- The abortive military-police coup in Ecuador, which took
place on September 30, has raised numerous questions about the role of
the US and its allies among the traditional oligarchy and the leftist social
movements, Indian organizations and their political parties.
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- While President Correa and all governments in Latin
America, and significant sectors of the Ecuadorian public described the
violent actions as a coup, the principle organ of Wall Street The
Wall Street Journal described it as a "police protest".
Spoke persons for Goldman Sachs and the Council of Foreign Relations referred
to the police and military power grab against the democratically elected
government as a self-induced "political crises" of the President.
While the coup was underway the "Indian" movement CONAIE, launched
a manifesto condemning the government, while the "Indian" party
Pachakutik supported the ouster of the President and backed the police
coup as a "just act of public servants".
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- In summary, the imperial backers of the coup , sectors
of the Ecuadorian elite and Indian movement downplayed the violent police
uprising as a coup in order to justify their support for it as just another
"legitimate economic protest". In other words, the victim of
the elite coup was converted into the repressor of the peoples' will.
The factual question of whether their was a coup or not, is central to
deciding whether the government was justified in repressing the police
uprising and whether in fact the democratic system was endangered.
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- The Facts about the Coup
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- The police did not simply "protest" against
economic polices, they seized the National Assembly and attempted to occupy
public buildings and media outlets. The air force or at least those
sectors collaborating with the police seized the airport in Quito,
concerted actions seizing and blocked strategic transport networks.. President
Correa was assaulted and seized and kept hostage under police guard by
scores of heavily armed police, who violently resisted the Special Forces
who eventually freed the president resulting in scores of wounded and ten
deaths. Clearly the leaders of the police uprising had more in mind that
a simple "protest" over cancelled bonuses they sought to
overthrow the president and were willing to use their firepower to carry
it off. The initial economic demands of public sector employees were used
by the coup leaders as a springboard to oust the regime.
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- The fact that the coup failed is, in part, a result
of the President's vigorous and dramatic appeal to the people to take to
the streets to defend democracy - an appeal, which resonated with thousands
of supporters and denied the coup makers public support in the streets.
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- The facts on the ground all point to a violent attempt
by the police and sectors of the military to seize power and depose the
president by any definition a coup. And so it was immediately understood
by all Latin American governments, from right to left, some of whom immediately
closed their frontiers and threatened to break relations if the coup leaders
succeeded. The only exception was Washington whose first response
was not to join in the condemnation but to wait and see what would be the
outcome or as presidential spokesperson Philip Crowley announced "we
are monitoring events", referring to the uprising as a "protest"
challenging the government. When Washington realized that the coup was
actively opposed by the Ecuadorian public, all the Latin American governments,
the bulk of the armed forces and doomed to failure, Secretary of State
Clinton called Correa to announce US "backing" for his government,
referring to the coup as merely an "interruption of the democratic
order".
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- In the run-up to the restoration of democracy, the trade
unions were by and large passive observers, certainly no general strikes
were discussed or even active mobilizations. The response of top military
officials in the army were by and large opposed to the coup, except perhaps
in the air force which seized the principle airport in Quito, before handing
it over to anti-drug units of the police force. The anti narcotic police
were in the forefront of the coup and not surprisingly were under intense
US training and indoctrination for the past five years.
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- Explanation for the Varied Responses to the Coup
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- The responses to and interpretations of the coup varied
according to different sets of objective interests and subjective perceptions.
Latin American regimes unanimously rejected the coup fearing a coup multiplier
effect in the region, in which other successful coups (after last year's
in Honduras) would encourage the military and police to act in their countries.
The memories of the recent past in which the military dismantled all representative
institutions and jailed, tortured, killed and exiled political leaders
was a key factor in shaping Latin America's resounding rejection. Secondly,
the existing political order benefits the capitalist class, in almost all
of Latin America and provides the bases for political stability and elite
prosperity. No powerful mass movements threaten capitalist socio-economic
hegemony, which might require the economic elite to back a coup.
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- Correa supporters were in the streets, though not in
the numbers of his previous calls to action ousting ex-President Lucio
Gutierrez, .They were mainly party loyalists. Others supported his "anti-imperialist"
measures (expelling the US military base from Manta) or were defending
democratic institutions even as they have become critical of his recent
policies.
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- The US vacillation, shifting from an initial refusal
to condemn to later denouncing the failed coup, was based on longstanding
ties to the military but especially the police. Between 2006-2011 US military
and police aid will have totaled $94 million, of which $89 million was
channeled to the "war on drugs". From 2006-2008, Ecuadorian
military and police trainees numbered 931, 526 of whom were incorporated
in the "counter-drugs programs". It was precisely the anti-drug
sector of the police which played a major role in seizing the airports
in Quito during the abortive coup. The US certainly had plenty of motives
for the coup. Correa came to power by ousting pro-US client Lucio Gutierrez
and decimating the oligarchical parties who were responsible for dollarizing
the economy and embracing Washington's free market doctrine. Correa called
into question the foreign debt, declining to pay debts incurred under fraudulent
circumstances. Most of all Correa was an ally of Venezuelan President
Hugo Chavez, a member of ALBA and a strong opponent of Colombia, Washington's
main ally in the region. Ecuador's policy weakened Washington's strategy
of "encircling Venezuela" with hostile regimes. Having already
backed the successful coup against Honduras President Zelaya, an ally of
Chavez, Washington had everything to gain from a military coup which ousted
another member of ALBA. Washington is pursuing a "triple strategy"
of 1/diplomacy, offering to improve relations,2/ subversion by building
subversive capacity by financing the police and military and3/ financing
via AID, NED, World Bank and NGO's sectors of the Indian movement especially
Pachacutik and dissident groups linked Lucio Gutierrez.
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- The leadership of the Indian movement varied in its
response to the coup. The most extreme position adopted by the near moribund
electoral party Pachacutik (US aid recipient) actually endorsed the police
coup and call on the masses to form a "united front", a call
which fell on deaf ears. The bulk of the Indian movement (CONAIE) adopted
a complex position of denying that a coup was taking place, yet rejecting
the police violence and setting forth a series of demands and criticisms
of Correa's policies and methods of governance. No effort was made to
either oppose the coup or to support it. In other words, in contrast to
its militant anti dictatorial past, CONAIE was virtually a marginal actor.
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- The passivity of CONAIE and most of the trade unions
has its roots in profound policy disagreements with the Correa regime.
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- Correa's Self-Induced Vulnerability: His Right Turn
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- During the emerging citizens-movement five years ago,
Rafael Correa played an important role in deposing the authoritarian, corrupt
and pro-imperialist regime of Lucio Gutierrez. Once elected President,
he put in practice some of his major electoral promises: evicting the
US from its military base in Manta; rejecting foreign debt payments based
on illicit accounts; raising salaries, the minimum wage, providing low
interest loans and credit to small business. He also promised to consult
with and take account of the urban social and Indian movements, in the
lead up to the election of a constitutional assembly to write up a new
constitution. In 2007 Correa's list running with his new party Alianza
Pais (the country alliance) won a two thirds majority in the legislature.
However facing declining revenues due to the world recession, Correa made
a sharp turn to right. He signed lucrative contracts with multi-national
mining companies granting them exploitation rights on lands claimed by
indigenous communities without consulting the latter, despite a past history
of catastrophic contamination of Indian lands, water and habitat. When
local communities acted to block the agreements, Correa sent in the army
and harshly repressed the protestors. In subsequent efforts to negotiate,
Correa only heard his own voice and dismissed the Indian leaders as a "bunch
of bandits", and "backward elements" who were blocking the
"modernization of the country".
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- Subsequently, Correa went on the offensive against the
public employees, pushing legislation reducing salaries, bonuses and promotions,
repudiating settlements based on agreements between unions and legislators.
In the same way Correa imposed new laws on university governance, which
alienated the professoriate, administration and students. Equally damaging
to Correa's popularity among the organized sectors of the wage and middle
classes, was his authoritarian style in pushing his agenda, the pejorative
language he used to label his interlocutors and his insistence that negotiations
were only a means to discredit his counterparts.
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- Contrary to Correa's claim to be a pathfinder for "21st
century socialism", he was, instead, the organizer of a highly personal
strategy for 21st century capitalism, one based on a dollarized economy,
large scale foreign investments in mining, petroleum and financial services
and social austerity.
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- Correa's 'right turn', however; also depended on political
and financial support from Venezuela and its Cuban and Bolivian allies.
As a result Correa fell between two chairs: he lost support from the social
left because of "pro-extractive" foreign economic policies and
austere domestic programs and did not secure support from the US, because
of his ties to Chavez and Cuba.
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- As a result, Correa so alienated the unions and the
Indian and social movements that he was only able to secure very limited
amount of "street power" in closing down the economy to thwart
the coup. Equally important, the US and its collaborators saw in his declining
organized support and the growth of social protest, an opportunity to test
the waters for a possible coup, via their most dependable collaborators
in the police and to a lesser degree in the air force. The police uprising
was a test run, encouraged to proceed, without any overt, commitment, pending
its success or failure. If the police coup secured sufficient military
support, Washington and its civilian political oligarchs could intervene,
call for a "negotiated outcome" which would either oust Correa
or "turn him" into a "pragmatic" client. In other
words, a "successful" coup would eliminate another Chavez ally,
but even a failed coup would put Correa on notice for the future.
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- Final Reflections in the Way of a Conclusion
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- The unfolding of the police coup turned into a farce:
the coup makers miscalculated their support within the military as well
as among the protesting Indians and unions. They stood alone without glory
or success. Lacking national leaders, or even a coherent strategy, they
were put down in a matter of hours. They misjudged the willingness of
the US to commit, once it became clear that the coup makers lacked any
resonance among the military elite and were totally inept. What may have
started as a coup ended as a comic opera with a brief shoot-out with the
military at a police hospital.
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- On the other side, the fact that Correa, in the end
could only rely on his elite special forces, to free him from police hostage,
reveals the tragedy of a popular leader. One who started with immense
popular backing, promising to finally fulfill the demand of the campesinos
for land reform, the Indians demand for sovereignty to negotiate over mineral
riches and urban labors' demands for just remuneration, and ended returning
to the Presidential Palace protected by military armored carriers.
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- The failed coup in Ecuador raises a larger political
question: Does the near demise of Correa spell the end of the experiment
of the 'new center-left regimes' which attempt to "balance" vigorous
export-based growth with moderate social payoffs? The entire success of
the center-left regimes has been based on their ability to subsidize and
promote agro-mineral foreign and domestic capital while increasing employment,
wages and subsistence payments (anti-poverty programs). This 'political
formula' has been underwritten by the boom in demand from Asia and other
world markets and by historically high commodity prices. When the crises
of 2008 broke, Ecuador was the weakest link in Latin America, as it was
tied to the dollar and was unable to 'stimulate' growth or cushion the
economy. Under conditions of crises, Correa resorted to repression of
the social movements and trade unions and greater efforts to secure support
from petro-mining multi-nationals. Moreover, Ecuador's police and military
was much more vulnerable to infiltration by US agencies because of large
scale funding and training programs unlike Bolivia and Venezuela which
had expelled these agencies of subversion. Unlike Argentina and Brazil,
Correa lacked a capacity to "conciliate" diverse sectors of social
movements through negotiations and concessions. Of course, the penetration
of the Indian communities by imperial funded NGO's promoting "separatism"
and identity' politics did not make conciliation easy.
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- Nevertheless, despite the particularities of Ecuador,
the failed coup underlines the relative importance of resolving basic socio-economic
grievances, if the center-left macro-economic projects are to succeed.
Apart from Venezuela, none of the center-left regimes are carrying out
structural reforms (land reform) nationalizations of strategic sectors,
income redistribution .Even the Chavez regime in Venezuela has lost a great
deal of popular support because of neglect of essential services (public
safety, garbage collection, delivery of water, electrical power and food
delivery) because of corruption and incompetence. Over time, the center-left
can no longer depend on "charismatic" leaders to compensate for
the lack of structural changes. The regimes must sustain the improvement
of wages and salaries and delivery of basic services in an ambience of
'social dialogue'. The absence of continuous social reforms, while agro-mining
elites prosper, opens the door for the return of the right and provokes
divisions in the social coalitions supporting the center-left regimes.
Most important the implosion of the center-left provides an opportunity
for Washington to subvert and overthrow the regimes, reverse their relatively
independent foreign policy and reassert its hegemony.
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- The institutional foundations of the center-left are
fragile everywhere, especially the police and army, because officialdom
is still engaged in government programs with US military, narco-police
and intelligence agencies. The center-left regimes except Venezuela
have continued to participate in all joint military programs. The
center-left has not transformed the state. Equally important it has promoted
the economic bases of the pro-US Right via its agro-mineral export strategy.
It has ignored the fact that political stability is temporary and based
on a balance of social power resulting from the popular rebellions of the
2000-2005 period .The center-left ignores the reality that as the capitalist
class prospers, as a result of center-left agro-mineral export strategies,
so does the political right. And as the wealth and political power of
the export elites increase and as the center-left turns to the Right, as
has been the case with Correa, there will be greater social conflict and
a new cycle of political upheavals, if not by the ballot box then via the
bullet via coups or via popular uprisings.
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- The successful coup in Honduras (2009) and the recent
failed coup in Ecuador are symptomatic of the deepening crises of "post-neo-liberal"
politics. The absence of a socialist alternative, the fragmentation of
the social movements, the embrace of "identity politics", have
severely weakened an effective organized alternative when and if the center-left
regimes go into crises. For the moment most "critical intellectuals"
cling to the center-left in hopes of a "left turn", of a political
rectification, rather than taking the difficult but necessary road of rebuilding
an independent class based socialist movement.
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