- A case of smallpox
-
- The following is a compilation of facts I extracted from
a psychology thesis I wrote several years ago entitled "A
STUDY FOCUSING ON THE FORMATION OF OPINION, AND THE KNOWLEDGE ASSOCIATED
WITH ITS DEVELOPMENT."
-
- The study itself is long and boring but there are some
facts I'd like to bring to light about the United States government and
the history of biological weapons and warfare, especially as it relates
to the aforementioned government.
-
- I want to make this absolutely clear, this particular
article should not frighten the reader, the truth is that biological agents
are very unpredictable and can harm those that unleash them just as it
can those targeted. To sum it up neatly, after decades of research the
United States government's conclusion concerning defense against biological
agents is that there is no defense against them, a virus can be quickly
and inexpensively "tweaked" so that all known vaccines are rendered
ineffective, meaning that vaccine manufacturers would have to start all
over from the beginning, which is quite time consuming and expensive, thus
there really is no point if you get my meaning.
-
- I wrote the above thesis back in 2002 when I still believed
the government's "official version" of what happened on 9-11.
When I still believed the government's "official version" of
the anthrax letters. Needless to say, I no longer believe these lies.
-
- What the United States government and for that matter,
most western governments have more than proven of late, is that they cannot
be trusted and are not representing their national populations. Just today
I read where an entire Italian University was shut down to prevent Dr.
Robert Faurisson from speaking there. For those of you unfamiliar with
Dr. Faurisson, he's a notable "historical revisionist," that
doubts the "official version" of the holocaust narrative. I ask
you the reader, what is the University so frightened of? Have you ever
heard of such a thing?
-
- In any case, below I have included a number of facts
the Zionist media and Zio-American government will never tell you about.
All of them are cited/sourced in the bibliography of my thesis, so please,
do not hesitate to investigate further.
-
- 1. Mathew Meselson a professor of molecular biology at
Harvard, and American notable in the area of chemical and biological warfare,
reinforces the fact that the United States government has extensively researched
and developed biological weapons in the past. Meselson described an American
facility, north of Terre Haute, Indiana, built in 1944 that would have
produced 500,000 four pound anthrax bombs monthly once in full operation.
Professor Meselson's notable achievements in the field of biological weapons
research include being part of teams that proved the accidental release
of anthrax at a Soviet facility in 1979, disproved charges of biological
warfare in Laos and Cambodia in the late 1970s, and Meselson was a driving
force behind popularizing the Chemical Weapons Convention in 1994 (Academy
of Arts and Sciences, 1999).
-
- The United States Government also concurs with the scientists,
politicians and authors thus far noted, albeit in a more subdued, but equally
certain stance. A Congressional Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) study
conducted in 1993 ascertained that one hundred kilograms, or a mere two
hundred and twenty pounds of anthrax could under optimal conditions, kill
as many as three million residents of Washington D.C (Office of Technology
Assessment, United States Congress. 1993)In academic circles, the word
"optimal" might stand out as a word reducing the true significance
of the potential anthrax represents to Americans, but if one considers
a reduction in the efficacy of said biological agent, and perhaps investigates
a sub-optimal release with only a three or four percent total potential,
then one must still grasp the fact that 90,000 to 120,000 people would
still die.
-
- 2. In contrast to the killing capacity to weight ratio
of anthrax, Peter Burgasov, former Chief Sanitary Physician of the Soviet
Union, admitted to the Courier, a Russian newspaper in November 2001, that
the Soviet Union had been testing smallpox as a weapon since at least the
1970's and described one particularly disturbing test conducted on an island
in the Aral Sea "A research ship of the Aral fleet came within 15
kilometers away from the island (it was forbidden to come any closer than
40 kilometers) The lab technician of this ship took samples of plankton
twice a day from the top deck. The smallpox formulation-400 grams of which
was exploded on the island -"got her"- and she became infected."
(House International Relations Committee, on Bioterrorism, 2001). The aforementioned
OTA study focuses on what is to be expected immediately after an attack,
and does not take into account the fact that anthrax spores will continue
to represent a viable threat for decades as it would thoroughly contaminate
the soil, and leave the entire area under quarantine for generations. An
example of anthrax's longevity can be seen even today, from afar, on the
Island of Gruinard off the coast of Scotland. The British conducted experiments
with anthrax there during World War Two, and the entire area has been closed
to the public since, and more than five decades later still represents
a threat to human life despite the fact that the British government has
attempted in every scientific way to make the area safe (Hersh, 1968; Alibek,
1999).
-
- 3. A former top-level Soviet scientist involved at the
highest echelons with research on biological agents named Ken Alibek discloses
in detail an incident that occurred in Sverdlovsk Russia in the late 1970s.
Much of the incident was known about already through an investigation conducted
by U.S. analysts, but the full details were not known until Alibek defected
to the United States and told the entire story. In March 1979, a Soviet
technician accidentally forgot to replace a vital filter in the anthrax
production facilities ventilation system resulting in a release of anthrax
into the surrounding community. Dozens of people died, a local communist
party chief immediately ordered a cleanup, which disturbed the already
settled anthrax spores, and re-infected people through secondary aerosols
(Alibek, 1999).
-
- Predictably, the Soviet government initiated a cover-up,
and all the facts weren't known until 1993. The American Defense Intelligence
Agency published a report in 1986 outlining what it knew about the accident
at Sverdlovsk, and pointed out some significant facts about the attempts
on the part of the Soviet government to decontaminate the area after the
exposure. Incidentally, the Defense Intelligence Agency also emphasizes
the fact that only twenty-two pounds, approximately ten kilograms was accidentally
dispersed into the atmosphere. The following observations were noted in
the report, demonstrating the fact that decontaminating an area contaminated
by anthrax spores is difficult at best, and impossible overall (Defense
Intelligence Agency report: 1986, Pp, 4-7).· Initial disinfection
and decontamination procedures were largely ineffective.· The extraordinary
efforts to clean up were inconsistent with the Soviet explanation.·
The reported aerial spraying activity and disinfection with steam and hypochlorite,
a bleach solution around the military installation are clear attempts to
decontaminate areas affected by infectious aerosol.
-
- 4. Expert opinion on the need for a large infrastructure
and bio-agent production
-
- Osterholm and Schwartz (2000) argues that a fairly remedial
background in biology is all that is necessary to produce significant quantities
of anthrax in one's basement, completely countering the Federal Bureau
of Investigations contention, as emphasized by the media, that a massive
infrastructure, knowledge, scientific, and economic resources are necessary.
An example of this belief can be found in the following article, alongside
a most erroneous statement suggestive of the fact that the authors hadn't
done their homework. "Militarized anthrax spores are so difficult
to manufacture that only a handful of countries with large military-industrial
establishments have ever developed the capacity"(Department of Health
and Human Services, 2000). "There has never been a confirmed use of
anthrax spores, anywhere, by anyone, in a military or terrorist attack"
(Department of Health and Human Services, 2000). This report was indeed
written prior to the anthrax letters to Daschle and various media representatives,
but it was written more than fifty-years after known Japanese military
use of anthrax in Manchuria during World War Two (Eitzen & Takafuji,
1997). The Japanese use of biological agents in warfare was cited by Osterholm
and Schwartz (2000, p. 70), Alibek (1999, p. 36-37), and Hersh (1968, p.
12-18). In short, it was a fairly well known fact, and should not have
been missed by the Department of Health and Human Services.The idea that
bacterial growth and dissemination requires advanced technology and/or
weapon systems is equally nonsensical, and is dismissed by Osterholm and
Schwartz as well as other experts within the pages of their book on the
topic (2000, p.112-117).
-
- "One government analyst some years ago determined
that $1,500 of nuclear killing power would set an anthrax assailant back
by only a penny" (Osterholm & Schwartz, 2000, p. 8). Leonard Cole
(1988) supports this by citing expert information provided to the United
Nations in 1969 stating that a square kilometer of ground costs approx
$2000 to take with conventional weapons, $800 with nuclear, $600 with nerve
agent, and a single dollar with Biological agents.This would seem to cast
some doubt on the governments position that a large economic base is essential,
thus effectively ruling out a rogue individual, or loose knit terrorist
organization. In fact, one encounters the experts differing from this line
of thinking all together.
-
- Kenneth Alibek stated clearly on October 24th, 2001,
in response to the question, "is anthrax really that hard to get your
hands on," "In my opinion, it's not very hard" (The Money
Gang, October 24th). In another televised interview Alibek detailed the
fact that there is an island in the Aral Sea completely contaminated with
anthrax spores, and that if anyone wanted to acquire them, there were no
guards, and that "it wouldn't be a big problem." The former Soviet
scientist added the fact that the anthrax spores that could be found on
this island were also genetically engineered, making them antibiotic resistant
(48 Hours, 2001,October 19th).
-
- 5. Where would one acquire anthrax if so inspired? Prior
to the recent terrorist attack associated with the anthrax letters sent
to Daschle and various media figures, one could actually order it from
labs across the country. It was in this manner that a gentleman named Larry
Wayne Harris, associated with fringe elements in the political arena, acquired
both plague samples and anthrax samples. He was dismissed as a threat by
the government when this fact was exposed, because it was said that the
strains he obtained weren't exceedingly virulent (Osterholm & Schwartz,
2000).
-
- Perhaps the government wished to get the case out of
the public's mind as quickly as possible because Harris obtained the plague
samples through the mail simply by writing to the American Type Culture
Collection (ATCC) and requesting it. Essentially, luck played a role in
his capture, and law enforcement officials were able to confiscate the
bubonic plague sample from his glove compartment. According to congressional
testimony provided by Representative John R, Kasich "what he (Larry
Harris) did was not a crime," and at least in 1996, "the law
currently treats the improper disposal of motor oil by a service station
more severely than what Harris did" (Senate Committee on the Judiciary,
1996, March 6). Harris is not the only example of someone acquiring lethal
biological agents through the ATCC. Iraq also acquired their anthrax by
mailing requests to the ATCC, as did a religious cult in Oregon who used
their easily acquired bacteria to infect the town of The Dalles, in Oregon
with a strain of salmonella in the 1980s (Miller, Engelberg, & Broad,
2001). When one considers these disturbing facts, one might conclude that
perhaps the government, its analysts and experts have forgotten that bacteria's
primary mission is to grow, and in anthrax's case encapsulate itself indefinitely
when the environment proves too hostile to proliferate. Another unique
quality, perhaps forgotten by the government, is bacteria's ability to
mutate, and in many cases this mutation can be easily manipulated by using
animals as incubators. Progress on the phenomena associated with mutations
and bacteria was well developed by 1968, allowing for an increase in virulence,
longevity, resistance, and a variety of other adaptations (Hersh, 1968).
-
- By the early 1980s, mutation and DNA recombinant techniques
had reached a point where at least one (Harris, 1982) author felt that
"ethnic germs" or ethnically selective bacteria might be a possibility.
Additionally, genetically engineered viruses affecting the way an immune
system responds to infection were thought to also be under research. The
author also asserts that such a germ may already have been developed by
1982 (Harris, 1982). Joshua Lederberg, a Nobel Laureate, Professor, and
pioneer in the fields of genetic exchanges in bacteria, and microbial genetics
also acknowledges the theoretical likelihood that "ethnic germs"
are on the horizon (Miller, et all, 2001).Alibek (1999) details the fact
that an accidental release of anthrax into a city sewer system in the Soviet
Union exposed rats to anthrax, killing them. However, before they died
some of the rats unwittingly participated in an incubation process that
increased the virulence of the original strain. Soviet scientists proceeded
to weaponize the new deadlier strain, calling it anthrax 836.
-
- 6. The Federal Government admitted in a study conducted
in the 1960s, that biological warfare scientists concluded that an, "Attack
with disease was possible, indeed terrifyingly simple". They further
concluded that the United States was, "Highly Vulnerable," to
a germ warfare attack (Harris, 1982).
-
- Nearly forty years later, little has changed. The government
is still unprepared to meet the challenges associated with a biological
attack. In 1960 "the head of the Army Chemical Corp warned congress
that a potential enemy could perhaps kill or perhaps seriously disable
30 percent of the American population by mounting a biological warfare
attack with ten aircraft" (Hersh, 1968, Pp. 68).
-
- The author Richard McCarthy also emphasized the fact
that the American government had "no defense" against biological
warfare in 1969 (McCarthy, 1967).In a Center For Civilian Biodefense Strategies
(CCBS) report, the center revealed, "there are currently no atmospheric
warning systems to detect an aerosol cloud of anthrax spores. The first
sign of a bioterrorist attack would most likely be patients presenting
with symptoms of inhalation anthrax" (CCBS, 2000). According to the
same CCBS report, those presenting with symptoms of inhalation anthrax
are most likely to die, reinforcing the fact that those who have developed
symptoms will in ninety percent of cases expire. Additionally, the report
then acknowledges a little known fact, "U.S. vaccine supplies are
limited and U.S. production capacity is modest. There is no vaccine available
for civilian use" (CCBS, 2000).
-
- 7. In fact, the United States Government should be exceedingly
familiar with many scenarios involving biological agents, and possible
consequences, perhaps more so than any other nation in the world. The U.S.
government has sanctioned the exposure of its own population to various,
allegedly benign, bacterial agents including serratia marcens, and bacillus
subtilus. In the end these agents weren't entirely benign, and caused the
deaths of American citizens submitted involuntarily to experiments conducted
without their consent or knowledge (Cole, 1988).
-
- As recently as 1996 the integrity and honesty of the
United States government was called into question concerning American soldiers
that had developed symptoms during the Gulf War that could not be explained.
Patrick Eddington, a one-time CIA analyst, allegedly was fired by the agency
for claiming it was covering up the fact that the Iraqis had actually used
chemical weapons on U.S. soldiers during the war.
-
- David Martin, a CBS reporter, interviewed Eddington asking
him, "Would you call it a cover up?" Eddington responds by saying,
"yes, I would describe that as a cover up." Eddington then concludes
the interview by stating, "the culture of the CIA is one that does
not really welcome those who rock the boat, who question prevailing assessments,
who question prevailing views" (CBS Evening News, 1996, October 30).
Two days later, the CIA came out with its official response to Eddington's
accusations, stating in effect that the agency "continued to conclude
that Iraq did not use chemical or biological agents during the Gulf War"
(Slatkin, 1996, November 1).
-
- 8. The U.S. Army did subject the New York City population
to an experiment in the 1960s concerned with measuring "saturation
rates," or the amount of bacteria one would inhale at certain times,
and in specific locations after the initial release. Light bulbs containing
eighty-seven trillion bacilli each were dropped onto ventilation grates
above the New York City subway system. It was deduced that within minutes
exposed individuals were inhaling a million bacilli per minute, and were
entirely unaware of it. Additionally, the subway trains created a vacuum
of sorts that conveniently spread the bacilli throughout the system with
little effort (Cole, 1988).
-
- The implications of the New York subway system experiments
are truly horrific. People breathing in a million bacilli per minute were
not aware of it in any way. If government reports are accurate concerning
the lethal dose of anthrax being in the neighborhood of eight thousand
spores in total, which incidentally is in dispute in some scientific circles,
then one might conclude that anthrax represents a serious threat today.
-
- Bacillus subtilus is similar to anthrax in that it is
a sporalating gram-positive rod bacterium, and aerosolizes, as would anthrax.
If a light bulb can contain eighty-seven trillion bacilli, if filled with
anthrax it would represent enough to kill the entire human population on
terra firma more than twice over, with approximately 10,875,000,000 individual
lethal doses, with eight thousand spores representing a lethal dose. This
fact becomes especially frightening when one considers the Soviet Union
always maintained a stockpile of hundreds of tons of anthrax at all times.
In fact, according to Ken Alibek (1999) anthrax production at one facility
alone could be as much as 500-600 kilograms daily.
-
- 9. One of the more frightening scenarios encountered
in the research of this thesis was whether or not anthrax could be passed
through currency. Certainly everyone is now familiar with the fact that
it traveled rather nicely inside envelopes. On the issue of whether or
not anthrax can be carried on currency, there is a great deal of contention
among different sources. Ted Koppel admitted on Nightline, "the possibility
is scaring me to death. Please tell me it's not possible." In response
to Koppel's concerns the Department of Health and Human Services replied,
"highly unlikely," "highly improbable," "almost
impossible." The Treasury Department, in their apparent expertise,
stated that, "there is no way to embed anthrax in the currency"
(Nightline, 2001, October 17).
-
- Oddly enough a study conducted in 1972 and reported in
a Discover magazine article determined that staphylococci, micrococci,
diptheroids, and propriobacteria, were present and viable on randomly tested
bills of various denominations (Discover, 1998). A second study conducted
in 1997 found that 3% of coins, and 11% of all bills tested were positive
for bacteria. In 1998, another study conducted by the University of California
at San Francisco found in 113 examples of currency samples that most of
the bills grew "harmless bacteria" but 18% of coins, and 7% of
bills manifested pathogenic bacteria, including E-Coli, and Staphylococcus
Aureus (Discover, 1998).
-
- Shirley Lowe, a microbiologist credited with conducting
the study on behalf of the University stated that "half the money,"
she obtained from a doughnut shop grew Staphylococcus Aureus (Discover,
1998). I think the gist of this article, Filthy Lucre, is that money, especially
currency with its 75% cotton, 25% linen composition is a more than suitable
vector for bacteria.Also mentioned in the same article was the fact that
bacteria can't live on the dry acidic surface of money forever, as it requires
a moist warm environment to grow. This is very true with most bacteria,
but untrue in respect to anthrax spores, as the spores themselves are nearly
impervious to the environment, and when introduced into a receptive environment,
will then proliferate.
-
- Possibly the most significant aspect of this entire article
devoted to money is not the revelation that bacteria can survive on currency,
but that cocaine hydrochloride was known to cross-contaminate currency
at the counting-sorting machines used in banks and at the Federal Reserve
as early as 1997.
-
- The article Filthy Lucre proceeds to mention that a study
conducted at the Houston Advanced Research Center in Texas found that 70-80%
of all currency had trace amounts of cocaine hydrochloride on them. In
older bills that had been in circulation for some time, 90% had cocaine
traces (p.82). The Journal of Forensic Sciences conducted a study in May
1998 that concluded that more than 93% of all bills tested had trace amounts
of cocaine hydrochloride present.
-
- In 1997 Tom Jourdan, chief of the Materials and Devices
unit at the FBI lab in Washington D.C. found that 90% of bills tested were
positive for cocaine.
-
- Tom Jourdan stated that it is his belief that "mechanical
currency counters are homogenizing money." According to Jourdan, "one
contaminated bill brushed through the counting machine at the bank can
contaminate the entire stack"(p.84). The last paragraph in the article
Filthy Lucre states exactly, "So money isn't exactly squeaky clean.
But it isn't exactly going to do us in either. If there's a lesson here,
it is that money reflects whatever activity, and mischief, that human hands
get up to-and the activity and occasional mischief of all the microscopic
organisms along for the ride on our skin" (pg 84). This last statement
could prove to be more prophetic than the author ever intended, with the
exception of the "isn't exactly going to do us in" part, which
may prove one day to be overly optimistic. It would certainly seem feasible
that if cocaine hydrochloride could "homogenize" money, then
anthrax ought to be able to as well. Perhaps the greater concern here is
not the possibility that anthrax can cross-contaminate money, but that
the FBI was apparently unable to deduce the commonalities between currency,
and envelopes.
|
