its business. Several
recommendations concerning Congressional structure have already been made
in this report: to create a special Congressional body to deal with homeland
security issues (recommendation 7); to consider all of the State Department's
appropriations within the Foreign Operations subcommittee (recommendation
22); and to move to a two-year budget cycle for defense modernization programs
(recommendation 31). To meet the challenges of the next quarter century,
we recommend Congress take additional steps.
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- · 48: Congress should rationalize its current
committee structure so that it best serves U.S. national security objectives;
specifically, it should merge the current authorizing committees with the
relevant appropriations subcommittees.
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- Our discussion of homeland security highlights the complexity
and overlaps of the current committee structure. The Congressional leadership
must review its structure systematically in light of likely 21st century
security challenges and of U.S. national security priorities. This is to
ensure both that important issues receive sufficient attention and oversight
and the unnecessary duplication of effort by multiple committees is minimized.
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- Such an effort would benefit the Executive Branch, as
well, which currently bears a significant burden in terms of testimony.
The number of times that key Executive Branch officials are required to
appear on the same topics in front of different panels is a minor disgrace.
At a minimum, we recommend that a public record should be kept of these
briefings and published annually. If that were done, it would become obvious
to all observers that a great deal of testimony could be given in front
of joint panels and, in some cases, bicameral joint panels. While we emphasize
the need for strong consultation with the Legislative Branch, we need a
better sense of what constitutes a reasonable amount of time that any senior
Executive Branch official should spend publicly educating Congress.
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- Specifically, in terms of committee structure, we believe
action must be taken to streamline the budgeting and appropriations processes.
In 1974, Congress developed its present budget process as a way of establishing
overall priorities for the various authorizations and appropriations committees.
Over time, however, the budget process has become a huge bureaucratic undertaking
and the authorization process has expanded to cover all spending areas.
In light of this, there is no longer a compelling rationale for separate
authorization and appropriations bills.
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- This is why we believe that the appropriations subcommittees
should be merged with their respective authorizing committees. The aggregate
committee (for example, the Senate Armed Services Committee) should both
authorize and appropriate within the same bill. This will require realigning
appropriations subcommittees. For example, appropriations relating to defense
are currently dealt with in three subcommittees (defense, military construction,
and energy and water); under this proposal, all appropriations would be
made within the Senate Armed Services Committee.
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- This approach has at least two important merits. First,
it furthers the aim of rationalizing committee jurisdiction because all
appropriating and authorizing elements relating to a specific topic are
brought within one committee. Second, it brings greater authority to those
charged with oversight as well as appropriations. In the current system,
power has shifted from the authorizing committees to the appropriating
committees with a much-narrower budgetary focus. By combining the two functions,
more effort may be paid to examining how foreign policy laws have been
implemented, what their results have been, and how policy objectives can
be better achieved. Finally, this new structure may facilitate adoption
of two-year budgeting if efforts such as those proposed for defense modernization
programs prove successful. The merged committee could authorize, in less
detail, for the two-fiscal-year period while appropriating, in greater
detail, for the first fiscal year.*146
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- If this important reform were undertaken, then the budget
committees in each house of Congress would consist of the Chairman and
ranking member of each new combined committee. As part of the budget function,
these two committees would distribute the macro-allocations contained in
the budget resolution.
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- Once Congress has gotten its own house in order, it still
remains to ensure that there is ongoing Executive-Legislative consultation
and coordination. Efforts to do so are beneficial not only so that both
branches can fulfill their Constitutional obligations but also because
effective consultation can improve the quality of U.S. policy. We have
acknowledged this, for example, in our Defense Department planning recommendation,
which defers detailed program and budget decisions until Congress has marked
up the previous year's submission.*147 Because Congress is the most representative
branch of government, Executive Branch policy that considers a range of
Congressional views is more likely to gain public support. The objections
raised by differing Congressional opinions can refine policy by forcing
the administration to respond to previously unconsidered concerns. Finally,
Congress can force the President and his top aides to articulate and explain
administration policy-so the American people and the world can better understand
it.
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- Given these benefits, efforts must be undertaken to improve
the consultative process. Indeed, a coherent and effective foreign policy
requires easy and honest consultation between the branches. The bicameral,
bipartisan panel put forward in recommendation 46 is a good first step
in this process, but additional processes must be established to ensure
that such efforts are ongoing. Therefore, we recommend the following:
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- · 49: The Executive Branch must ensure a sustained
focus on foreign policy and national security consultation with Congress
and devote resources to it. For its part, Congress must make consultation
a higher priority and form a permanent consultative group of Congressional
leaders as part of this effort.
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- A sustained effort at consultation must be based on mutual
trust, respect, and partnership and on a shared understanding of each branch's
role. The Executive Branch must recognize Congress' role in policy formulation
and Congress must grant the Executive Branch flexibility in the day-to-day
implementation of that policy. Congress must also ensure that if it is
consulted and its criticisms are taken seriously, it will act with restraint
and allow the Executive Branch to lead. For his part, the President must
convey to administration officials the importance of ongoing, bipartisan
consultation and dialogue. Efforts must not be limited to periods of crisis.
Further, administration officials should take into consideration the differences
in knowledge and perspective among members.
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- Beyond these general principles, specific mechanisms
can facilitate better consultation:
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- · Congress should create a permanent consultative
group composed of the Congressional leadership and the Chairmen and ranking
members of the main Congressional committees involved in foreign policy.
Other members with special interest or expertise could join the group's
work on certain issues. The group would meet regularly-in informal and
private sessions-with representatives of the Executive Branch. While these
may regularly be Cabinet officials, they may often be at the Under Secretary
level. This will make possible a regular dialogue with knowledgeable administration
officials, allowing the Congressional group not only to respond to crises
but to be part of the development of preventive strategies. The agenda
for these meetings would not be strictly limited, allowing members to raise
issues they are concerned about. The group would also meet on an emergency
basis whenever the President considers military action abroad or deals
with a foreign policy crisis.
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- · Beyond this interaction between the leadership
of both branches, the administration must reach out to consult with a broader
Congressional group. This will involve increasing the number of administration
representatives working to consult with Congress and assigning high-quality
people to that task. The Executive must send mid-level, as well as high-level,
officials to Capitol Hill and keep closer track of the foreign policy views
and concerns of every member of Congress. Only through such concerted efforts,
combined with the aforementioned education initiatives, will there be a
critical mass of members knowledgeable of and engaged in foreign policy
issues.
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- · Finally, in order for Congress to be most effective
in partnering with the Executive Branch, it must undertake its own consultation
with a broad group of leaders in science, international economics, defense,
intelligence, and in the high-technology, venture- capital arena. Congress
is far more accessible to this expertise than the Executive Branch and
should work to bring these insights into consultations. To do this, however,
Members of Congress need regular and direct dialogue with experts without
the screen of their staffs. The best experts in these fields are vastly
more knowledgeable than any Congressional staff member, and there needs
to be a routine system for bringing members of Congress in touch with experts
in the areas in which they will be making decisions.*48 All four parts
of the National Academies of Science should play key roles in bringing
the most knowledgeable scientists and engineers in contact with members
of the Legislative Branch.*149 Policy institutions with deep reservoirs
of expertise on defense and foreign policy, too, can help build Congressional
fluency with these issues with a measure of detachment and independent
perspective. Similar institutions need to be engaged in other areas.
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- An effective national security policy for the 21st century
will require the combined resources of the Executive and Legislative Branches.
While much of this report has rightly focused on the needs for reform within
Executive Branch structures and processes, corresponding efforts must be
undertaken for Congress. We believe that a tripartite effort focused on
the foreign policy education of members, the restructuring of the Congressional
committee system, and stronger Executive-Legislative consultative efforts
will go a long way to ensuring that the United States can meet any future
challenges.
A Final Word
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- Based on its assessment of the next 25 years (Phase I),
this Commission has devised a strategy (Phase II) and a program of reform
to aid in the achievement of that strategy (Phase III). We propose significant
change, and we know that change takes time. We also know that some proposals,
however insightful and practical they may be, are never implemented for
lack of determined leadership or appropriate method.
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- We are optimistic that the new administration and the
new Congress will pursue the recommendations made here because we believe
those recommendations are persuasive on the merits. We are also mindful
that, following the 2000 election, the opportunity for the Executive and
Legislative Branches together to concentrate on bipartisan efforts to advance
the national interest will be particularly appealing. Our recommendations,
from a Commission composed of seven Democrats and seven Republicans, fall
entirely into that category.
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- But what of a method? The President may choose any of
several models for implementing this Commission's recommendations: an independent
advisory commission overseen by the Vice President or some other senior
official; a prestigious Special Advisor working with the Executive Office
of the President; a joint Executive-Legislative commission with one co-chairman
appointed by the President and one by the House and Senate leadership;
a group of "Wise Men" drawn from former high government officials
of both parties and from the private sector; a special NSC committee; or
some combination of these possibilities.
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- The specific method adopted, however, is a secondary
matter. What is crucial is that the President create some mechanism to
ensure the implementation of the recommendations proffered here. We therefore
recommend the following:
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- · 50: The President should create an implementing
mechanism to ensure that the major recommendations of this Commission result
in the critical reforms necessary to ensure American national security
and global leadership over the next quarter century.
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- The reason this is necessary is that the President, along
with all of his top national security advisors, will be busy enough dealing
with immediate policy issues. Unless the job of implementing reform is
taken seriously, and unless the chosen mechanism designates senior officials
to be responsible and accountable for guiding reform, the momentum for
real change will quickly dissipate.
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- In our view, this would be tragic. The difference, for
example, between a properly reformed Defense Department and the one we
have today may be measured in tens of billions of dollars saved each and
every year. The difference between a more effective organization for the
Department of State and the crippled organization of today may be measured
by opportunities lost in preventing devastating crises abroad that affect
American interests and values alike. The difference between a better way
of managing science and education and the way it is done now may be measured
by the capacity for U.S. global leadership a quarter century hence. The
difference between a government personnel system that can attract and keep
the highest caliber human capital and one that cannot may be measured by
the success or failure of the full range of U.S. national security policies.
The difference between modern government organization for homeland security
and the diffuse accretion of agencies and responsibilities we have today
may be measured in tens of thousands of American lives saved or lost. The
stakes of reform are very high. This Commission has done its best to propose
serious solutions for deadly serious problems. It is now up to others to
do their best to ensure that our efforts are put to their best use for
the sake of the American people. That is a task measured in leadership.
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Appendix & Footnotes
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