- Early in 1935, a passenger ship bound for Haifa in Palestine
left the German port of Bremerhaven. Its stern bore the Hebrew letters
for its name, "Tel Aviv," while a swastika banner fluttered from
the mast. And although the ship was Zionist-owned, its captain was a National
Socialist Party member. Many years later a traveler aboard the ship recalled
this symbolic combination as a "metaphysical absurdity."1 Absurd
or not, this is but one vignette from a little-known chapter of history:
The wide-ranging collaboration between Zionism and Hitler's Third Reich.
-
- Common Aims
-
- Over the years, people in many different countries have
wrestled with the "Jewish question": that is, what is the proper
role of Jews in non-Jewish society? During the 1930s, Jewish Zionists and
German National Socialists shared similar views on how to deal with this
perplexing issue. They agreed that Jews and Germans were distinctly different
nationalities, and that Jews did not belong in Germany. Jews living in
the Reich were therefore to be regarded not as "Germans of the Jewish
faith," but rather as members of a separate national community. Zionism
(Jewish nationalism) also implied an obligation by Zionist Jews to resettle
in Palestine, the "Jewish homeland." They could hardly regard
themselves as sincere Zionists and simultaneously claim equal rights in
Germany or any other "foreign" country.
-
- Theodor Herzl (1860-1904), the founder of modern Zionism,
maintained that anti-Semitism is not an aberration, but a natural and completely
understandable response by non-Jews to alien Jewish behavior and attitudes.
The only solution, he argued, is for Jews to recognize reality and live
in a separate state of their own. "The Jewish question exists wherever
Jews live in noticeable numbers," he wrote in his most influential
work, The Jewish State. "Where it does not exist, it is brought in
by arriving Jews ... I believe I understand anti-Semitism, which is a very
complex phenomenon. I consider this development as a Jew, without hate
or fear." The Jewish question, he maintained, is not social or religious.
"It is a national question. To solve it we must, above all, make it
an international political issue ..." Regardless of their citizenship,
Herzl insisted, Jews constitute not merely a religious community, but a
nationality, a people, a Volk.2 Zionism, wrote Herzl, offered the world
a welcome "final solution of the Jewish question."3
-
- Six months after Hitler came to power, the Zionist Federation
of Germany (by far the largest Zionist group in the country) submitted
a detailed memorandum to the new government that reviewed German-Jewish
relations and formally offered Zionist support in "solving" the
vexing "Jewish question." The first step, it suggested, had to
be a frank recognition of fundamental national differences: 4
-
- Zionism has no illusions about the difficulty of the
Jewish condition, which consists above all in an abnormal occupational
pattern and in the fault of an intellectual and moral posture not rooted
in one's own tradition. Zionism recognized decades ago that as a result
of the assimilationist trend, symptoms of deterioration were bound to appear
...
-
- Zionism believes that the rebirth of the national life
of a people, which is now occurring in Germany through the emphasis on
its Christian and national character, must also come about in the Jewish
national group. For the Jewish people, too, national origin, religion,
common destiny and a sense of its uniqueness must be of decisive importance
in the shaping of its existence. This means that the egotistical individualism
of the liberal era must be overcome and replaced with a sense of community
and collective responsibility ...
-
- We believe it is precisely the new [National Socialist]
Germany that can, through bold resoluteness in the handling of the Jewish
question, take a decisive step toward overcoming a problem which, in truth,
will have to be dealt with by most European peoples ...
-
- Our acknowledgment of Jewish nationality provides for
a clear and sincere relationship to the German people and its national
and racial realities. Precisely because we do not wish to falsify these
fundamentals, because we, too, are against mixed marriage and are for maintaining
the purity of the Jewish group and reject any trespasses in the cultural
domain, we -- having been brought up in the German language and German
culture -- can show an interest in the works and values of German culture
with admiration and internal sympathy ...
-
- For its practical aims, Zionism hopes to be able to win
the collaboration of even a government fundamentally hostile to Jews, because
in dealing with the Jewish question not sentimentalities are involved but
a real problem whose solution interests all peoples and at the present
moment especially the German people ... Boycott propaganda -- such as is
currently being carried on against Germany in many ways -- is in essence
un-Zionist, because Zionism wants not to do battle but to convince and
to build ...
-
- We are not blind to the fact that a Jewish question exists
and will continue to exist. From the abnormal situation of the Jews severe
disadvantages result for them, but also scarcely tolerable conditions for
other peoples. The Federation's paper, the Jüdische Rundschau ("Jewish
Review"), proclaimed the same message: "Zionism recognizes the
existence of a Jewish problem and desires a far-reaching and constructive
solution. For this purpose Zionism wishes to obtain the assistance of all
peoples, whether pro- or anti-Jewish, because, in its view, we are dealing
here with a concrete rather than a sentimental problem, the solution of
which all peoples are interested."5 A young Berlin rabbi, Joachim
Prinz, who later settled in the United States and became head of the American
Jewish Congress, wrote in his 1934 book, Wir Juden ("We Jews"),
that the National Socialist revolution in Germany meant "Jewry for
the Jews." He explained: "No subterfuge can save us now. In place
of assimilation we desire a new concept: recognition of the Jewish nation
and Jewish race." 6
-
- Active Collaboration
-
- On this basis of their similar ideologies about ethnicity
and nationhood, National Socialists and Zionists worked together for what
each group believed was in its own national interest. As a result, the
Hitler government vigorously supported Zionism and Jewish emigration to
Palestine from 1933 until 1940-1941, when the Second World War prevented
extensive collaboration.
-
- Even as the Third Reich became more entrenched, many
German Jews, probably a majority, continued to regard themselves, often
with considerable pride, as Germans first. Few were enthusiastic about
pulling up roots to begin a new life in far-away Palestine. Nevertheless,
more and more German Jews turned to Zionism during this period. Until late
1938, the Zionist movement flourished in Germany under Hitler. The circulation
of the Zionist Federation's bi-weekly Jüdische Rundschau grew enormously.
Numerous Zionist books were published. "Zionist work was in full swing"
in Germany during those years, the Encyclopaedia Judaica notes. A Zionist
convention held in Berlin in 1936 reflected "in its composition the
vigorous party life of German Zionists."7
-
- The SS was particularly enthusiastic in its support for
Zionism. An internal June 1934 SS position paper urged active and wide-ranging
support for Zionism by the government and the Party as the best way to
encourage emigration of Germany's Jews to Palestine. This would require
increased Jewish self-awareness. Jewish schools, Jewish sports leagues,
Jewish cultural organizations -- in short, everything that would encourage
this new consciousness and self-awareness - should be promoted, the paper
recommended.8
-
- SS officer Leopold von Mildenstein and Zionist Federation
official Kurt Tuchler toured Palestine together for six months to assess
Zionist development there. Based on his firsthand observations, von Mildenstein
wrote a series of twelve illustrated articles for the important Berlin
daily Der Angriff that appeared in late 1934 under the heading "A
Nazi Travels to Palestine." The series expressed great admiration
for the pioneering spirit and achievements of the Jewish settlers. Zionist
self-development, von Mildenstein wrote, had produced a new kind of Jew.
He praised Zionism as a great benefit for both the Jewish people and the
entire world. A Jewish homeland in Palestine, he wrote in his concluding
article, "pointed the way to curing a centuries-long wound on the
body of the world: the Jewish question." Der Angriff issued a special
medal, with a Swastika on one side and a Star of David on the other, to
commemorate the joint SS-Zionist visit. A few months after the articles
appeared, von Mildenstein was promoted to head the Jewish affairs department
of the SS security service in order to support Zionist migration and development
more effectively. 9
-
- The official SS newspaper, Das Schwarze Korps, proclaimed
its support for Zionism in a May 1935 front-page editorial: "The time
may not be too far off when Palestine will again be able to receive its
sons who have been lost to it for more than a thousand years. Our good
wishes, together with official goodwill, go with them."10 Four months
later, a similar article appeared in the SS paper: 11
-
- The recognition of Jewry as a racial community based
on blood and not on religion leads the German government to guarantee without
reservation the racial separateness of this community. The government finds
itself in complete agreement with the great spiritual movement within Jewry,
the so-called Zionism, with its recognition of the solidarity of Jewry
around the world and its rejection of all assimilationist notions. On this
basis, Germany undertakes measures that will surely play a significant
role in the future in the handling of the Jewish problem around the world.
-
- A leading German shipping line began direct passenger
liner service from Hamburg to Haifa, Palestine, in October 1933 providing
"strictly kosher food on its ships, under the supervision of the Hamburg
rabbinate." 12 With official backing, Zionists worked tirelessly to
"reeducate" Germany's Jews. As American historian Francis Nicosia
put it in his 1985 survey, The Third Reich and the Palestine Question:
"Zionists were encouraged to take their message to the Jewish community,
to collect money, to show films on Palestine and generally to educate German
Jews about Palestine. There was considerable pressure to teach Jews in
Germany to cease identifying themselves as Germans and to awaken a new
Jewish national identity in them." 13
-
- In an interview after the war, the former head of the
Zionist Federation of Germany, Dr. Hans Friedenthal, summed up the situation:
"The Gestapo did everything in those days to promote emigration, particularly
to Palestine. We often received their help when we required anything from
other authorities regarding preparations for emigration." 14
-
- At the September 1935 National Socialist Party Congress,
the Reichstag adopted the so-called "Nuremberg laws" that prohibited
marriages and sexual relations between Jews and Germans and, in effect,
proclaimed the Jews an alien minority nationality. A few days later the
Zionist Jüdische Rundschau editorially welcomed the new measures:
15
-
- Germany ... is meeting the demands of the World Zionist
Congress when it declares the Jews now living in Germany to be a national
minority. Once the Jews have been stamped a national minority it is again
possible to establish normal relations between the German nation and Jewry.
The new laws give the Jewish minority in Germany its own cultural life,
its own national life. In future it will be able to shape its own schools,
its own theatre, and its own sports associations. In short, it can create
its own future in all aspects of national life ...
-
- Germany has given the Jewish minority the opportunity
to live for itself, and is offering state protection for this separate
life of the Jewish minority: Jewry's process of growth into a nation will
thereby be encouraged and a contribution will be made to the establishment
of more tolerable relations between the two nations. Georg Kareski, the
head of both the "Revisionist" Zionist State Organization and
the Jewish Cultural League, and former head of the Berlin Jewish Community,
declared in an interview with the Berlin daily Der Angriff at the end of
1935: 16
-
- For many years I have regarded a complete separation
of the cultural affairs of the two peoples [Jews and Germans] as a pre-condition
for living together without conflict... I have long supported such a separation,
provided it is founded on respect for the alien nationality. The Nuremberg
Laws ... seem to me, apart from their legal provisions, to conform entirely
with this desire for a separate life based on mutual respect... This interruption
of the process of dissolution in many Jewish communities, which had been
promoted through mixed marriages, is therefore, from a Jewish point of
view, entirely welcome.
-
- Zionist leaders in other countries echoed these views.
Stephen S. Wise, president of the American Jewish Congress and the World
Jewish Congress, told a New York rally in June 1938: "I am not an
American citizen of the Jewish faith, I am a Jew... Hitler was right in
one thing. He calls the Jewish people a race and we are a race." 17
The Interior Ministry's Jewish affairs specialist, Dr. Bernhard Lösener,
expressed support for Zionism in an article that appeared in a November
1935 issue of the official Reichsverwaltungsblatt: 18
-
- If the Jews already had their own state in which the
majority of them were settled, then the Jewish question could be regarded
as completely resolved today, also for the Jews themselves. The least amount
of opposition to the ideas underlying the Nuremberg Laws have been shown
by the Zionists, because they realize at once that these laws represent
the only correct solution for the Jewish people as well. For each nation
must have its own state as the outward expression of its particular nationhood.
-
- In cooperation with the German authorities, Zionist groups
organized a network of some forty camps and agricultural centers throughout
Germany where prospective settlers were trained for their new lives in
Palestine. Although the Nuremberg Laws forbid Jews from displaying the
German flag, Jews were specifically guaranteed the right to display the
blue and white Jewish national banner. The flag that would one day be adopted
by Israel was flown at the Zionist camps and centers in Hitler's Germany.
19
-
- Himmler's security service cooperated with the Haganah,
the Zionist underground military organization in Palestine. The SS agency
paid Haganah official Feivel Polkes for information about the situation
in Palestine and for help in directing Jewish emigration to that country.
Meanwhile, the Haganah was kept well informed about German plans by a spy
it managed to plant in the Berlin headquarters of the SS.20 Haganah-SS
collaboration even included secret deliveries of German weapons to Jewish
settlers for use in clashes with Palestinian Arabs. 21 In the aftermath
of the November 1938 "Kristallnacht" outburst of violence and
destruction, the SS quickly helped the Zionist organization to get back
on its feet and continue its work in Germany, although now under more restricted
supervision. 22
-
- Official Reservations
-
- German support for Zionism was not unlimited. Government
and Party officials were very mindful of the continuing campaign by powerful
Jewish communities in the United States, Britain and other countries to
mobilize "their" governments and fellow citizens against Germany.
As long as world Jewry remained implacably hostile toward National Socialist
Germany, and as long as the great majority of Jews around the world showed
little eagerness to resettle in the Zionist "promised land,"
a sovereign Jewish state in Palestine would not really "solve"
the international Jewish question. Instead, German officials reasoned,
it would immeasurably strengthen this dangerous anti-German campaign. German
backing for Zionism was therefore limited to support for a Jewish homeland
in Palestine under British control, not a sovereign Jewish state. 23
-
- A Jewish state in Palestine, the Foreign Minister informed
diplomats in June 1937, would not be in Germany's interest because it would
not be able to absorb all Jews around the world, but would only serve as
an additional power base for international Jewry, in much the same way
as Moscow served as a base for international Communism.24 Reflecting something
of a shift in official policy, the German press expressed much greater
sympathy in 1937 for Palestinian Arab resistance to Zionist ambitions,
at a time when tension and conflict between Jews and Arabs in Palestine
was sharply increasing. 25
-
- A Foreign Office circular bulletin of June 22, 1937,
cautioned that in spite of support for Jewish settlement in Palestine,
"it would nevertheless be a mistake to assume that Germany supports
the formation of a state structure in Palestine under some form of Jewish
control. In view of the anti-German agitation of international Jewry, Germany
cannot agree that the formation of a Palestine Jewish state would help
the peaceful development of the nations of the world."26 "The
proclamation of a Jewish state or a Jewish-administrated Palestine,"
warned an internal memorandum by the Jewish affairs section of the SS,
"would create for Germany a new enemy, one that would have a deep
influence on developments in the Near East." Another SS agency predicted
that a Jewish state "would work to bring special minority protection
to Jews in every country, therefore giving legal protection to the exploitation
activity of world Jewry."27 In January 1939, Hitler's new Foreign
Minister, Joachim von Ribbentrop, likewise warned in another circular bulletin
that "Germany must regard the formation of a Jewish state as dangerous"
because it "would bring an international increase in power to world
Jewry." 28
-
- Hitler himself personally reviewed this entire issue
in early 1938 and, in spite of his long-standing skepticism of Zionist
ambitions and misgivings that his policies might contribute to the formation
of a Jewish state, decided to support Jewish migration to Palestine even
more vigorously. The prospect of ridding Germany of its Jews, he concluded,
outweighed the possible dangers. 29
-
- Meanwhile, the British government imposed ever more drastic
restrictions on Jewish immigration into Palestine in 1937, 1938 and 1939.
In response, the SS security service concluded a secret alliance with the
clandestine Zionist agency Mossad le-Aliya Bet to smuggle Jews illegally
into Palestine. As a result of this intensive collaboration, several convoys
of ships succeeded in reaching Palestine past British gunboats. Jewish
migration, both legal and illegal, from Germany (including Austria) to
Palestine increased dramatically in 1938 and 1939. Another 10,000 Jews
were scheduled to depart in October 1939, but the outbreak of war in September
brought the effort to an end. All the same, German authorities continued
to promote indirect Jewish emigration to Palestine during 1940 and 1941.
30 Even as late as March 1942, at least one officially authorized Zionist
"kibbutz" training camp for potential emigrants continued to
operate in Hitler's Germany. 31
-
- The Transfer Agreement
-
- The centerpiece of German-Zionist cooperation during
the Hitler era was the Transfer Agreement, a pact that enabled tens of
thousands of German Jews to migrate to Palestine with their wealth. The
Agreement, also known as the Haavara (Hebrew for "transfer"),
was concluded in August 1933 following talks between German officials and
Chaim Arlosoroff, Political Secretary of the Jewish Agency, the Palestine
center of the World Zionist Organization. 32
-
- Through this unusual arrangement, each Jew bound for
Palestine deposited money in a special account in Germany. The money was
used to purchase German-made agricultural tools, building materials, pumps,
fertilizer, and so forth, which were exported to Palestine and sold there
by the Jewish-owned Haavara company in Tel-Aviv. Money from the sales was
given to the Jewish emigrant upon his arrival in Palestine in an amount
corresponding to his deposit in Germany. German goods poured into Palestine
through the Haavara, which was supplemented a short time later with a barter
agreement by which Palestine oranges were exchanged for German timber,
automobiles, agricultural machinery, and other goods. The Agreement thus
served the Zionist aim of bringing Jewish settlers and development capital
to Palestine, while simultaneously serving the German goal of freeing the
country of an unwanted alien group.
-
- Delegates at the 1933 Zionist Congress in Prague vigorously
debated the merits of the Agreement. Some feared that the pact would undermine
the international Jewish economic boycott against Germany. But Zionist
officials reassured the Congress. Sam Cohen, a key figure behind the Haavara
arrangement, stressed that the Agreement was not economically advantageous
to Germany. Arthur Ruppin, a Zionist Organization emigration specialist
who had helped negotiate the pact, pointed out that "the Transfer
Agreement in no way interfered with the boycott movement, since no new
currency will flow into Germany as a result of the agreement..." 33
The 1935 Zionist Congress, meeting in Switzerland, overwhelmingly endorsed
the pact. In 1936, the Jewish Agency (the Zionist "shadow government"
in Palestine) took over direct control of the Ha'avara, which remained
in effect until the Second World War forced its abandonment.
-
- Some German officials opposed the arrangement. Germany's
Consul General in Jerusalem, Hans Döhle, for example, sharply criticized
the Agreement on several occasions during 1937. He pointed out that it
cost Germany the foreign exchange that the products exported to Palestine
through the pact would bring if sold elsewhere. The Haavara monopoly sale
of German goods to Palestine through a Jewish agency naturally angered
German businessmen and Arabs there. Official German support for Zionism
could lead to a loss of German markets throughout the Arab world. The British
government also resented the arrangement.34 A June 1937 German Foreign
Office internal bulletin referred to the "foreign exchange sacrifices"
that resulted from the Haavara. 35
-
- A December 1937 internal memorandum by the German Interior
Ministry reviewed the impact of the Transfer Agreement: "There is
no doubt that the Haavara arrangement has contributed most significantly
to the very rapid development of Palestine since 1933. The Agreement provided
not only the largest source of money (from Germany!), but also the most
intelligent group of immigrants, a nd finally it brought to the country
the machines and industrial products essential for development." The
main advantage of the pact, the memo reported, was the emigration of large
numbers of Jews to Palestine, the most desirable target country as far
as Germany was concerned. But the paper also noted the important drawbacks
pointed out by Consul Döhle and others. The Interior Minister, it
went on, had concluded that the disadvantages of the agreement now outweighed
the advantages and that, therefore, it should be terminated. 36
-
- Only one man could resolve the controversy. Hitler personally
reviewed the policy in July and September 1937, and again in January 1938,
and each time decided to maintain the Haavara arrangement. The goal of
removing Jews from Germany, he concluded, justified the drawbacks. 37
-
- The Reich Economics Ministry helped to organize another
transfer company, the International Trade and Investment Agency, or Intria,
through which Jews in foreign countries could help German Jews emigrate
to Palestine. Almost $900,000 was eventually channeled through the Intria
to German Jews in Palestine.38 Other European countries eager to encourage
Jewish emigration concluded agreements with the Zionists modeled after
the Ha'avara. In 1937 Poland authorized the Halifin (Hebrew for "exchange")
transfer company. By late summer 1939, Czechoslovakia, Romania, Hungary
and Italy had signed similar arrangements. The outbreak of war in September
1939, however, prevented large-scale implementation of these agreements.
39
-
- Achievements of Haavara
-
- Between 1933 and 1941, some 60,000 German Jews emigrated
to Palestine through the Ha'avara and other German-Zionist arrangements,
or about ten percent of Germany's 1933 Jewish population. (These German
Jews made up about 15 percent of Palestine's 1939 Jewish population.) Some
Ha'avara emigrants transferred considerable personal wealth from Germany
to Palestine. As Jewish historian Edwin Black has noted: "Many of
these people, especially in the late 1930s, were allowed to transfer actual
replicas of their homes and factories -- indeed rough replicas of their
very existence."40
-
- The total amount transferred from Germany to Palestine
through the Ha'avara between August 1933 and the end of 1939 was 8.1 million
pounds or 139.57 million German marks (then equivalent to more than $40
million). This amount included 33.9 million German marks ($13.8 million)
provided by the Reichsbank in connection with the Agreement.41
-
- Historian Black has estimated that an additional $70
million may have flowed into Palestine through corollary German commercial
agreements and special international banking transactions. The German funds
had a major impact on a country as underdeveloped as Palestine was in the
1930s, he pointed out. Several major industrial enterprises were built
with the capital from Germany, including the Mekoroth waterworks and the
Lodzia textile firm. The influx of Ha'avara goods and capital, concluded
Black, "produced an economic explosion in Jewish Palestine" and
was "an indispensable factor in the creation of the State of Israel."42
-
- The Ha'avara agreement greatly contributed to Jewish
development in Palestine and thus, indirectly, to the foundation of the
Israeli state. A January 1939 German Foreign Office circular bulletin reported,
with some misgiving, that "the transfer of Jewish property out of
Germany [through the Ha'avara agreement] contributed to no small extent
to the building of a Jewish state in Palestine."43
-
- Former officials of the Ha'avara company in Palestine
confirmed this view in a detailed study of the Transfer Agreement published
in 1972: "The economic activity made possible by the influx German
capital and the Haavara transfers to the private and public sectors were
of greatest importance for the country's development. Many new industries
and commercial enterprises were established in Jewish Palestine, and numerous
companies that are enormously important even today in the economy of the
State of Israel owe their existence to the Haavara."44
-
- Dr. Ludwig Pinner, a Ha'avara company official in Tel
Aviv during the 1930s, later commented that the exceptionally competent
Ha'avara immigrants "decisively contributed" to the economic,
social, cultural and educational development of Palestine's Jewish community.45
-
- The Transfer Agreement was the most far-reaching example
of cooperation between Hitler's Germany and international Zionism. Through
this pact, Hitler's Third Reich did more than any other government during
the 1930s to support Jewish development in Palestine.
-
- Zionists Offer a Military Alliance With Hitler
-
- In early January 1941 a small but important Zionist organization
submitted a formal proposal to German diplomats in Beirut for a military-political
alliance with wartime Germany. The offer was made by the radical underground
"Fighters for the Freedom of Israel," better known as the Lehi
or Stern Gang. Its leader, Avraham Stern, had recently broken with the
radical nationalist "National Military Organization" (Irgun Zvai
Leumi) over the group's attitude toward Britain, which had effectively
banned further Jewish settlement of Palestine. Stern regarded Britain as
the main enemy of Zionism.
-
- This remarkable Zionist proposal "for the solution
of the Jewish question in Europe and the active participation of the NMO
[Lehi] in the war on the side of Germany" is worth quoting at some
length:46
-
- In their speeches and statements, the leading statesmen
of National Socialist Germany have often emphasized that a New Order in
Europe requires as a prerequisite a radical solution of the Jewish question
by evacuation. ("Jew-f ree Europe")
-
- The evacuation of the Jewish masses from Europe is a
precondition for solving the Jewish question. However, the only way this
can be totally achieved is through settlement of these masses in the homeland
of the Jewish people, Palestine, and by the establishment of a Jewish state
in its historical boundaries.
-
- The goal of the political activity and the years of struggle
by the Israel Freedom Movement, the National Military Organization in Palestine
(Irgun Zvai Leumi), is to solve the Jewish problem in this way and thus
completely liberate the Jewish people forever.
-
- The NMO, which is very familiar with the good will of
the German Reich government and its officials towards Zionist activities
within Germany and the Zionist emigration program, takes that view that:
-
- 1. Common interests can exist between a European New
Order based on the German concept and the true national aspirations of
the Jewish people as embodied by the NMO.
-
- 2. Cooperation is possible between the New Germany and
a renewed, folk ish-national Jewry [Hebr_ertum].
-
- 3. The establishment of the historical Jewish state on
a national and totalitarian basis, and bound by treaty with the German
Reich, would be in the interest of maintaining and strengthening the future
German position of power in the Near East.
-
- On the basis of these considerations, and upon the condition
that the German Reich government recognize the national aspirations of
the Israel Freedom Movement mentioned above, the NMO in Palestine offers
to actively take part in the war on the side of Germany.
-
- This offer by the NMO could include military, political
and informational activity within Palestine and, after certain organizational
measures, outside as well. Along with this the Jewish men of Europe would
be militarily trained and organized in military units under the leadership
and command of the NMO. They would take part in combat operations for the
purpose of conquering Palestine, should such a front by formed.
-
- The indirect participation of the Israel Freedom Movement
in the New Order of Europe, already in the preparatory stage, combined
with a positive-radical solution of the European Jewish problem on the
basis of the national aspirations of the Jewish people mentioned above,
would greatly strengthen the moral foundation of the New Order in the eyes
of all humanity.
-
- The cooperation of the Israel Freedom Movement would
also be consistent with a recent speech by the German Reich Chancellor,
in which Hitler stressed that he would utilize any combination and coalition
in order to isolate and defeat England.
-
- There is no record of any German response. Acceptance
was very unlikely anyway because by this time German policy was decisively
pro-Arab.47 Remarkably, Stern's group sought to conclude a pact with the
Third Reich at a time when stories that Hitler was bent on exterminating
Jews were already in wide circulation. Stern apparently either did not
believe the stories or he was willing to collaborate with the mortal enemy
of his people to help bring about a Jewish state. 48
-
- An important Lehi member at the time the group made this
offer was Yitzhak Shamir, who later served as Israel's Foreign Minister
and then, during much of the 1980s and until June 1992, as Prime Minister.
As Lehi operations chief following Stern's death in 1942, Shamir organized
numerous acts of terror, including the November 1944 assassination of British
Middle East Minister Lord Moyne and the September 1948 slaying of Swedish
United Nations mediator Count Bernadotte. Years later, when Shamir was
asked about the 1941 offer, he confirmed that he was aware of his organization's
proposed alliance with wartime Germany. 49
-
- Conclusion
-
- In spite of the basic hostility between the Hitler regime
and international Jewry, for several years Jewish Zionist and German National
Socialist interests coincided. In collaborating with the Zionists for a
mutually desirable and humane solution to a complex problem, the Third
Reich was willing to make foreign exchange sacrifices, impair relations
with Britain and anger the Arabs. Indeed, during the 1930s no nation did
more to substantively further Jewish-Zionist goals than Hitler's Germany.
-
- Notes
-
- 1.W. Martini, "Hebr_isch unterm Hakenkreuz,"
Die Welt (Hamburg), Jan. 10, 1975. Cited in: Klaus Polken, "The Secret
Contacts: Zionism and Nazi Germany, 1933-1941," Journal of Palestine
Studies, Spring-Summer 1976, p. 65. 2.Quoted in: Ingrid Weckert, Feuerzeichen:
Die "Reichskristallnacht" (Tübingen: Grabert, 1981), p.
212. See also: Th. Herzl, The Jewish State (New York: Herzl Press, 1970),
pp. 33, 35, 36, and, Edwin Black, The Transfer Agreement (New York: Macmillan,
1984), p. 73. 3.Th. Herzl, "Der Kongress," Welt, June 4, 1897.
Reprinted in: Theodor Herzls zionistische Schriften (Leon Kellner, ed.),
erster Teil, Berlin: Jüdischer Verlag, 1920, p. 190 (and p. 139).
4.Memo of June 21, 1933, in: L. Dawidowicz, A Holocaust Reader (New York:
Behrman, 1976), pp. 150-155, and (in part) in: Francis R. Nicosia, The
Third Reich and the Palestine Question (Austin: Univ. of Texas, 1985),
p. 42.; On Zionism in Germany before Hitler's assumption of power, see:
Donald L. Niewyk, The Jews in Weimar Germany (Baton Rouge: 1980), pp. 94-95,
126-131, 140-143.; F. Nicosia, Third Reich (Austin: 1985), pp. 1-15. 5.Jüdische
Rundschau (Berlin), June 13, 1933. Quoted in: Heinz H_hne, The Order of
the Death's Head (New York: Ballantine, pb., 1971, 1984), pp. 376-377.
6.Heinz Höhne, The Order of the Death's Head (Ballantine, 1971, 1984),
p. 376. 7."Berlin," Encyclopaedia Judaica (New York and Jerusalem:
1971), Vol. 5, p. 648. For a look at one aspect of this "vigorous
life," see: J.-C. Horak, "Zionist Film Propaganda in Nazi Germany,"
Historical Journal of Film, Radio and Television, Vol. 4, No. 1, 1984,
pp. 49-58. 8.Francis R. Nicosia, The Third Reich and the Palestine Question
(1985), pp. 54-55.; Karl A. Schleunes, The Twisted Road to Auschwitz (Urbana:
Univ. of Illinois, 1970, 1990), pp. 178-181. 9.Jacob Boas, "A Nazi
Travels to Palestine," History Today (London), January 1980, pp. 33-38.
10.Facsimile reprint of front page of Das Schwarze Korps, May 15, 1935,
in: Janusz Piekalkiewicz, Israels Langer Arm (Frankfurt: Goverts, 1975),
pp. 66-67. Also quoted in: Heinz H_hne, The Order of the Death's Head (Ballantine,
1971, 1984), p. 377. See also: Erich Kern, ed., Verheimlichte Dokumente
(Munich: FZ-Verlag, 1988), p. 184. 11.Das Schwarze Korps, Sept. 26, 1935.
Quoted in: F. Nicosia, The Third Reich and the Palestine Question (1985),
pp. 56-57. 12.Lenni Brenner, Zionism in the Age of the Dictators (1983),
p. 83. 13.F. Nicosia, The Third Reich and the Palestine Question (1985),
p. 60. See also: F. Nicosia, "The Yishuv and the Holocaust,"
The Journal of Modern History (Chicago), Vol. 64, No. 3, Sept. 1992, pp.
533-540. 14.F. Nicosia, The Third Reich and the Palestine Question (1985),
p. 57. 15.Jüdische Rundschau, Sept. 17, 1935. Quoted in: Yitzhak Arad,
with Y. Gutman and A. Margaliot, eds., Documents on the Holocaust (Jerusalem:
Yad Vashem, 1981), pp. 82-83. 16.Der Angriff, Dec. 23, 1935, in: E. Kern,
ed., Verheimlichte Dokumente (Munich: 1988), p. 148.; F. Nicosia, Third
Reich (1985), p. 56.; L. Brenner, Zionism in the Age of the Dictators (1983),
p. 138.; A. Margaliot, "The Reaction...," Yad Vashem Studies
(Jerusalem), vol. 12, 1977, pp. 90-91.; On Kareski's remarkable career,
see: H. Levine, "A Jewish Collaborator in Nazi Germany," Central
European History (Atlanta), Sept. 1975, pp. 251-281. 17."Dr. Wise
Urges Jews to Declare Selves as Such," New York Herald Tribune, June
13, 1938, p. 12. 18.F. Nicosia, The Third Reich (1985), p. 53. 19.Lucy
Dawidowicz, The War Against the Jews, 1933-1945 (New York: Bantam, pb.,
1976), pp. 253-254.; Max Nussbaum, "Zionism Under Hitler," Congress
Weekly (New York: American Jewish Congress), Sept. 11, 1942.; F. Nicosia,
The Third Reich (1985), pp. 58-60, 217.; Edwin Black, The Transfer Agreement
(1984), p. 175. 20.H. H_hne, The Order of the Death's Head (Ballantine,
pb., 1984), pp. 380-382.; K. Schleunes, Twisted Road (1970, 1990), p. 226.;
Secret internal SS intelligence report about F. Polkes, June 17, 1937,
in: John Mendelsohn, ed., The Holocaust (New York: Garland, 1982), vol.
5, pp. 62-64. 21.F. Nicosia, Third Reich (1985), pp. 63-64, 105, 219-220.
22.F. Nicosia, Third Reich (1985), p. 160. 23.This distinction is also
implicit in the "Balfour Declaration" of November 1917, in which
the British government expressed support for "a national home for
the Jewish people" in Palestine, while carefully avoiding any mention
of a Jewish state. Referring to the majority Arab population there, the
Declaration went on to caution, "...it being clearly understood that
nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights
of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine." The complete text
of the Declaration is reproduced in facsimile in: Robert John, Behind the
Balfour Declaration (IHR, 1988), p. 32. 24.F. Nicosia, Third Reich (1985),
p. 121. 25.F. Nicosia, Third Reich (1985), p. 124. 26.David Yisraeli, The
Palestine Problem in German Politics 1889-1945 (Bar-Ilan University, Israel,
1974), p. 300.; Also in: Documents on German Foreign Policy, Series D,
Vol. 5. Doc. No. 564 or 567. 27.K. Schleunes, The Twisted Road (1970, 1990),
p. 209. 28.Circular of January 25, 1939. Nuremberg document 3358-PS. International
Military Tribunal, Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International
Military Tribunal (Nuremberg: 1947-1949), vol. 32, pp. 242-243. Nazi Conspiracy
and Aggression (Washington, DC: 1946-1948), vol. 6, pp. 92-93. 29.F. Nicosia,
Third Reich (1985), pp. 141-144.; On Hitler's critical view of Zionism
in Mein Kampf, see esp. Vol. 1, Chap. 11. Quoted in: Robert Wistrich, Hitler's
Apocalypse (London: 1985), p. 155.; See also: F. Nicosia, Third Reich (1985),
pp. 26-28.; Hitler told his army adjutant in 1939 and again in 1941 that
he had asked the British in 1937 about transferring all of Germany's Jews
to Palestine or Egypt. The British rejected the proposal, he said, because
it would cause further disorder. See: H. v. Kotze, ed., Heeresadjutant
bei Hitler (Stuttgart: 1974), pp. 65, 95. 30.F. Nicosia, Third Reich (1985),
pp. 156, 160-164, 166-167.; H. H_hne, The Order of the Death's Head (Ballantine,
pb., 1984), pp. 392-394.; Jon and David Kimche, The Secret Roads (London:
Secker and Warburg, 1955), pp. 39-43. See also: David Yisraeli, "The
Third Reich and Palestine," Middle Eastern Studies, October 1971,
p. 347.; Bernard Wasserstein, Britain and the Jews of Europe, 1939-1945
(1979), pp. 43, 49, 52, 60.; T. Kelly, "Man who fooled Nazis,"
Washington Times, April 28, 1987, pp. 1B, 4B. Based on interview with Willy
Perl, author of The Holocaust Conspiracy. 31.Y. Arad, et al., eds., Documents
On the Holocaust (1981), p. 155. (The training kibbutz was at Neuendorf,
and may have functioned even after March 1942.) 32.On the Agreement in
general, see: Werner Feilchenfeld, et al., Haavara-Transfer nach Palaestina
(Tübingen: Mohr/Siebeck, 1972).; David Yisraeli, "The Third Reich
and the Transfer Agreement," Journal of Contemporary History (London),
No. 2, 1971, pp. 129-148.; "Haavara," Encyclopaedia Judaica (1971),
vol. 7, pp. 1012-1013.; F. Nicosia, The Third Reich and the Palestine Question
(Austin: 1985), pp. 44-49.; Raul Hilberg, The Destruction of the European
Jews (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1985), pp. 140-141.; The Transfer Agreement,
by Edwin Black, is detailed and useful. However, it contains numerous inaccuracies
and wildly erroneous conclusions. See, for example, the review by Richard
S. Levy in Commentary, Sept. 1984, pp. 68-71. 33.E. Black, The Transfer
Agreement (1984), pp. 328, 337. 34.On opposition to the Haavara in official
German circles, see: W. Feilchenfeld, et al., Haavara-Transfer nach Palaestina
(1972), pp. 31-33.; D. Yisraeli, "The Third Reich," Journal of
Contemporary History, 1971, pp. 136-139.; F. Nicosia, The Third Reich and
the Palestine Question, pp. 126-139.; I. Weckert, Feuerzeichen (1981),
pp. 226-227.; Rolf Vogel, Ein Stempel hat gefehlt (Munich: Droemer Knaur,
1977), pp. 110 ff. 35.W. Feilchenfeld, et al., Haavara-Transfer (1972),
p. 31. Entire text in: David Yisraeli, The Palestine Problem in German
Politics 1889-1945 (Israel: 1974), pp. 298-300. 36.Interior Ministry internal
memo (signed by State Secretary W. Stuckart), Dec. 17, 1937, in: Helmut
Eschwege, ed., Kennzeichen J (Berlin: 1966), pp. 132-136. 37.W. Feilchenfeld,
et al, Haavara-Transfer (1972), p. 32. 38.E. Black, Transfer Agreement,
pp. 376-377. 39.E. Black, Transfer Agreement (1984), pp. 376, 378.; F.
Nicosia, Third Reich (1985), pp. 238-239 (n. 91). 40.E. Black, Transfer
Agreement, p. 379.; F. Nicosia, Third Reich, pp. 212, 255 (n. 66). 41.W.
Feilchenfeld, et al., Haavara-Transfer, p. 75.; "Haavara," Encyclopaedia
Judaica, (1971), Vol. 7, p. 1013. 42.E. Black, Transfer Agreement, pp.
379, 373, 382. 43.Circular of January 25, 1939. Nuremberg document 3358-PS.
International Military Tribunal, Trial of the Major War Criminals Before
the International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg: 1947-1949), Vol. 32, pp.
242-243. 44.Werner Feilchenfeld, et al., Haavara-Transfer nach Palaestina
(Tübingen: Mohr/Siebeck, 1972). Quoted in: Ingrid Weckert, Feuerzeichen
(Tübingen: Grabert, 1981), pp. 222-223. 45.W. Feilchenfeld, et al.,
Haavara-Transfer nach Palaestina (1972). Quoted in: I. Weckert, Feuerzeichen
(1981), p. 224. 46.Original document in German Ausw_rtiges Amt Archiv,
Bestand 47-59, E 224152 and E 234155-58. (Photocopy in author's possession).;
Complete original German text published in: David Yisraeli, The Palestine
Problem in German Politics 1889-1945 (Israel: 1974), pp. 315-317. See also:
Klaus Polkhen, "The Secret Contacts," Journal of Palestine Studies,
Spring-Summer 1976, pp. 78-80.; (At the time this offer was made, Stern's
Lehi group still regarded itself as the true Irgun/NMO.) 47.Arab nationalists
opposed Britain, which then dominated much of the Arab world, including
Egypt, Iraq and Palestine. Because Britain and Germany were at war, Germany
cultivated Arab support. The leader of Palestine's Arabs, the Grand Mufti
of Jerusalem, Haj Amin el-Husseini, worked closely with Germany during
the war years. After escaping from Palestine, he spoke to the Arab world
over German radio and helped raise Muslim recruits in Bosnia for the Waffen
SS. 48.Israel Shahak, "Yitzhak Shamir, Then and Now," Middle
East Policy (Washington, DC), Vol. 1, No. 1, (Whole No. 39), 1992, pp.
27-38.; Yehoshafat Harkabi, Israel's Fateful Hour (New York: Harper and
Row, 1988), pp. 213-214. Quoted in: Andrew J. Hurley, Israel and the New
World Order (Santa Barbara, Calif.: 1991), pp. 93, 208-209.; Avishai Margalit,
"The Violent Life of Yitzhak Shamir," New York Review of Books,
May 14, 1992, pp. 18-24.; Lenni Brenner, Zionism in the Age of the Dictators
(1983), pp. 266-269.; L. Brenner, Jews in America Today (1986), pp. 175-177.;
L. Brenner, "Yitzhak Shamir: On Hitler's Side," Arab Perspectives
(League of Arab States), March 1984, pp. 11-13. 49.Avishai Margalit, "The
Violent Life of Yitzhak Shamir," New York Review of Books, May 14,
1992, pp. 18-24.; Lenni Brenner, Zionism in the Age of the Dictators (1983),
pp. 266-269.; L. Brenner, Jews in America Today (1986), pp. 175-177.; L.
Brenner, "Skeletons in Shamir's Cupboard," Middle East International,
Sept. 30, 1983, pp. 15-16.; Sol Stern, L. Rapoport, "Israel's Man
of the Shadows," Village Voice (New York), July 3, 1984, pp. 13 ff.
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