The Phase III Report Of
The U.S.Commission On
National Security/21st Century
Appendix & Footnotes

The Recommendations
This appendix lists all of the Phase III Report's major recommendations in order of their presentation. The recommendations are numbered sequentially and grouped by Section. The page on which the recommendation appears in the report is noted in the box. Those recommendations in red type indicate recommendations on which Congressional action is required for implementation. Those in blue type can be implemented by Executive Order. Those in green type can be implemented by the head of an Executive Branch department or agency, or by the Congressional leadership, as appropriate.
Securing the National Homeland
1: The President should develop a comprehensive strategy to heighten America's ability to prevent and protect against all forms of attacks on the homeland, and to respond to such attacks if prevention and protection fail. (p. 11)
2: The President should propose, and Congress should agree, to create a National Homeland Security Agency (NHSA) with responsibility for planning, coordinating, and integrating various U.S. government activities involved in homeland security. They should use the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) as a key building block in this effort. (p. 15)
3: The President should propose to Congress the transfer of the Customs Service, the Border Patrol, and Coast Guard to the National Homeland Security Agency, while preserving them as distinct entities. (p. 15)
4: The President should ensure that the National Intelligence Council include homeland security and asymmetric threats as an area of analysis; assign that portfolio to a National Intelligence Officer; and produce National Intelligence Estimates on these threats. (p. 23)
5: The President should propose to Congress the establishment of an Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Security within the Office of the Secretary of Defense, reporting directly to the Secretary. (p. 23)
6: The Secretary of Defense, at the President's direction, should make homeland security a primary mission of the National Guard, and the Guard should be reorganized, properly trained, and adequately equipped to undertake that mission. (p. 25)
7: Congress should establish a special body to deal with homeland security issues, as has been done with intelligence oversight. Members should be chosen for their expertise in foreign policy, defense, intelligence, law enforcement, and appropriations. This body should also include members of all relevant Congressional committees as well as ex-officio members from the leadership of both Houses of Congress. (p. 28)
Recapitalizing America's Strengths in Science and Education
8: The President should propose, and the Congress should support, doubling the U.S. government's investment in science and technology R&D by 2010. (p. 32)
9: The President should empower his Science Advisor to establish non-military R&D objectives that meet changing national needs, and to be responsible for coordinating budget development within the relevant departments and agencies. (p. 34)
10: The President should propose, and the Congress should fund, the reorganization of the national laboratories, providing individual laboratories with new mission goals that minimize overlap. (p. 37)
11: The President should propose, and Congress should pass, a National Security Science and Technology Education Act (NSSTEA) with four sections: reduced-interest loans and scholarships for students to pursue degrees in science, mathematics, and engineering; loan forgiveness and scholarships for those in these fields entering government or military service; a National Security Teaching Program to foster science and math teaching at the K- 12 level; and increased funding for professional development for science and math teachers. (p. 41)
12: The President should direct the Department of Education to work with the states to devise a comprehensive plan to avert a looming shortage of quality teachers. This plan should emphasize raising teacher compensation, improving infrastructure support, reforming the certification process, and expanding existing programs targeted at districts with especially acute problems. (p. 43)
13: The President and Congress should devise a targeted program to strengthen the historically black colleges and universities in our country, and should particularly support those that emphasize science, mathematics, and engineering. (p. 45)
Institutional Redesign
14: The President should personally guide a top-down strategic planning process and delegate authority to the National Security Advisor to coordinate that process. (p. 48)
15: The President should prepare and present to the Congress an overall national security budget to serve the critical goals that emerge from the NSC strategic planning process. Separately, the President should continue to submit budgets for individual national security departments and agencies for Congressional review and appropriation. (p. 49)
16: The National Security Council (NSC) should be responsible for advising the President and for coordinating the multiplicity of national security activities, broadly defined to include economic and domestic law enforcement activities as well as the traditional national security agenda. The NSC Advisor and staff should resist the temptation to assume a central policymaking and operational role. (p. 50)
17: The President should propose to the Congress that the Secretary of Treasury be made a statutory member of the National Security Council. (p. 51)
18: The President should abolish the National Economic Council, distributing its domestic economic policy responsibilities to the Domestic Policy Council and its international economic responsibilities to the National Security Council. (p. 52)
19: The President should propose to the Congress a plan to reorganize the State Department, creating five Under Secretaries, with responsibility for overseeing the regions of Africa, Asia, Europe, Inter-America, and Near East/South Asia, and redefining the responsibilities of the Under Secretary for Global Affairs. These new Under Secretaries would operate in conjunction with the existing Under Secretary for Management. (p. 54)
20: The President should propose to the Congress that the U.S. Agency for International Development be consolidated into the State Department. (p. 55)
21: The Secretary of State should give greater emphasis to strategic planning in the State Department and link it directly to the allocation of resources through the establishment of a Strategic Planning, Assistance, and Budget Office. (p. 56)
22: The President should ask Congress to appropriate funds to the State Department in a single integrated Foreign Operations budget, which would include all foreign assistance programs and activities as well as all expenses for personnel and operations. (p. 58)
23: The President should ensure that Ambassadors have the requisite area knowledge as well as leadership and management skills to function effectively. He should therefore appoint an independent, bipartisan advisory panel to the Secretary of State to vet ambassadorial appointees, career and non-career alike. (p. 62)
24: The Secretary of Defense should propose to Congress a restructuring plan for the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, which would abolish the office of the Assistant Secretary for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict (SOLIC), and create a new office of an Assistant Secretary dedicated to Strategy and Planning (S/P). (p. 64)
25: Based on a review of the core roles and responsibilities of the staffs of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the military services, and the CINCs, the Secretary of Defense should reorganize and reduce those staffs by ten to fifteen percent. (p. 65)
26: The Secretary of Defense should establish a ten-year goal of reducing infrastructure costs by 20 to 25 percent through outsourcing and privatizing as many DoD support agencies as possible. (p. 66)
27: The Congress and the Secretary of Defense should move the Quadrennial Defense Review to the second year of a Presidential term. (p. 68)
28: The Secretary of Defense should introduce a new process that would require the Services and defense agencies to compete for the allocation of some resources within the overall Defense budget. (p. 69)
29: The Secretary of Defense should establish and employ a two-track acquisition system, one for major acquisitions and a second, "fast track" for a limited number of potential breakthrough systems, especially those in the area of command and control. (p. 71)
30: The Secretary of Defense should foster innovation by directing a return to the pattern of increased prototyping and testing of selected weapons and support systems. (p. 72)
31: Congress should implement two-year defense budgeting solely for the modernization element of the DoD budget (R&D/procurement) because of its long-term character, and it should expand the use of multiyear procurement. (p. 73)
32: Congress should modernize Defense Department auditing and oversight requirements by rewriting relevant sections of U.S. Code, Title 10, and the Federal Acquisition Regulations. (p. 75)
33: The Secretary of Defense should direct the DoD to shift from the threat-based 2MTW force sizing process to one which measures requirements against recent operational activity trends, actual intelligence estimates of potential adversaries' capabilities, and national security objectives as defined in the new administration's national security strategy-once formulated. (p. 76)
34: The Defense Department should devote its highest priority to improving and furthering expeditionary capabilities. (p. 78)
35: The President should establish an Interagency Working Group on Space (IWGS) at the National Security Council to coordinate all aspects of the nation's space policy, and place on the NSC staff those with the necessary expertise in this area. (p. 80)
36: The President should order the setting of national intelligence priorities through National Security Council guidance to the Director of Central Intelligence. (p. 83)
37: The Director of Central Intelligence should emphasize the recruitment of human intelligence sources on terrorism as one of the intelligence community's highest priorities, and ensure that operational guidelines are balanced between security needs and respect for American values and principles. (p. 84)
38: The intelligence community should place new emphasis on collection and analysis of economic and science/technology security concerns, and incorporate more open source intelligence into analytical products. Congress should support this new emphasis by increasing significantly the National Foreign Intelligence Program (NFIP) budget for collection and analysis. (p. 84)
The Human Requirements for National Security
39: Congress should significantly expand the National Security Education Act (NSEA) to include broad support for social sciences, humanities, and foreign languages in exchange for military and civilian service to the nation. (p. 89)
40: The Executive and Legislative Branches should cooperate to revise the current Presidential appointee process by reducing the impediments that have made high-level public service undesirable to many distinguished Americans. Specifically, they should reduce the number of Senate confirmed and non-career Senior Executive Service (SES) positions by 25 percent; shorten the appointment process; and revise draconian ethics regulations. (p. 92)
41: The President should order the overhauling of the Foreign Service system by revamping the examination process, dramatically improving the level of on-going professional education, and making leadership a core value of the State Department. (p. 95)
42: The President should order the elimination of recruitment hurdles for the Civil Service, ensure a faster and easier hiring process, and see to it that strengthened professional education and retention programs are worthy of full funding by Congress. (p. 98)
43: The Executive Branch should establish a National Security Service Corps (NSSC) to enhance civilian career paths, and to provide a corps of policy experts with broad-based experience throughout the Executive Branch. (p. 101)
44: Congress should significantly enhance the Montgomery GI Bill, as well as strengthen recently passed and pending legislation supporting benefits-including transition, medical, and homeownership-for qualified veterans. (p. 106)
45: Congress and the Defense Department should cooperate to decentralize military personnel legislation dictating the terms of enlistment/commissioning, career management, retirement, and compensation. (p. 107)
The Role of Congress
46: The Congressional leadership should conduct a thorough bicameral, bipartisan review of the Legislative Branch relationship to national security and foreign policy. (p. 110)
47: Congressional and Executive Branch leaders must build programs to encourage individual members to acquire knowledge and experience in both national security and foreign policy. (p. 111)
48: Congress should rationalize its current committee structure so that it best serves U.S. national security objectives; specifically, it should merge the current authorizing committees with the relevant appropriations subcommittees. (p. 112)
49: The Executive Branch must ensure a sustained focus on foreign policy and national security consultation with Congress and devote resources to it. For its part, Congress must make consultation a higher priority and form a permanent consultative group of Congressional leaders as part of this effort. (p. 113)
50: The President should create an implementing mechanism to ensure that the major recommendations of this Commission result in the critical reforms necessary to ensure American national security and global leadership over the next quarter century. (p. 111)
Charter of the U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century
The Department of Defense recognizes that America should advance its position as a strong, secure, and persuasive force for freedom and progress in the world. Consequently, there is a requirement to: 1) conduct a comprehensive review of the early 21st Century global security environment, including likely trends and potential "wild cards"; 2) develop a comprehensive overview of American strategic interests and objectives for the security environment we will likely encounter in the 21st Century; 3) delineate a national security strategy appropriate to that environment and the nation's character; 4) identify a range of alternatives to implement the national security strategy, by defining the security goals for American society, and by describing the internal and external policy instruments required to apply American resources in the 21st Century; and 5) develop a detailed plan to implement the range of alternatives by describing the sequence of measures necessary to attain the national security strategy, to include recommending concomitant changes to the national security apparatus as necessary. A Commission, the U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century (USCNS/21), will be established to fulfill this requirement, supported by a Study Group. Two individuals who have national recognition and significant depth of experience and public service will oversee the efforts of this Commission and serve as its Co-chairpersons. The study effort shall be conducted by a Study Group, composed of individuals who will be appointed as Department of Defense (DoD) personnel, in accordance with Section VI below. Based on the results of this study and the Commission's consideration thereof, the USCNS/21 will advance practical recommendations that the President of the United States, with the support of the Congress, could begin to implement in the Fiscal Year 2002 budget, if desired.
(a) CO-CHAIRPERSONS.- The Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and the Secretary of State, shall select two Co-chairpersons to oversee the study effort and to co-chair the U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century. The Co-chairpersons shall be prominent United States citizens, with national recognition, significant depth of experience, and prior public service.
(b) MEMBERSHIP.- The Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and the Secretary of State, shall select 15-17 individuals to serve as a board of Commissioners to the study, drawing on accomplished and prominent United States citizens and reflecting a cross-section of American public and private sector life.
(c) OPERATION.- The Commissioners shall meet at the discretion of the Co-chairpersons to provide visionary leadership and guidance for the study effort, and to consider appropriate recommendations to the Secretary of Defense and the President, based on the results of the study. The Co-chairpersons shall provide oversight for the study effort. The USCNS/21 will be chartered separately and operated as a Federal advisory committee in accordance with the Federal Advisory Committee Act (Public Law 92-463), as amended.
(d) PERIOD OF APPOINTMENT; VACANCIES.- All Commissioners shall be appointed for the life of the study effort. Vacancies shall be filled in the same manner as the original appointment, in accordance with the Commission's charter.
(a) COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW.- The study will define America's role and purpose in the first quarter of the 21st Century through an integrated analysis, and identify the national security strategy in political, economic, military, societal, and technological terms that must be implemented for America to fulfill that role and achieve its purpose. This study shall include the following:
(1) A description of the national security environments that the United States will likely encounter in the 21st Century, and an evaluation of the security threats which can be reasonably expected in political, economic, military, societal, and technological terms.
(2) A comprehensive overview of American domestic and international strategic interests and objectives for the security environment we will likely encounter in the 21st Century.
(3) Delineation of the national security strategy that must be implemented to achieve America's objectives in the 21st Century.
(4) Identification of the range of alternatives to implement the national security strategy, by defining the domestic security goals for American society, and by describing the internal and external policy instruments required to apply American resources in the 21st Century.
(5) Development of a detailed plan to implement the range of alternatives by describing the sequence of measures necessary to attain the national security strategy.
(b) MATTERS TO BE CONSIDERED.- In carrying out the study, the USCNS/21 shall develop specific findings and recommendations for each of the following:
(1) Identification of nations, supranational groups, and trends that may assist the fulfillment of U.S national security strategy.
(2) Identification of nations, supranational groups, and trends that may pose military, economic, or technological threats to fulfillment of the United States national security strategy.
(3) Identification of societal forces that enable the attainment of United States national security strategy, and recommendations to exploit those forces.
(4) Identification of societal forces that inhibit the attainment of the United States national security strategy, and recommendations to overcome those inhibitors.
(5) Identification of the roles to be played by the Armed Forces and Federal civilian agencies of the United States in attainment of the United States national security strategy.
(6) The adequacy of the current national security apparatus to meet early 21st Century security challenges, and recommendations to modify this apparatus as necessary.
(7) Examination of existing and/or required international security arrangements, to include recommendations for modification, as appropriate.
(8) Recommended course(s) of action to secure the active support of an informed American public for the implementation of our national security strategy in the 21st Century.
The USCNS/21 will accomplish its mission in three phases, as set forth below.
(a) PHASE ONE.- Phase One will examine and describe the kind of nation the United States will be in the early 21st Century and the range of likely international security environments that we can reasonably anticipate. The goal will be to establish the domestic and international contexts in which the United States will exist in the next century. The study will seek to identify the most likely domestic and international trends, taking account of less likely or "wild card" events, such as the spread of weapons of mass destruction, technological breakthroughs, natural disasters, or regime changes abroad. This phase will predict the possible international security environments with consideration of the interrelationships of the various sectors involved. Phase One will terminate with the submission by the Co-chairpersons, after consultation with the board of Commissioners, of a report to the Secretary of Defense describing the range of potential domestic and international environments as they relate to national security.
(b) PHASE TWO.- Existing national interests and objectives will be reviewed and analyzed for applicability in the early part of the next century. If appropriate, modifications will be recommended to bring the policy objectives into line with the anticipated global environment. Where necessary objectives and interests have not yet been clearly articulated for security arenas in which the United States must function in the future, the USCNS/21 will recommend appropriate objectives. These objectives should encompass all critical American security concerns. Delineation of national security strategy (or strategies) for the early part of the 21st Century will complete Phase Two of the study. A proposed strategy will be constrained by only the following factors: it must support attainment of our national security objectives, it must be acceptable to the American people, and it must be feasible within current (or projected) resource availability. (For the purposes of this study, an acceptable national security strategy is one that is reasonably consistent with the projected values and desires of the American people, taking into account the ability of confident national leaders to move public opinion in the direction of rational responses to new national challenges). The goal of Phase Two is to describe America's interests and objectives in a comprehensive, attainable, and supportable national security strategy that gives the Executive and Legislative Branches policy options for allocation of national resources and for domestic and international strategic initiatives. Phase Two will terminate upon the submission by the Co-chairpersons, after consultation with the board of Commissioners, of a report to the Secretary of Defense which meets this goal.
(c) PHASE THREE.- As needed, the USCNS/21 will propose measures to adapt existing national security structures or to create new structures where none exists. These measures must be appropriate to the range of anticipated international environments identified in Phase One and the national security objectives identified in Phase Two. Selected measures may require some modification of certain institutions, processes and structures in order to improve their relevance in the first two decades of the 2lst Century and enhance their positive impact upon the national security process. When appropriate, cost and time estimates to complete these improvements and a recommended sequence of actions will be provided. The end result of Phase Three will be an institutional road map for the early part of the 21st Century, provided as a report from the U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century to the Secretary of Defense, with detailed recommendations for each major segment of the United States government's national security apparatus.
All reports shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include classified annexes. The Secretary of Defense will transmit a copy of each report to the Congress.
(a) PHASE ONE.- The Co-chairs shall submit to the Secretary of Defense a report on Phase One of the study, as outlined in Section IV(a), not later than September 15, 1999.
(b) PHASE TWO.- The Co-chairs shall submit to the Secretary of Defense a report on Phase Two of the study, as outlined in Section IV(b), not later than April 14, 2000.
(c) FINAL REPORT.- The Co-chairs shall submit to the Secretary of Defense a final report, including assessments and recommendations and the institutional road map outlined in Section IV(c), not later than February 16, 2001.
(a) ADMINISTRATIVE AND SUPPORT SERVICES.- The U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century will be supported by the Study Group and its staff. The Study Group, as a DoD organizational element, will receive administrative and other support services from the Director, Administration and Management, including four individuals detailed to support the Study Group, consistent with the budgetary parameters established in Section VIII. Additional administrative and support services requested by the Co-chairpersons or the Executive Director (which position is provided for in paragraph (d)(1), below) in support of the USCNS/21 will be furnished by DoD as necessary and appropriate. These support requirements will be administered by the Director, Administration and Management, in conjunction with other DoD officials, as appropriate.
(b) SECURITY CLEARANCES.- Insofar as expeditious processing of personnel security clearances is essential to the timely completion of the study, DoD will expedite personnel security clearance procedures for access to classified information for Study Group personnel and staff to the extent permitted by law and Executive Order, when requested by the Executive Director.
(c) BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS APPOINTMENT AND COMPENSATION.- Commissioners of the USCNS/21, including the Co-chairpersons, who are not full-time officers or employees of the United States shall be appointed by the Secretary of Defense as special government employees. Such members may serve with or without compensation and shall be allowed travel expenses, including per diem in lieu of subsistence, in accordance with the Board's charter.
(1) EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR.- The Secretary of Defense, upon advice of the Co-chairpersons, shall select an Executive Director. The Executive Director shall be appointed to a limited term (not to exceed three years), Senior Executive Service position within DoD. The Executive Director shall supervise the Study Group and its staff, with full authority, in accordance with applicable law and regulations, and merit system principles.
(2) MEMBERSHIP.- The Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, the Secretary of State and the Executive Director, will select sufficient individuals with diverse experience and expertise to fill positions as members of the Study Group. All Study Group members shall be United States citizens with widely-recognized expertise in fields relevant to the Study Group's national security objectives. Members should be innovative and creative practitioners or strategists in their respective fields of endeavor. The Study Group members shall be appointed under an appropriate authority which allows for an assignment of a temporary duration. Terms for such appointments shall not exceed the length of the study, but may be such shorter period of time as determined by the Executive Director. Vacancies shall be filled by the Executive Director, with the approval of the Secretary of Defense.
(e) STAFF APPOINTMENT AND COMPENSATION.- The Executive Director may select for appointment as DoD employees, in accordance with paragraph VI(a), above, and applicable Civil Service laws and regulations and DoD policies, up to twelve individuals. Selectees who are not currently full time DoD military or civilian personnel will be given limited term appointments for up to the length of the study, in accordance with section VI(a) above, to support the study Group.
(f) TEMPORARY AND INTERMITTENT SERVICES.- The Executive Director may procure temporary and intermittent services under section 3109(b) of title 5, United States Code, at a rate of pay not to exceed the daily rate of pay for a GS-15, step 10 in accordance with such title.
The study will terminate not later than 30 days after the Co-chairpersons submit the final report to the Secretary of Defense, or no later than March 15, 2001, whichever is earlier.*50 SEC.

Except as provided herein, the operating costs of the study, including the compensation, travel, and per diem allowances for the Commissioners and the Study Group members and staff, will be paid by the Department of Defense. The overall cost for this project (excluding the cost of the four detailees described in section VI(a) above) may not exceed $10.44 Mil, without prior approval by the Secretary of Defense or designee. These funds are expected to be obligated as follows: FY 1999-$1.43 Mil; FY 1999-$3.76 Mil; FY 2000-$3.73 Mil; and FY 2001-$1.52 Mil. William S. Cohen, Secretary of Defense SEPT 2, 1999

*1 Disclaimer: This Commission has striven successfully to achieve consensus on all major issues, and each Commissioner stands by all the major recommendations made in this report. However, as is to be expected when discussing complex issues, not every Commissioner agrees completely with every statement in the text that follows.
*2 See Appendix 3 for Commissioner biographies and a staff listing.
*3 Publication consisted of two documents: Major Themes and Implications and Supporting Research and Analysis.
*4 All of this Commission's reports may be found on its web page at
*5 See Appendix 2 for the full text of the Charter.
*6 The recommendations are listed together in Appendix 1, pp. 118-123.
*7 See New World Coming, p. 4, and the Report of the National Defense Panel, Transforming Defense: National Security in the 21 st Century (Washington, DC: December 1997), p. 17.
*8 See International Crime Threat Assessment (Washington, DC: The White House, December 2000).
*9 Note in this regard Stephen E. Flynn, "Beyond Border Control," Foreign Affairs (November/December 2000).
*10 See the Report of the Interagency Commission on Crime and Security in U.S. Seaports (Washington, DC: Fall 2000).
*11 See the Report of the U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform (Washington, DC: 1997).
*12 See Report of the Interagency Task Force on U.S. Coast Guard Roles and Missions, A Coast Guard for the Twenty First-Century (Washington, DC: December 1999).
*13 We return to this problem below in Section IV.
*14 The Chief Information Officer Council is a government organization consisting of all the statutory Chief Information Officers in the government. It is located within OMB under the Deputy Director for Management.
*15 We return to this issue in our discussion of the Intelligence Community in Section III.F., particularly inrecommendation 37.
*16 See also the Report of the National Defense University Quadrennial Defense Review 2001 Working Group (Washington, DC: Institute for National Strategic Studies, November 2000), p. 60.
*17 Sponsored by Senators Sam Nunn and Richard Lugar.
*18 See Public Law 104-201, National Defense Authorization Act for FY 1997: Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction. This legislation, known as the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Amendment, was passed in July 1996.
*19 We note: the Rumsfeld Commission [Report of the Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States (Washington, DC: July 15, 1998)]; the Deutch Commission [Combating Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (Washington, DC: July 14, 1999)]; Judge William Webster's Commission [Report on the Advancement of Federal Law Enforcement (Washington, DC: January 2000)]; the Bremer Commission [Report of the National Commission on Terrorism, Countering the Changing Threat of International Terrorism (Washington, DC: June 2000)]; and an advisory panel led Virginia Governor James Gilmore [First Annual Report to the President and the Congress of the Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction (Washington, DC: December 15, 1999)].
*20 The Defense Production Act was developed during the Korean War, when shortages of critical natural resources such as coal, oil, and gas were prioritized for national defense purposes. [See Defense Production Act of 1950, codified at 50 USC App. § 2061 et seq. Title I includes delegations to prioritize and allocate goods and services based on national defense needs.] Executive Order 12919, National Defense Industrial Resources Preparedness, June 6, 1994, implements Title I of the Defense Production Act. Congressional review should focus on the applicability of the Defense Production Act to homeland security needs, ranging from prevention to restoration activities. Section 706 of the Communications Act of 1934 also needs revision so that it includes the electronic media that have developed in the past two decades. [See 48 Stat. 1104, 47 USC § 606, as amended.] Executive Order 12472, Assignment of National Security and Emergency Preparedness Telecommunications Functions, April 3, 1984, followed the breakup of AT&T and attempted to specify anew the prerogatives of the Executive Branch in accordance with the 1934 Act in directing national communications media during a national security emergency. It came before the Internet, however, and does not clearly apply to it.
*21 For more than four years, multiple institutions have called on national leadership to support laws and policies promoting security cooperation through public-private partnerships. See, for example, the President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection, Critical Foundations, Protecting America's Infrastructures (Washington, DC: October 1997), pp. 86-88 and Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Information Warfare (Washington, DC: November 1996).
*22 This includes substantial efforts in multiple forums, such as the Council of Europe and the G8, to fight transnational organized crime. See Communiqué on principles to fight transnational organized crime, Meeting of the Justice and Interior Ministers of the Eight, December 9-10, 1997.
*23 This is why it is not possible to establish a direct correlation between educational achievement and either productivity or economic growth indices. For the last two decades, for example, U.S. educational achievements have lagged behind those of many other countries even as U.S. productivity and growth measures have outdistanced them.
*24 The President's FY2001 budget allocates U.S. government research monies to its major players as follows: 43 percent NIH, 12 percent NASA, 12 percent DOE, 11 percent DoD, 8 percent NSF, 4 percent USDA, 10 percent all others. See AAAS Report XXV, Research and Development FY2001 (Washington, DC: American Association for the Advancement of Science, 2000), pp. 35. These are research budget figures only, not total R&D accounts.
*25 There is, in addition, a Federally-Funded Research and Development Center mandated by Congress-the Critical Technologies Institute located within RAND-that acts as a think-tank for the OSTP. It plays a useful role and should be preserved, but it cannot substitute for a more capable OSTP itself.
*26 We believe that the creation of a counterintelligence "czar," announced by the out-going Clinton Administration on January 4, 2001, is a step in the right direction for this purpose. But proper inventory stewardship is a precondition for such a "czar" to be effective.
*27 Founded in 1863 by Abraham Lincoln, the National Academy of Sciences today consists of four parts: the National Academy of Science, the National Academy of Engineering, the Institute of Medicine, and the National Research Council. The NAS advises the government, but it is not a government organization.
*28 Research accounts for approximately ten percent of DoD's $38 billion R&D budget for fiscal year 2001. See AAAS Report XXV, Research and Development FY 2001, p. 71.
*29 About 43 percent of the labs' physical facilities is more than 40 years old, and 73 percent is more than twenty years old.
*30 National Commission on Mathematics and Science Teaching for the 21st Century, Before It's Too Late (Washington, DC: September 27, 2000), p. 12.
*31 Ibid., p. 21.
*32 U.S. Department of Education, National Center for Education Statistics, 1993-1994 Schools and Staffing Survey (Teacher Questionnaire) (Washington, DC: 1997), p. 26.
*33 National Science Board, Science and Engineering Indicators-1998 (Arlington, VA: National Science Foundation, 1998), p. A-36.
*34 We discuss these shortages and their implications for government below in Section IV.
*35 This is because the majority of public school teachers are currently in their forties, with the normal retirement age being around 65 years old. U.S. Department of Education, National Center for Education Statistics, "Schools and Staffing Survey."
*36 In 1995, the Third International Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS) ranked the performance of American 12th graders in general mathematics and science knowledge among the lowest of all participating countries. Americans placed 19th out of 21 in general mathematics and 17th out of 21 in general science. In advanced mathematics and physics knowledge, American 12th graders placed 15th out of 16 in mathematics and dead last in physics. In all content areas of physics and advanced mathematics, the American students' performance was among the lowest of all the nations participating in the TIMSS. Some observers question the utility of these tests on the grounds that in many other countries only the brightest students take the test because children are separated into vocational and college tracks at an early age. Most believe, however, that the test results are instructive of general trends
*37 See Diana Jean Schemo, "Students in U.S. Do Not Keep Up in Global Tests," The New York Times, December 6, 2000, pp. A1, A18.
*38 The National Academy of Sciences/National Research Council, through its Center for Science, Mathematics, and Engineering Education, has completed the Defense Reinvestment Initiative (DRI) funded by the Department of Defense. The program worked with the Los Angeles Unified School District to build a model for the transition of professional scientists, mathematicians, and engineers from military duty, defense-related and aerospace industries, and national laboratories into careers teaching secondary school science and mathematics. See the Final Report to the U.S. Department of Defense on the Defense Reinvestment Initiative, Defense Reinvestment Initiative Advisory Board, National Research Council, 1999.
*39 As recommended by the National Academy of Science in Attracting Science and Mathematics Ph.Ds to Secondary School Education (Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 2000).
*40 The Eisenhower Professional Development Program (Title II of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act, as amended by the Improving America's Schools Act of 1994) focuses on the professional development of mathematics and science teachers. See U.S. Department of Education, Office of the Under Secretary, Planning and Evaluation Service, Designing Effective Professional Development: Lessons from the Eisenhower Program, Executive Summary (Washington, DC: 1999)
*41 "ETS Report Discusses Teacher Quality," NSTA Reports, Dec. 2000-Jan. 2001, p. 11.
*42 Before It's Too Late, pp. 19, 26-30.
*43 National Writing Project, 1999 Annual Report.
*44 In lieu of or in addition to raising salaries, which may be restricted in some places by issues of inter- jurisdictional equity and union complications, signing bonuses can be used to attract people to teaching. 45 We note the successful example of the Long Beach Unified School District. Over the past five years, it has partnered with California State University Long Beach (CSULB), and Long Beach City College, in collaboration with additional local, regional, and national partners, to developed a seamless (preK-18) approach that has aligned content standards, learning methodology, and assessment from pre-school through the masters level. The aim is to ensure coherent exit and entry expectations among the three institutions. They have collaborated to address curriculum, preparation, and professional development issues as well.
*45: Congress and the Defense Department should cooperate to decentralize military personnel legislation dictating the terms of enlistment/commissioning, career management, retirement, and compensation.
*46 Two-year budgeting specifically for DoD modernization accounts would entail authorization and appropriation for both fiscal years simultaneously, if our recommendation 31is adopted.
*47 See the discussion on page 69 following recommendation 28.
*48 A problem well described years ago in C.P. Snow, Science and Government (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1961).
*49 Note 5 in Section II, on page 34, lists these four constituent parts.
*50 The termination date of the study was moved to July 31, 2001 in October 2000.
*51 Today, the Function 150 budget categories are defined in terms of titles such as Export and Investment Assistance, Bilateral Economic Assistance, Military Assistance, and Multilateral Economic Assistance. More purposeful titles should be put in their place; e.g., economic development or international security.
*52 New World Coming, p. 38.
*53 The Commission supports the recommendation of the Overseas Presence Advisory Panel to upgrade immediately the State Department's information and communications technologies by providing all overseas staff with Internet access, e-mail, a secure unclassified Internet website, and shared applications, permitting unclassified communications among all agencies around the globe. See The Report of the Overseas Presence Advisory Panel, America's Overseas Presence in the 21 st Century (Washington, DC: November 1999), p. 7.
*54 The Overseas Presence Advisory Panel made this recommendation in November 1999. The Panel concluded that significant savings are achievable from right-sizing U.S. embassies; e.g., a ten percent reduction in all agencies' staff would save almost $380 million annually. The Secretary of State has taken steps to implement this recommendation.
*55 Many studies have endorsed such principles, including GAO studies in 1976, 1978, 1996, 1999, and 2000, as well as the Rockefeller Committee, the Rice Report, the Packard Commission, the Senate Armed Services Committee study leading up to Goldwater-Nichols, the Commission on Roles and Missions, the Hicks & Associates study, the Defense Reform Initiative, and the BENS (Business Executives for National Security) Tail-to-Tooth Commission.
*56 We are speaking only of these specific staff roles, not of DoD civilian personnel in general. We are aware that, in this more general category, there has been a reduction of approximately 35 percent since 1990.
*57 At the same time, our discussion of the Civil Service in Section IV.D, specifically in recommendation 42, calls for a ten to fifteen percent personnel float to allow for adequate professional training should be introduced in civilian staff offices within OSD. In other words, while we advocate cutting staff slots by ten to fifteen percent, the actual number of civilian employees working in OSD staffs may not change significantly.
*58 Infrastructure is defined as non-combat activities and support services that commonly operate from fixed locations (e.g., installation support, central training, central medical, central logistics, acquisition infrastructure, central personnel, and central command, control, and communications.)
*59 Outsourcing combines government ownership with private contracting. Privatization means reducing or eliminating government ownership and getting DoD out of the process of competing with private industry. Outsourcing can achieve ten percent savings; privatization may achieve savings of up to twenty percent in some sectors.
*60 Commissaries and exchanges would still exist, but they would be privately owned and operated.
*61 Goldwater-Nichols mandated the National Security Strategy as a way for the President to describe the country's broad national security directions. Required by law every January, the NSS is habitually late, and its objectives and goals have never been prioritized. By this Commission's definition, the NSS is not a "strategy" document because it fails to relate ends to means.
*62 In our discussion of Presidential appointments in Section IV, we recommend shortening this period.
*63 Note the Services and defense agencies must identify "programs" not "funds." Otherwise they will stretch programmed procurement to free budget year "funds," but increase future unit costs by doing so.
*64 See John Harbison, Thomas Moorman Jr., Michael Jones, and Jikun Kim, "U.S. Defense Industry Under Siege-An Agenda for Change," Booz-Allen & Hamilton Viewpoint, July 2000; "Preserving a Healthy and Competitive U.S. Defense Industry to Ensure our Future National Security," Defense Science Board Task Force briefing to USCNS/21, June 2000; "U.S. Space Industrial Base Study," DoD and NRO Co-sponsored Study by Booz-Allen & Hamilton, briefed to USCNS/21, June 2000; "The National Crisis in the Defense Industry," study briefed by the Scowcroft Group and DFI International to USCNS/21, June 2000.
*65 In DoD acquisition jargon, the period from requirement definition to production of a weapon system is referred to as its "cycle time."
*66 It might be appropriate for the revised FARs to test a modified version of the award fee process tied to schedule, cost, and performance. This discretionary award could range from a higher-than-present level to a moderately negative level. The determining evaluation would be based upon separate periodic input from the program manager, the contractor, and outside auditors who would advise either the Service acquisition official or an independent board with authority to determine the fee.
*67 While the military departments have never defined the term MTW, we infer it to require all forms of military capability (land, sea, air) on the scale equivalent to the Gulf War or that envisioned in the past for North Korea.
*68 New World Coming, pp. 53-4, and Seeking a National Strategy, p. 9.
*69 A National Security Strategy for a New Century (Washington, DC: The White House, December 1999),pp. 12.
*70 This is how the 1999 DoD promulgated space policy defined space superiority.
*71 See Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Space Superiority (Washington, DC: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology, February 2000.)
*72 The Outer Space Treaty bans only the deployment of weapons of mass destruction in space, and the ABM Treaty only limits interference with national means of verification with respect to arms control agreements. Meanwhile, even the United Nations Charter, in Article 51, states explicitly that no nation is precluded from taking appropriate defensive measures in any environment.
*73 Recent or ongoing examinations of space issues include: Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Space Superiority (Washington, DC: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology, February 2000); "U.S. Space Industrial Base," Booz-Allen Hamilton report to the NRO and DoD, June 2000; and the Congressionally-mandated "Commission to Assess United States National Security Space Management and Organization."
*74 The representation of relevant agencies would be achieved through their departments; e.g., FAA representation through the Department of Transportation, and that of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) through the Department of Commerce.
*75 A more detailed definition of space architecture includes: the on-orbit force structure and missions; configurations to include type of sensors, on-board processing, and dissemination; ground control systems and downloading/processing capabilities; frequency spectrum use and deconfliction; multi-mission capabilities; and system protection measures and security requirements.
*76 The national Future Imagery Architecture [FIA] is sponsored by the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO).
*77 The NRO is responsible for satellite, constellation, and ground operations design and acquisition; NIMA is responsible for imagery product development and dissemination.
*78 The NSSA currently reports to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence ASD(C3I) for DoD-related issues, and coordinates with the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (DDCI) and the DDCI for Collection Management on intelligence-related issues.
*79 The primary elements would come from the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD(AT&L)), and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Computers, and Intelligence (ASD(C3I)). In essence ASD(C3I) would transfer the proposed reorganization.
*80 New World Coming, p. 130.
*81 Seeking a National Strategy, p. 9.
*82 Panel on Civic Trust and Citizen Responsibility, A Government to Trust and Respect: Rebuilding Citizen-Government Relations for the 21 st Century (Washington, DC: National Academy of Public Administration, 1999), p. iii.
*83 Seeking a National Strategy, p. 9.
*84 Our model is the National Defense Education Act of the late 1950s and 1960s, which provided loan forgiveness incentives for those willing to serve in the military or teach in schools with disadvantaged students or in disadvantaged areas. That act provided scholarships to those studying hard sciences and mathematics, as well as those studying critical foreign languages where the country at large confronted significant deficiencies.
*85 National Security Education Act 1991 (Public Law 102-183-December 4, 1991.)
*86 The Marine Corps PLC scholarship program is similar to the ROTC program, but is not affiliated with a particular learning institution and is not tied to an actual cadre unit at a specific school.
*87 A limited version of this loan reduction concept is currently under development in a portion of the Civil Service. See "Proposed Rules-Repayment of Student Loans", Federal Register, June 22, 2000, pp. 38791- 38794.
*88 Paul C. Light and Virginia L. Thomas, The Merit and Reputation of an Administration: Presidential Appointees on the Appointments Process (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution and The Heritage Foundation, April 28, 2000), p. 3.
*89 Norman Ornstein and Thomas Donilon, "The Confirmation Clog," Foreign Affairs, November/December 2000, p. 91.
*90 Defense Science Board, Final Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Human Resources Strategy (Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, February 2000), p. 41.
*91 Ornstein and Donilon, p. 89.
*92 Defense Science Board, p. D-6.
*93 The recently-rescinded Executive Order 12834, signed by President Clinton on January 20, 1993, his first day in office, extended to five years the previous one-year ban on an ex-official's appearance before his or her former agency. This restriction was placed on the most senior presidential appointees. All former employees face certain limitations, but Senate-confirmable employees paid at the EL-V or EL-IV level (and non-career SES appointees whose salaries fall within this range) face additional regulations potentially very harmful to their post-service careers. Under Executive Order 12834, they could not lobby their former agency for five years, while other appointees are restricted only for one year. See Defense Science Board, p. D-7 and the relevant section of the U.S. Code, 18 USC §207.
*94 Defense Science Board, pp. 42-43. 95 Ibid., p. 43.
*96 Ibid., p. 44.
*97 Ornstein and Donilon, p. 97. We also advocate accelerating the appointment process for the 80 key science and technology personnel in government. See Section II above, and Science and Technology in the National Interest: The Presidential Appointments Process, National Academies of Science, June 30, 2000. The 80 positions of which we speak are listed on p. 8.
*98 Ornstein and Donilon, p. 94.
*99 Ibid., p. 95.
*100 Former FBI (and CIA) Director William Webster has noted that these files are "often freighted with hearsay, rumor, innuendo, and unsubstantial allegations." Quoted in ibid., p. 95.
*101 According to the National Center for Education Statistics, 30 to 35 percent of students at three different grade levels performed below the "basic" level of civics knowledge. 38 percent at the 4 th grade level, 41 percent at the 8 th grade level, and 59 percent at the 12 th grade level performed below the "basic" level of U.S. history knowledge. Roughly 30 percent of students at all grade levels performed below the "basic" level in geography.
*102 There are indications that retention may be a looming concern as well. According to data provided by the State Department, while most Foreign Service entering classes have shown attrition rates between 12 and 17 percent by the eighth year of service, two recent classes show figures at 23 and 32 percent. These indications are not conclusive but they are supported by two major studies on departmental talent management, one completed by McKinsey & Company for the department and the other by the Overseas Presence Advisory Panel. Both found that while qualified applicants valued faster advancement and greater autonomy, it is precisely those things, along with quality management and respect for their family situations, they found lacking once in the Foreign Service.
*103 The State-commissioned report by McKinsey & Company, The War for Talent: Maintaining a Strong Talent Pool, emphasized that for the State Department to sustain its talent base, it must improve talent management. The final report of the Overseas Presence Advisory Panel built on McKinsey's finding and highlighted that "private sector managers were almost twice as likely as public-sector managers to give high performers the best development opportunities and fast-track growth. More than 70 percent of the private-sector managers viewed motivating and attending to people as a prime priority, while less than 30 percent of State Department managers interviewed considered it a top priority." [Overseas Presence Advisory Panel, p. 52.]
*104 Ibid., p. 55.
*105 The Commission considers personnel from the Departments of State (excluding the Foreign Service), Defense, Commerce, Justice, and Treasury and members of the Intelligence Community to constitute the core national security members of the Civil Service. Members of the Intelligence Community, however, are governed by separate personnel regulations and authorities.
*106 On the general question, compare the pessimistic study led by Paul Volcker [The National Commission on the Public Service, Leadership for America: Rebuilding the Public Service (Washington, DC: The National Commission on the Public Service, 1989)] with the more optimistic assessment of Joel D. Aberbach and Bert A. Rockman [In the Web of Politics: Three Decades of the U.S. Federal Executive (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2000).]
*107 U.S. Office of Personnel Management, The Fact Book: Federal Civilian Workforce Statistics (Washington, DC: Office of Personnel Management, September 1999).
*108 U.S. Office of Personnel Management and Senior Executives Association, Survey of Senior Executive Service (Washington, DC: Office of Personnel Management, 1999); United States General Accounting Office, Senior Executive Service: Retirement Trends Underscore the Importance of Succession Planning (Washington, DC: General Accounting Office, May 2000), p. 2. This latter document offers startling figures for individual departments: 77 percent of those at the Department of Commerce, 74 percent of those at the Department of Defense, and 71 percent of those at the Department of the Treasury will be eligible for regular retirement by 2005, (p. 46).
*109 The Office of the Secretary of Defense has received between 100 and 140 applications each year since 1997 for six to eight open PMI positions. Data provided by the OSD, July 7, 2000.
*110 Booz-Allen & Hamilton, Inc., Employee Recruitment and Retention Survey Results, August 30, 2000, pp. 33.
*111 CIO Council, Meeting the Federal IT Workforce Challenge (Washington, DC: CIO Council, June 1999), p. 15.
*112 Ibid., p. 11.
*113 Data provided by the National Security Agency.
*114 Examples include recruitment and retention bonuses, the use of special pay scales for specific types of professionals, and pay banding whereby agencies would have greater flexibility in allocating personnel funds among employees of different quality and skills. New regulations currently under review at OPM would allow departments to repay federally funded student loans by $6,000 a year up to a maximum of $40,000. See "Proposed Rules-Repayment of Student Loans."
*115 Overseas Presence Advisory Panel, p. 55.
*116 The Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) currently has the authority and funding to conduct a five-year pilot program through which he can hire up to 39 technical specialists in critical functions and pay them on the basis of market standards rather than on the federal pay scale. The Federal Bureau of Investigation has a similar program.
*117 CIO Council, p. 13. On the CIO Council, see note 14 in Section I.
*118 Ibid., p. 15.
*119 The recent NSA outsourcing is estimated to save the government $1 billion over the ten-year life of the contract. See ibid., p. A29.
*120 Seeking A National Strategy, p. 14.
*121 For example, a recent OPM survey of SES personnel indicates that only nine percent of those surveyed have changed jobs to work in another agency since becoming an SES member, despite the fact that 45 percent said that mobility would improve job performance. See U.S. Office of Personnel Management and Senior Executives Association, pp. 27-8.
*122 For example, departments might designate that personnel must hold one assignment outside his or her parent department in order to become a member of the SES and another such assignment to be promoted to SES-4. [SES pay scales are numbered one through six. An additional rotation is suggested for promotion to SES-4 because this is the pay grade at which many SES members serve during their final tours, when they generally have the highest level of responsibility for interagency activities.]
*123 Data provided by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, showing both active and reserve recruiting results, July 2000. See also William S. Cohen, Annual Report to the President and the Congress (Washington DC: Department of Defense, 2000), chapter 4.
*124 Statement of the Honorable Rudy De Leon, Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness) before the Military Personnel Subcommittee of the Armed Service Committee, "Sustaining the All-Volunteer Force: Military Recruiting and Retention," March 8, 2000.
*125 Department of Defense, Quarterly Readiness Report to Congress, January-March 2000.
*126 Some numbers illustrate the problem. The Navy is nine hundred pilots short of necessary levels, while the Air Force reported the largest peacetime pilot shortage in its history (1,200 pilots short of operational requirements). The Air Force pilot loss rate is projected to double by 2002 [William Taylor, S. Craig Moore, and C. Robert Roll, Jr., The Air Force Pilot Shortage: A Crisis for Operational Units? (Washington, DC: RAND, 2000, pp. iii and 1]. Over the past ten years, the Army has experienced a 58 percent increase in the percentage of Captains voluntarily leaving the military before promotion to Major [Information Paper TAPC-ARI-PS, October 22, 1999]. High-quality junior officers are also leaving military service earlier. In 1987, 38 percent of the Army's West Point graduates left military service before ten years of active duty-the best retention rate among all Army commissioning sources. In 1999, 68 percent of West Point graduates left before the ten-year point, the lowest retention rate among all Army commissioning sources. [DMDC West DoD Officer Retention Data, July 2000, verified by Army Personnel Branch, July 2000]. High-quality Lieutenant Colonels/Colonels and their Navy equivalents (O-5s and O-6s who have had Department/Battalion/Squadron/Ship-level commands in their careers) are leaving early, as well. The Navy reports that both post-department officers and post-squadron Commanders are separating at a rate three times higher than a decade ago.
*127 See "Spring 1999 Sample Survey of Military Personnel: Career Intent," U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences Survey Report, October 1999.
*128 Garnered from ten-year point junior officer retention data provided by Defense Manpower Data Center to USCNS/21, July 2000.
*129 DOPMA Public Law 96-513.
*130 Those Majors/Lieutenant Commanders not selected for promotion must normally retire at twenty years; Lieutenant Colonels and Navy Commanders must retire at 28 years if not selected for promotion to Colonel/Captain; Colonels, and Navy Captains have until the 30-years point to make promotion to flag officer rank before mandatory retirement; and most flag officers that remain in grade have a 35-year limit of commissioned service. It should be noted that most Colonels/Navy Captains know by the time of their promotion to O-6 whether they have a chance at further promotion. Most do not, and the incentives currently in place encourage those officers to retire at the earliest possible time. The result is a significant talent drain of officers who, under the current system, could have served at least five or six additional years.
*131 Charles Moskos, Military Recruitment Survey, Northwestern University Students," report prepared for
the Commission, March 2000.
132 See DOPMA Public Law 96-513 §3202, 8202, 5444, 5442.
*133 Military Retirement Act of 1986 (Public Law 99-348). This authorizes military benefits for personnel after twenty years of service at 40 percent of their five years' highest basic pay. Effective October 1, 1999, the Military Retirement Act of 1986 (REDUX), U.S. Code, Title 10, §1409(b), was repealed by the National Defense Authorization Act 1999 (Public Law 106-65; U.S. Code, Title 10, §1409 (b) which restored to the military service members who entered military service after July 31, 1986, 50 percent of the highest three years average basic pay for twenty years of active duty service, rather than 40 percent under REDUX. Also, it provided for full cost of living adjustments (COLAs) rather than the Consumer Price Index (CPI) minus one percentage point under REDUX.
*134 There is 2.5 percent increase in the retirement percentage of base pay for each year of service past twenty years, which stops at 30 years. In addition, 26 years of service is where the last bi-yearly longevity salary increase occurs.
*135 DOPMA Public Law 96-513, §633 requires that Lt. Colonels and Navy Commanders who are not listed for promotion to the next higher grade be retired upon completion of 28 years of active commissioned service.
*136 Half-pay is a term of art referring to the fact that after twenty years' service, a soldier is entitled to 50 percent of pay upon retirement. Since a soldier would get half pay even if he were not still in service, staying in service can be characterized as working for the other 50 percent-hence the phrase "working for half pay."
*137 See Bernard Rostker, Harry Thie, James L. Lacy, Jennifer H. Kawata, and S.W. Purnell, The Defense Officer Personnel Management Act of 1980: A Retrospective (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1993).
*138 Defense Science Board, p. 79
*139 The program is administered by the Veterans Administration, under agreements with the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Transportation, who submit an annual request to Congress detailing the necessary appropriations. Funds are transferred to the Veterans Administration from the Department of Defense Education Benefits Fund administered by the Treasury Department, or from appropriations made to the Department of Transportation in the case of the Coast Guard .
*140 See Veterans Administration web site October 2000, Summary of Educational Benefits under the Montgomery GI Bill Active Duty Educational Assistance Program, Chapter 30 of Title 38 U.S. Code and Selected Reserve Educational Assistance Program Chapter 1606 of Title 10 U.S. Code. Active duty servicemen and women can elect a $100/month reduction in pay for twelve months in exchange for up to 36 months of educational entitlements. The maximum entitlement rate is $552 per month. However, servicemen do not necessarily receive the full $552. Monthly rates are calculated according to the cost of tuition. Recipients are entitled to a full 36 months of benefits, not the compounded total of $552 for 36 months. Reservists do not contribute $100 per month, but receive a maximum of only $263 per month. Bill S1402, currently pending Presidential approval, would increase the Active Duty Rate to $650 per month in educational entitlements. In the event of death, the $1,200 reduction in pay is refunded, but benefits are non-transferable.
*141 The College Board, Trends in College Pricing 2000. The College Board report indicates 2000-01 annual costs for a commuter student at a public four-year institution is $9,229 and $7,024 for a two-year institution. This far exceeds the current maximum GI Bill entitlement of $552 per month for active duty members.
*142 The double pass over rule refers to officers who have been in the primary zone for promotion to the next higher grade but who have been passed over for promotion for two consecutive years. Once such officers are passed over twice, they become subject to DOPMAs mandatory "up-or-out" exit flowpoints.
*143 In 1964 senior enlisted leader (E-8s) pay was by comparison to junior enlisted (E-2's) pay a 7:1 ratio. With the pay increases associated with the All-Volunteer Force, the ratio of senior to junior enlisted pay is currently 3:1. In other words, in relation to the junior personnel they supervise, senior enlisted service members are paid significantly less than senior NCOs were in the draft military. In addition, the advent of large enlistment and reenlistment bonuses for junior enlisted personnel menas that ratio of senior to junior enlisted pay has compressed even further.
*144 This resulted from increased taxes paid by veterans who achieved higher incomes made possible by college education.
*145 About one-third of all recruits do not complete their initial military obligation.
*146 Two-year budgeting specifically for DoD modernization accounts would entail authorization and appropriation for both fiscal years simultaneously, if our recommendation 31is adopted.
*147 See the discussion on page 69 following recommendation 28.
*148 A problem well described years ago in C.P. Snow, Science and Government (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1961).
*149 Note 5 in Section II, on page 34, lists these four constituent parts.
*150 The termination date of the study was moved to July 31, 2001 in October 2000.
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