- As stark as a morgue photo, the picture from FirstEnergy
Corp.'s files captures a reactor in distress.
-
- Something is hemorrhaging atop the massive steel lid
that covers the radioactive core of the Davis-Besse nuclear plant near
Toledo.
-
- The vivid color print, taken in April 2000, shows rust
trails the hue of dried blood spilling from inspection ports on the reactor's
sloping dome.
-
- The corrosion stains end in piles of white-brown debris
at the lid's edge. The loose clumps of dried acid are trapped there like
fallen leaves against a fence by the ring of huge bolts that locks the
80-ton cap in place.
-
- Anyone who saw the image that has come to be known as
the "red photo" would have to question whether the lid - a vital
safety barrier - was damaged.
-
- "I would have concluded that a serious corrosion
problem probably existed" on the lid, said Digby Macdonald, an international
corrosion expert who directs Pennsylvania State University's Center for
Advanced Materials.
-
- But federal regulators never got that chance.
-
- FirstEnergy's nuclear division didn't share the 2-year-old
photo with senior Nuclear Regulatory Commission staffers last fall. It
wasn't in the batch of images the company provided the NRC in November
2001 as part of FirstEnergy's successful campaign to convince the agency
the lid was OK, and to justify postponing a costly shutdown to inspect
it.
-
- The photo didn't surface until April, on page 93 of a
thick FirstEnergy report. The document attempts to explain in hindsight
how the company had allowed boric acid sludge left behind by leaking reactor
coolant to chew a pineapple-size hole all the way through the 6.5-inch-thick
lid.
-
- The unprecedented hole, found a month earlier, jeopardized
the plant's safety, rocked the nuclear industry and is expected to cost
the company nearly $400 million in repairs and replacement power purchases.
-
- The omitted photo is just one example of what regulatory
officials say are FirstEnergy's multiple failures over almost a decade
to accurately document and communicate what the company knew to be the
worsening condition of Davis-Besse's reactor lid.
-
- Those misrepresentations - especially during the crucial
NRC review last autumn - are the subject of an agency criminal probe. They
also are the subject of a new allegation by a watchdog group, the Nuclear
Information and Resource Service, which is calling for Davis-Besse's license
to be revoked. The NRC is reviewing that claim and may address it in its
ongoing investigation.
-
- The NRC already has determined that FirstEnergy's nuclear
division violated agency rules requiring that information be accurate and
complete. The company insists, without further explanation, that it did
nothing criminal. But if the inquiry under way by the NRC's criminal unit,
the Office of Investigations, verifies intentional wrongdoing, plant personnel
and FirstEnergy managers could find themselves answering to a federal grand
jury, or facing hefty civil fines.
-
- The findings also could affect the NRC's decision on
whether or when to allow Davis-Besse to resume making electricity.
-
- Neither the government nor FirstEnergy has been willing
to say much publicly about the records issue because of the investigations.
In the last few weeks, however, a picture of the evidence in the case and
the company's defense has emerged from newly released NRC reports as well
as a Plain Dealer review of thousands of pages of inspection documents,
meeting transcripts and briefing materials.
-
- While not contesting that their records were inaccurate
and incomplete, FirstEnergy officials have sought to portray the documentation
problems as benign miscommunications or misinterpretations rather than
deliberate attempts to deceive. They have said that evidence such as the
"red photo" that gave a more detailed indication of the lid's
condition was available if the NRC had looked hard enough.
-
- "It was there for the asking," said company
spokesman Todd Schneider. "Being our regulator, the NRC has full access
to the plant, to our documents, to just about every part of our operation."
-
- But that rationale sidesteps the key legal issue of why
material in FirstEnergy's files sharply differs from the rosy picture the
company painted for the NRC late last year to justify the reactor's continued
operation.
-
- "I think that's a little bit disingenuous,"
Brian Sheron, the agency's associate director for project licensing and
technical analysis, said. "We were asking them to provide us with
all the information to support their argument to operate beyond Dec. 31.
Apparently, we did not get everything."
-
- The NRC itself is under fire from critics, including
some members of Congress, for allowing the plant to delay its lid inspection
last fall. Angry and embarrassed agency staffers say they made the right
call based on the information they had.
-
- "If we knew they had three or four inches of [acid]
caked on top of the head . . . that would have started the chain"
of more intense questioning, Sheron said.
-
- Had FirstEnergy disclosed that its inspections dating
at least to 1998 had consistently found red, rusty lumps of acid on the
lid - increasingly large deposits that weren't fully cleaned off so the
surface underneath could be checked - "we would have challenged the
licensee then and there to explain what we were seeing," Sheron said.
"If we didn't get a reasonable explanation, we probably would have
taken action to try to force them to shut down."
-
-
- String of inaccuracies
-
- The string of inaccurate and incomplete Davis-Besse records
that the NRC has identified began in 1993.
-
- At that time, managers at the plant and at FirstEnergy's
predecessor, Toledo Edison Co., were debating whether to modify a platform
that sits atop the reactor lid. The structure helps support the dozens
of control rods that pass in and out of the reactor's core through sleeves,
or nozzles, in the lid to regulate the nuclear reaction. It also holds
insulation to contain the reactor's fierce heat.
-
- The problem with the service structure, though, was its
close fit. At the top of the lid, there was only a 2-inch gap between the
lid's metal surface and the insulation, making inspection of that area
extremely difficult.
-
- To check the lid's condition every two years during the
plant's refueling shutdown, inspectors attached a video camera to a pole
and poked it through one of the 16 small "mouse holes" that ring
the service structure's base. But it was hard to get the camera all the
way to the top of the lid.
-
- Davis-Besse's sister plants had begun cutting larger
ports in the structure to allow for better inspection and cleaning. In
March 1990, a Davis-Besse engineer recommended that the plant do the same
after finding boric acid residue from leaking coolant in several places
on the lid. He reminded his bosses of the acid's potential for harm.
-
- Managers finally decided in September 1993 that the modification
wasn't needed. The reason, according to the cancellation notice signed
by four high-level managers, was because "cleaning of the reactor
vessel head [lid] during last three outages [in 1990, '91 and '93] was
completed successfully without requiring access ports."
-
- That statement wasn't accurate, the NRC has determined.
Agency inspectors who reviewed Davis-Besse records from the 1991 and '93
refueling shutdowns found that workers had allowed acid deposits to remain
on the lid each time the reactor was restarted.
-
- FirstEnergy's own review this year notes that there are
no records indicating the lid was inspected at all in 1990. The FirstEnergy
report doesn't say what, if anything, the 1991 records show, but acknowledges
the company can't verify the effectiveness of the lid-cleaning done in
1993.
-
- The record-keeping flaws at Davis-Besse continued in
1998. Plant documents from that year stated that workers had cleaned acid
buildup from the lid, even though the company noted as an aside that its
reactor's manufacturer, Babcock & Wilcox, considered such deposits
harmless. Plant records also said inspections had shown the lid surface
was free of "any" corrosion damage.
-
- All three statements were incorrect, the NRC has found.
-
- A videotape of the 1998 inspection showed fist-sized
clumps of red, rusty acid on parts of the reactor lid, and Davis-Besse
workers again allowed some of them to remain, especially on the hard-to-reach
top of the dome. That precluded plant personnel from knowing, as they claimed
to, that the underlying metal was OK. In fact, the hole in the lid had
started its rapid growth that year, FirstEnergy surmises, in the very area
workers had left uncleaned.
-
- Also, none of the nine Babcock & Wilcox reports the
NRC examined contained the reassuring statement FirstEnergy had quoted:
that acid residue left on the lid wouldn't cause corrosion.
-
- There were multiple inaccuracies in Davis-Besse documents
from 2000, the NRC has found, most having to do with claims that the reactor
lid was rigorously cleaned and that inspection showed it to be unblemished.
-
- "Work performed without deviation," noted an
April 25, 2000, order signed by the reactor coolant system engineer detailing
the lid-cleaning activities. "Engineering displayed noteworthy persistence
in ensuring boric acid accumulation from the reactor head was thoroughly
cleaned," trumpeted a July 7, 2000, report by the plant's quality
assurance unit.
-
- None of it was true. As FirstEnergy acknowledged in reports
to the NRC this year, Davis-Besse personnel were under intense pressure
to stay on the tight work schedule during the refueling outage so the plant
could resume making electricity - and money - as soon as possible.
-
- Workers examining the lid at the start of the 2000 outage
found rock-hard, "lava-like" piles of acid that clogged some
of the mouse holes and hindered the video camera's path. They did some
cleaning, but with time running out, managers decided to stop, leaving
some acid clumps in place and part of the lid unchecked. Contrary to policy,
they didn't do a written evaluation to justify their actions.
-
- Eighteen months later, when FirstEnergy officials were
pressing the NRC to postpone the mandatory lid inspections that most other
plants were doing to look for possible nozzle cracks, they assured the
agency their lid was in good shape. But as the NRC would later discover,
the evidence the company provided was selective and misleading.
-
- In letters and in-person briefings to the NRC staff at
the agency's Rockville, Md., headquarters, company officials mentioned
having found "some" boric acid in past inspections. But they
didn't reveal the alarmingly rusty characteristics and amount of the acid
residue - by this time nearing 900 pounds, they later found out - that
had been accumulating for years.
-
- In one meeting, for example, FirstEnergy nuclear division
president Robert Saunders "said he knew there was some light dusting
of boron in certain spots. But he said he was not concerned that was from
major leakage," recalled the NRC's Sheron.
-
- And in an Oct. 17, 2001, letter, FirstEnergy nuclear
division support services director L.W. Worley told NRC staffers that the
lid was cleaned in 1996. He added that re-reviews of the videotapes from
that inspection and ones in 1998 and 2000 "did not identify any leakage
in the . . . nozzle-to-head areas that could be inspected."
-
- When NRC staffers continued to push for a shutdown by
Dec. 31, FirstEnergy officials volunteered to fly to Rockville with the
inspection videotapes so NRC staffers could see for themselves. But the
company didn't show any tapes that depicted the masses of rusty acid accumulated
at the center of the lid, according to the NRC's subsequent interviews
with staffers who attended the meeting.
-
- "The NRC staff members recollected that they were
shown freeze-frame video images that depicted inspectable nozzles, i.e.
free of significant deposits," an NRC task force reported last month.
"The nature and extent of boric acid deposits remaining on the [lid]
. . . were not disclosed."
-
- The NRC has always been heavily dependent on the candor
of the utilities it regulates. There are 103 commercial nuclear reactors
in the United States, each a highly complex machine with dozens of operational
issues per day that require attention and generate thousands of pages of
paperwork.
-
- Even in the best of times, the agency has only a dozen
or so people monitoring the day-to-day operations of an individual plant
- two or three on-site inspectors and the rest at regional offices or at
headquarters.
-
- Because of its staffing level, "the NRC doesn't
count every thread on every bolt; we focus on things that are safety-significant,"
the agency's Sheron said. "We poke, we probe, we ask questions. But
for the most part, we rely on the licensee. Our whole regulatory process
is based on trust."
-
- The agency's oversight of Davis-Besse was particularly
vulnerable at the exact time the hole in the reactor's lid was forming
and growing, in the late 1990s.
-
- The resident inspector's post at the plant was vacant
for a year; the job of senior project engineer for Davis-Besse at the NRC's
Midwest regional office was left empty for 20 months. And there were serious
problems at other area reactors that required attention, so the amount
of time the agency spent on inspections at Davis-Besse plummeted to an
eight-year low.
-
- However, the NRC's own shortcomings don't explain FirstEnergy's
repeated failures to disclose what it knew.
-
-
- Legal review
-
- After news of the NRC's probe of possible criminal wrongdoing
leaked this spring, FirstEnergy asked one of its law firms to review staff
activities at the plant during the past decade.
-
- The company won't discuss or release the findings, but
an executive told stock analysts in September that while Davis-Besse managers
had made poor decisions in operating the reactor and dealing with federal
regulators, the law firm found no behavior "which would rise to criminal."
-
-
- Instead, in numerous filings and meetings with the NRC
to explain itself, FirstEnergy has depicted former Davis-Besse managers
as production-obsessed and out of touch with the plant, and workers as
being naive about the potential for boric acid deposits to harm the reactor
lid if left in place. Only wet boric acid posed a corrosion threat, and
plant personnel wrongly thought that, once the steel lid's searing heat
instantly dried the leaking coolant, the acid deposits left behind couldn't
get wet again.
-
- But if Davis-Besse personnel truly believed the acid
buildup was harmless, why not acknowledge its presence? Why say or imply
that it had been fully cleaned away when it hadn't?
-
- "That is one of the standards problems we're trying
to correct at the plant - that cleaning the head back then meant cleaning
as much as you could, not the entire head," said FirstEnergy's Schneider.
"That's about all I can say on that. Those issues will come out in
the investigation."
-
- FirstEnergy has fired, transferred or reprimanded some
senior employees in connection with the hole in the lid. But it is mum
on whether those moves, which included the departure of nuclear division
Vice Presidents Guy Campbell and Howard Bergendahl and engineering director
John Wood, were because of the record-keeping inaccuracies.
-
- The NRC's Sheron said FirstEnergy nuclear division President
Robert Saunders told him the disciplinary steps were a consequence of its
law firm's review. "I don't think a company would fire somebody if
it concluded they hadn't done anything wrong," Sheron said.
-
- FirstEnergy's Schneider has said the company expects
to be fined for its overall lapses, but that the management changes and
renewed focus on safety should be enough to regain the trust of the NRC
and the public.
-
- A national nuclear watchdog group disagrees. Concerned
that the NRC will accept superficial changes at Davis-Besse and not push
for fundamental reforms, the Nuclear Information and Resource Service recently
filed a complaint with the NRC. It alleges that FirstEnergy records contained
false and inaccurate statements about the Davis-Besse reactor lid, and
that the company's analyses of the event have failed to explain why.
-
- The NRC has assigned the allegation to a review board,
and, if it's deemed serious enough, it could be incorporated into the Office
of Investigation's ongoing work.
-
- Davis-Besse "should have its operating license revoked,"
said Paul Gunter, director of NIRS' reactor watchdog project and the author
of the complaint. "Our concern remains that the NRC is going to go
along with this plan to just replace managers at Davis-Besse as the solution
to underlying problems with the management culture that places production
over safety."
-
- With Davis-Besse aiming to finish its repair work by
late January or February, it's possible the NRC may have to decide whether
to let the plant resume operating before the agency's criminal inquiry
is complete.
-
- Although it may not have the final report in hand before
restart, the special NRC panel overseeing Davis-Besse's rehabilitation
will have a good idea of what the findings will be, said its chairman,
Jack Grobe. The decision will hinge on whether FirstEnergy has corrected
whatever deficiencies the probe finds.
-
- "We'll have to have confidence in the plant personnel"
before letting Davis-Besse power up again, Grobe said. "This is a
critical element."
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- For full coverage of Davis-Besse, go to www.cleveland.com/davisbesse/
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- To reach these Plain Dealer reporters: jmangels@plaind.com,
216-999-4842 jfunk@plaind.com, 216-999-4842
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- http://www.cleveland.com/news/plaindealer/index.ssf?/base/news/1038742203214530.xml
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