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Plan To Destroy Russian
Chemical Weapons Near Collapse

By Peter Eisler
USA Today
10-1-2

WASHINGTON -- The U.S. government has spent $230 million trying to build a Russian plant to destroy thousands of tons of deadly chemical munitions from the old Soviet arsenal. This month, unless Congress acts, the Pentagon will begin closing down the project without laying a single brick -- or eliminating a single weapon.
 
The facility was designed to wipe out one of the world's most worrisome stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction: nearly 2 million artillery shells and missile warheads filled with deadly nerve gasses. Stored in open racks in a cluster of wooden warehouses in the town of Shchuch'ye, they are among the most portable, ready-made weapons of mass destruction a terrorist could obtain. Even the smallest shells, which fit in a briefcase, can kill 100,000 or more if set off in a crowded city.
 
There have been no reported thefts at Shchuch'ye (SHOO-che), but U.S. officials note that such an act would be hard to detect and represents a serious threat. President Bush called the stockpile's destruction a ''vital mission'' in a national security address last winter at The Citadel military college in South Carolina.
 
Yet the U.S. effort to build the plant that would dismantle and neutralize the arms at Shchuch'ye has been unraveling quietly for years. Now, it's close to collapse.
 
The project is the most costly and ambitious of U.S. efforts to help eliminate Russia's chemical arsenal. With the $230 million spent so far, design and site preparation are complete for the plant. But hundreds of millions of dollars pledged for construction have been frozen for three years by congressional critics who distrust Russia's plans to destroy its stockpile.
 
Pentagon officials, having kept the project alive with a trickle of residual funds, say they will start canceling construction contracts this month because their money runs out today, the start of the new fiscal year. Even if the cash is released later this fall, the holdup has added years to the project -- and to Russia's entire chemical weapons disposal schedule.
 
The delays in destroying the 5,400 tons of weaponized nerve gas at Shchuch'ye are emblematic of setbacks that have plagued U.S. and international efforts to help Russia wipe out its 40,000 tons of mostly Soviet-made chemical weapons. It's the world's largest collection of nerve and skin-burning blister compounds, stored both in bulk and in munitions. Virtually none has been eliminated.
 
The U.S. assistance is part of a multibillion-dollar Cooperative Threat Reduction program Congress began in 1992 to help newly independent Soviet states secure and destroy nuclear, biological and chemical weapons they inherited.
 
A decade later, the effort to address Russia's chemical stocks is perhaps the least successful of its cooperative assistance initiatives. Russia's balky, cash-strapped, demilitarization campaign has no chance of eliminating the arsenal by 2007, the deadline in the 1997 Chemical Weapons Convention for destroying stockpiles worldwide.
 
Critics say Russia's slow progress shows a lack of commitment, and they argue that continued assistance for the Shchuch'ye project is unwarranted.
 
The critics ''don't realize how serious this situation is,'' says Sen. Richard Lugar, R-Ind., who helped set up the assistance program. ''This is the kind of stuff, at Shchuch'ye, that (terrorists) are after. We have an opportunity to get rid of it, and we're not moving forward.''
 
The unaddressed threat
 
The weapons at Shchuch'ye represent one-seventh of Russia's chemical arsenal, nearly all of it inherited from the Soviets. The Soviet chemical warfare program, which continued secretly into the early years of Russian statehood, was the world's most advanced. Besides working with such widely used nerve gases as VX and sarin, the Soviets built a secret program, called novichok, or ''new shock,'' that created more lethal toxins from agricultural compounds.
 
The Shchuch'ye stockpile, one of seven in Russia, is a major concern:
 
* The weapons are portable and ready to use, making them a more attractive target for theft than the bulk containers of toxins stored at other Russian sites. Many of the shells and warheads at Shchuch'ye are easy to hide and are launchable from widely available artillery pieces and rockets.
 
* The stockpile is vulnerable. It sits in an impoverished region near the border with Kazakhstan and Asian havens for al-Qaeda and other terror networks. Security, despite recent upgrades, is weaker than at Russian nuclear facilities and other sensitive sites. There's no reliable inventory, so thefts by an insider could go unnoticed.
 
* The munitions are deadly. Most of the shells and warheads are packed with sarin, soman and VX gasses, all of which can kill in minutes. An 85mm shell of sarin -- the smallest artillery piece at Shchuch'ye -- can kill up to 140,000 if set off in a densely populated area. It can fit in a briefcase.
 
Paul Walker, who toured Shchuch'ye as a congressional staffer on the first U.S. inspection, in 1994, calls it ''one of the most vulnerable and worrisome sites worldwide.''
 
''It certainly has the potential of becoming a Wal-Mart for terrorists,'' says Walker, now with Global Green USA. It's part of an environmental organization, Green Cross International, set up by former Soviet president Mikhail Gorbachev to facilitate elimination of weapons stockpiles.
 
The money spent on the Shchuch'ye plant so far is about a quarter of the $888 million that U.S. officials pledged to complete the project. It is the largest American investment in helping Russia eliminate chemical arms.
 
The Pentagon also has spent millions to install alarms and other safeguards at both Shchuch'ye and Kizner, a chemical stockpile in central Russia. U.S. officials say the upgrades addressed the sites' big weaknesses, though they remain worried about insider thefts or a well-executed raid.
 
Other U.S.-backed initiatives focus on dismantling chemical weapons production facilities and providing research equipment and jobs to former weapons scientists who might otherwise be lured to work for rogue states or terrorists.
 
European nations fund similar projects, including a German-financed disposal plant set to start running this winter at Gornyy, a bulk-container stockpile 500 miles southeast of Moscow.
 
But the Shchuch'ye plant is the key to Russia's chemical demilitarization plans, which envision expanding the facility to destroy munitions from several stockpiles.
 
The Russian Embassy in Washington declined to comment on the funding freeze. Officials in Moscow have said it's unwarranted. They note that they've boosted budgets for the program and replaced military managers with more committed civilians.
 
''We are fulfilling all of our obligations,'' says Nikolai Platé, of the State Commission on Chemical Disarmament. He dismisses criticism that Russia has hidden the true size of its arsenal.
 
Officials would not underestimate the size of the stockpiles because that might result in less assistance, he says. ''The U.S. promised this money, and they should give it to us and come see that we will use it to destroy the weapons,'' Platé says.
 
Old suspicions, new hurdles
 
Questions about Russia's tally of its chemical weapons were a central issue when a small group of mostly Republican lawmakers blocked spending for the Shchuch'ye project in late 1999. The hold lasted until Congress approved $35 million for Shchuch'ye in its 2002 budget. But critics set conditions that still left the Pentagon unable to spend the funds.
 
The spending restrictions are far stricter than those for other threat reduction programs. Such rules generally require the administration to ''certify'' that states receiving assistance are making progress in getting rid of the arsenals they inherited. But the added conditions for Russian chemical weapons programs include six criteria, requiring that Russia provide a detailed inventory of its chemical weapons and more verifiable plans for destroying them.
 
Critics ''are using these criteria as a stick to hit the Russians,'' says Michael Moodie, an arms control negotiator in the first Bush administration who now runs the Chemical and Biological Arms Control Institute in Washington. ''Their feeling is, 'If we're going to have these assistance programs, we're going to make it as hard as we can for the Russians.' ''
 
The Bush administration has asked Congress for authority to waive the funding criteria. But the idea has hit resistance.
 
Rep. Mac Thornberry, R-Texas, an Armed Services Committee member, says it's more likely that Congress will pass a limited, short-term waiver later this year.
 
''A blanket waiver removes some of the leverage we have to make sure Russia complies with the intended purposes for these funds,'' he adds, noting that Russia's demilitarization program has a history of management problems. ''The bigger issue is how big is the problem and if we spend this much money, how much of a dent will it make?''
 
Foes of a waiver accuse Russia of lying about the size and nature of its stocks. They note that despite admissions about the novichok program by its former managers, Russia has not detailed what became of those toxins.
 
They also say Russia has not provided sufficient U.S. access to chemical weapons sites.
 
''They want a confession, and what we need is a solution,'' says former Democratic senator Sam Nunn of Georgia, who now runs the Nuclear Threat Initiative, a foundation that seeks to eliminate excess Soviet weapons. He says the Russians have shown ''good faith'' and may not know the full extent of their arsenal.
 
Nunn says U.S. officials should seize the chance to destroy the weapons at Shchuch'ye. ''It's going to take unprecedented cooperation to make this work,'' he says.
 
The multibuilding complex planned for Shchuch'ye would drain the weapons, neutralize and immobilize their toxins in asphalt, and incinerate the shells. It was to begin operation by 2006, but is at least two years behind schedule.
 
The Pentagon is requesting $126 million for construction at the site in the new fiscal year. Officials say they need at least the $35 million that is frozen in the bank to keep the project viable after the residual, pre-freeze money they've used to sustain it runs out today.
 
''If we don't get this money, we're going to have to start taking down the (contracting) teams we've assembled,'' says Thomas Kuenning, chief of Cooperative Threat Reduction for the Pentagon's Defense Threat Reduction Agency.
 
If the money is released now, construction could begin in weeks, Kuenning adds, but the start-up time will grow exponentially if it becomes necessary to line up new contractors. ''Eight months from now, it may take a year. Those people will go and find other work.''
 
Without the assistance, most U.S. officials agree, Russia has no hope of meeting the Chemical Weapons Convention deadline for stockpile destruction, even given the likelihood that it will be extended to 2012 at Russia's request.
 
U.S. stockpiles, interests
 
The United States also will be pressed by that deadline, despite having smaller chemical weapons stocks -- 30,000 tons vs. Russia's 40,000 -- and far more money.
 
The Pentagon has destroyed a bit more than 25% of its chemical weapons, and officials say the job can't be done by the treaty's original 2007 target. Meanwhile, cost estimates for eliminating the entire stockpile have climbed from $15 billion to $24 billion.
 
Russia, its economy in shambles, hopes to spend about $6 billion.
 
Critics say Russia's comparatively small financial commitment and its reluctance to open the books on its arsenal justify the hold on money for Shchuch'ye.
 
Rep. Curt Weldon, R-Pa., who chairs the House military procurement subcommittee, sees some validity to the criticism, though he wants the project funded. ''The Russians have got to be more transparent, more flexible. You can't just blame the Congress.''
 
Supporters of the Shchuch'ye project say it must be viewed in the larger context of U.S. interests.
 
''I don't think the Russians have been completely up front with us,'' says Amy Smithson, a chemical weapons expert at The Henry L. Stimson Center who testifies often before Congress. ''Does that mean we should allow the weapons to sit there? We have a chance to address a serious national security problem. It behooves us to do so.''
 
Copyright © 2002 <http://rd.yahoo.com/dailynews/usatoday/brand/*http://www.usatoday.com>USA TODAY, a division of <http://www.gannett.com/>Gannett Co. Inc.





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