- As some readers may know, the term "passionate attachment"
was used by George Washington in his farewell address in 1796. Washington
advised citizens of the new republic to renounce any "passionate attachment"(Footnote
23) with another nation, and also to repudiate "inveterate hatred"
toward another country. In the Twentieth Century, the United States failed
to heed Washington's warnings on both counts. Shortly after World War II,
we developed an "inveterate hatred" of the Soviet Union and formed
a "passionate attachment" to Israel, although the latter accelerated
dramatically under the Johnson Administration.
-
- President Dwight D. Eisenhower was the last American
president in the Twentieth Century to successfully stand up to the pressures
and unyielding annoyances of the Israeli government and its American supporters.
Although President Kennedy shared his predecessor's views intellectually,
he entered the White House after an extremely close election. Consequently,
he had to assume a more cautious approach.
-
- The Eisenhower administration's Middle East policy is
important for two reasons. First of all, it demonstrated that a strong
American president can stand up to Israel. Secondly, it reveals that Lyndon
Johnson-then Senate Majority Leader-was Eisenhower's most influential political
adversary regarding Israel.
-
- Two major incidents occurred on Eisenhower's watch where
Israel acted as an aggressor toward its neighbors and toward Palestinians
living in the region. The first incident occurred in 1953 and involved
Israel's effort to secretly divert waters of the Jordan. The second incident
occurred in 1957 when Israel conspired with France and Britain to attack
Egypt and overthrow that country's leader, President Gamal Abdel Nasser,
after he nationalized the Suez Canal in defiance of Israel and the Western
powers. In the latter incident, Lyndon Johnson used all of his political
muscle as Senate Majority Leader to prevent the UN from imposing sanctions
on Israel-the sanctions were fully supported by the Eisenhower administration-for
its flagrant disregard for international law. In both instances, Eisenhower
forced Israel to behave by temporarily cutting off American aid.
-
-
-
- 1953: The Jordan River Diversion
-
- Israel secretly planned to use the Palestinian village
of Banat Ya'qub for a major water diversion project that would move waters
of the Jordan Valley to central Israel and the North Negev. The UN, the
US, and the Palestinians who lived in that area were unaware of Israel's
plans. Earlier, the Eisenhower administration had offered to implement
an American-sponsored regional water-usage plan, and Israel had promised
to cooperate in that effort. But in reality, Israel secretly wanted complete
control of the flow of water in the region, despite its commitments to
the Americans. Consequently, a dispute ensued over the control of Palestinian
territory near Banat Ya'qub.
-
- Unaware of Israel's hidden agenda, UN Representative,
Dr. Ralph Bunche, worked out a truce agreement where disputed lands would
be evacuated by Syrian forces. The agreement stipulated that Israel must
allow Arab inhabitants to continue farming there. Israel also agreed that
it would not occupy the disputed area, but would allow it to be a neutral
zone.
-
- Immediately after the Syrian troops withdrew, the Israelis
broke their promise and drove the Palestinian farmers from the land. The
Syrian troops responded by opening fire to drive out the settlers. Israel
responded by complaining that the Syrians had violated the truce and asserted
a right to occupy the areas. UN Truce Observers immediately cited Israel
as the instigator and essentially stated that the Syrian troops were justified
in retaliating against Israel for violating the truce agreement.
-
- The Israelis took the strategy that if they completed
the water diversion project at Banat Ya'qub, then the UN would back down
because the work simply could not be undone. So the Israelis began working
aggressively on the project. They worked non-stop, twenty-four hours a
day using searchlights at night to hasten completion. But secrecy was still
key. They omitted appropriations for the project from their published budget.
In addition, they did not mention it to Americans working with them on
other water projects; however, US intelligence soon detected their activity.
-
- President Eisenhower and Secretary of State John Foster
Dulles realized that Israel had openly deceived them and had no intention
of keeping its earlier promise to cooperate in the American-sponsored regional
water-usage plan. To show its displeasure, the Eisenhower administration
withheld $26 million under the Mutual Security Act and suspended economic
aid until Israel agreed to cooperate with UN observers. In addition, President
Eisenhower directed the Treasury to prepare an Executive Order removing
tax-deductible status from contributions by Jewish Americans to such Zionist
organizations as the United Jewish Appeal (UJA). Eisenhower did not make
these actions public because he did not want to humiliate the Israelis;
however, the Israelis interpreted his magnanimous gesture as a sign of
weakness. As a result, they continued work on the project-convinced that
the Americans would back down.
-
- Israel's strategy might have worked had Israel not launched
a bloody raid on the village of Kibya on the night of October 14, 1953.
In that attack, twenty-five-year-old Ariel Sharon and his three hundred
Israeli commandos, known as Force 101, massacred fifty-three Palestinian
civilians. According to a UN report, Sharon's forces drove the villagers
into their homes then blew them up.
-
- The Eisenhower administration condemned the raid and,
for the first time, publicly revealed that it had already suspended construction
funds for Israel's water supply. Their was a huge backlash against Eisenhower.
The US government was denounced by Hadassah, a Jewish charitable organization.
An attaché at the Israeli Embassy attempted to divert attention
from the water controversy by claiming-in a widely publicized speech-that
the Kibya raid was in response to Jordanian aggression. Pro-Israeli congressmen
and David Ben-Gurion accused Eisenhower and his advisers of anti-Semitism.
-
- But Eisenhower stood firm and continued to withhold funds
from Israel. Fearing a financial burden, Israeli representatives informed
President Eisenhower-on October 19-that work had ceased on the water diversion
project and that Israel would cooperate with the Security Counsil's efforts
to solve the Jordan River Development problem. Within twenty-four hours,
America restored aid to Israel.
-
- Eisenhower demonstrated that Israel responded faster
to cutting off the money flow than anything else; however, the Israelis
interpreted America's quick restoration of aid as proof that they could
manipulate the superpower by applying adequate pressure. Ultimately, Israel
completed the project in a slightly altered manner.1
-
-
-
- Nov. 1956: The Suez Crisis
-
- The stage was set for the Suez Crisis in 1955 when the
Eisenhower administration began pressuring Israel to demonstrate its commitment
to peace in the Middle East.
-
- On February 28, 1955, President Gamal Adbel Nasser made
a speech full of warnings against Israeli atrocities. He emphasized a bloody
raid on the Gaza Strip by the Israelis, allegedly a retaliation for raids
made from Gaza. Nasser was also upset with the United States for denying
his request for arms a few months earlier. In his speech he repeated the
request for Egypt to buy arms but was ignored.
-
- On September 4, 1955, Egypt announced that it had received
a proposal from the Soviet Union for an arms sale. The Eisenhower administration
treated this as an idle threat which angered Nasser. As a result, he brokered
a cotton-for-arms barter agreement with Czechoslovakia on September 27
in which Egypt received $200 million worth of arms-tanks, MiG planes, artillery,
submarines, and small arms.
-
- Israel immediately renewed its joint arms agreement with
the United States, France, and Britain. In addition, Israel requested a
treaty guaranteeing its security, but it was denied by the Western powers
because they knew that Israel's military strength was vastly superior to
the neighboring Arab nations.
-
- On August 26, 1955, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles
made a speech before the Council of Foreign Relations in New York in which
he outlined terms for peace in the Middle East. He stated that the problem
of Palestinian refugees could be solved, but Israel should not be expected
to assume the full cost. He proposed that Congress approve an international
loan to finance the resettlement or repatriating of Palestinian refugees.
The loan would also help develop irrigation projects to assist refugees
in cultivating their land for growing crops.
-
- The Israelis were somewhat agitated by Dulles's speech
because he mentioned a possible boundary revision. Dulles promptly responded
to clarify the American position. He stated in no uncertain terms that
if Sharett and Ben-Gurion (Israeli leaders) wanted American diplomatic,
political, and military aid, they would have to demonstrate their peaceful
intentions by helping resolve the sensitive problems of Palestinian refugees
and boundary disputes. On November 9, President Eisenhower-who was in a
Denver hospital convalescing from a heart attack-confirmed Dulles's position
in a formal statement made from his hospital bed.2
-
- At that point, it became clear that the United States
could no longer be counted on to support Israel's continuing efforts to
expand its borders. Consequently, Israel turned to the European powers
for support. Over the next year, trouble began to arise over the Suez Canal.
-
- The Suez Canal is a sea-level waterway running north-south
across the Isthmus of Suez in Egypt to connect the Mediterranean and the
Red seas. The canal separates the African continent from Asia, and it provides
the shortest seagoing route between Europe and the lands lying around the
Indian and western Pacific oceans. It is one of the world's most heavily
used shipping lanes.3
-
- On July 26, 1956, Egyptian President Nasser angered Israel
and the European powers when he nationalized the Suez Canal. He took this
bold action because he felt that friends of Israel in America had cheated
him out of US aide for the Aswan Dam that Egypt needed for irrigation and
power. The dam cost $1.3 billion and Nasser had been given the impression
by the Eisenhower administration that US aide would be forthcoming; however,
friends of Israel in America pressured the Senate Appropriations Committee
into blocking funding for the dam. On July 16, 1956, funding was officially
denied-much to the chagrin of President Eisenhower and Secretary of State
John Foster Dulles. To make matters worse, the State Department issued
a statement, on July 19, critically appraising Egypt's international credit.
Nasser felt that this was a ruse created by friends of Israel in America,
and he responded by seizing control of the canal and nationalizing the
Suez Canal Company in order to obtain funds for the dam.4
-
- On October 29, 1956, Israel attacked Egypt and advanced
toward the Suez Canal. On November 1, British and French forces also invaded
Egypt and began occupation of the canal zone, but growing opposition from
President Eisenhower, Secretary of State Dulles, UN Secretary-General Dag
Hammarskjöld, and Soviet threats of intervention put an immediate
stop to British and French support, but Israeli troops still occupied the
Gulf of Aqaba and the Gaza Strip in defiance of a UN resolution.5 Eisenhower
was so angered by European involvement in the attack that he telephoned
British Prime Minister Anthony Eden and gave him such a tongue-lashing
that the Prime Minister was reduced to tears.6 (Footnote 24)
-
- Eisenhower told Dulles: "Foster, you tell'em, goddamn
it, we're going to apply sanctions, we're going to the United Nations,
we're going to do everything that there is to stop this thing." He
later explained, "We just told the Israelis it was absolutely indefensible
and that if they expect our support in the Middle East and in maintaining
their position, they had better behave We went to town right away to give
them hell."
-
- UN Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld shared Eisenhower's
view that Israel needed to learn to behave. Consequently, Hammarskjöld
and Ben-Gurion engaged in some heated exchanges after the UN Secretary
General publicly condemned Israel for its retaliatory actions against Palestinians.
In 1956 Ben-Gurion complained that Hammarskjöld's remarks had encouraged
assaults on Israel by Egypt and Jordan. Hammarskjöld replied as follows:
-
-
- You are convinced that the threat of retaliation has
a deterrent effect. I am convinced that it is more of an incitement to
individual members of the Arab forces than even what has been said by their
own governments. You are convinced that acts of retaliation will stop further
incidents. I am convinced that they will lead to further incidents.You
believe that this way of creating respect for Israel will pave the way
for sound coexistence with the Arab people. I believe that the policy may
postpone indefinitely the time for such coexistence. I think the discussion
of this question can be considered closed since you, in spite of previous
discouraging experiences, have taken the responsibility of large-scale
tests of the correctness of your belief.7
-
-
-
- On February 2, 1957, the UN General Assembly passed a
resolution demanding Israel's withdrawal from the Gulf of Aqaba and the
Gaza Strip, but Ben-Gurion refused. Fed up with Israel's treachery, Eisenhower
wrote a strong letter to Ben-Gurion demanding Israel's withdrawal. Still
Ben-Gurion refused.8
-
-
-
- Feb. 1957: LBJ Rescued Israel From UN Sanctions
-
- It had been rumored that UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld
of Sweden was quietly pushing for sanctions-with the full support of the
Eisenhower administration-against Israel if it continued to maintain troops
in the Gulf of Aqaba and Gaza in defiance of US and UN demands for immediate
withdrawal. In response, Lyndon Johnson-then Senate Majority Leader-wrote
a letter to Secretary of State John Foster Dulles urging the Eisenhower
Administration not to support UN sanctions against Israel. Johnson's letter
to Dulles appeared in the New York Times on February 20, 1957. The Senate
Majority Leader's argument was that it was an unfair double-standard to
punish a small country like Israel when large countries like the Soviet
Union were allowed to openly defy UN resolutions without being punished.9
-
- In addition, Johnson rallied Senate Democrats to oppose
Israel sanctions.(Footnote 25) He used partisan politics to pressure Eisenhower
into retreating from principle, but Eisenhower stood his ground and kept
applying pressure to Israel by cutting off or delaying financial assistance.
When Israel began to run out of money, in March 1957, Prime Minister David
Ben-Gurion finally agreed to withdraw troops from the occupied territories.
President Eisenhower triumphed, but Johnson had protected Israel from the
humiliation of UN sanctions. Sadly, Eisenhower was the last US president
to stand up to the Israeli government and it's American supporters. At
least he proved it could be done.10
-
- Ironically, one of the best accounts of Lyndon Johnson's
involvement in the Suez Crisis was written by Louis Bloomfield in his 1957
book entitled Egypt, Israel and the Gulf of Aqaba. In the ensuing years,
Johnson's involvement in that conflict has been erased from history. Although
his pro-Israel stance appeared on the front page of the New York Times
on February 20, 1957, his name is not mentioned in Western history books
about the Suez Crisis (none that I have found anyway, except Bloomfield's).
The power elite within the book publishing industry have apparently been
concealing Johnson's loyalty to Israel as a means of preventing inquiries
by historians, researchers, and investigators about a possible Jewish conspiracy
behind the assassination of President Kennedy years later.
-
- This is how Bloomfield described Johnson's pro-Israel
stance during the Suez/Gulf of Aqaba Crisis:
-
-
- On February 11th, 1957, Mr. John Foster Dulles, United
States Secretary of State, submitted certain Proposals to the Israeli Government
which were, in effect, that:
-
- "Israel should withdraw her troops from the Gulf
of Aqaba region and the Gaza Strip, in accordance with the recommendations
of the United Nations General Assembly.
-
- The United States should use all its influence to establish
the Strait of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba as an international waterway
for the innocent passage of all nations, including Israel.
-
- Meanwhile the United States should do everything it could
to see that United Nations troops replaced the Israeli troops in the Gaza
Strip and that that area should become a kind of de facto United Nations
trusteeship where United Nations officials would watch and if possible
stop any fighting between Israel and Egypt."
-
- Subsequent discussion between the United States Secretary
of State and Mr. Abba Eban did not bring about the withdrawal of the Israeli
forces from these two areas and rumours began to circulate in the American
press that the Afro-Asian bloc would introduce resolutions calling for
economic and military sanctions to force Israel to comply with the withdrawal
resolutions.
-
- On February 19th, 1957, Senator Lyndon B. Johnson, the
Senate Majority Leader, wrote to Mr. John Foster Dulles urging that the
United States oppose imposing of economic sanctions against Israel by the
United Nations. The letter was endorsed by the Senate Democratic Policy
Committee.
-
-
-
- (Louis Bloomfield, Egypt, Israel, and the Gulf of Aqaba,
p. 152)
-
-
-
- Jul. 2, 1957: Senator Kennedy Made a Controversial Speech
About Algeria
-
- On July 2, 1957, John F. Kennedy-then a US Senator-made
a speech, "Facing Facts on Algeria," which denounced France's
colonial occupation of Algeria and the brutality of the French-Algerian
War. The speech also demonstrated an understanding of Indochina that would
likely have prevented him from escalating US military involvement in Vietnam
had he not been killed.
-
- Historian Richard Mahoney summarized the speech and events
that preceded and followed it:
-
-
- Early in 1957, Kennedy decided to make a major critique
of the [Eisenhower] administration's position on France's colonial war
in Algeria. By 1957, the French had committed over 500,000 troops to the
effort to suppress the nationalist rebellion. Torture, atrocity, and terror
on both sides had turned the pride of France's empire into a chamber of
horrors. the Eisenhower administration had been maintaining a policy of
strict silence in Algeria at least until Kennedy's attack, which
The New York Times called "the most comprehensive and outspoken arraignment
of Western policy toward Algeria yet presented by an American in public
office."
-
-
-
- On July 2, 1957, Kennedy accused the Eisenhower administration
of courting disaster in Algeria. He charged that Eisenhower's policy of
non-involvement in Africa and Asia was really made up of "tepid encouragement
and moralizations to both sides, cautious neutrality on all the real issues,
and a restatement of our obvious dependence upon our European friends,
and our obvious dedication nevertheless to the principles of self-determination,
and our obvious desire not to become involved." The result, Kennedy
said, was that, "We have deceived ourselves into believing that we
have thus pleased both sides and displeased no one when, in truth, we
have earned the suspicion of all."
-
-
-
- The previous decade had proven that the tide of nationalism
in the Third World from Indochina to India to Indonesia was
"irresistible," Kennedy declared. It was time for France to face
the fact that Algeria had to be freed. When would the West learn, he asked,
that colonies "are like fruit that cling to the tree only till they
ripen?" Didn't the French debacle in Indochina, which ended at Dien
Bien Phu, serve as a warning of what lay ahead for France in Algeria if
something were not done?
-
-
-
- [Referring to lessons that should have been learned from
France's Indochina debacle, Kennedy stated,]
-
-
-
- "Did that tragic episode not teach us whether France
likes it or not, admits it or not, or has our support or not, that their
overseas territories are sooner or later, one by one, going to break free
and look with suspicion on the Western nations who impeded their steps
to independence? Nationalism in Africa cannot be evaluated purely in terms
of the historical and legal niceties argued by the French and thus far
accepted by the State Department. National self-identification frequently
takes place by quick combustion which the rain of repression simply cannot
extinguish."
-
-
-
- In the United States, a storm of protest greeted Kennedy's
address on "Facing Facts on Algeria." President Eisenhower complained
about "young men getting up and shouting about things." Secretary
[of State John Foster] Dulles commented acidly that if the senator wanted
to tilt against colonialism, perhaps he might concentrate on the communist
variety. Most prominent Democrats were equally scornful. Adlai Stevenson
dismissed Kennedy's speech as "terrible." Dean Acheson described
the speech as "foolish words that wound a dispirited ally."
-
-
-
- In France, the speech provoked an even more furious outcry.
Paris's largest daily, "Le Figaro," remarked: "It is shameful
that our business is so badly directed that we are forced to endure such
idiocies." U.S. News and World Report noted that "An American
has unified France against himself!" Responding to Kennedy's
speech, French President Rene Coty told the French Senate that France would
"never negotiate with cutthroats since independence would give the
1,200,000 Europeans living in Algeria one alternative leaving their
homeland or living at the mercy of fanaticism." French Defense Minister
Andre Morice publicly wondered whether Kennedy was "having nightmares."
Talk of independence, Morice said, "will cost many more innocent lives,"
Harvard historian Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. reported to Kennedy from Paris
that summer that "Algeria is beginning to poison France."
-
-
-
- In Algeria itself, feeling among the European colonists
against the speech ran so high that French authorities warned American
newsmen and residents to stay off the streets to avoid reprisals. Two days
after the speech a bomb exploded outside the American consulate in Algiers.
The French Resident Minister in Algiers, Robert Lacoste, called the bomb
"a Communist joke" and challenged Kennedy to come to Algeria.
The senator declined.
-
-
-
- Practically no one in the American foreign-policy establishment
regarded the Algeria speech as anything more than a partisan political
blast designed to attract attention. But foreign correspondents such as
Alistair Cooke of the Manchester Guardian and Henri Pierre of Le Monde
recognized what their American counterparts had not that Kennedy
knew what he was talking about on Third World issues. In a letter to the
editor of The New York Times, Pierre wrote: "Strangely enough, as
a Frenchman I feel that on the whole Mr. Kennedy is more to be commended
than blamed for his forthright, frank and provocative speech."
-
-
-
- Although Le Monde opposed Kennedy's call for Algerian
independence, it identified the senator as one of the few serious students
of history in American politics: "The most striking point of the speech
of Mr. Kennedy is the important documentation it revealed and his thorough
knowledge of the French milieu."
-
-
-
- (Richard Mahoney, JFK: Ordeal in Africa, pp. 19-22)
-
-
-
- Kennedy, Eisenhower, and Algeria
-
- In his 1957 speech about Algeria, "Senator"
Kennedy was highly critical of the Eisenhower administration; however,
the political dynamic involved must be considered. Kennedy's views about
Israel and the Middle East in general were closer to Eisenhower's than
Johnson's. Having stated that, it is significant to understand that Kennedy's
public endorsement of an independent Algeria was a subtle criticism of
Israel. It is widely known that Israel opposed Algeria's independence because
it (Israel) wanted to oppress or dominate all Muslim/Arab states. Although
Eisenhower had not publicly supported Algerian independence, it seems plausible
that he may have agreed with Kennedy but lacked the political courage to
denounce France as the young Senator had boldly done in his speech. Upon
reflection, Eisenhower may have secretly admired Kennedy for publicly denouncing
America's World War II ally. After all, France had recently betrayed Eisenhower
by secretly conniving with Israel and Britain to attack Egypt after President
Nasser had nationalized the Suez Canal.(Footnote 26)
-
- Kennedy surely understood how much he and Eisenhower
agreed on Middle Eastern issues, but Eisenhower belonged to the opposing
political party; and Kennedy and Johnson both had their eyes on the White
House in the upcoming 1960 presidential campaign. Consequently, one of
Kennedy's objectives when making the Algerian speech was likely to differentiate
himself from the sitting Republican President and his Democratic adversary,
Johnson. Although Kennedy and Johnson held opposing views about Israel,
they could not openly criticize each other because they were both Democrats.
But since Eisenhower was a Republican, it made sense politically for a
Democratic Senator to criticize him for not supporting Algerian independence.
The speech also sent a message to informed political observers that unlike
Johnson, Kennedy would not be a minion for Israel if elected president.
-
- Even more important, Kennedy's Algerian speech made the
front page of the New York Times which put him in the same league as Senate
Majority Leader Johnson. Recall that Johnson had made the front page of
the New York Times five months earlier (Feb. 1957) for opposing Eisenhower's
efforts to place UN sanctions on Israel in the wake of that country's failed
attempt to seize land from Egypt and overthrow Nasser in the Suez Crisis
of 1956 and 57.
-
-
-
- Jun. 5, 1967: The Six Day War
-
- Ten years after the Suez Crisis, Israel attacked Egypt
again; but this time with success. The event is known as the Six Day War
which began on June 5, 1967. Things had changed a great deal over the ten
years leading up to the Six Day War. Israel's most influential adversaries
had either died or left public office. Eisenhower had retired years earlier
and was in failing health. John Foster Dulles had died of cancer in 1959.
Dag Hammarskjöld had been killed in a mysterious plane crash in the
Congolese province of Katanga in 1961. President Kennedy of course had
been assassinated in Dallas in 1963. And Israel's old ally, Lyndon Johnson,
had become Commander-in-Chief of the United States. In July of 1965, President
Johnson had appointed Supreme Court Justice Arthur Goldberg as US ambassador
to the UN. Goldberg-a Jew and ardent supporter of Israel-replaced Adlai
Stevenson as US delegate to the UN after Stevenson died suddenly of a heart
attack on July 14, 1965.(Footnote 27) The Yemen War had been eroding Arab
unity since the conflict began in 1962.(Footnote 28) By 1967, Egyptian
forces had suffered heavy losses and were weakened after five years of
military involvement in the Yemen War.
-
- Whether these events were random or planned is anyone's
guess, but they were definitely advantageous to Israel by the time the
Six Day War occurred in 1967.
-
- The Six Day War was a watershed event that transformed
Israel from a small nation into a colonial empire. Although Israel became
a nation in 1948, it expanded dramatically after the Six Day War. Israel
took from the Arabs-through military force-the Old City of Jerusalem, the
Sinai and the Gaza Strip, the Jordanian territory west of the Jordan River
known as the West Bank, and the Golan Heights, on the Israeli-Syrian border.11
In addition to acquiring new land, Israel gained control of an additional
900,000 Arabs who became the discontented subjects of the new Israeli empire.
Since 1967, the number of Arabs under Israel's military control has grown
to over 1.75 million.12
-
- Amnesty International has documented Israel's inhumane
treatment of its Palestinian subjects citing arbitrary arrests, torturing
detainees, destroying or sealing the homes of Arab suspects and their relatives,
confiscating land, destroying crops, and diverting precious water from
thirsty Palestinians in the desert to fill the swimming pools and water
the lawns of Israeli settlers.13 This conduct is condoned, embraced, and
encouraged by the United States through its steadfast financial and military
support of Israel. Today, US tax payers spend approximately $3 billion
annually to subsidize, support, and arm Israel. Although Israel is a wealthy
country by western standards, it receives the highest amount of American
foreign aid money, 28 percent.14
-
- Jewish scholars Michael Kazin and Maurice Isserman described
in their book, America Divided: The Civil War of the 1960s, the passion
ignited within American Jews by the Six Day War. They wrote the following:
-
-
- The swift, complete victory was followed by a long and
wrenching occupation of Palestinian lands. For many American Jews, the
1967 conflict awakened and inspired passions that did much to transform
the meaning of their identity. No longer was Israel just a reason for Jewish
pride, a desert miracle of orange groves and thriving kibbutzes, whose
creation was romanticized in Exodus-a popular novel and film of the late
'50s and early '60s. Israel was now the homeland of fellow Jews who had
fought alone for their survival and were resigned to living in perpetual
danger. The threat came not just from Arab militants but from communist
powers, their Third World allies, and a good many American leftists who
were eager to prove their "anti-imperialist" credentials. In
the face of extinction, Israel became "the ultimate reality in the
life of every Jew living today," as a young professor at Brandeis
University put it, "In dealing with those who oppose Israel, we are
not reasonable and we are not rational. Nor should we be."15
-
-
-
- Those are troubling words, but they reflect the true
agenda of those who support the Jewish state of Israel.
-
-
-
- Background on the Six Day War
-
- Understanding the Six Day War requires some background
regarding the politics of the Middle East in 1967. The following men were
heads of state for the countries involved in the Six Day War:
-
-
- Nation Head of State
- Egypt President Gamal Abdel Nasser
- Sryia General Salah al-Jadid
- Jordan King Hussein [ibn Talal]
- Israel Prime Minister Levi Eshkol
- US President Lyndon Baines Johnson
- USSR Chairman Aleksey Nikolayevich Kosygin
- UN Secretary General U Thant (of Burma, now Myanmar)
-
-
-
- Egyptian President Nasser was a key figure in Middle
Eastern affairs for seventeen years. In 1954 he became prime minister of
Egypt, and in 1956 he became that country's president-remaining in that
position until his sudden death in 1970.16 Nasser had been Israel's primary
enemy because he was a charismatic Muslim leader who advocated Arab unity
(also known as pan-Arabism).
-
- Egypt has no oil of any consequence, but it has a more
advanced culture than the other oil-producing Arab nations. It was the
home of one of the principal civilizations of the ancient Middle East.
It is also one of the earliest urban and literate societies.17 Consequently,
the other Arab nations have historically looked to Egypt for leadership.
-
- The original antagonist of Israel in the Six Day War
was Syria, led by General Salah al-Jadid, head of the Ba'th regime.18 Although
Syria-under the Ba'th regime-was an aggressive enemy of Israel, Syria's
erratic behavior toward other Arab nations actually helped Israel. In fact,
Israel used Syrian raids along the its border as a pretext for attacking
Egypt and starting the Six Day War.
-
- In March 1963 Ba'thist supporters seized power from the
"secessionist" regime in a military coup. With the Ba'th in power,
Nasser had three Arab nations against him. Those nations were Saudi Arabia
and Jordan (because they supported the ousted Imam in the Yemen war) and
Syria.
-
- In April 1967 Syrian bombardments of Israeli villages
had been intensified. When the Israeli Air Force shot down six Syrian MiG
planes in reprisal, Egypt mobilized its forces near the Sinai border.19
Egypt had a mutual defense agreement with the Syrians, who now felt themselves
in danger. As an advocate of pan-Arabism, Nasser felt obliged to help Syria.
He ordered part of the Egyptian Army to move into Sinai. He thought that
the presence of Egyptian forces would discourage the Israelis from attacking
Syria. It was a purely defensive move designed to draw off Israeli forces
from Syria. If Israel had attacked Syria, then the Egyptian Army would
have carried out operations in support of the Syrians. But no offensive
operations against Israel were consider.20
-
- A standoff between Egypt and Israel ensued, and tensions
mounted between the superpowers. The Soviet Union supported Egypt and the
United States supported Israel. This raced the stakes considerably because
it introduced the possibility of nuclear war.21
-
- Historians now know that Israel secretly launched an
attack against Egypt, but lied about it claiming that Nasser had launched
the attack first. In fact Israeli Prime Minister Menachem
-
- Begin made this admission in a speech on August 8, 1982
before the National Defense College in Jerusalem. He stated that the Six
Day War was not a "war of necessity" but rather a "war of
choice Nasser did not attack us. We decided to attack him."22 This
was a major admission by Begin.
-
- On June 3, 1967, just two days before the Israelis attacked,
the United States sent the aircraft carrier Intrepid through the Suez Canal
with all its planes lined up on deck. Nasser thought this was an unnecessary
show of force. The Egyptian people became furious. They lined the bank
of the Canal and threw old shoes at the carrier. At the same time the Sixth
Fleet flexed its muscles and prepared for a war situation. It was an excessive
show of force by the United States.23
-
- After Israel's victory, Nasser was disgusted with Johnson.
He felt that Johnson was dishonest and had colluded with Israel to strike
first and blame it on Egypt. He was suspicious of America's UN ambassador
Arthur Goldberg, an ardent Zionist. Goldberg had immediately backed Israel
in the UN when it claimed that Egypt "fired the first shot."
Nasser accused Johnson of collusion, broke off diplomatic relations with
the United States, and ordered all Americans out of Egypt. Several other
Arab states did the same. Soon Johnson, already angered by the charge of
collusion, had to watch the humiliating spectacle of twenty-four thousand
American men, women, and children being thrown out of the Middle East.
Johnson never forgot and never forgave.24
-
- After Egypt's humiliating defeat in the Six Day War,
Nasser attempted to resign, but massive street demonstrations and a vote
of confidence by the National Assembly induced him to remain in office.
The Soviet Union immediately began replacing all the destroyed war equipment
and installed surface-to-air missiles along the Suez as a cover for Egypt's
artillery installations.25
-
- An important footnote to the Six Day War is an incident
that occurred in Yemen months earlier. In early 1967, fighting in Yemen
still continued. One day there was shooting in Taiz (in Yemen). Direction
finders indicated that two bazooka shots came from the headquarters of
the United States Point Four Aid Program-which was the CIA's cover organization.
Yemeni government forces attacked the building and arrested the four people
inside. The safes were opened and an enormous number of documents were
found and subsequently photographed by Egyptian intelligence experts.(Footnote
29) The United States was furious at the attack on the building and demanded
the documents. They were returned three weeks later, but by that time their
secrets were known. Many people within the United States military became
extremely hostile toward Nasser because of this event. Some believe the
Six Day War was a form of retribution.26
-
-
-
- UN Resolution 242
-
- Within six months after the Six Day War, the UN Security
Council issued Resolution 242 which called for "withdrawal of Israeli
armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict." In
theory the UN should enforce the resolution itself, but unfortunately,
reality is much different. The sad truth is the UN is unable to enforce
much of anything without the support of the United States, and the United
States has maintained a "passionate attachment" to Israel ever
since President Johnson was in office.
-
- Ironically, Resolution 242 was issued on the fourth anniversary
of President Kennedy's death, November 22, 1967.27 It is an extremely important
document because virtually all disputes between Israel and the Palestinians
and neighboring Arab states could be resolved by its enforcement.
-
- In addition, the Israelis managed to secure ambiguous,
legalistic wording for Resolution 242 which makes even more difficult to
enforce;28 however, the resolution remains a highly sensitive area for
American presidents and politicians to roam. The following is the entire
text of the resolution:
-
-
- The Security Council,
-
- Expressing its continuing concern with the grave situation
in the Middle East,
-
- Emphasizing the inadmissibility of the acquisition of
territory by war and the need to work for a just and lasting peace in which
every State in the area can live in security,
-
- Emphasizing further that all Member States in their acceptance
of the Charter of the United Nations have undertaken a commitment to act
in accordance with Article 2 of the Charter,
-
- 1. Affirms that the fulfillment of Charter principles
requires the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East
which should include the application of both the following principles:
-
- (i) Withdrawal of Israel armed forces from territories
occupied in the recent conflict;
-
- (ii) Termination of all claims or states of belligerency
and respect for and acknowledgment of the sovereignty, territorial integrity
and political independence of every State in the area and their right to
live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats
or acts of force;
-
- 2. Affirms further the necessity
-
- (a) For guaranteeing freedom of navigation through international
waterways in the area;
|