- Begin Excerpt...
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- The US/Russia controversy over missile defense in Europe
has become even more complex now that the Obama administration has announced
it will replace the land-based anti-missile systems with a mobile sea launched
system. The Russians were fighting the land based system with a loud and
vociferous media campaign and by getting their numerous allies in the Polish
and Czech Parliaments to oppose it. Notwithstanding the opposition in Eastern
Europe, the determination of the Bush administration to install the system
gave the Russians the perfect excuse to install more offensive missiles
in Kaliningrad, the southern Baltic enclave Western globalist leaders "graciously"
allowed the Russians to keep control of despite evidence that the "Fall
of the Soviet Union" was a carefully contrived deception.
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- Kaliningrad contains numerous armed Russian camps situated
on the northern border of Poland which provide large forward stockpiles
of offensive arms for Russia in preparation for a future invasion of Europe.
Kaliningrad also allows Russian naval forces to maintain yet another strategic
base on the ice-free Baltic Sea. Short and Medium Range missiles are a
key part of that future offensive and are the reason why Russia is not
abiding by the Intermediate Nuclear Forces treaty which banned such missiles.
Even thought President Medvedev claims to have canceled the installation
of Iskander missiles in Kaliningrad, as a reciprocal gesture to Obama's
cancellation of the Polish ABM base, one can never take the Russians at
the word on such matters--especially now that the Russians know the US
is simply replacing one system for another.
-
- The new US mobile sea-based interceptors stationed in
the waters nearby would be even more effective against Kaliningrad's weapons
than the previous land-based interceptors, which were few in number and
sited at fixed locations-making them easier to target. Mobile sea based
interceptors would still be able to target Russia's large arsenal of ICBMs
in their boost phase. However, both the land-based system and the sea-based
ABM system depend on constant communication with radar tracking, and thus
are vulnerable to jamming. The sea based system on board the Aegis cruisers
is a also kinetic strike system (no exploding warhead) so it has the same
deficiencies as the land-based system.
-
- Journalist Rick Rozoff wrote an extensive briefing on
the new situation in missile defense. His closing comment makes a good
introduction for the excerpts I will quote: "Former plans for interceptor
missile facilities in Poland and the Czech Republic, employing as they
were to have antiquated technology, have been superseded by new projects
that will encompass broader regions of the world and will coordinate deployments
on land, at sea, in the air and in space."
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- Actually, the former was NOT antiquated technology-but
the latest state-of-the-art tracking technology designed to allow "a
bullet to hit a bullet at supersonic speeds," and similar to the sea
based SM-3 kinetic strike system on board our latest Aegis missile cruisers.
This strange design criteria (no explosive warhead) only works if no jamming
occurs (unlikely) and if the ABM interceptor makes a direct hit on the
target--something which only happened in about half the tests, when no
jamming is present--not exactly encouraging. The SM-3 tests have been better,
but they were designed to take down satellites in space, which is a much
easier target than an incoming Russian warhead traveling at hyper speeds.
-
- I'm convinced the entire purpose of these few "high
tech" warhead-less interceptors was to give the public a feeling they
were really protected, when they were not. In short, it is a criteria-compromised
system that would not prevent a Russian first strike consisting of thousands
of warheads, which globalist leaders have been quietly covering for--and
still are.
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- So, why did the Russian's make such a fuss about the
land-based Polish ABM placement if it was designed to not be effective?
And, why aren't they in a fuss about this switch to a mobile system? In
answer to the first, being suspicious of America's "stupid" military
and foreign policies, the Russians probably suspected that the US might
actually put warheads on the missiles and suddenly make them effective.
Moreover, the US could easily deploy more interceptors than the half dozen
claimed, and actually threaten their first strike plans. After all, that's
the kind of lying, hiding and cheating game the Russians have always played.
More on the second question later. Back to Rozen with [my comments in brackets].
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- "Synchronized announcements on September 17 by President
Barack Obama and Defense Secretary Robert Gates that the U.S. was abandoning
plans to station interceptor missiles in Poland and a forward-based missile
radar site in the Czech Republic are now ten days ago and information surfacing
in the interim indicates that its new plans are more far-reaching than
their predecessor.
-
- "[Quoting Gates]... 'I want to have real capacity
as soon as possible, and to take maximum advantage of new technologies...
American missile defense on the continent will continue, and not just in
Central Europe, the most likely location for future SM-3 sites, but, we
hope, in other NATO countries as well.......We are strengthening -- not
scrapping -- missile defense in Europe.'
-
- "Remarking that the earlier-envisioned system in
Poland and the Czech Republic would not have been operative until 2015
and that opposition among both nations' parliamentarians would have delayed
the process at least another two years, Gates evinced both impatience with
and far grander designs for the European wing of the U.S.'s global missile
shield program by asserting, 'In the first phase, to be completed by 2011,
we will deploy proven, sea-based SM-3 interceptor missiles -- weapons that
are growing in capability [that should worry the Russians even more]'
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- Gates then discussed what he meant by new technology.
"'[A] fixed radar site like the one previously envisioned for the
Czech Republic would be far less adaptable than the airborne, space- and
ground-based sensors we now plan to use [the US has long had a space based
warning system, but it looks like there is some new integration being implemented
with airborne and shipborne control]. The new system, in addition to being
more effective and quickly operationalized, will be much grander in scope
and will include several times as many missiles as those intended for Poland,
although that nation will still host different variants of medium-range
interceptor missiles and, as Gates states below, will still eventually
station long-range ground-based missiles. 'The second phase, which will
become operational around 2015, will involve putting upgraded SM-3s [Standard
Missile-3s] on the ground in Southern and Central Europe. All told, every
phase of this plan will include scores of SM-3 missiles, as opposed to
the old plan of just 10 ground-based interceptors.'"
-
- So, there you have it. The Russians have been duped.
Their relief at the withdrawal of the Polish system was premature. There
is no removal of the land-based systems at all, except they are exchanging
one type for another. The US is increasing both the size, sophistication,
and number of sites compared to the single limited site before. The Russians
should be screaming their heads off in opposition, but they are not--at
least not President Medvedev or PM Putin.
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- Only Russia's NATO envoy was vociferous in his condemnation
of the new plans, and his remarks were quickly disowned by the Russian
hierarchy. As Reuters Europe said, "The remark, made by Dmitry Rogozin
on Tuesday, contrasted with Russian President Dmitry Medvedev's positive
assessment of U.S. President Barack Obama's announcement that Washington
would drop plans to deploy parts of its anti-missile shield in Europe.
A senior Kremlin source disowned on Wednesday remarks by the Russian envoy
to NATO that Moscow remained suspicious of Washington's new anti-missile
plans and feared they could remain a security threat."
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- So, why isn't Russia protesting this new ABM announcement?
Actually, they might. Russian sources say the government is preparing a
formal response, so what I have reported today may change. There are several
possible explanations for Russia soft-peddling this more robust system.
1) The Russians could always launch numerous short range rockets to induce
the US to fire upon them and quickly deplete the limited numbers of interceptor
missiles. 2) the Russians may already have effective jamming electronics
ready to employ on Aegis systems close to land or based on the land. 3)
The Russians may have confidence that their overwhelming numbers of missiles
can get through limited boost phase interdiction. The US frankly does not
know how many missiles the Russians have hidden away in secret underground
factories locations like Yamantau Mountain. 4) it is even possible that
they view the long-term advantages of feigning the friendly ally can overcome
or compromise ABM systems through spying and future sabotage from within
NATO. The latter strategy involves deeper spy penetration into NATO, and
that appears to be the direction Moscow is taking.
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- The Associated Press wrote this week that on the basis
of Obama dropping the Polish missile base, "Russia is ready to fully
restore cooperation with NATO which was suspended in the aftermath of the
Russia-Georgia war, the Kremlin said Wednesday. A planned trip to Moscow
by NATO's secretary-general should demonstrate that the alliance is also
ready for developing ties, said Nataliya Timakova, a spokeswoman for President
Dmitry Medvedev. 'Of course, we would like to restore our cooperation in
full.'" I'll bet they would.
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- ATTACK ON IRAN HEATING UP
-
- With the UK Globe Express revealing (via a leak from
British Intelligence) that Saudia Arabia has given Israel the go ahead
to overfly its territory in a strike on Iran, it looks all the more certain
that an Israeli attack on Iran is only a matter of time--and certain to
be followed up by US attacks if Iran resists in any way. Veteran military
analysisAnthony H. Cordesman reviews the establishment view of the new
administration's plans to go after Iran, coordinated (I believe) in secret
with Israel to provide the trigger. "Iran's acknowledgment that it
is developing a second uranium-enrichment facility does little to dispel
the view that the regime is developing a weapons program. Israel must consider
not just whether to proceed with a strike against Iran----but how [and
frankly, neither does Iran's latest offer to send their highly enriched
uranium to Russia for final processing. Russia always plays both sides
and can't be trusted].
-
- "When the Israeli army's then-Deputy Chief of Staff
Dan Halutz was asked in 2004 how far Israel would go to stop Iran's nuclear
program, he replied: '2,000 kilometers,' roughly the distance been the
two countries. Israel's political and military leaders have long made it
clear that they are considering taking decisive military action if Iran
continues to develop its nuclear program.
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- "An Israeli strike on Iran would be far more challenging
than the Israeli strike that destroyed Iraq's Osirak reactor in 1981. An
effective Israeli nuclear strike may not be possible, yet a regional nuclear
arms race is a game that Iran can start [Actually, it cannot, since it
does not have an operational weapon-Israel and the US will strike before
they do], but cannot possibly win. Anyone who meets regularly with senior
Israeli officials, officers and experts knows that Israel is considering
military options, but considering them carefully and with an understanding
that they pose serious problems and risks.
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- "One of the fundamental problems dogging Israel,
especially concerning short-ranged fighters and fighter-bombers, is distance.
Iran's potential targets are between 950 and 1,400 miles from Israel, the
far margin of the ranges Israeli fighters can reach, even with aerial refueling.
Israel would be hard-pressed to destroy all of Iran's best-known targets
[That's why they will provide the initial strike and wait for Iran's retaliation
so the US has an excuse to enter the fray]. What's more, Iran has had years
in which to build up covert facilities, disperse elements of its nuclear
and missile programs, and develop options for recovering from such an attack.
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- "Israel would have to contend with the fact that
it has consistently had a 'red light' from both the Bush and Obama administrations
opposing such strikes [only for show, to make it appear as if Obama is
against it]. Any strike that overflew Arab territory or attacked a fellow
Islamic state would stir the ire of neighboring Arab states, as well as
Russia, China and several European states [which is why a wider Middle
East war will be the result]. This might not stop Israel. Hardly a week
goes by without another warning from senior Israeli officials that a military
strike is possible, and that Israel cannot tolerate a nuclear-armed Iran,
even though no nation has indicated it would support such action.
-
- "Most analyses of a possible Israeli attack focus
on only three of Iran's most visible facilities: its centrifuge facilities
at Natanz, its light water nuclear power reactor near Bushehr [not yet
operational], and a heavy water reactor at Arak it could use to produce
plutonium [a long way from being finished]. They are all some 950 to 1,000
miles from Israel... The centrifuge facility at Natanz is a different story.
It is underground and deeply sheltered, and is defended by modern short-range
Russian TOR-M surface-to-air missiles. It also, however, is the most important
target Israel can fully characterize. Both Israeli and outside experts
estimate that it will produce enough low enriched uranium for Iran to be
able to be used in building two fission nuclear weapons by some point in
2010 -- although such material would have to be enriched far more to provide
weapons-grade U-235 [which would take a lot longer].
-
- "The first would be whether it can destroy a hardened
underground facility like Natanz. The second is that a truly successful
strike might have to hit far more targets over a much larger area than
the three best-known sites. Iran has had years to build up covert and dispersed
facilities, and is known to have dozens of other facilities associated
with some aspect of its nuclear programs. Moreover, Israel would have to
successfully strike at dozens of additional targets to do substantial damage
to another key Iranian threat: its long-range missiles. Experts sharply
disagree as to whether the Israeli air force could do more than limited
damage to the key Iranian facility at Natanz. Some feel it is too deeply
underground and too hardened for Israel to have much impact. Others believe
that it is more vulnerable than conventional wisdom has it, and Israel
could use weapons like the GBU-28 earth-penetrating bombs it has received
from the U.S. or its own penetrators, which may include a nuclear-armed
variant, to permanently collapse the underground chambers. No one knows
what specialized weapons Israel may have developed on its own, but Israeli
intelligence has probably given Israel good access to U.S., European, and
Russian designs for more advanced weapons than the GBU-28. Therefore, the
odds are that Israel can have a serious impact on Iran's three most visible
nuclear targets and possibly delay Iran's efforts for several years.
-
- "The story is very different, however, when it comes
to destroying the full range of Iranian capabilities. There are no meaningful
unclassified estimates of Iran's total mix of nuclear facilities, but known
unclassified research, reactor, and centrifuge facilities number in the
dozens. It became clear just this week that Iran managed to conceal the
fact it was building a second underground facility for uranium enrichment
near Qom, 100 miles southwest of Tehran, and that was designed to hold
3,000 centrifuges. Iran is developing at least four variants of its centrifuges,
and the more recent designs have far more capacity than most of the ones
installed at Natanz. This makes it easier to conceal chains of centrifuges
in a number of small, dispersed facilities and move material from one facility
to another. Iran's known centrifuge production facilities are scattered
over large areas of Iran, and at least some are in Mashad in the far northeast
of the country----far harder to reach than Arak, Bushehr and Natanz. Many
of Iran's known facilities present the added problem that they are located
among civilian facilities and peaceful nuclear-research activities-- although
Israel's precision-strike capabilities may well be good enough to allow
it to limit damage to nearby civilian facilities [doubtful].
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- "It is not clear that Israel can win this kind of
"shell game." It is doubtful that even the U.S. knows all the
potential targets, and even more doubtful that any outside power can know
what each detected Iranian facility currently does----and the extent to
which each can hold dispersed centrifuge facilities that Iran could use
instead of Natanz to produce weapons-grade uranium. As for the other elements
of Iran's nuclear programs, it has scattered throughout the country the
technical and industrial facilities it could use to make the rest of fission
nuclear weapons. The facilities can now be in too many places for an Israeli
strike to destroy Iran's capabilities." In my opinion, this is precisely
why we will see a massive US air assault on all major military and civilian
infrastructure sites in Iran--the old "shock and awe" treatment
which so hurts the American image with the rest of the world.
-
- Meanwhile, the possibilities of meaningful diplomatic
dialogue are probably finished. As the AP reported, "Secretary of
State Hillary Clinton says she doesn't believe Iran can convince the U.S.
and other world powers that its nuclear program is for peaceful purposes,
putting Tehran on course for tougher economic penalties beyond the current
'leaky sanctions.'" The near future diplomatic battle will only be
at the UN over heavier sanctions, leading up to a full break with Iran.
Iran already took the first step by announcing it will only sell its oil
for Euros, not dollars. That's not hard to do given that its clients for
oil don't need to use dollars.
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- Iran isn't helping things by doing another series of
missile tests. It's almost like Ahmadinejad is purposely picking a fight,
or his backers have given him so many false assurances of success that
he feels Iran is invincible. That backer is Russia, but if the fall of
Iraq is any example, Russia will not come to Iran's rescue.
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- End Excerpt
-
- World Affairs Brief - Commentary and Insights on
a Troubled World
-
- Copyright Joel Skousen. Partial quotations with attribution
permitted.
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- Cite source as Joel Skousen's World Affairs Brief http://www.worldaffairsbrief.com
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