- Few still hope that Yasser Arafat could ever be Israel's
partner in peace, but many now feel that his predicament could become the
catalyst of a much larger conflict. If it began to unfold, it could unleash
pent-up forces and take on a disastrous momentum of its own. When the
possibility
arose that Arafat might be killed in the ruins of his headquarters, there
was undisguised panic among Arab governments. What they dreaded also
greatly
alarmed their European counterparts, as well as the U.S. and even the
Israelis
themselves: uncontrollable mass demonstrations in Arab capitals that might
compel reluctant rulers to try to attack Israel in turn.
-
- How would it begin? In one grim scenario, it would start
with Egypt's Hosni Mubarak, who is in the most exposed position of all.
His controlled media have long been replete with fervent anti-Israeli
propaganda
in a deliberate attempt to deflect attention from corruption and
mismanagement
at home. Endless television replays of the most brutal scenes of the
Israeli
occupation have hammered home the message that Egypt's most urgent concern
is the plight of the Palestinians. At the same time, what is still a
military-based
regime justifies large expenditures on the armed forces amid extreme
poverty
by boasting of their strength. Mubarak therefore risks becoming the
prisoner
of his own propaganda: If Palestine is all-important and Egypt that strong,
why not use its strength against the Israelis? The least dangerous Egyptian
move would be disastrous in its consequences. Violating Anwar Sadat's peace
treaty, cutting itself off from vital U.S. aid, the Egyptian army could
send part of its vast forces--say, the four tank divisions and eight
mechanized
divisions with 1,600 battle tanks, including first-line U.S. M1A1s--into
the Sinai peninsula to threaten the Israeli frontier. Compelling the
Israelis
to mobilize their own army, which would very likely freeze any further
action against the Palestinians, would make sense as a piece of military
gamesmanship. But strategically it would be catastrophic, because if the
Egyptians acted, Syria's young and insecure President Bashar Assad would
most likely feel compelled to compete with them by sending his own armored
forces--seven divisions with 2,000 tanks--to threaten the Golan frontier.
And then even King Abdullah of Jordan, who greatly values his peace treaty
with Israel, might come under irresistible pressure from his Palestinian
subjects to send his two armored and two mechanized divisions, equipped
with some 700 tanks, opposite the Jordanian frontier.
-
- None of this need be done with any intention of actually
fighting to provoke a war nonetheless. Other Arab governments could be
propelled by a mounting spiral of popular enthusiasm to send their own
forces to reinforce the frontline states. That would cue Saddam Hussein
to demand his opportunity to send armored forces to threaten Israel by
marching through Jordan or Syria or both. The King of Jordan would dread
such contaminating assistance in his territory, and Assad of Syria too
would fear it, but if the rhetorical escalation of the leaders and popular
agitation heat up the climate, it might become impossible to deny passage
to Iraqi forces in part because they might bring with them the chemical
or even biological weapons that evoke the special enthusiasm of Hamas and
other fundamentalists. Finally, there is the Hizballah militia in southern
Lebanon, already deployed close to Israel's northern frontier with hundreds
of bombardment rockets ready to strike as far away as the port city of
Haifa.
-
- Competing mobilizations amid mounting waves of popular
enthusiasm would be a direct replay of what happened in 1967, which back
then triggered humiliating Arab military defeats and the Israeli occupation
of Gaza, the West Bank and the Golan Heights, which still endures. For
that very reason the scenario might seem exceedingly improbable. As the
frequent references to 7th century events in political speeches show, Arabs
have excellent historical memories. Even those born after 1967 know the
story very well. Certainly each government has powerful reasons to refrain
from anything more than diplomatic protests even if Arafat is killed. Egypt
would lose the U.S. aid that pays for the very weapons it would deploy
($2 billion a year) and for much of its daily bread. Jordan is likewise
dependent, Syria's equipment is too outdated to risk war, and even Saddam
Hussein can hardly threaten Israel with ballistic missiles and weapons
of mass destruction whose existence he strenuously denies.
-
- But madness is rare only among individuals. It is quite
common in entire nations. The Israelis themselves might reasonably be said
to be mad to think they can have a tranquil occupation of Palestinian
areas--actually
they are merely split down the middle between those who have long wanted
to withdraw and those who think land is more important than peace. As for
the Arab leaders, what might cause them to behave irrationally is their
lack of legitimacy--nobody elected them, very few of their subjects respect
their competence, and lately many are seen as the slavish stooges of the
U.S.
-
- If the Arab-buildup scenario came to pass, the Israelis
would be forced to mobilize some 425,000 reservists to staff their armed
forces, a large part of their entire able-bodied population. Because it
would paralyze their economy and indeed society as a whole, mobilization
cannot last much more than a few weeks at most. Unless diplomatic pressure
induces the Arab forces to withdraw again, the Israelis would attack to
force them into flight or destroy them, as in 1967.
-
- But for the Israelis such a war would not be a repeat
of 1967. Since then, the military balance has moved greatly in favor of
Israel. Almost useless in stopping suicide bombers, downright clumsy in
facing stone-throwing teenagers, the Israeli armed forces are much better
at doing what they are trained and equipped to do: smash regular forces
with superior firepower and skill. With some 400 first-line strike aircraft
and a large inventory of guided weapons (Israel is a major producer and
exporter), they have a combination of weapon loads and accuracy that would
be devastating to Arab ground forces. If Arab air forces were to intervene
to protect them, it is believed that the Israelis would shoot down at least
30 aircraft for each loss of their own (in 1982 they scored 80-0 against
the Syrians). The Israeli army's 11 armored divisions would be outnumbered,
but Israeli armored columns are trained to move significantly faster than
their enemies, to outmaneuver them if the terrain allows, while their
gunnery--100%
the product of female instructors--is thought to be far superior.
-
- The Israelis would have no surefire way of stopping the
Hizballah from launching its huge inventory of Iranian-supplied bombardment
rockets at the villages and cities of northern Israel. Although grossly
inaccurate, they would still inflict damage. Syria also has hundreds of
bombardment rockets, some with chemical warheads, but unlike the Hizballah
guerrillas, it must fear Israeli retaliation. No Arab air force is likely
to be much of a threat to Israeli cities, while if Saddam Hussein chooses
to blow his cover by launching the handful of ballistic missiles he has
kept hidden all these years, they are unlikely to do much damage. In 1991
the 50 Scud missiles fired into Israel frightened many but killed nobody.
Even if Iraqi missiles have nerve gas or anthrax warheads, they are
unlikely
to kill more than a few. The theoretical potency of agents like VX--one
tiny drop kills--or anthrax is defeated by the mechanics of distribution
and dilution. A missile warhead would have to open up to release its cargo
on top of a crowd to kill many, and that is a far more advanced capability
than Saddam Hussein could possibly have.
-
- But, of course, even a splendid victory would be
disastrous
for Israel, because at great expense in wealth and blood, it would gain
nothing in the aftermath that it did not have before the current crisis:
safety from invasion. And any outcome at all would be disastrous for
Western
and especially American interests. Nobody can even bear to contemplate
an utterly improbable Israeli defeat. But if Arab leaders are humiliatingly
defeated, the most likely outcome of a war, the fundamentalists would have
their first real chance of coming to power. Arafat's ineffectual strategy
and utter recklessness have thus caused a crisis that induces all, even
the Israelis, to wish him a long life, for his death might precipitate
the most damaging of wars.
-
- Edward N. Luttwak is the author of
- Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace
-
- http://www.time.com/time/covers/1101020408/scenario.html
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