- In the lead-up to the invasion of Iraq, the Bush administration
likely planned on stationing U.S. troops in the country years after an
established peace. U.S. military interventions have traditionally been
followed by a period in which U.S. troops remain in the host country in
order to influence future developments there. Even more importantly, interventions
that take place in countries located in strategically vital regions give
Washington the wherewithal to play a central role in the affairs of those
regions. The invasion of Iraq in March of 2003 followed this trend, although
not exactly in the manner that Washington policymakers initially hoped
for.
-
- Dispelling any notion that U.S. troops were planning
on leaving Iraq quickly, various Bush administration and Pentagon spokespeople
stated early on that U.S. troops would remain in Iraq for an indefinite
period of time. As late as December, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
General Richard B. Myers assured that U.S. troops were not planning on
leaving Iraq anytime soon: "It's going to depend on events over the
next couple of years. It's to be determined."
-
- General Myers' suggestion that U.S. troops will remain
in Iraq until possibly 2006 was confirmed by recent comments made by British
Foreign Secretary Jack Straw. Speaking with BBC Radio this month, Straw
said that he had no idea when British troops were going to leave Iraq:
"I can't say whether it's going to be 2006, 2007. It's not going to
be months, for sure."
-
- While it was expected that contingents of U.S. troops
would remain in Iraq for years after the U.S. occupation was completed,
it was not expected that over 100,000 troops would be needed for this mission.
The U.S. military, which is composed of an all-volunteer force, is not
suited to handle large-scale missions -- such as this one -- for long periods
of time. As U.S. Representative John Spratt of South Carolina warned late
last year, "We are pushing the envelope. We are using our troops pretty
much to their maximum utility."
-
- A report released by the Congressional Budget Office
recognized this dilemma, concluding that the active Army would be unable
to maintain current troop levels in Iraq "beyond about March 2004
if it chose not to keep individual units deployed to Iraq for longer than
one year without relief." Indeed, the Pentagon will now be relying
on reserve soldiers for combat missions rather than for their traditional
combat support roles. This state of affairs has a broad array of implications.
-
- For one, by having such a significant amount of its forces
stationed in one country, Washington has less leverage to deal with other
world developments that may require a deployment of U.S. troops. It also
adds strain to U.S. deployments in other strategically significant states,
such as South Korea and Afghanistan. Even though stationing troops in the
center of the Middle East gives Washington significant influence in the
region, the amount of troops currently needed, in addition to the losses
that they are enduring, is not desirable or sustainable.
-
- As a result of the extra strain imposed on U.S. forces
due to the length of their deployments, it is becoming harder for the Pentagon
to rely on an all-volunteer military force to handle the White House's
foreign policy initiatives. Many soldiers in the military originally enlisted
during times of relative peace and did not expect to be deployed for months
at a time in the Middle East, let alone being placed in a country that
is sending body bags and stretchers home on a consistent basis.
-
- This current reality has concerned Washington policymakers
as there is a justified fear that troop retention rates will decline and
that less individuals will sign up for military service. The idea of an
all-volunteer military is now being tested in a manner not experienced
before.
-
- Lieutenant General James Helmly, chief of the 250,000-member
Army Reserve, told USA Today in the fall of last year that, "Retention
is what I am most worried about. It is my number one concern. This is the
first extended-duration war the country has fought with an all-volunteer
force." Helmly assured that he and other Pentagon officials would
be carefully monitoring retention rates in 2004.
-
- There are a few principal reasons why Pentagon officials
are concerned about troop retention rates. Even though National Guard and
reserve troops were sent to the 1991 war in Iraq and the war in Afghanistan,
they rarely were deployed on the front lines, and were instead relegated
to combat support roles. With the new troop deployment rotation planned
by the Pentagon, these troops will serve on the front lines and will certainly
see casualties among their ranks.
-
- Additionally, the long troop deployments add quite a
burden to the lives of National Guard and reserve troops since these soldiers
usually have full-time civilian jobs and only perform military training
one weekend a month and for two weeks in the summer. After spending many
months away from their civilian jobs, getting reacquainted with the life
that they left becomes difficult. While their employers are obliged by
law to take them back once they return, they often find that their work
opportunities suffer as a result of their extended time away.
-
- Washington policymakers have drafted a number of plans
to combat the possibility of decreasing retention rates. One policy decision,
which went into effect at the start of 2004, prevents active duty and reserve
troops deployed to Iraq and Kuwait from leaving the Army before serving
12 months on the ground, plus another three months once they return from
their tours. This order is aimed at preventing soldiers from retiring from
the Army after they fulfill the duration of their initial commitment.
-
- The other proposal that has been decided in Washington
offers economic bonuses of up to $10,000 to soldiers who are willing to
reenlist in the Army for an additional three years and serve in Iraq, Kuwait
or Afghanistan.
-
- While these proposals may alleviate troop retention concerns,
they may prove to be largely ineffective. The decision to prevent active
duty and reserve troops from retiring from the military at the end of their
original commitment is, in a way, similar to forced conscription. This
was highlighted by Ted Carpenter, an analyst with the Washington-based
Cato Institute, who told Reuters, "Clearly, if large numbers of personnel
have their terms extended against their will, that violates the principle
of volunteerism. It also suggests just how strained the military is in
trying to provide for the Iraqi occupation plus all the other U.S. obligations
around the world."
-
- The other proposal, that of providing financial rewards
to soldiers willing to reenlist for an additional three years, also may
have limited success. Associated Press writer Matthew Rosenberg, who interviewed
U.S. troops in Baqouba, Iraq about the proposed reenlistment bonus, wrote
that the idea "evoked laughter from a few bored-looking troopers,"
one who said, "there's not enough money in the world to make me stay
a month longer."
-
- If Washington continues to fail in the pacification of
Iraq, and therefore cannot reduce its current troop levels there, it will
have to seriously consider how to resolve the present strain on U.S. forces.
Two primary options, such as pulling troops out of Iraq prematurely, or
reintroducing conscription, are not at all desirable to the administration
since the former could result in a dramatic blow to U.S. interests while
the latter would open up a political hornets nest.
-
-
- http://www.pinr.com/report.php?ac=view_report&report_id=130&language_id=1
|
