- This work examines a controversial, and in some respects,
taboo subject: the role of the neoconservatives as the fundamental driving
force in the Bush administration's war on Iraq in 2003 and the subsequent
militant American policy in the Middle East, and the close relationship
of these neocons' with the Israeli Likudnik right. It marshals evidence
to illustrate that this foreign-policy blunder - of colossal proportions,
from the perspective of the American national interest - stems from the
fact that the policy, pushed by the neoconservatives, was created to serve
the interests of a foreign country, namely Israel. Such a thesis does
not mean that the neoconservatives intentionally sought to aid Israel at
the expense of the United States, but rather that they have seen American
foreign policy through the lens of Israeli interest.
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- While not focused on the neoconservative movement per
se, this book reviews the background of the neoconservatives - their network
and agenda - as it relates to the aforementioned foreign-policy theme.
What characterizes neoconservatives is not only their but also their personal
interconnectedness in terms of organizations, publications, schooling,
and even blood. Of crucial importance is how the neocons, over the years,
identified closely with the interests of Israel, and how their Middle
East agenda paralleled that of the Israeli Likudnik right. In fact, much
of the neocon approach to the Middle East can be seen to have originated
in Likudnik thinking. And the Israeli government of Ariel Sharon worked
in tandem with the neocons in supporting both the war on Iraq and the
U.S.'s later militant policies toward Iran and Syria.
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- The overarching goal of both the neocons and the Likudniks
was to create an improved strategic environment for Israel. The aim of
the neoconservative and Likudnik foreign-policy strategy was to weaken
and fragment Israel's adversaries in the Middle East and concomitantly
increase Israel's relative strength, both externally and internally. A
key objective was to eliminate the demographic threat posed by the Palestinians
to the Jewish state, which the destabilization of Israel's external enemies
would achieve, since the Palestinian resistance depended upon external
support, both moral and material. Without outside support, the Palestinians
would be forced to accede to whatever type of peaceful solution Israel
offered.
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- The neoconservative position on the Middle East was the
polar opposite of what had been the traditional United States foreign
policy, set by what might be called the foreign-policy establishment.
The goal of the traditional policy was to promote stability in the Middle
East in order to maintain the flow of oil. In contrast to pursuing stability
- the traditional goal - the neocons called for destabilizing various of
the existing regimes in the Middle East. Of course, the neocons couched
their policy in terms of the eventual restabilization of the region on
a democratic basis. This work questions the genuineness of the neocons'
motives with respect to democracy - at least in light of how democracy
is normally understood.
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- Over the years, the neocons developed a powerful, interlocking
network of think tanks, organizations, and media outlets outside of government
with the express purpose of influencing American foreign policy. By the
end of the 1990s, the neoconservatives developed a complete blueprint
for the remaking of the Middle East by military means, starting with Iraq.
It was only by becoming an influential part of the administration of George
W. Bush that they obtained a position to make their Israeli-centric agenda
actual American policy.
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- But the neocons did not gain the upper hand in formulating
the foreign policy of the Bush administration until the terror attacks
of September 11, 2001 - which proved to be the pivotal events in the neocon
ascendancy. When the administration looked for a plan to deal with terrorism,
the neocons had one to offer, and a network, inside and outside of the
government, to promote it.
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- The second President Bush was essentially a convert to
neoconservative policy. Prior to 9/11, Bush never exhibited any strong
understanding of or interest in Middle East policy, and was therefore
in need of the kind of guidance that the neocons could present in a simple
paradigm-good versus evil-that Bush would find attractive.
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- The neocons did not drag the majority of the American
people into war in 2003 against their collective will. In large measure,
the neoconservative militaristic agenda resonated with an American public
and Congress that had been traumatized by terror and was desperately seeking
a way to retaliate. Moreover, the neocon network, inside and outside the
government, was in place to push the bogus propaganda - most critically
regarding the non-existent weapons of mass destruction (WMD) threat posed
by Iraq - to successfully mobilize congressional and popular support for
the war agenda.
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- The book goes over the post-invasion issues and the neocon
efforts to extend the destabilization effort elsewhere in the Middle East,
especially Iran. Emphasized is the opposition to this agenda by the foreign
policy establishment. This opposition combined with the increasing unpopularity
of the war in Iraq has so far limited the extension of the neocon war
agenda, though its impact so far has already served to destabilize the
region. Moreover, the success of pro-neocon John McCain as the presumptive
Republican presidential nominee illustrates that the neoconservatives'
influence still remains. And the existence of American forces in Iraq
can easily lead to an American war on Iran and the continued implementation
of the neoconservatives' regional goals.
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