Feds Ruling On Importing Cow/Cow Products To US

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Feds Ruling On Importing Cow/Cow Products To US From Terry S. Singeltary Sr flounder9@verizon.net 9-18-7
Subject: [Docket No. APHIS-2006-0041] RIN 0579-AC01 BSE, MRR; Importation of
Live Bovines and Products Derived From Bovines; FINAL RULE
Date: September 18, 2007 at 8:19 am PST

Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Minimal-Risk Regions; Importation of
Live Bovines and Products Derived From Bovines; Final Rule

[[Page 53314]]

-------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE

Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service

9 CFR Parts 93, 94, 95, and 96

[Docket No. APHIS-2006-0041]
RIN 0579-AC01

Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Minimal-Risk Regions;
Importation of Live Bovines and Products Derived From Bovines

AGENCY: Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, USDA.

ACTION: Final rule.

----------------------------

SUMMARY: We are amending the regulations regarding the importation of animals and animal products to establish conditions for the importation of the following commodities from regions that present a minimal risk of introducing bovine spongiform encephalopathy into the United States: Live bovines for any use born on or after a date determined by the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service to be the date of effective enforcement of a ruminant-to-ruminant feed ban in the region of export; blood and blood products derived from bovines; and casings and part of the small intestine derived from bovines. We are making these amendments after conducting a risk assessment and comprehensive evaluation of the issues and concluding that such bovines and bovine products can be safely imported under the conditions described in this rule. This document also removes the delay in applicability of certain provisions of a final rule published in January 2005.

DATES: Effective Date: November 19, 2007.

snip... see full text here, you need to read this BSe, you can see just how this administration writes it's own science. ...tss

http://a257.g.akamaitech.net/7/257/2422/01jan20071
800/edocket.access.gpo.gov/2007/07-4595.htm

IN A NUTSHELL

(Adopted by the International Committee of the OIE on 23 May 2006)

11. Information published by the OIE is derived from appropriate declarations made by the official Veterinary Services of Member Countries. The OIE is not responsible for inaccurate publication of country disease status based on inaccurate information or changes in epidemiological status or other significant events that were not promptly reported to then Central Bureau............

http://www.oie.int/eng/Session2007/RF2006.pdf

Audit Report
Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service
Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) Surveillance Program - Phase II
and
Food Safety and Inspection Service

Controls Over BSE Sampling, Specified Risk Materials, and Advanced Meat
Recovery Products - Phase III

Report No. 50601-10-KC January 2006

Finding 2 Inherent Challenges in Identifying and Testing High-Risk Cattle
Still Remain

http://www.usda.gov/oig/webdocs/50601-10-KC.pdf

Report to Congressional Requesters:
February 2005:
Mad Cow Disease:

FDA's Management of the Feed Ban Has Improved, but Oversight Weaknesses
Continue to Limit Program Effectiveness:

[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-101]:

http://www.gao.gov/htext/d05101.html

http://www.gao.gov/highlights/d05101high.pdf

January 2002 MAD COW DISEASE Improvements in the Animal Feed Ban and
Other Regulatory Areas Would Strengthen U.S. Prevention Efforts GAO-02-183

http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d02183.pdf

BIO-RAD BSE TEST POLITICAL REPLY TO TSS

Subject: FSIS NOTICE SAMPLE COLLECTION FROM CATTLE UNDER THE BOVINE
SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY (BSE)
ONGOING SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM
From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr."
Reply-To: Sustainable Agriculture Network Discussion Group
Date: Fri, 2 Feb 2007 17:32:58 -0600

Subject: Re: USDA/APHIS JUNE 2004 'ENHANCED' BSE/TSE COVER UP UPDATE
DECEMBER 19, 2004 USA
Date: Thu, 30 Dec 2004 12:27:06 -0600
From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr.

BSE-L

snip...

OH, i did ask Bio-Rad about this with NO reply to date;

-------- Original Message --------
Subject: USA BIO-RADs INCONCLUSIVEs
Date: Fri, 17 Dec 2004 15:37:28 -0600
From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr."
To: susan_berg@bio-rad.com

Hello Susan and Bio-Rad,

Happy Holidays!

I wish to ask a question about Bio-Rad and USDA BSE/TSE testing
and there inconclusive. IS the Bio-Rad test for BSE/TSE that complicated,
or is there most likely some human error we are seeing here?

HOW can Japan have 2 positive cows with
No clinical signs WB+, IHC-, HP- ,
BUT in the USA, these cows are considered 'negative'?

IS there more politics working here than science in the USA?

What am I missing?

-------- Original Message --------
Subject: Re: USDA: More mad cow testing will demonstrate beef's safety
Date: Fri, 17 Dec 2004 09:26:19 -0600
From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr."
snip...end

Experts doubt USDA's mad cow results

snip...END

WELL, someone did call me from Bio-Rad about this, however it was not Susan Berg. but i had to just about take a blood oath not to reveal there name. IN fact they did not want me to even mention this, but i feel it is much much to important. I have omitted any I.D. of this person, but thought I must document this ;

Bio-Rad, TSS phone conversation 12/28/04

Finally spoke with ;

Bio-Rad Laboratories
2000 Alfred Nobel Drive
Hercules, CA 94547
Ph: 510-741-6720
Fax: 510-741-5630
Email: XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

at approx. 14:00 hours 12/28/04, I had a very pleasant phone conversation with XXXX XXXXX about the USDA and the inconclusive BSE testing problems they seem to keep having. X was very very cautious as to speak directly about USDA and it's policy of not using WB. X was very concerned as a Bio-Rad official of retaliation of some sort. X would only speak of what other countries do, and that i should take that as an answer. I told X I understood that it was a very loaded question and X agreed several times over and even said a political one.

my question;

Does Bio-Rad believe USDA's final determination of False positive, without WB, and considering the new atypical TSEs not showing positive with -IHC and -HP ???

ask if i was a reporter. i said no, i was with CJD Watch and that i had lost my mother to hvCJD. X did not want any of this recorded or repeated.

again, very nervous, will not answer directly about USDA for fear of retaliation, but again said X tell me what other countries are doing and finding, and that i should take it from there. "very difficult to answer"

"very political"

"very loaded question"

outside USA and Canada, they use many different confirmatory tech. in house WB, SAF, along with IHC, HP, several times etc. you should see at several talks meetings (TSE) of late Paris Dec 2, that IHC- DOES NOT MEAN IT IS NEGATIVE. again, look what the rest of the world is doing. said something about Dr. Houston stating; any screening assay, always a chance for human error. but with so many errors (i am assuming X meant inconclusive), why are there no investigations, just false positives? said something about ''just look at the sheep that tested IHC- but were positive''. ...

TSS

-------- Original Message --------
Subject: Your questions
Date: Mon, 27 Dec 2004 15:58:11 -0800
From: To: mailto:flounder@wt.netflounder@wt.net

Hi Terry:

............................................

snip Let me know your phone
number so I can talk to you about the Bio-Rad BSE test.
Thank you

Regards

Bio-Rad Laboratories
2000 Alfred Nobel Drive
Hercules, CA 94547
Ph: 510-741-6720
Fax: 510-741-5630
Email:

snip...end...TSS

TSS REPORT ON 2ND TEJAS MAD COW Mon, 22 Nov 2004 17:12:15 -0600 (the one
that did NOT get away, thanks to the Honorable Phyllis Fong)

-------- Original Message -------- Subject: Re: BSE 'INCONCLUSIVE' COW from
TEXAS ???
Date: Mon, 22 Nov 2004 17:12:15 -0600
From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr."
To: Carla Everett
References: [log in to unmask]
[log in to unmask] us

Greetings Carla,still hear a rumor;

Texas single beef cow not born in Canada no beef entered the food chain?

and i see the TEXAS department of animal health is ramping up forsomething, but they forgot a url for update?I HAVE NO ACTUAL CONFIRMATION YET...can you confirm???terry

==============================
==============================

-------- Original Message -------- Subject: Re: BSE 'INCONCLUSIVE' COW from
TEXAS ???
Date: Fri, 19 Nov 2004 11:38:21 -0600
From: Carla Everett
To: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr."
References: [log in to unmask]

The USDA has made a statement, and we are referring all callers to the USDA web site. We have no informationabout the animal being in Texas. CarlaAt 09:44 AM 11/19/2004, you wrote:Greetings Carla,i am getting unsubstantiated claims of this BSE 'inconclusive' cow is fromTEXAS. can you comment on this either way please?thank you,Terry S. Singeltary Sr.

===================

===================

-------- Original Message -------- Subject: Re: BSE 'INCONCLUSIVE' COW from
TEXAS ???
Date: Mon, 22 Nov 2004 18:33:20 -0600
From: Carla Everett
To: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr."
References: [log in to unmask]
[log in to unmask] us
[log in to unmask] [log in to unmask]
us [log in to unmask]

our computer department was working on a place holder we could postUSDA's announcement of any results. There are no results to be announced tonightby NVSL, so we are back in a waiting mode and will post the USDA announcementwhen we hear something.At 06:05 PM 11/22/2004, you wrote:why was the announcement on your TAHC site removed?Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy:November 22: Press Release title here star image More BSE informationterry Carla Everett wrote: no confirmation on the U.S.' inconclusive test... no confirmation on location of animal.

==========================
==========================

THEN, 7+ MONTHS OF COVER-UP BY JOHANN ET AL! no doubt about it now $$$

NO, it's not pretty, hell, im not pretty, but these are the facts, take em or leave em, however, you cannot change them.

with kindest regards,

I am still sincerely disgusted and tired in sunny Bacliff, Texas USA 77518

Terry S. Singeltary Sr.

FULL 130 LASHINGS TO USDA BY OIG again

http://www.usda.gov/oig/webdocs/50601-10-KC.pdf

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
Statement
May 4, 2004
Media Inquiries: 301-827-6242
Consumer Inquiries: 888-INFO-FDA

Statement on Texas Cow With Central Nervous System Symptoms On Friday, April 30 th , the Food and Drug Administration learned that a cow with central nervous system symptoms had been killed and shipped to a processor for rendering into animal protein for use in animal feed.

FDA, which is responsible for the safety of animal feed, immediately began an investigation. On Friday and throughout the weekend, FDA investigators inspected the slaughterhouse, the rendering facility, the farm where the animal came from, and the processor that initially received the cow from the slaughterhouse.

FDA's investigation showed that the animal in question had already been rendered into "meat and bone meal" (a type of protein animal feed). Over the weekend FDA was able to track down all the implicated material. That material is being held by the firm, which is cooperating fully with FDA.

Cattle with central nervous system symptoms are of particular interest because cattle with bovine spongiform encephalopathy or BSE, also known as "mad cow disease," can exhibit such symptoms. In this case, there is no way now to test for BSE. But even if the cow had BSE, FDA's animal feed rule would prohibit the feeding of its rendered protein to other ruminant animals (e.g., cows, goats, sheep, bison).

FDA is sending a letter to the firm summarizing its findings and informing the firm that FDA will not object to use of this material in swine feed only. If it is not used in swine feed, this material will be destroyed. Pigs have been shown not to be susceptible to BSE. If the firm agrees to use the material for swine feed only, FDA will track the material all the way through the supply chain from the processor to the farm to ensure that the feed is properly monitored and used only as feed for pigs.

To protect the U.S. against BSE, FDA works to keep certain mammalian protein out of animal feed for cattle and other ruminant animals. FDA established its animal feed rule in 1997 after the BSE epidemic in the U.K. showed that the disease spreads by feeding infected ruminant protein to cattle.

Under the current regulation, the material from this Texas cow is not allowed in feed for cattle or other ruminant animals. FDA's action specifying that the material go only into swine feed means also that it will not be fed to poultry.

FDA is committed to protecting the U.S. from BSE and collaborates closely with the U.S. Department of Agriculture on all BSE issues. The animal feed rule provides crucial protection against the spread of BSE, but it is only one of several such firewalls. FDA will soon be improving the animal feed rule, to make this strong system even stronger.

####

http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/news/2004/NEW01061.html

http://lists.ifas.ufl.edu/cgi-bin/wa.exe?A2=ind0702&L=sanet-mg&P=720

THE USDA JUNE 2004 ENHANCED BSE SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM WAS TERRIBLY FLAWED ;

CDC DR. PAUL BROWN TSE EXPERT COMMENTS 2006

The U.S. Department of Agriculture was quick to assure the public earlier this week that the third case of mad cow disease did not pose a risk to them, but what federal officials have not acknowledged is that this latest case indicates the deadly disease has been circulating in U.S. herds for at least a decade.

The second case, which was detected last year in a Texas cow and which USDA officials were reluctant to verify, was approximately 12 years old.

These two cases (the latest was detected in an Alabama cow) present a picture of the disease having been here for 10 years or so, since it is thought that cows usually contract the disease from contaminated feed they consume as calves. The concern is that humans can contract a fatal, incurable, brain-wasting illness from consuming beef products contaminated with the mad cow pathogen.

"The fact the Texas cow showed up fairly clearly implied the existence of other undetected cases," Dr. Paul Brown, former medical director of the National Institutes of Health's Laboratory for Central Nervous System Studies and an expert on mad cow-like diseases, told United Press International. "The question was, 'How many?' and we still can't answer that."

Brown, who is preparing a scientific paper based on the latest two mad cow cases to estimate the maximum number of infected cows that occurred in the United States, said he has "absolutely no confidence in USDA tests before one year ago" because of the agency's reluctance to retest the Texas cow that initially tested positive.

USDA officials finally retested the cow and confirmed it was infected seven months later, but only at the insistence of the agency's inspector general.

"Everything they did on the Texas cow makes everything USDA did before 2005 suspect," Brown said. ...snip...end

http://www.upi.com/

CDC - Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy and Variant Creutzfeldt ...
Dr. Paul Brown is Senior Research Scientist in the Laboratory of Central
Nervous System ... Address for correspondence: Paul Brown, Building 36, Room
4A-05, ...

http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/eid/vol7no1/brown.htm

PAUL BROWN COMMENT TO ME ON THIS ISSUE

Tuesday, September 12, 2006 11:10 AM

"Actually, Terry, I have been critical of the USDA handling of the mad cow issue for some years, and with Linda Detwiler and others sent lengthy detailed critiques and recommendations to both the USDA and the Canadian Food Agency." ........TSS

BRITISH MEDICAL JOURNAL

SOMETHING TO CHEW ON

BMJ

http://www.bmj.com/cgi/eletters/319/7220/1312/b#EL2

BMJ

http://www.bmj.com/cgi/eletters/320/7226/8/b#EL1

THE PATHOLOGICAL PROTEIN

BY Philip Yam

CHAPTER 14 LAYING ODDS

Answering critics like Terry Singeltary, who feels that the U.S. under- counts CJD, Schonberger conceded that the current surveillance system has errors but stated that most of the errors will be confined to the older population.

http://www.thepathologicalprotein.com/

INTRODUCTION

http://www.thepathologicalprotein.com/_wsn/page3.html

Yam Philip Yam News Editor Scientific American http://www.sciam.comwww.sciam.com
http://www.thepathologicalprotein.com/

EXPORTATION AND IMPORTATION OF ANIMALS AND ANIMAL PRODUCTS:
BSE; MRR AND IMPORTATION OF COMMODITIES, 65758-65759 [E6-19042]

OIE SELLS THERE SOUL TO THE DEVIL

http://lists.ifas.ufl.edu/cgi-bin/wa.exe?A2=ind0701&L=sanet-mg&T=0&P=3854

http://lists.ifas.ufl.edu/cgi-bin/wa.exe?A2=ind0611&L=sanet-mg&T=0&P=3381

http://lists.ifas.ufl.edu/cgi-bin/wa.exe?A2=ind0703&L=sanet-mg&T=0&P=498

http://lists.ifas.ufl.edu/cgi-bin/wa.exe?A2=ind0702&L=sanet-mg&T=0&P=10277

http://lists.ifas.ufl.edu/cgi-bin/wa.exe?A2=ind0701&L=sanet-mg&T=0&P=9972

http://lists.ifas.ufl.edu/cgi-bin/wa.exe?A2=ind0703&L=sanet-mg&T=0&P=4492

http://lists.ifas.ufl.edu/cgi-bin/wa.exe?A2=ind0703&L=sanet-mg&T=0&P=2583

http://lists.ifas.ufl.edu/cgi-bin/wa.exe?A2=ind0703&L=sanet-mg&T=0&P=2470

Docket No. 03-080-1 -- USDA ISSUES PROPOSED RULE TO ALLOW LIVE ANIMAL
IMPORTS FROM CANADA

snip...

In recent correspondence, the Director General of the OIE acknowledged that there has been an "increase in unjustified restrictions in international trade, particularly as it relates to cattle and cattle products." The letter was in response to a request from Secretary Veneman, Agricultural Minister Lyle Vanclief, Canada, and Agriculture Secretary Javier Usabiaga, Mexico, to the OIE to provide more practical guidance regarding the resumption of trade with countries that have reported cases of BSE.

IF THE OIE CHANGES BSE/TSE GUIDELINES NOW (as weak as they are), just because the USA, Canada and Mexico does not like them. then all the work all other countries have done to erradicate this horrible disease from the planet over the last 3 decades will go for naught, and the agent will continue to spread...

Terry S. Singeltary Sr.
P.O. Box 42
Bacliff, Texas USA 77518

https://web01.aphis.usda.gov/BSEcom.nsf/0/b78ba677e2b0c12185256dd300649f9d?OpenDocument&AutoFramed

Importation of Whole Cuts of Boneless Beef from Japan [Docket No. 05-004-1]
RIN 0579-AB93 TSS SUBMISSION

----- Original Message -----
From: Terry S. Singeltary Sr.
To: docket.oeca@epa.gov ;
delores.b.johnson@aphis.usda.gov
Sent: Thursday, August 25, 2005 9:16 AM
Subject: Importation of Whole Cuts of Boneless Beef from Japan [Docket No.
05-004-1] RIN 0579-AB93 TSS SUBMISSION

Greetings Dr. Colgrove and Miss Johnson,

Thank you for taking this submission via email. i have had trouble submitting via the comment page due to the length of my submission. I was not sure that my file attachment that i submitted via the ;

EDOCKET: Go to
http://www.epa.gov/feddocket

I submitted yesterday, just did not know if the file reached anyone. so to make sure, I am sending to you to submit for me.

many thanks,

Terry

From: TSS ()
Subject: Importation of Whole Cuts of Boneless Beef from Japan [Docket No.
05-004-1] RIN 0579-AB93 TSS SUBMISSION
Date: August 24, 2005 at 2:47 pm PST

August 24, 2005

Importation of Whole Cuts of Boneless Beef from Japan [Docket No. 05-004-1]
RIN 0579-AB93 TSS SUBMISSION

Greetings APHIS ET AL,

My name is Terry S. Singeltary Sr.

I would kindly like to comment on [Docket No. 05-004-1] RIN 0579-AB93 ;

PROPOSED RULES
Exportation and importation of animals and animal products:
Whole cuts of boneless beef from-
Japan,
48494-48500 [05-16422]

[Federal Register: August 18, 2005 (Volume 70, Number 159)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Page 48494-48500]
From the Federal Register Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]
[DOCID:fr18au05-7]

========================================================================

snip...

WE MUST ADHERE TO THE BSE GBR RISK ASSESSMENTS, WE MUST WORK TO ENHANCE THOSE BSE GBR RISK ASSESSMENTS TO INCLUDE ALL ANIMAL TSEs, USDA/APHIS/GW ET ALs BSE MRR (Minimal Risk Region) should be REPEALED/DISBANDED/TRASHED/NADA and done away with for good. The BSE MRR policy is nothing more than a legal tool to trade all strains of TSEs globally...

Terry S. Singeltary Sr.

P.O. Box 42

Bacliff, Texas USA 77518

Your Comment with Title "[Docket

http://docket.epa.gov/edkfed/do/EDKStaffItemDetailView?objectId=090007d480993808

http://docket.epa.gov/edkfed/do/EDKStaffAttachDownloadPDF?objectId=090007d480993808

http://docket.epa.gov/edkfed/do/EDKStaffCollectionDetailView?objectId=0b0007d48096b40d

Subject: BSE; MRR; IMPORTATION OF LIVE BOVINES AND PRODUCTS DERIVED FROM
BOVINES [Docket No. APHIS-2006-0041] RIN 0579-AC01
Date: January 9, 2007 at 9:08 am PST

[Federal Register: January 9, 2007 (Volume 72, Number 5)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Page 1101-1129]
From the Federal Register Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]
[DOCID:fr09ja07-21]

[[Page 1101]]

-------------------------------

snip...

EFSA Scientific Report on the Assessment of the Geographical BSE-Risk (GBR) of the United States of America (USA)

Summary of the Scientific Report

The European Food Safety Authority and its Scientific Expert Working Group on the Assessment of the Geographical Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) Risk (GBR) were asked by the European Commission (EC) to provide an up-to-date scientific report on the GBR in the United States of America, i.e. the likelihood of the presence of one or more cattle being infected with BSE, pre-clinically as well as clinically, in USA. This scientific report addresses the GBR of USA as assessed in 2004 based on data covering the period 1980-2003.

The BSE agent was probably imported into USA and could have reached domestic cattle in the middle of the eighties. These cattle imported in the mid eighties could have been rendered in the late eighties and therefore led to an internal challenge in the early nineties. It is possible that imported meat and bone meal (MBM) into the USA reached domestic cattle and leads to an internal challenge in the early nineties.

A processing risk developed in the late 80s/early 90s when cattle imports from BSE risk countries were slaughtered or died and were processed (partly) into feed, together with some imports of MBM. This risk continued to exist, and grew significantly in the mid 90's when domestic cattle, infected by imported MBM, reached processing. Given the low stability of the system, the risk increased over the years with continued imports of cattle and MBM from BSE risk countries.

EFSA concludes that the current GBR level of USA is III, i.e. it is likely but not confirmed that domestic cattle are (clinically or pre-clinically) infected with the BSE-agent. As long as there are no significant changes in rendering or feeding, the stability remains extremely/very unstable. Thus, the probability of cattle to be (pre-clinically or clinically) infected with the BSE-agent persistently increases.

http://www.efsa.europa.eu/en/science/tse_assessments/gbr_assessments/573.html

http://www.efsa.europa.eu/etc/medialib/efsa/science/tse_assessments/
gbr_assessments/573.Par.0004.File.dat/sr03_biohaz02_usa_report_v2_en1.pdf

EFSA Scientific Report on the Assessment of the Geographical BSE-Risk (GBR)
of Canada

Summary of the Scientific Report

The European Food Safety Authority and its Scientific Expert Working Group on the Assessment of the Geographical Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) Risk (GBR) were asked to provide an up-to-date scientific report on the GBR in Canada, i.e. the likelihood of the presence of one or more cattle being infected with BSE, pre-clinically as well as clinically, in Canada. This scientific report addresses the GBR of Canada as assessed in 2004 based on data covering the period 1980-2003.

The BSE agent was probably imported into the country middle of the eighties and could have reached domestic cattle in the early nineties. These cattle imported in the mid eighties could have been rendered in the late eighties and therefore led to an internal challenge in the early 90s. It is possible that imported meat and bone meal (MBM) into Canada reached domestic cattle and led to an internal challenge in the early 90s.

A certain risk that BSE-infected cattle entered processing in Canada, and were at least partly rendered for feed, occurred in the early 1990s when cattle imported from UK in the mid 80s could have been slaughtered. This risk continued to exist, and grew significantly in the mid 90's when domestic cattle, infected by imported MBM, reached processing. Given the low stability of the system, the risk increased over the years with continued imports of cattle and MBM from BSE risk countries.

EFSA concludes that the current GBR level of Canada is III, i.e. it is confirmed at a lower level that domestic cattle are (clinically or pre-clinically) infected with the BSE-agent. As long as the system remains unstable, it is expected that the GBR continues to grow, even if no additional external challenges occur.

http://www.efsa.europa.eu/en/science/tse_assessments/gbr_assessments/564.html

http://www.efsa.europa.eu/etc/medialib/efsa/science/tse_assessments/gb

r_assessments/564.Par.0001.File.dat/sr02_biohaz02_canada_report_v2_en1.pdf

snip...

MY personal belief, since you ask, is that not only the Canadian border, but the USA border, and the Mexican border should be sealed up tighter than a drum for exporting there TSE tainted products, until a validated, 100% sensitive test is available, and all animals for human and animal consumption are tested. all we are doing is the exact same thing the UK did with there mad cow poisoning when they exported it all over the globe, all the while knowing what they were doing. this BSE MRR policy is nothing more than a legal tool to do just exactly what the UK did, thanks to the OIE and GW, it's legal now. and they executed Saddam for poisoning ???

go figure....

Terry S. Singeltary Sr.
P.O. Box 42
Bacliff, Texas USA 77518

Comment Submitted
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Thank you. Your comment on Document ID: APHIS-2006-0041-0001 has been sent.
Comment Tracking Number: APHIS-2006-0041-DRAFT-0028

Attachments:
C:\My Music\My Documents\APHIS-2006-0041_January 28.doc

If you wish to retain a copy of the receipt, use the following link to print
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http://lists.ifas.ufl.edu/cgi-bin/wa.exe?A2=ind0701&L=sanet-mg&T=0&F=&S=&P=3854

18 January 2007 - Draft minutes of the SEAC 95 meeting (426 KB) held on 7
December 2006 are now available.

snip...

64. A member noted that at the recent Neuroprion meeting, a study was presented showing that in transgenic mice BSE passaged in sheep may be more virulent and infectious to a wider range of species than bovine derived BSE.

Other work presented suggested that BSE and bovine amyloidotic spongiform encephalopathy (BASE) MAY BE RELATED. A mutation had been identified in the prion protein gene in an AMERICAN BASE CASE THAT WAS SIMILAR IN NATURE TO A MUTATION FOUND IN CASES OF SPORADIC CJD.

snip...

http://www.seac.gov.uk/minutes/95.pdf

3:30 Transmission of the Italian Atypical BSE (BASE) in Humanized Mouse

Models Qingzhong Kong, Ph.D., Assistant Professor, Pathology, Case Western Reserve University

Bovine Amyloid Spongiform Encephalopathy (BASE) is an atypical BSE strain discovered recently in Italy, and similar or different atypical BSE cases were also reported in other countries. The infectivity and phenotypes of these atypical BSE strains in humans are unknown. In collaboration with Pierluigi Gambetti, as well as Maria Caramelli and her co-workers, we have inoculated transgenic mice expressing human prion protein with brain homogenates from BASE or BSE infected cattle. Our data shows that about half of the BASE-inoculated mice became infected with an average incubation time of about 19 months; in contrast, none of the BSE-inoculated mice appear to be infected after more than 2 years.

***These results indicate that BASE is transmissible to humans and suggest that BASE is more virulent than classical BSE in humans.***

6:30 Close of Day One

http://www.healthtech.com/2007/tse/day1.asp

SEE STEADY INCREASE IN SPORADIC CJD IN THE USA FROM
1997 TO 2006. SPORADIC CJD CASES TRIPLED, with phenotype
of 'UNKNOWN' strain growing. ...

http://www.cjdsurveillance.com/resources-casereport.html

There is a growing number of human CJD cases, and they were presented last week in San Francisco by Luigi Gambatti(?) from his CJD surveillance collection.

He estimates that it may be up to 14 or 15 persons which display selectively SPRPSC and practically no detected RPRPSC proteins.

http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/ac/06/transcripts/1006-4240t1.htm

http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/ac/06/transcripts/2006-4240t1.pdf

Subject: MAD COW BASE H-TYPE AND L-TYPE
Date: August 23, 2007 at 11:30 am PST

http://lists.ifas.ufl.edu/cgi-bin/wa.exe?A2=ind0708&L=sanet-mg&T=0&P=19779

REMEMBER, both Canadan and USA have had atypical BSE documented. ...TSS

and H-type cases identified in a number of European countries and North America.

SEAC July 2007

References

1SEAC 97 discussion papers available at
http://www.seac.gov.uk/agenda/agen100507.htm

http://lists.ifas.ufl.edu/cgi-bin/wa.exe?A2=ind0708&L=sanet-mg&T=0&P=19779

Where has atypical BSE been found?

Although the greatest number of cases is in France(12), increasing numbers of cases have now been identified in other countries Canada (1), Germany (2), Italy (2), Japan (2), Netherlands (4), Poland (7), Sweden (1), Switzerland (1), UK (1), and USA (2). In Sweden and the USA the atypical cases represent the only indigenous cases detected. In other words typical BSE has not been detected in native cattle in these two countries (34). In France, Poland, Netherlands and Germany both H and L forms of atypical BSE have been reported(25).

http://www.tseandfoodsafety.org/position_papers/TAFS_POSITION_
PAPER_ON_ATYPICAL_SCRAPIE_AND_%20ATYPICAL_BSE_070516.pdf

Scrapie Canada Update April 2007

SHEEP CAN NOW BE IMPORTED FROM THE UNITED STATES

Canadian Food Inspection Agency News Release- April 20, 2007:

Import of Small Ruminants from the United States: CFIA Policy- Apr. 20, 2007

Requirements for Small Ruminants Imported from the United States for Breeding, Domestic or Captive Purposes

Small Ruminants: are defined as members of the Family: Bovidae, Subfamily: Caprinidae, Genus : Ovis and Capra. In general, the term "small ruminants" applies to sheep and goats and their exotic relatives of the genus ovis and capra.

http://www.scrapiecanada.ca/updateApril2007.html

From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr."
Sent: Tuesday, August 21, 2007 9:50 AM
Subject: TWO MORE Nor98 atypical Scrapie cases detected in USA bringing
total to 3 cases to date

Infected and Source Flocks

As of June 30, 2007, there were .....

snip...

One field case and one validation case were consistent with Nor-98 scrapie.

http://www.aphis.usda.gov/animal_health/animal_diseases/scrapie/downloads/monthly_scrapie_rpt.pps

IN the February 2007 Scrapie report it only mentions ;

''One case was consistent with Nor98 scrapie.''

http://www.aphis.usda.gov/animal_health/animal_diseases/scrapie/

(please note flocks of origin were in WY, CO, AND CA. PERSONAL COMMUNCATIONS

USDA, APHIS, VS ET AL. ...TSS)

NOR98 SHOWS MOLECULAR FEATURES REMINISCENT OF GSS

http://lists.ifas.ufl.edu/cgi-bin/wa.exe?A2=ind0708&L=sanet-mg&T=0&P=14553

An evaluation of scrapie surveillance in the United States

http://lists.ifas.ufl.edu/cgi-bin/wa.exe?A2=ind0708&L=sanet-mg&T=0&P=3427

From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr."
Subject: CWD UPDATE 88 AUGUST 31, 2007

http://lists.ifas.ufl.edu/cgi-bin/wa.exe?A2=ind0709&L=sanet-mg&T=0&P=450

Where is CWD found? Chronic wasting disease was first seen in Colorado deer belonging to several research facilities in 1967, and later was diagnosed in captive and wild deer and elk in northern Colorado and southern Wyoming. In the 1970s, CWD occurred at a zoo in Canada in mule deer that had been imported from a zoological park in Colorado. Fortunately, the disease did not spread. Since 1996, CWD has been diagnosed in ranched elk as well as farmed wild deer in both Saskatchewan and Alberta. CWD has also been found in deer and elk in the USA.

http://www.inspection.gc.ca/english/anima/heasan/disemala/cwdmdc/cwdmdcfse.shtml
http://www.inspection.gc.ca/english/anima/heasan/disemala/cwdmdc/cwdmdce.shtml

September 13, 2007

Whatever happened to the outbreak of chronic wasting disease in deer in Wisconsin? Is the disease gone or is it still a problem there?

Bill Byers, Jackson

NOT only is CWD spreading, CWD and other animal TSEs are being ignored by the media. oh, they print the usual USDA certified BSe, but let me tell you 'the rest of the story'. you will not like it. i have wasted some 10 years daily on this topic, soon i will never speak of it again, for now, let me tell you what your federal government is not telling you. i have listed the different topics below, with links to them, choose you poison of choice. ...

Terry S. Singeltary Sr.
P.O. Box 42
Bacliff, Texas USA 77518
mailto:flounder9@verizon.netflounder9@verizon.net

Posted: Fri Sep 14, 2007 12:30 pm

http://www.freep.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20070913/SPORTS10/709130344/1058/SPORTS

THE BSE MRR policy is nothing more than a legal tool to trade TSE legally, globally. North America is now no different than that of what the U.K. was, back when they poisoned the globe with there mad cow products, except this time the OIE, USDA et al have made it legal. it's all about commodities and futures, the elderly are expendable, and sporadic CJDs just fall from the sky. and all those dead farmers and there wives, that died from sporadic CJD, that had BSE herds, well, that was just a happenstance of bad luck too. the ukbsenvCJD only theory was fact, only one strain of one mad cow, only in one geographical location of the globe, when on the one hand, the UKs tainted MBM was shipped all over the Globe, and on the other hand, the USA developed and shipped the 'continuous rendering' techonology that brewed up this recipe for disastor to the U.K. some 5 years before the USA started using it. daaa, only 13 mad cows in North America, well, 14, if you count that one stumbling and staggering mad cow in Texas they never tested at all. yep, and i fell of a shrimp boat yesterday too. ...tss

UK TABLE of Exports of meal of meat and meat offal; greaves 1979 - 1995

USA 24 TONS

CANADA 83 TONS

http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/mb/m12/tab12.pdf

HOWEVER, my files show 44 tons of greaves for USA. ...TSS

Subject: Re: exports from the U.K. of it's MBM to U.S.???
From: mailto:S.J.Pearsall@esg.maff.gsi.gov.ukS.J.Pearsall@esg.maff.gsi.gov.uk
Date: Tue, 8 Feb 2000 14:03:16 +0000
To: mailto:flounder@wt.netflounder@wt.net (Receipt Notification Requested) (Non Receipt
Notification Requested)

Terry Meat and bonemeal is not specifically classified for overseas trade purposes. The nearest equivalent is listed as flours and meals of meat or offals (including tankage), unfit for human consumption; greaves. UK exports of this to the US are listed below: Country Tonnes

1980
1981 12
1982
1983
1984 10
1985 2
1986
1987
1988
1989 20
1990

Data for exports between 1975 and 1979 are not readily available. These can be obtained (at a charge) from data retailers appointed by HM Customs and Excise: BTSL (Tel: 01372 463121) or Abacus (01245 252222). Best wishes Simon Pearsall Overseas trade statistics Stats (C&F)C

======================================

The exact same recipe for B.S.E. existed in the U.S. for years and years. In reading over the Qualitative Analysis of BSE Risk Factors-1, this is a 25 page report by the USDA:APHIS:VS. It could have been done in one page. The first page, fourth paragraph says it all;

"Similarities exist in the two countries usage of continuous rendering technology and the lack of usage of solvents, however, large differences still remain with other risk factors which greatly reduce the potential risk at the national level."

Then, the next 24 pages tries to down-play the high risks of B.S.E. in the U.S., with nothing more than the cattle to sheep ratio count, and the geographical locations of herds and flocks. That's all the evidence they can come up with, in the next 24 pages.

Something else I find odd, page 16;

"In the United Kingdom there is much concern for a specific continuous rendering technology which uses lower temperatures and accounts for 25 percent of total output. This technology was _originally_ designed and imported from the United States. However, the specific application in the production process is _believed_ to be different in the two countries."

A few more factors to consider, page 15;

U.S. Scientist should be concerned with a CJD epidemic in the U.S., as well... 2 January 2000

http://www.bmj.com/cgi/eletters/320/7226/8/b#6117

statement
Restoring Scientific Integrity in Policymaking

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

----

On February 18, 2004, over 60 leading scientistsNobel laureates, leading medical experts, former federal agency directors, and university chairs and presidentssigned the statement below, voicing their concern over the misuse of science by the Bush administration. UCS is seeking the signatures of thousands of additional U.S. scientists in support of this effort.

----

Science, like any field of endeavor, relies on freedom of inquiry; and one of the hallmarks of that freedom is objectivity. Now, more than ever, on issues ranging from climate change to AIDS research to genetic engineering to food additives, government relies on the impartial perspective of science for guidance.

President George H.W. Bush, April 23, 1990

Attention Scientists

We need you to support this statement calling for an end to scientific abuse-now more than ever.

Creating meaningful reform will require the persistent and energetic engagement of the scientific community-in universities, laboratories, government agencies, and companies across the United States.

We need engineers and ecologists, physicists and physicians, psychologists and public health professionals-scientists of all disciplines.

Sign the statement today-click here.

For a sampling of prominent signatories, click here.

To search for your colleagues who are among the 12,000 plus current signers, click here.

Successful application of science has played a large part in the policies that have made the United States of America the world's most powerful nation and its citizens increasingly prosperous and healthy. Although scientific input to the government is rarely the only factor in public policy decisions, this input should always be weighed from an objective and impartial perspective to avoid perilous consequences. Indeed, this principle has long been adhered to by presidents and administrations of both parties in forming and implementing policies. The administration of George W. Bush has, however, disregarded this principle.

When scientific knowledge has been found to be in conflict with its political goals, the administration has often manipulated the process through which science enters into its decisions. This has been done by placing people who are professionally unqualified or who have clear conflicts of interest in official posts and on scientific advisory committees; by disbanding existing advisory committees; by censoring and suppressing reports by the government's own scientists; and by simply not seeking independent scientific advice. Other administrations have, on occasion, engaged in such practices, but not so systematically nor on so wide a front. Furthermore, in advocating policies that are not scientifically sound, the administration has sometimes misrepresented scientific knowledge and misled the public about the implications of its policies. For example, in support of the president's decision to avoid regulating emissions that cause climate change, the administration has consistently misrepresented the findings of the National Academy of Sciences, government scientists, and the expert community at large. Thus in June 2003, the White House demanded extensive changes in the treatment of climate change in a major report by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). To avoid issuing a scientifically indefensible report, EPA officials eviscerated the discussion of climate change and its consequences.

The administration also suppressed a study by the EPA that found that a bipartisan Senate clean air proposal would yield greater health benefits than the administration's proposed Clear Skies Act, which the administration is portraying as an improvement of the existing Clean Air Act. "Clear Skies" would, however, be less effective in cleaning up the nation's air and reducing mercury contamination of fish than proper enforcement of the existing Clean Air Act.

Misrepresenting and suppressing scientific knowledge for political purposes can have serious consequences. Had Richard Nixon also based his decisions on such calculations he would not have supported the Clean Air Act of 1970, which in the following 20 years prevented more than 200,000 premature deaths and millions of cases of respiratory and cardiovascular disease. Similarly, George H.W. Bush would not have supported the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 and additional benefits of comparable proportions would have been lost.

The behavior of the White House on these issues is part of a pattern that has led Russell Train, the EPA administrator under Presidents Nixon and Ford, to observe, "How radically we have moved away from regulation based on independent findings and professional analysis of scientific, health and economic data by the responsible agency to regulation controlled by the White House and driven primarily by political considerations."

Across a broad range of policy areas, the administration has undermined the quality and independence of the scientific advisory system and the morale of the government's outstanding scientific personnel:

Highly qualified scientists have been dropped from advisory committees dealing with childhood lead poisoning, environmental and reproductive health, and drug abuse, while individuals associated with or working for industries subject to regulation have been appointed to these bodies. Censorship and political oversight of government scientists is not restricted to the EPA, but has also occurred at the Departments of Health and Human Services, Agriculture, and Interior, when scientific findings are in conflict with the administration's policies or with the views of its political supporters. The administration is supporting revisions to the Endangered Species Act that would greatly constrain scientific input into the process of identifying endangered species and critical habitats for their protection. Existing scientific advisory committees to the Department of Energy on nuclear weapons, and to the State Department on arms control, have been disbanded. In making the invalid claim that Iraq had sought to acquire aluminum tubes for uranium enrichment centrifuges, the administration disregarded the contrary assessment by experts at Livermore, Los Alamos and Oak Ridge National Laboratories. The distortion of scientific knowledge for partisan political ends must cease if the public is to be properly informed about issues central to its well being, and the nation is to benefit fully from its heavy investment in scientific research and education. To elevate the ethic that governs the relationship between science and government, Congress and the Executive should establish legislation and regulations that would:

Forbid censorship of scientific studies unless there is a reasonable national security concern; Require all scientists on scientific advisory panels to meet high professional standards; and Ensure public access to government studies and the findings of scientific advisory panels. To maintain public trust in the credibility of the scientific, engineering and medical professions, and to restore scientific integrity in the formation and implementation of public policy, we call on our colleagues to:

Bring the current situation to public attention; Request that the government return to the ethic and code of conduct which once fostered independent and objective scientific input into policy formation; and Advocate legislative, regulatory and administrative reforms that would ensure the acquisition and dissemination of independent and objective scientific analysis and advice.

http://www.ucsusa.org/scientific_integrity/interference/scientists-signon-statement.html

See a list of prominent signatories

statement
RSI Signatories

--------------------

http://www.ucsusa.org/scientific_integrity/interference/prominent-statement-signatories.html

On December 9, 2006, UCS released the names of more than 10,000 scientists of all backgrounds from all 50 states-including 52 Nobel Laureates-who have since joined their colleagues on this statement.

http://go.ucsusa.org/RSI_list/

Agencies slow in responding to FOIA requests
From: Terry S. Singeltary Sr.
Date: Wed, 4 Jul 2007 10:03:09 -0500

http://lists.ifas.ufl.edu/cgi-bin/wa.exe?A2=ind0707&L=sanet-mg&T=0&P=2679

Title: Pathobiology and diagnosis of animal transmissible spongiform encephalopathies: current knowledge, research gaps, and opportunities

Authors

Kehrli, Marcus
O`rourke, Katherine
Hamir, Amirali
Richt, Juergen
Nicholson, Eric
Silva, Christopher
Edelman, Daniel - FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRAT
Gay, Cyril

Submitted to: Government Publication/Report
Publication Type: Government Publication
Publication Acceptance Date: May 1, 2007
Publication Date: July 1, 2007
Citation: Kehrli, Jr., M.E., O'Rourke, K.I., Hamir, A.N., Richt, J.A., Nicholson, E.M., Silva, C.J., Edelman, D., Gay, C.G. 2007. Pathobiology and diagnosis of animal transmissible spongiform encephalopathies: current knowledge, research gaps, and opportunities [government white paper]. Beltsville, MD: Interagency Working Group on Prion Science, Subcommittee on Pathobiology and Diagnostics. USDA, Agriculture Research Service. 33 p.

Technical Abstract: Transmissible spongiform encephalopathies (TSEs) are fatal neurologic diseases that can affect several animal species and human beings. There are four animal TSE agents found in the United States: scrapie of sheep and goats; chronic wasting disease (CWD) of deer, elk, and moose; transmissible mink encephalopathy (TME) and bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE). Although the animal TSEs do not cause major death losses among US livestock populations, they are important because of international trade issues. The experience of the United Kingdom and Europe in dealing with the vast majority of the world's BSE cases, serves as a reminder of the need for continuing vigilance in monitoring risks for public health and research to answer remaining questions around the pathogenesis and transmission of these diseases. There remain questions on 1) cross-species transmissibility of TSEs in livestock and wildlife; 2) the pathobiology of TSEs in natural and secondary hosts; pathogenesis and transmission of CWD; and 4) pathogenesis and ante mortem detection of typical and atypical BSE. Our understanding of the pathogenesis and transmission of these diseases continues to evolve as ongoing, global TSE research efforts focus on defining tissue sites of abnormal prion accumulation, routes of infection, methods of strain differentiation, genetics of susceptibility and ante-mortem diagnostics. In this paper, a Subcommittee on Pathobiology and Diagnostics of TSEs for an Interagency Working Group on Prion Science summarizes the science of animal TSEs in order to identify knowledge gaps for the purpose of prioritizing animal prion research needs. Because of substantial losses involving international trade and potential risk for interspecies transmission to susceptible livestock and possibly humans, the presence of BSE, CWD, scrapie and TME in the United States presents a liability to U.S. domestic and alternative livestock industries. In addition, the proven risk of BSE to agriculture and public health from subclinical or clinically sick animals requires science-based surveillance for any silent, unrecognized epizootic expansions of these diseases in populations of animals that could either directly or indirectly affect food animals. CWD is an example of an uncontrolled expanding epidemic that threatens not only cervids but possibly other livestock. CWD also has elicited public health surveillance programs to monitor for scientific evidence of a prion disease in humans that consume venison. Therefore, some of the research needs are precautionary, but the risks to animal and human health from being caught unaware are high. Efforts are being made by both federal and state regulatory agencies to eradicate scrapie and CWD, and to determine the prevalence of BSE. The effectiveness of these programs will depend heavily on having accurate information about the nature of these diseases, not only in the original hosts, but also in other species that may be in contact with infected animals.

http://www.ars.usda.gov/research/publications/publications.htm?seq_no_115=212488

[Docket No. 03-025IFA] FSIS Prohibition of the Use of Specified Risk Materials for Human Food and Requirement for the Disposition of Non-Ambulatory Disabled Cattle

03-025IFA
03-025IFA-2
Terry S. Singeltary

9/13/2005

http://www.fsis.usda.gov/OPPDE/Comments/03-025IFA/03-025IFA-2.pdf

suppressed peer review of Harvard study October 31, 2002

http://www.fsis.usda.gov/oa/topics/BSE_Peer_Review.pdf

[Docket No. FSIS-2006-0011] FSIS Harvard Risk Assessment of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE)

http://www.fsis.usda.gov/OPPDE/Comments/2006-0011/2006-0011-1.pdf

Docket No, 04-047-l Regulatory Identification No. (RIN) 091O-AF46 NEW BSE
SAFEGUARDS (comment submission)

https://web01.aphis.usda.gov/regpublic.nsf/0/eff9eff1f7c5cf2b87256ecf000df08d?OpenDocument

Docket No. 03-080-1 -- USDA ISSUES PROPOSED RULE TO ALLOW LIVE ANIMAL
IMPORTS FROM CANADA

https://web01.aphis.usda.gov/BSEcom.nsf/0/b78ba677e2b0c12185256dd300649f9d?OpenDocument&AutoFramed

Docket No. 2003N-0312 Animal Feed Safety System [TSS SUBMISSION]

http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dockets/03n0312/03N-0312_emc-000001.txt

Docket Management Docket: 02N-0273 - Substances Prohibited From Use in

Animal Food or Feed; Animal Proteins Prohibited in Ruminant Feed

Comment Number: EC -10

Accepted - Volume 2

http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dailys/03/Jan03/012403/8004be07.html

PART 2

http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dailys/03/Jan03/012403/8004be09.html

PDF]Freas, William TSS SUBMISSION

File Format: PDF/Adobe Acrobat -

Page 1. J Freas, William From: Sent: To: Subject: Terry S. Singeltary

Sr. [ mailto:flounder@wt.netflounder@wt.net] Monday, January 08,200l 3:03 PM freas ...

http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/ac/01/slides/3681s2_09.pdf

Asante/Collinge et al, that BSE transmission to the 129-methionine

genotype can lead to an alternate phenotype that is indistinguishable

from type 2 PrPSc, the commonest _sporadic_ CJD;

http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/ac/03/slides/3923s1_OPH.htm

Docket Management Docket: 96N-0417 - Current Good Manufacturing Practice
in Manufacturing, Packing, or Holding Dietary Ingredients a
Comment Number: EC -2
Accepted - Volume 7

http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dailys/03/Mar03/031403/96N-0417-EC-2.htm

[PDF] Appendices to PL107-9 Inter-agency Working Group Final Report 1-1
File Format: PDF/Adobe Acrobat - View as HTML
Agent, Weapons of Mass Destruction Operations Unit Federal Bureau of
those who provided comments in response to Docket No. ...
Meager 8/18/01 Terry S. Singeltary Sr ...

www.aphis.usda.gov/lpa/pubs/pubs/PL107-9_Appen.pdf

Docket No. 2003N-0312 Animal Feed Safety System [TSS SUBMISSION
TO DOCKET 2003N-0312]

http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dockets/03n0312/03N-0312_emc-000001.txt

# Docket No: 02-088-1 RE-Agricultural Bioterrorism Protection Act of
2002; [TSS SUBMISSION ON POTENTIAL FOR BSE/TSE & FMD 'SUITCASE BOMBS'] -
TSS 1/27/03 (0)

Docket Management

Docket: 02N-0276 - Bioterrorism Preparedness; Registration of Food
Facilities, Section 305
Comment Number: EC-254 [TSS SUBMISSION]

http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dockets/02n0276/02N-0276-EC-254.htm

Dockets Entered On October 2, 2003 Table of Contents, Docket #,
Title, 1978N-0301,

OTC External Analgesic Drug Products, ... EMC 7, Terry S. Singeltary Sr.
Vol #: 1, ...

www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dailys/03/oct03/100203/100203.htm

Daily Dockets Entered on 02/05/03

DOCKETS ENTERED on 2/5/03. ... EMC 4 Terry S. Singeltary Sr. Vol#: 2.
... Vol#: 1.

03N-0009 Federal Preemption of State & Local Medical Device Requireme. ...

www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dailys/03/Feb03/020503/020503.htm

Docket Management

Docket: 02N-0370 - Neurological Devices; Classification of Human Dura Mater

Comment Number: EC -1

Accepted - Volume 1

http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dailys/03/Jan03/012403/8004be11.html

http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dailys/03/Jan03/012403/8004bdfe.html

http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dailys/03/Jan03/012403/8004bdfc.html

Daily Dockets - 04/10/03

... 00D-1662 Use of Xenotransplantation Products in Humans.
EMC 98 Terry S. Singeltary Sr. Vol#: 3. 01F ...
www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dailys/03/Apr03/041003/041003.htm - 05-20-2003
- Cached

2003D-0186
Guidance for Industry: Use of Material From Deer and Elk In Animal Feed

EMC 1
Terry S. Singeltary Sr.
Vol #:
1

http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dailys/03/Jun03/060903/060903.htm

Diagnosis and Reporting of Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease

Singeltary, Sr et al. JAMA.2001; 285: 733-734.

http://jama.ama-assn.org/http://www.neurology.org/cgi/eletters/60/2/176#535

JOURNAL OF NEUROLOGY

MARCH 26, 2003

RE-Monitoring the occurrence of emerging forms of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease in the United States

Email Terry S. Singeltary:

mailto:flounder@wt.netflounder@wt.net

I lost my mother to hvCJD (Heidenhain Variant CJD). I would like to comment on the CDC's attempts to monitor the occurrence of emerging forms of CJD. Asante, Collinge et al [1] have reported that BSE transmission to the 129-methionine genotype can lead to an alternate phenotype that is indistinguishable from type 2 PrPSc, the commonest sporadic CJD. However, CJD and all human TSEs are not reportable nationally. CJD and all human TSEs must be made reportable in every state and internationally. I hope that the CDC does not continue to expect us to still believe that the 85%+ of all CJD cases which are sporadic are all spontaneous, without route/source. We have many TSEs in the USA in both animal and man. CWD in deer/elk is spreading rapidly and CWD does transmit to mink, ferret, cattle, and squirrel monkey by intracerebral inoculation. With the known incubation periods in other TSEs, oral transmission studies of CWD may take much longer. Every victim/family of CJD/TSEs should be asked about route and source of this agent. To prolong this will only spread the agent and needlessly expose others. In light of the findings of Asante and Collinge et al, there should be drastic measures to safeguard the medical and surgical arena from sporadic CJDs and all human TSEs. I only ponder how many sporadic

CJDs in the USA are type 2 PrPSc?

http://www.neurology.org/cgi/eletters/60/2/176#535

doi:10.1016/S1473-3099(03)00715-1
Copyright © 2003 Published by Elsevier Ltd.
Newsdesk

Tracking spongiform encephalopathies in North America

Xavier Bosch

Available online 29 July 2003.
Volume 3, Issue 8, August 2003, Page 463

"My name is Terry S Singeltary Sr, and I live in Bacliff, Texas. I lost my mom to hvCJD (Heidenhain variant CJD) and have been searching for answers ever since. What I have found is that we have not been told the truth. CWD in deer and elk is a small portion of a much bigger problem."

............................

http://www.thelancet.com/journals/laninf/article/PIIS1473309903007151/fulltext

http://download.thelancet.com/pdfs/journals/1473-3099/PIIS1473309903007151.pdf

see history of cjd questionnaire

http://brain.hastypastry.net/forums/showthread.php?t=2408

Sent: Monday May 28, 2007

Subject: THE BIG LIE SPORADIC CJD AND MAD COW DISEASEs i.e. TSE

Terry S. Singeltary Sr.

POLICY IN CONFIDENCE; CONFIDENTIAL; CJD IN FARMER WITH BSE COW ie
OCCUPATIONAL EXPOSURE

Subject: POLICY IN CONFIDENCE: CJD IN FARMER WITH BSE COW

POLICY IN CONFIDENCE: CJD IN FARMER WITH BSE COW

LIKELY TO ATRACT MEDIA ATTENTION

snip...

DOES ANYONE BESIDES ME SEE A PATTERN YET ???

Vickey Rimmer, 16, DID NOT DIE FROM nvCJD, she died from a form of sporadic CJD, whatever the hell that is. and there have been 16 year old die from sporadic CJD in the USA as well.

SIMPLY PUT, the ukbsenvcjd only theory was wrong from day one. the elderly are expendable, pets and kids are not.

Science was dictated by 'big buisness' after the Vickey Rimmer case with the ukbsenvcjd only myth.

snip...

see full text ;

http://lists.ifas.ufl.edu/cgi-bin/wa.exe?A2=ind0705&L=sanet-mg&T=0&P=25276

Terry S. Singeltary Sr.
P.O. Box 42
Bacliff, Texas USA 77518
mailto:flounder9@verizon.netflounder9@verizon.net

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