- A fast guy had thought that a wallet was unattended,
and tried to snatch it. But to his distress, he was stopped in his tracks
by a burly wallet owner. This could a fair description of Saddam Hussein
snatching Kuwait. This also fits the war over South Ossetia.
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- Georgian President Saakashvili thought he can take South
Ossetia while nobody is looking; while everybody is watching the Olympiad.
In order to maximise the surprise factor, he declared barely three hours
before the snatch that he would never send troops in.
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- Here the similarity ends. While Saddam succeeded to take
Kuwait, Saakashvili failed to take over the SO. Saakashvili's strategy
was also different, and reminiscent rather of Israeli conquest of 1948:
he wanted to have Ossetia without the native folk, the Ossetians. For this
reason he bombarded the SO capital, Tskhinvali, and caused mass exodus
of the people some thirty thousand of them, or almost half of population
crossed the high mountains to the Russian side. The Russians rolled in
and kicked Sakashvili troops out.
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- So far, so good.
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- (1) Saakashvili had it coming for a long time. His
flirt, no, heavy petting with the US and Israel, his fervent anti-Russian
sentiments, his Kartveli nationalism had led him and his country to trouble.
Like young Fidel, he wanted to turn his land into a match to set the global
fire. He was the first to be burnt.
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- (2) Russia fulfilled its residual imperial duty: as
the successor of the Soviet Union, it is duty bound to guarantee some well-being
of its erstwhile junior member-states. Russia could not allow Saakashvili
to ethnically cleanse the Ossetians, for practical reasons, too: fifty
thousand refugees from South Ossetia would destabilise North Caucasus.
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- (3) Russia demonstrated that beyond bark, it has bite,
too. Probably other adventurous neighbours, namely pro-American leaders
of Estonia, Poland, Ukraine will entertain second thoughts before their
next paroxysm of anti-Russian emotions.
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- (4) Russia proved that it can use force quickly, efficiently
and with moderation. There was no old Soviet overkill; rather moderate
and modest, well-executed military operation. The best about it was its
brevity, two-three days of actual fighting and the rest some mopping-up.
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- (5) Russian leadership proved they are not scared by
Washington's rhetoric. This is very good after many years of complicity
and impotence.
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- (6) Military defeat may be very good for the Georgian
soul. Georgians are wonderful people, warm, handsome, pleasant and generous.
However, they are ferocious nationalists of tribal kind. Like some of their
neighbours, they tend to see others mainly through ethnic prism. The first
thing the Georgians did when they became independent in the wake of 1917
Russian Revolution was the expulsion of all Armenians and confiscation
of their property. Joseph Stalin also acted the Georgian way when he expelled
the Chechens from their mountains and the Germans from Prussia. Georgia
is by no means homogeneous: it is populated by a few smaller ethnic
groups, next to the Kartveli majority. After Georgia became independent
second time, in 1991, the Kartvelis have tried to deal with the minorities
by harsh methods, undermining their culture and language and even expelling
them on the first suspicion. This was the reason three autonomous areas
of the country decided to split from Georgia. SO is one of the three, but
unless the Kartvel nationalism would be reined in, Ajarians, Svans and
other communities may rebel, too. Military defeat may cause the Georgians
to re-think their attitude to their immediate neighbours.
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- (7) Though Russia did not send its troops in order
to remove Saakashvili, it does not make such an outcome less than desirable.
Saakashvili is dangerous for Georgia, Russia, Ossetia and the World. Pity
he did not lose the general elections a few months ago; shame that other
candidates met with untimely death in suspicious circumstances. One may
hope the true patriots of Georgia will kick him out and chose a better
president, siding for neutrality and friendship with Georgia's neighbours
including Russia.
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- (8) Georgian communists expressed their distaste with
the Saakashvili's attack; they would like to lead their country back into
a close union with Russia. It should be considered: many Georgians, say
the Communists in their letter from Tbilisi, would love to see the relations
restored.
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- (9) A neutral and neighbour-friendly Georgia will be
able to re-integrate South Ossetia and Abkhazia. The ethnic Georgian, Kartvel
and Mingrel refugees would be able to return into their villages. Caucasus
is so poly-ethnic that mutual expulsions and transfers are unacceptable.
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- (10) This is the time to stop anti-Georgian
propaganda in Russia and anti-Russian propaganda elsewhere. Russia has
a long tradition of friendship with the Caucasian nations, with Georgians,
Ossetians, Circassians; the tradition well established by Leo Tolstoy,
Lermontov and Griboedov. Let it prevail. As Marshal Stalin would say, Saakashvili
come and go, but the Georgian people endure forever.
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- Europeans showed more understanding of the Russian action
than it could be expected. There was no mass hysteria, and the Ossetians
were allowed to express their view. Israel stopped its supplies of military
hardware to Georgia. While the American leaders responded to the victory
of Russian arms with expected verbal severity, they wisely avoided any
action likely to enhance the military standing of Saakashvili. They could
do an airlift of their armour to Tbilisi, they could show more of muscle,
but they did not.
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- This was the true mystery of the campaign. Did the Americans
encourage Saakashvili? Did he act at his own foolhardy will? There could
be a few explanations of the enigma.
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-
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- (1) Every Georgian president tried to regain the lost
provinces, so Saakashvili could have a try being carried away by the magic
of auspicious triple eight, as they began their offensive on <http://8.8.8.>8.8.8.
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- (2) Saakashvili may fail to understand the Americans.
This happened to Saddam Hussein when he snatched Kuwait. He was convinced
that the Ambassador Gillespie gave him green light for the operation.
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- (3) The Americans and Saakashvili may fail in their
prognostication. They interpreted Russian inaction in the past as a harbinger
of their inaction in the future. On 8.8.8, a pro-American Russian newspaper
Gazeta.ru predicted that the Russians will not move their forces and will
swallow the defeat, for otherwise they would act earlier.
-
- (4) The Americans plan some operation in Iran, and
they encouraged this Georgian diversion to keep the Russians busy. This
still can be the case, as in present position Russia has a weak hand in
the UN to deal with the American demands or with direct aggression.
-
- (5) Iran expressed its support for the Russian operation
and condemned the Georgian invasion of South Ossetia. The New York Times
and similar papers editorialised that the US should not push Russia too
hard, in order to get Russian approval for an anti-Iranian sanctions or
steps.
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- My preferred version of the events is that the Americans
(and the Israelis) encouraged the Georgian president as they were curious
to see the Russian reaction and to observe preparedness of the Russian
Armed Forces. In military parlance, such a minor operation is called "contact
reconnaissance", or just a "feeler". No one could be certain
how the Russian army will operate. In 1996, being sent to retake the rebellious
Grozny, the Russian Army ran away in disarray leaving its burning tanks
behind. Since then, the Russians did not fire a shot in anger; they were
very much a mystery for the West. In such a situation, there is no substitute
for some bout of actual fighting, and Saakashvili unwittingly offered this
opportunity to the West.
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-
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- This is rather an optimistic view, as the following comparison
will make clear. In 1930s, the Japanese occupying Manchukuo faced the Russians.
The Japanese did not know whether the Soviet Russians will fight well or
will they run away, as they easily defeated the Russian Imperial Army in
1903-4 war but took some beating from the Bolsheviks in 1918. That is why
they carried out a contact reconnaissance at Khalkhyn Gol (Nomonhan) to
take their measure of Russian resistance. After General Zhukov destroyed
their attacking force, they decided to keep peace with Russia, and despite
many pleas by Hitler, the Japanese troops stayed put.
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-
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- If this reading is right, we may be optimistic. Weakness
invites war; the Neocons attacked Iraq because it was the weakest link.
Now, the Russian army demonstrated its fighting capability, the Russian
diplomats confirmed their abilities and the Russian society was remarkably
united. Russia is not that weak as to invite pressure or war.
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