- I am sure I am not the only one to have been reminded
in the past months of some wise and prescient words of one of the most
impressive figures of 20th century America, the radical pacifist A.J.
Muste.
As the US entered World War II 60 years ago, he predicted with considerable
accuracy the contours of the world that would emerge after the US victory,
and a little later, observed that "the problem after a war is with
the victor. He thinks he has just proved that war and violence pay. Who
will now teach him a lesson?"
-
- Far too many people around the world were to learn the
bitter meaning of these words. It is only in folk tales, children's
stories,
and the journals of intellectual opinion that power is used wisely and
well to destroy evil. The real world teaches very different lessons, and
it takes wilful and dedicated ignorance to fail to perceive them.
-
- These are, unfortunately, leading themes of history.
In his major study of European state formation, Charles Tilly observed,
accurately enough, that over the last millennium, "war has been the
dominant activity of European states," for an unfortunate reason:
"The central tragic fact is simple: coercion "works"; those
who apply substantial force to their fellows get compliance, and from that
compliance draw the multiple advantages of money, goods, deference, access
to pleasures denied to less powerful people." These are close to
historical
truisms, which most of the people of the world have learned the hard way.
The deference commonly includes the awed acclaim of the educated classes.
Resort to overwhelming means of violence to destroy defenseless enemies
with impunity tends to win particular admiration, and also to become
natural,
a demonstration of one's virtue; again, close to historical-cultural
universals.
-
- One normal concomitant of easy victories over defenseless
enemies is the entrenchment of the habit of preferring force over the
pursuit
of peaceful means. Another is the high priority of acting without
authority.
The incarnation of the God who comes to Earth as the "perfect
man"
with the mission of eradicating evil from the world needs no higher
authority.
What is true of the most ancient Indian epics from millennia ago holds
as well for the plagiarists of today. The preference for force, and
rejection
of authorization, have been notable features of the last decade of
overwhelming
and unchallenged power and crushing of much weaker adversaries, in accord
with policy recommendations. As the first Bush administration came into
office, it undertook a National Security Policy Review dealing with
"third
world threats." Parts were leaked to the press during the Gulf war.
The Review concluded that "In cases where the U.S. confronts much
weaker enemies" -- that is, the only kind one chooses to fight --
"our challenge will be not simply to defeat them, but to defeat them
decisively and rapidly." Any other outcome would be
"embarrassing"
and might "undercut political support," understood to be thin.
With the collapse of the sole deterrent a few months later, the conclusions
became even more firmly established, not surprisingly. These are, I think,
some of the considerations that should be at the back of our minds when
we contemplate the world after Sept. 11.
-
- Whatever one's judgment about the events of the past
weeks, if we want to reach a reasonable assessment of what may lie ahead,
we should attend carefully to several crucial factors. Among them
are:
-
- (1) The premises on which policy decisions have been
based
-
- (2) Their roots in stable institutions and doctrines
in very recent history, to a large extent involving the same
decision-makers
-
- (3) The ways these have been translated to specific
actions
-
- I'd like to say a few words about each of these
topics.
-
- The new millennium quickly produced two terrible new
crimes, added to the gloomy record of persisting ones. The first was the
terrorist attacks of Sept. 11; the second, the response to them, surely
taking a far greater toll of innocent lives, Afghan civilians who were
themselves victims of the suspected perpetrators of the crimes of Sept.
11. I'll assume these to be Osama bin Laden and his al-Qaeda network. There
has been a prima facie case from the outset, though little credible
evidence
has been produced, and there have been few successes at home, despite what
must be the most intensive investigations ever by the coordinated
intelligence
services of the major powers. Such "leaderless resistance"
networks,
as they are called, are not easy nuts to crack.
-
- An inauspicious sign is that in both cases the crimes
are considered right and just, even noble, within the doctrinal framework
of the perpetrators, and in fact are justified in almost the same words.
Bin Laden proclaims that violence is justified in self-defense against
the infidels who invade and occupy Muslim lands and against the brutal
and corrupt governments they impose there -- words that have considerable
resonance in the region even among those who despise and fear him. Bush
and Blair proclaim, in almost identical words, that violence is justified
to drive evil from our lands. The proclamations of the antagonists are
not entirely identical. When bin Laden speaks of "our lands,"
he is referring to Muslim lands: Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Chechnya, Bosnia,
Kashmir, and others; the radical Islamists who were mobilized and nurtured
by the CIA and its associates through the 1980s despise Russia, but ceased
their terrorist operations in Russia from Afghan bases after the Russians
withdrew. When Bush and Blair speak of "our lands" they are,
in contrast, referring to the world. The distinction reflects the power
that the adversaries command. That either side can speak without shame
of eradicating evil in the light of their records... -- that should leave
us open-mouthed in astonishment, unless we adopt the easy course of
effacing
even very recent history.
-
- Another fact with grim portent is that in both cases,
the perpetrators insist on underscoring the criminality of their acts.
In the case of bin Laden, no discussion is needed. The US pointedly
rejected
the framework of legitimacy that resides in the UN Charter. There has been
much debate over whether the ambiguous Security Council declarations
provided
authorization for the resort to force. It is, in my opinion, beside the
point. To resolve the debate would have been simple enough, had there been
any wish to do so. There is scarcely any doubt that Washington could have
obtained entirely unambiguous Security Council authorization, not for
attractive
reasons. Russia is eager to gain US support for its own massive crimes.
China hopes to be admitted to the coalition of the just for the same
reasons,
and in fact, states throughout the world recognized at once that they could
now enlist the support of the global superpower for their own violence
and repression, a lesson not lost on the global managers either. British
support is reflexive; France would raise no objections. There would, in
brief, have been no veto.
-
- But Washington preferred to reject Security Council
authorization
and to insist on its unique right to act unilaterally in violation of
international
law and solemn treaty obligations, a right forcefully proclaimed by the
Clinton administration and its predecessors in clear and explicit words
-- warnings that we and others may choose to ignore, but at our peril.
Similarly, Washington contemptuously dismissed the tentative offers to
consider extradition of bin Laden and his associates; how real such
possibilities
were we cannot know, because of the righteous refusal even to consider
them. This stand adheres to a leading principle of statecraft, called
"establishing
credibility" in the rhetoric of statecraft and scholarship. And it
is understandable. If a Mafia Don plans to collect protection money, he
does not first ask for a Court order, even if he could obtain it. Much
the same is true of international affairs. Subjects must understand their
place, and must recognize that the powerful need no higher
authority.
-
- Thucydides remarked that "large nations do what
they wish, while small nations accept what they must." The world has
changed a great deal over several thousand years, but some things stay
much the same.
-
- The atrocities of Sept. 11 are regarded as a historic
event, which is true, though not because of their scale. In its civilian
toll, the crime is far from unusual in the annals of violence short of
war. To mention only one example, so minor in context as to be a mere
footnote,
a Panamanian journalist, condemning the crimes of Sept. 11, observed that
for Panamanians the "sinister times" are not unfamiliar,
recalling
the US bombing of the barrio Chorrillo during "Operation Just
Cause"
with perhaps thousands killed; our crimes, so there is no serious
accounting.
The atrocities of Sept. 11 are indeed a historic event, but because of
their target. For the US, it is the first time since the British burned
down Washington in 1814 that the national territory has been under serious
attack, even threatened. There is no need to review what has been done
to others in the two centuries since. For Europe, the reversal is even
more dramatic. While conquering much of the world, leaving a trail of
terror
and devastation, Europeans were safe from attack by their victims, with
rare and limited exceptions. It is not surprising, then, that Europe and
its offshoots should be shocked by the crimes of Sept. 11, a dramatic
breach
of the norms of acceptable behavior for hundreds of years.
-
- It is also not surprising that they should remain
complacent,
perhaps mildly regretful, about the even more terrible suffering that
followed.
The victims, after all, are miserable Afghans -- "uncivilized
tribes,"
as Winston Churchill described them with contempt when he ordered the use
of poison gas to "spread a lively terror" among them 80 years
ago, denouncing the "squeamishness" of the soft-hearted ninnies
who failed to understand that chemical weapons were just "the
application
of modern science to modern warfare" and must be used "to procure
a speedy termination of the disorder which prevails on the
frontier."
-
- Similar thoughts are heard today. The editors of the
"New Republic", who not long ago were calling for more military
aid for "Latin-style fascists...regardless of how many are
murdered"
because "there are higher American priorities than Salvadoran human
rights," now explain -- correctly -- that "Operation Enduring
Freedom is not a humanitarian intervention," so that "If we leave
behind a country in chaos that can no longer serve as a base of operations
against us, then we will have accomplished a necessary objective,"
and should "lose the obsession with nation-building" to try to
repair what we have done to Afghanistan for 20 years.
-
- While few are willing to sink to that level, it remains
true that atrocities committed against Afghans carry little moral stigma,
for one reason, because such practices have been so familiar throughout
history, even when there has been no pretext other than greed and
domination.
And retribution knows no bounds. For that there is ample historical
precedent,
not to speak of authority in the holiest texts we are taught to
revere.
-
- Another aspect of the complacent acceptance of atrocities
was described with wonder by Alexis de Tocqueville in his report of one
of the great crimes of ethnic cleansing of the continent, the expulsion
of the Cherokees through the trail of tears "in the middle of
winter,"
with snow "frozen hard on the ground," a "solemn
spectacle"
of murder and degradation, "the triumphal march of civilization across
the desert." He was particularly struck that the conquerors could
deprive people of their rights and exterminate them "with singular
felicity, tranquilly, legally, philanthropically, without shedding blood,
and without violating a single great principle of morality in the eyes
of the world." It was impossible to destroy people with "more
respect for the laws of humanity," he wrote.
-
- That is a fair enough description of what has been
unfolding
before our eyes. For example, in the refugee camp of Maslakh, where
hundreds
of thousands of people are starving, dozens dying every night from cold
and starvation. They were living on the edge of survival even before the
bombing, which deprived them of desperately-needed aid. It remains a
"forgotten
camp" as we meet, three months after Sept. 11. Veteran correspondent
Christina Lamb reports scenes more "harrowing" than anything
in her memory, after having "seen death and misery in refugee camps
in many parts of Asia and Africa." The destruction of lives is silent
and mostly invisible, by choice; and can easily remain forgotten, also
by choice. The easy tolerance of the "vivid awfulness" that Lamb
recounts merely reflects the fact that this is how the powerful deal with
the weak and defenseless, hence in no way remarkable.
-
- We have no right to harbor any illusions about the
premises
of current planning. Planning for the war in Afghanistan was based on the
unchallenged assumption that the threat of bombing, and its realization,
would considerably increase the number of Afghans at risk of death from
starvation, disease, and exposure. The press blandly reported that the
numbers were expected to increase by 50%, to about 7.5 million: an
additional
2.5 million people. Pleas to stop the bombing to allow delivery of food
and other aid were rebuffed without comment, mostly without even report.
These came from high UN officials, major relief and aid agencies, and
others
in a good position to know. By late September, the Food and Agricultural
Organization (FAO) had warned that more than 7 million people would face
starvation if the threatened military action were undertaken, and after
the bombing began, advised that the threat of "humanitarian
catastrophe"
was "grave," and that the bombing had disrupted the planting
of 80% of the grain supplies, so that the effects next year could be even
more severe.
-
- What will happen we cannot know. But we know well enough
the assumptions on which plans are based and executed, and commentary
produced.
As a simple matter of logic, it is these assumptions that inform us about
the shape of the world that lies ahead, whatever the outcomes might be.
The basic facts have been casually reported, including the fact that as
we meet, little is being done to bring food and other aid to many of those
dying in refugee camps and the countryside, even though supplies are
available
and the primary factor hampering delivery is lack of interest and
will.
-
- Furthermore, the longer-term effects will remain unknown,
if history is any guide. Reporting is scanty today, and the consequences
will not be investigated tomorrow. It is acceptable to report the crime
of "collateral damage" by bombing error, the inevitable cost
of war, but not the conscious and deliberate destruction of fleeing Afghans
who will die in silence, invisibly, not by design, but because it doesn't
matter, a much deeper level of moral depravity; if we step on an ant while
walking, we have not purposely killed it.
-
- People do not die of starvation instantly; they can
survive
on roots and grass, and if malnourished children die of disease, who will
seek to determine the immediate cause? In the future, the topic is off
the agenda by virtue of a crucial principle: We must devote enormous energy
to meticulous accounting of crimes of official enemies, quite properly
including not only those literally killed, but also those who die as a
consequence of their policies; and we must take equally scrupulous care
to avoid this practice in the case of our own crimes, adopting the stance
that so impressed de Tocqueville. There are hundreds of pages of detailed
documentation of the application of these principles; again, I suppose,
close to a historical universal. It will be a welcome surprise if the
current
case turns out differently.
-
- And we should remember that we are not observing all
of this from Mars, or describing the crimes of Attila the Hun. There is
a great deal that we can do right now, if we choose.
-
- To explore what is likely to lie ahead from a different
perspective, let's ask whether there were alternatives to the resort to
devastating force at a distance, a device that comes naturally to those
with overwhelming might at their command, no external deterrent, and
confidence
in the obedience of articulate opinion.
-
- Alternatives were prominently suggested. By the Vatican,
for example, which called for reliance on the measures appropriate to
crimes,
whatever their scale: if someone robs my house and I think I know who did
it, I am not entitled to go after him with an assault rifle, meanwhile
killing people randomly in his neighborhood. Or by the eminent military
historian Michael Howard, who delivered a "scathing attack" on
the bombardment of Afghanistan on October 30, not on grounds of success
or failure, but its design: what is needed is "patient operations
of police and intelligence forces," "a police operation conducted
under the auspices of the UN on behalf of the international community as
a whole, against a criminal conspiracy, whose members should be hunted
down and brought before an international court." There certainly are
precedents, including acts of international terrorism even more extreme
than those of Sept. 11: the US terrorist war against Nicaragua, to take
an uncontroversial example -- uncontroversial, because of the judgment
of the highest international authorities, the International Court of
Justice
and the Security Council. Nicaragua's efforts to pursue lawful means
failed,
in a world ruled by force; but no one would impede the US if it chose to
follow a similar course.
-
- Could the legitimate goals of apprehending and punishing
the perpetrators have been attained without violence? Perhaps. We have
no way of knowing whether the Taliban offers to discuss extradition were
serious, since they were dismissed for the reasons already mentioned. The
same is true of the much later afterthought, overthrowing the Taliban
regime,
a high priority for many Afghans, much as for innumerable others throughout
the world who suffer under brutal regimes and miserable oppression.
-
- I mentioned a few of those who suggested alternatives,
and one of many examples of appropriate precedents. What about the most
important place to inquire: what are the attitudes and opinions of the
people of Afghanistan? To determine their views is a difficult task, no
doubt, but not entirely impossible. There are some reasonable ways to
proceed.
-
- We might begin with the gathering of 1000 Afghan leaders
in Peshawar at the end of October, some of them exiles, some who trekked
across the border from within Afghanistan, all committed to overthrowing
the Taliban regime. It was "a rare display of unity among tribal
elders,
Islamic scholars, fractious politicians, and former guerrilla
commanders,"
the NY Times reported. They unanimously "urged the US to stop the
air raids," appealed to the international media to call for an end
to the "bombing of innocent people," and "demanded an end
to the US bombing of Afghanistan." They urged that other means be
adopted to overthrow the hated Taliban regime, a goal they believed could
be achieved without mass slaughter and destruction.
-
- A similar message was conveyed by Afghan opposition
leader
Abdul Haq, who was highly regarded in Washington. Just before he entered
Afghanistan, apparently without US support, and was then captured and
killed,
he condemned the bombing and criticized the US for refusing to support
the efforts of his and of others "to create a revolt within the
Taliban."
The bombing was "a big setback for these efforts," he said. He
reported contacts with second-level Taliban commanders and ex-Mujahiddin
tribal elders, and discussed how such efforts could proceed, calling on
the US to assist them with funding and other support instead of undermining
them with bombs.
-
- The US, Abdul Haq said, ìis trying to show its
muscle, score a victory and scare everyone in the world. They don't care
about the suffering of the Afghans or how many people we will lose. And
we don't like that. Because Afghans are now being made to suffer for these
Arab fanatics, but we all know who brought these Arabs to Afghanistan in
the 1980s, armed them and gave them a base. It was the Americans and the
CIA. And the Americans who did this all got medals and good careers, while
all these years Afghans suffered from these Arabs and their allies. Now,
when America is attacked, instead of punishing the Americans who did this,
it punishes the Afghans.î
-
- For what it's worth, I think there is considerable merit
in his remarks.
-
- We can also look elsewhere for enlightenment about Afghan
opinions. There has, at last, been some belated concern about the fate
of women in Afghanistan. It even reached the First Lady. Maybe it will
be followed some day by concern for the plight of women elsewhere in
Central
and South Asia, which, unfortunately, is not all that different in many
places from life under the Taliban, including the most vibrant democracies.
There are plenty of highly reliable and expert sources on these matters,
if we choose to look. And such a radical departure from past practice would
lend at least some credibility to the professed outrage over Taliban
practices
just at the moment when it served US propaganda purposes. Of course, no
sane person advocates foreign military intervention by the US or other
states to rectify these and other terrible crimes in countries that are
US allies and clients. The problems are severe, but should be dealt with
from within, with assistance from outsiders if it is constructive and
honest,
not merely hypocritical and self-serving.
-
- But since the harsh treatment of women in Afghanistan
has at last gained some well-deserved attention, however cynical the
motives,
it would seem that attitudes of Afghan women towards policy options should
be a primary concern. These no doubt vary considerably, and are not easy
to investigate, but it should not be completely impossible to determine
whether there are mothers in Maslakh who praise the bombing, or who might,
rather, agree with those who fled from their homes to miserable refugee
camps under the threat of bombing and expressed the bitter hope that
"even
the cruel Americans must feel some pity for our ruined country" and
refrain from the threatened bombing that was already bringing death and
disaster. And Afghan women are by no means voiceless everywhere. There
is an organization of courageous women who have been in the forefront of
the struggle to defend women's rights for 25 years, RAWA (Revolutionary
Association of the Women of Afghanistan), doing remarkable work. Their
leader was assassinated by Afghan collaborators with the Russians in 1987,
but they continued their work within Afghanistan at risk of death, and
in exile nearby. They have been quite outspoken. A week after the bombing
began, for example, they issued a public statement that would have been
front-page news wherever concern for Afghan women was real, not a matter
of mere expediency.
-
- The RAWA statement of October 11 was entitled:
"Taliban
should be overthrown by the uprising of Afghan nation," and continued
as follows: ìAgain, due to the treason of fundamentalist hangmen,
our people have been caught in the claws of the monster of a vast war and
destruction. America, by forming an international coalition against Osama
and his Taliban-collaborators and in retaliation for the 11th September
terrorist attacks, has launched a vast aggression on our country. Despite
the claim of the US that only military and terrorist bases of the Taliban
and Al Qieda will be struck and that its actions would be accurately
targeted
and proportionate, we have witnessed for the past seven days leaves no
doubt that this invasion will shed the blood of numerous women, men, children, young and old of our country.î
-
- The statement went on to call for "the eradication
of the plague of Taliban and Al Qieda" by "an overall
uprising"
of the Afghan people themselves, which alone "can prevent the
repetition
and recurrence of the catastrophe that has befallen our
country...."
-
- In another declaration on November 25, at a demonstration
of women's organizations in Islamabad on the International Day for the
Elimination of Violence against Women, RAWA condemned the US/Russian-backed
Northern Alliance for a "record of human rights violations as bad
as that of the Taliban's," and called on the UN to "help
Afghanistan,
not the Northern Alliance."
-
- Perhaps Afghans who have been struggling for freedom
and women's rights for many years don't understand much about their
country,
and should cede responsibility for its future to foreigners who couldn't
have placed the country on a map a few months ago, along with others who
had helped destroy it in the past, led by commanders who were condemned
for international terrorism by the highest international authorities and
are supported by a coalition of other leading terrorist states. Maybe,
but it is not obvious.
-
- The situation is reminiscent of the Iraq war, when the
Iraq opposition was barred from media and journals of opinion, apart from
dissident journals at the margins. They forcefully opposed the US bombing
campaign against Iraq and accused the US of preferring a military
dictatorship
to overthrow of Saddam by internal revolt -- as was conceded publicly,
when Bush (#I) returned to collaboration with his former friend and ally
Saddam in carrying out major atrocities, this time quite directly, as
Saddam
brutally crushed a southern Shi'ite revolt that might well have overthrown
the murderous dictator, under the watchful eyes of the US military that
had total control over the region, while Washington refused even to allow
rebelling Iraqi generals access to captured Iraqi arms. The Bush
Administration
confirmed that it would have no dealings with Iraqi opposition leaders:
"We felt that political meetings with them would not be appropriate
for our policy at this time," State Department spokesman Richard
Boucher
announced on March 14, 1991, while Saddam was massacring southern rebels
with US acquiescence. That had been long-standing government policy. The
same is true of preference for force over pursuit of possibly feasible
diplomatic options, policies that continued in the decade that followed,
until today, and are quite natural, for basically the reasons that Abdul
Haq enunciated.
-
- Another sensible way to assess the prospects for the
future would be to review the actions of today's commanders when they
launched
the first war on terrorism 20 years ago: there is ample evidence of what
they achieved in Central America, Southern Africa, the Middle East and
Southeast Asia, all accompanied by much the same lofty rhetoric and passion
that we hear today. There should be no need to review that shameful record.
Evidently, it carries important lessons about the likely future, as does
the fact that the topic is scrupulously ignored in the laudatory chorus
for the current and future projects, although -- or perhaps because --
that record is so obviously relevant.
-
- At the end of the terrible decade of the 1980s, the
external
deterrent to the use of force disappeared. For its victims, the collapse
of Soviet tyranny was a remarkable triumph and liberation, though the
victory
was soon tainted by new horrors. For others, the consequences were more
complex. The basic character of the post-Cold War era was revealed very
quickly: more of the same, with revised pretexts and tactics. A few weeks
after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the US invaded Panama, killing hundreds
or thousands of people, vetoing two Security Council resolutions, and
kidnapping
a thug who was jailed in the US for crimes that he had mostly committed
while on the CIA payroll before committing the only one that mattered:
disobedience. The pattern of events was familiar enough, but there were
some differences. One was pointed out by Elliott Abrams, who pleaded guilty
to crimes committed when he was a State Department official during the
Reagan years, and has now been appointed Human Rights specialist at the
National Security Council. At the time of the invasion, he commented,
astutely,
that for the first time in many years the US could resort to force with
no concern about Russian reactions. There were also new pretexts: the
intervention
was in defense against Hispanic narcotraffickers, not the Russians who
were mobilizing in Managua, two days march from Harlingen, Texas.
-
- A few months later, the Bush Administration presented
its new Pentagon budget, an event of particular significance because this
was the first submission that could not rely on the plea that the Russians
are coming. The Administration requested a huge military budget, as before,
and in part for the same reasons. Thus it would be necessary to bolster
"the defense industrial base" (aka high-tech industry), and to
maintain the intervention forces that are aimed primarily at the Middle
East because of "the free world's reliance on energy supplies from
this pivotal region." But there was a change: in that pivotal region
the "threats to our interests" that have required direct military
engagement "could not be laid at the Kremlin's door," contrary
to decades of propaganda, now recognized to be useless. Nor could the
threats
be laid at Saddam's door: the Butcher of Baghdad was still a valued friend
and ally, not yet having committed his crime of disobedience. Rather, the
threat was indigenous nationalism, as it had always been. The clouds lifted
on the larger threat as well. It is not the Russians, but rather the
"growing
technological sophistication" of third world powers that requires
that we maintain complete military dominance worldwide, even without
"the
backdrop of superpower competition." The Cold War confrontation was
always in the background no doubt, but served more as a pretext than a
reason, just as the Russians appealed to the US threat to justify their
crimes within their own domains. The real enemy is independent (called
"radical") nationalism in the South, as now tacitly acknowledged,
the traditional pretexts having lost their utility. The documentary and
historical record provide ample evidence to support that conclusion.
-
- Another consequence of the collapse of the junior partner
in world control was the elimination of any space for non-alignment, and
the limited measure of independence it allowed. One indication is the
immediate
sharp reduction in foreign aid, most radically in the US, where the
category
virtually disappeared, even if we count the largest component, which goes
to a rich country for strategic reasons, and to Egypt because of its
collaboration
in the same enterprise. The decline of options was fully recognized.
President
Mahathir of Malaysia spoke for many when he said that:
ìParadoxically,
the greatest catastrophe for us, who had always been anti-communist, is
the defeat of communism. The end of the Cold War has deprived us of the
only leverage we had - the option to defect. Now we can turn to no
one.î
Not really a paradox, but the natural course of real-world history.
-
- Similar fears were widely expressed. The Gulf war was
bitterly condemned throughout the South as a needless show of force,
evading
diplomatic options; there was considerable evidence for such an
interpretation
at the time, more since. Many perceived what Abdul Haq describes today:
the US "is trying to show its muscle, score a victory and scare
everyone
in the world," establishing "credibility." The resort to
overwhelming military force is designed to demonstrate that "What
We Say Goes," in George Bush's proud words as bombs and missiles
rained
on Iraq. Those who did not grasp the message then should have had no
problem
in doing so when he instantly returned to support for Saddam's murderous
violence in order to ensure "stability," a code word for
subordination
to US power interests. The general mood in the South was captured by
Cardinal
Paulo Evarista Arns of Sao Paulo: In the Arab countries, he said, "the
rich sided with the US government while the "millions" of poor
condemned this military aggression." Throughout the Third World, he
continued, "there is hatred and fear: When will they decide to invade
us," and on what pretext?
-
- The general reaction to the bombing of Serbia was
similar,
and again, there is considerable evidence that peaceful options might have
been pursued, avoiding much misery. In this case, it was officially and
repeatedly proclaimed that the motives were to establish
"credibility"
and ensure "stability." It is difficult to take seriously the
claim that a subsidiary goal was to prevent the ethnic cleansing and
atrocities
that followed the withdrawal of monitors (over unreported Serbian
objections)
and the bombing immediately afterwards -- a "predictable"
consequence,
as the commanding General informed the press as the bombing began, later
reiterating that he knew of no such war aims. The rich documentary record
from the State Department, OSCE, the British government, and other Western
sources substantially reinforces these conclusions. Perhaps that is why
the illuminating record is so consistently ignored in the extensive
literature
on the topic. Even in the most loyal client states the bombing was
condemned
as a reversion to traditional gunboat diplomacy "cloaked in moralistic
righteousness" in the traditional fashion (the respected Israeli
military
analyst Amos Gilboa, by no means an isolated voice).
-
- Americans are carefully protected from world opinion
and critical discussion of such matters, but we do ourselves no favors
by keeping to these restrictions.
-
- We also do ourselves no favors by ignoring public
documents
that lucidly explain the thinking of planners. They understand very well
that the world may be tripolar in economic terms -- with roughly comparable
economic power in North America, Europe, and Asia -- but that it is
radically
unipolar in the capacity to resort to violence and to destroy. And it
should
be no surprise to discover that these facts of life enter crucially into
planning.
-
- Even before Sept. 11, the US outspent the next 15
countries
for "defense" -- which, as usual, means "offense."
And it is far ahead in sophisticated military technology. The military
budget was increased sharply after Sept. 11, as the Administration
exploited
the fear and anguish of the population to ram through a wide array of
measures
that they knew would arouse popular opposition without the appeal to
"patriotism"
-- which the powerful of course ignore; it is the rest who must be passive
and submissive. These included a variety of means to strengthen the
authority
of the very powerful state to which "conservatives" are deeply
committed, among them, sharp increases in military spending designed to
enhance the enormous disparity between the US and the rest of the world.
Included are the plans to extend the "arms race" into space --
a "race" with one competitor only -- undermining the Outer Space
Treaty of 1967 and other international obligations. Ballistic Missile
Defense
(BMD) is only a small component, and even that is understood to be an
offensive
weapon: "not simply a "shield" but an "enabler"
of action," the RAND corporation explained, echoing not only the
thoughts
but even the words of Chinese authorities. Strategic analysts realistically
describe the program as a means to establish US global
"hegemony,"
which is what the world needs, they explain, echoing many distinguished
predecessors.
-
- The far broader programs of militarization of space are
explained in high level public documents as the natural next step in
expanding
state power. Armies and navies were created to protect commercial interests
and investment, Clinton's Space Command observed, and the logical next
frontier is space, in pursuit of the same goals. But this time there will
be a difference. The British Navy could be countered by Germany, with
consequences
we need not discuss. But the US will be so awesomely powerful that there
will be no counterforce, so it is claimed.
-
- Overwhelming dominance is necessary for well-known
technical
reasons. Even BMD requires nullification of the anti-satellite weapons
of a potential adversary. The US must therefore achieve "full spectrum
dominance," ensuring that even this much simpler technology will not
be available. An iron fist is needed for other reasons. US military
planners
share the assessment of the intelligence community and outside experts
that what is misleadingly called "globalization" will lead to
a widening divide between the "haves" and the
"have-nots"
-- contrary to doctrine, but in accord with reality. And it will be
necessary
to control unruly elements: by inspiring fear, or perhaps by actual use
of highly-destructive killing machines launched from space, probably
nuclear-powered
and on hair-trigger alert with automated control systems, thus increasing
the likelihood of what in the trade are called "normal
accidents":
the unpredictable errors to which all complex systems are subject.
-
- It is recognized that these programs significantly
increase
the danger of uncontrollable catastrophe, but that too is entirely rational
within the framework of prevailing institutions and ideology, which ranks
hegemony well above survival. Again, there are ample precedents throughout
the history of the Cold War, and long before. The difference today is that
the stakes are much higher. It is no exaggeration to say that the survival
of the species is at risk.
-
- These seem to me some of the realistic prospects if
current
tendencies persist. But there is no reason for that to happen. The good
news is that the reigning systems of authority are fragile, and they know
it. There is a major effort to exploit the current window of opportunity
to institute harsh and regressive programs and to neutralize the mass
popular
movements that have been forming throughout the world in unprecedented
and highly encouraging ways. There is no reason to succumb to such efforts,
and every reason not to. Plenty of choices and options are available. What
is needed, as always, is the will and dedication to pursue them.
-
- ___
-
- Delivered At The AFSC Conference - 12-8-01
- http://www.zmag.org/chomskyafter911.htm
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