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Lack Of Safeguards At TX
Nuke Plant 'Appalling'
By Steve McVicker
c. 2003 Houston Chronicle
1-1-4



Driving west on FM 521 south of Bay City, the twin gray concrete-domed nuclear reactor containment buildings of the South Texas Project appear suddenly on the horizon over the salt grass and Spanish moss.
 
The South Texas Project, about an hour's drive from Houston and owned in part by Houston's Centerpoint Energy, is one of the most powerful nuclear plants in the country. In 2001, Unit 1 alone produced 10.8 million megawatts of power -- more than any other reactor in the United States that year.
 
But even while the United States is on a heightened terror alert, a closer look at the nuclear plant reveals little evidence of increased security. Plant officials, however, say just because their security measures aren't readily visible doesn't mean they aren't there.
 
On Saturday morning, a Houston Chronicle reporter and photographer accompanied a security industry consultant on a tour of the South Texas Project's perimeter. The consultant asked to remain anonymous, fearing that his security criticism could cause clients to reject his business.
 
The first stop was at the plant's front gate. There, the sport utility vehicle that carried the visitors was met by a lone security officer with a handgun strapped to her side. About 50 yards down the entrance road, two security vehicles were parked.
 
As the security guard approached the SUV, the consultant asked about the possibility of driving into the plant to check some shipping arrangements. The guard said that would not be possible but did allow the SUV to drive toward the plant in order to turn around. However, no one -- not the guard or the security personnel in the two parked vehicles -- reacted when the consultant drove almost 50 yards past the security vehicles before making a U-turn and exiting.
 
The next stop was the back gate on the north side of the facility. The checkpoint at that entrance was not staffed. The only visible impediment was a stop sign -- propped against the pole that apparently once bore it -- and three sets of black- and yellow-striped concrete, or Jersey, barriers linked by plastic-covered chains that stretched across the road.
 
No evident security measures would have prevented a visitor from getting out of a vehicle and walking around the barriers toward one of the reactor units, about 200 yards away.
 
After waiting to see if any security personnel would approach, the consultant drove the SUV around the plant's massive powerline terminal that funnels electricity off the grounds. The terminal is behind a chain link-and-barbed wire fence not more than 15 yards off the back entrance road.
 
The consultant drove off the road, across a field behind the grid to a rail line that extends into the plant grounds. The area also includes a parking lot for contractors and a roadside map detailing the plant's layout.
 
But after 30 minutes of waiting and inspecting the outer grounds, the unauthorized tour had not been interrupted by South Texas Project security.
 
"This is worse than I have ever seen it," said the security consultant. "It's appalling to think that we have a multibillion-dollar asset vital to the infrastructure to the United States that is being protected by one guard at the front gate and no guards at the back gate in the face of a heightened alert due to a significant terrorist threat."
 
The consultant suggested the plant should hire more visible, armed guards and use heavy-duty retractable barriers that would stop all vehicular traffic from penetrating the grounds.
 
A similar tour last week of the Houston Ship Channel, under guidance from the same consultant, also revealed security lapses. For instance, the consultant and a Chronicle reporter and photographer drove within a few feet of a work crew unloading a cargo ship without being challenged. The visitors cruised a mile of dockside but were never stopped or questioned.
 
The elevated reservoir where water for cooling the nuclear fuel rods is stored, on the plant's southeast side, also proved worrisome for the consultant. Its perimeter fence was rusted in some spots and had large holes in others.
 
"This fence wouldn't hold cattle," the consultant said.
 
However, according to the head of security at the South Texas Project, the reservoir is not a sensitive area and is separate from the main campus.
 
As for the back gate, he insisted it is completely secure. But when it comes to specifics, he said the public will just have to take his word for it.
 
"There are certain things with safeguards that I can't tell you,"said Paul Serra, South Texas Project plant protection manager. He also indicated that inside the plant grounds are security personnel in elevated positions with weapons and cameras.
 
"I can't tell you whether you were or weren't detected," said Serra. "But once you do come into the area where we must approach you, we can apprehend -- we can turn you over to the police. And if you pose a threat, we can use deadly force."
 
Serra said security personnel recently spent several days training with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission testing their defense strategies.
 
"And they were extremely successful," he said.
 
Additionally, South Texas Project officials said after Sept. 11, 2001, that buildings that house the reactors are constructed with 4-foot-thick, steel-reinforced concrete walls. They claimed at the time that those walls could not be breached, even by a Boeing 767 airliner.
 
Also, said Matagorda County Sheriff James Mitchell, since the elevated terror alert, an additional deputy has been assigned to the nuclear plant, bringing the number of full-time deputies on duty to two.
 
But the assurances from the plant's security people are cold comfort to the consultant who headed the Chronicle's tour.
 
"It doesn't make me sleep much better at night," he said.
 
http://www.chron.com/cs/CDA/ssistory.mpl/metropolitan/2323916
 
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