- I cannot express in words how awful a recent Washington
Post story about the "lost nuclear weapons" is. This pack of
lies can make one's blood boil, and was obviously written by:
-
- A. Authors Warrick and Pincus don't have a remote clue
about the actual handling of nuclear weapons
-
- OR
-
- B. The Washington Post article is one big dis-information
piece and rates as perhaps the worst piece of propaganda I've
ever read in years. I'd like to think for now that Warrick and Pincus aren't
part of such a blatant attempt at damage control. In fact, the innumerable
inaccuracies are a total insult to any reader with even half a brain still
working.
-
- If it wasn't for my respect for the copyright notice
of the Washington Post (hard as it may be) it would be prudent reproduce
their article in its entirety. If you haven't read this abominable "piece
of work yet (and you are not planning to eat today) check it out at the
link below.
-
- Be sure to come back and keep reading.
-
- http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article
/2007/09/22/AR2007092201447_pf.html
-
- However, I will reproduce some short excerpts under the
fair use law from the Warrick and Pincus article for clarity. Keep in mind
that there is a STRICT chain of custody for ALL nuclear weapons. Nuclear
weapons handling is spelled out in great detail in Air Force regulations,
to the credit of the USAF. Every person who order the moving of these weapons,
handles them, breaks seals or moves any nuclear these weapon must sign
off for tracking purposes. US Airforce security personnel see to that.
We are not talking about paintball cartridges or BB gun ammo here. These
are NUCLEAR WEAPONS.
-
- Let's begin with the Warrick and Pincus introductory
paragraph:
-
- "Just after 9 a.m. on Aug. 29, a group of U.S. airmen
entered a sod-covered bunker on North Dakota's Minot Air Force Base with
orders to collect a set of unarmed cruise missiles bound for a weapons
graveyard. They quickly pulled out a dozen cylinders, all of which appeared
identical from a cursory glance, and hauled them along Bomber Boulevard
to a waiting B-52 bomber." [2]
-
- Let's examine this statement: "Weapons graveyard.
More nonsense. Obsolete nuclear weapons are recycled, they are not buried
somewhere in a field like road kill. The extremely expensive Plutonium
"pit" which is about the size of a softball (see below) IS the
actual nuclear bomb which is recovered. The pit is surrounded by high
explosive segments. Because of the extreme steady-state heat of the pit,
explosive will dry out and become inert. Other parts of the weapon are
salvaged, and what little is left over is shredded into small pieces and
sold as scrap. It's also noteworthy that nuclear weapons are HIGH maintenance
items.
-
-
- Worth millions of dollars, and more precious than
gold
- A plutonium pit - the actual nuclear bomb element [4]
-
- Plutonium pits have a hot steady-state temperature of
about 400F. Pits from destroyed weapons are then stored in bunkers.
It literally takes dozens of railroad cars of extracted uranium to make
ONE Plutonium pit. Each is worth several million dollars. Again,
all this no big secret it was on the Discovery Channel a few years ago
on a documentary showing how weapons are decommissioned.
-
- The Washington Post article goes on to say, "They
quickly pulled out a dozen cylinders, all of which appeared identical from
a cursory glance"
-
- How do the authors know this? They certainly didn't get
any information from those involved. "Identical from a cursory glance"?
ALL weapons have serial numbers on them for identification and tracking.
Airmen never can just "quickly" pull out a dozen cylinders. You
don't move something "quickly" that weighs in around a ton.
Especially since it contains HIGH EXPLOSIVE trigger and nuclear material.
-
-
-
- Cruise missile being mounted under a bomber (Courtesy
USAF website [5] ). Can you imagine anyone "quickly moving"
something THIS big?
-
- The US government told CNN on or before Sept. 6 2007
that SIX nuclear warheads mounted on cruise missiles were missing, NOT
TWELVE. [1]
-
- "The airmen attached the gray missiles to the plane's
wings, six on each side. After eyeballing the missiles on the right side,
a flight officer signed a manifest that listed a dozen unarmed AGM-129
missiles. The officer did not notice that the six on the left contained
nuclear warheads, each with the destructive power of up to 10 Hiroshima
bombs."
-
- NUCLEAR weapons were mounted under wings for TRANSPORT?
And the officer responsible for these weapons "did not notice the
six on the left contained nuclear warheads." WHICH left side? If the
pilot is in the cockpit, to his left is port and to his right is starboard.
If someone is standing out on the tarmac facing the plane, left and right
are reversed. Still the problem remains, there were NOT 12 WEAPONS. The
authors may have been told by someone that the B-52 can support up to 12
weapons, so they went with that number. Let's not let facts get in the
way of what really happened.
-
- And it just keeps getting worse. The article goes on
to say that it would be 36 hours before anyone noticed. UTTER NONSENSE.
In the cockpit, weapon lights would be lit indicating the presence of the
SIX weapons under the wings. AND the plane would handle quite differently,
as the presence of the weapons will change the aerodynamic characteristics
of the plane. I was told this by a retired USAF pilot.
-
- The article also rambles on stating the Louisiana airbase
"has no idea nuclear warheads were coming." More lies -- a FLIGHT
PLAN had to be filed FIRST. Nuclear devices always warrant special handling.
To state the destination airbase had no idea nuclear warheads were coming
is a bald faced lie. As I've stated in my previous essay, there are safety
officers, ordinance officers and everyone involved SIGNED OFF on the weapons.
Who could possibly believe the pilot didn't know about the weapons?
-
- There are LEAD SEALS on the containers the weapons are
stored in. Cruise missiles are not just "sitting on blocks in storage" like
a red-neck junk car without wheels in someone's backyard. They are kept
in SEALED CONTAINERS with a crimped and numbered lead seal.
-
- THE FINAL NAIL IN THE STORY'S COFFIN
-
- PROPER RECOGNITION OF A REAL PATRIOT - LT.COL. GUY RAZER
(Ret.) FOR HIS HELP
-
- The following UNCLASSIFIED document was recently received
from Guy S. Razer, LtCol, USAF (Ret.) which provides detailed information
on how nuclear weapons are to be handled. He wrote me shortly after my
first essay about this non-accident to inform me my statements were accurate,
and he also provided supporting documentation for USAF security procedures
for handling nuclear weapons. I have included below just a few verbatim
extracts from the 8 page document which was updated 4 Sept. 2007.
-
- NOTES TO HELP THE READER:
-
- The document extracts below date back to 1991 and are
probably based on even earlier versions.
-
- NO-LONE ZONES-- No serviceman is allowed into the restricted
areas alone.
-
- TAMPER CONTROL PROGRAM -- Details how lead seals are
to be made and documented. Seals detect covert theft of radioactive material
(nuclear warheads) from weapons.
-
- Sec. 1.3 Defines the requirements of any personnel who
are permitted to handle nuclear weapons. It further states they must be
certified to do so.
-
- Sec. 3.3 Details the use of a video camera recording
system to document seals.
-
- ****
-
- START OF SELECTED EXTRACTS
-
- "Nuclear Surety Tamper Control and Detection Programs
Supplement" USAF document.
-
- This Interim Change (IC) 2006-2 provides new/additional
guidance regarding the definition and intent of the Air Force Tamper Detection
Program, further clarifies the intent for MAJCOMs to develop and distribute
sealing procedures and updates general information. A bar ( | ) indicates
a revision from the previous edition.
-
- 1. Requirements and Procedures.
-
- 1.1. Tamper Control Program. The Two-Person Concept is
central to nuclear surety tamper control measures in the Air Force. It
is designed to make sure that a lone individual cannot perform an incorrect
act or unauthorized procedure on a nuclear weapon, nuclear weapon system,
or certified critical component.
-
- 1.2. Concept Enforcement. Each organization with a mission
or function involving nuclear weapons, nuclear weapon systems, or certified
critical components:
-
- 1.2.1. Identifies no-lone zones (where at least two authorized
persons must be present during any operation or task).
-
- 1.2.1. (AFSPC) Apply Two-Person Concept procedures during
training with non-war reserve assets to the extent necessary to maintain
proficiency.
-
- 1.2.2. Enforces the Two-Person Concept
-
- 1.2.2. (AFSPC) Before entering a no-lone zone, brief
personnel that the Two-Person Concept applies. Supervisors must ensure
that individuals are aware of the location of all no-lone zone boundaries,
location of certified critical components within the no-lone zone, emergency
procedures, and methods for reporting violations and hazards. Do not use
signs or devices externally that identify a building as a no-lone zone.
-
- 1.2.3. Develops procedures to limit entry to authorized
persons who meet the requirements of paragraph 1.3.
-
- 1.2.3. (AFSPC) After entry into a no-lone zone, the supervisor/team
chief of each authorized team controls individual team members within the
no-lone zone.
-
- 1.2.4. (Added-AFSPC) After initial entry of an authorized
Two-Person Concept team into a no-lone zone, a single, authorized individual
may enter providing:
-
- 1.2.4.1. (Added-AFSPC) The Sole Vouching Authority (SVA)
identifies individuals wishing to gain entry to a no-lone zone, verifies
authorization, and validates need for entry into the no-lone zone. Note:
SVA is the representative identified as having responsibility for deciding
who will enter the no-lone zone. Normally, this is the senior member of
the first team entering the area. SVA may transfer between individuals
provided the two individuals jointly identify
-
- 1.2.5. (Added-AFSPC) An area designated as a no-lone
zone may be defined as the interior of a cabinet, a work bay or equipment
bay; an entire structure or building, a junction box, a drawer, an area
encompassed by an actual boundary established by painted markings, rope,
or a fence; and in some instances, the interior of vehicles. Local commanders
are authorized to enlarge a no-lone zone. This authority should be used
sparingly and only when absolutely required. When used for unattended storage
of nuclear weapons or certified critical components the no-lone zone must
meet the requirements of AFI 31-101, The Air Force Installation Security
Program, and AFI
-
- 1.2.5.7. (Added-AFSPC) Any room, computer facility, vault,
or similar area where certified critical components are repaired (operationally
certified or decertified), manufactured, stored, or processed, is a no-lone
zone. For an area in which maintenance is infrequently performed on certified
critical components, establish a temporary no-lone zone with signs placed
around the work area while components are present.
-
- 1.3. Team Requirements. (Refer to paragraph 1.1.6.1
for criteria on foreign nationals.) A Two-Person Concept team consists
of at least two individuals who:
-
- 1.3.1. Are certified under the Personnel Reliability
Program (PRP), as specified in AFI 36-2104, Nuclear Weapons Personnel Reliability
Program(formerly AFR 35-99 and AFR 40-925).
-
- 1.3.1. (AFSPC) Inspectors or evaluators who meet the
requirements of paragraph 1.3. may form a Two-Person Concept team in the
performance of their duties.
-
- 1.3.2. Know the nuclear surety requirements of the task
they perform.
-
- 1.3.3. Can promptly detect an incorrect act or unauthorized
procedure.
-
- 1.3.4. Have successfully completed nuclear surety training
according to AFI 91-101.
-
- 1.3.5. Are designated to perform the required task.
-
- 1.4. (AFSPC) Violations to Report. Report violations
of the Two-Person Concept, including emergency response, through the command
post to the commander. The commander will ensure violations are investigated
promptly. A Two-Person Concept team must ascertain if unauthorized acts
were performed, inspect involved certified critical components, verify
their status, and reestablish the integrity of the system. Accomplish applicable
visual and functional checks for components that have such procedures established.
-
- 1.6.4. PRP Interim-Certified Personnel Restrictions.
Two interim-certified individuals may not form a Two-Person Concept team.
Also, do not allow an interim-certified member to pilot a single-seat aircraft
loaded with nuclear weapons.
-
-
- TAMPER DETECTION PROGRAM
-
- 2. Tamper Detection Program. Seals help to verify that
no one has tampered with or accidentally activated a certified critical
component.
-
- 2.1. Sealing Requirements. Certain items must be sealed
because either:
-
- 2.1.1. Air Force nuclear weapon system safety rules require
it, or,
-
- 2.1.2. In the case of some certified critical components,
seals protect their certification status while in storage or during transportation,
as specified in AFI 91-105, Critical Components (formerly AFR 122-17).
-
- 2.2. Sealing Methods. Authorized sealing methods include:
-
- 2.2.1. Safety Wiring and Lead Seals. In this method,
you place a lead seal on a safety wire connected to certain switches, covers,
handles, or levers and impress the lead seal with a distinctive mark using
a crimping device and controlled die. An unauthorized act breaks or alters
the wire connection so that you can detect activation. Use this method
only in no-lone zones.
-
- 2.2.2. Tamper Detection Indicators (TDI). In this method
you place an approved TDI so that it will indicate when someone has activated
or had access to the interior of a certified critical component. Once the
TDI is installed, evidence of tampering is visible to the naked eye or
can be detected through the use of special equipment.
-
- 3.3.1. (AFSPC) Where AFSPC directives do not cover a
particular local situation, wings will develop local standard publications
or checklists to ensure adequate control of certified critical components
or nuclear weapons and application of the Tamper Control and Detection
Programs.
-
- 3.3.2. Develop and distribute procedures for sealing,
where appropriate. As a minimum, these procedural directives:
-
- 3.3.2.1. State when and by whom seals can be applied
and removed.
-
- 3.3.2.1. (AFSPC) Units will designate personnel authorized
to apply and remove tamper
-
- detection indicators (TDI). TDIs will be applied and
removed by a Two-Person Concept team when required by technical orders
or directives.
-
- 3.3.2.2. Establish controls for the handling, receipt,
storage, issue, inventory, and disposal of TDIs (including all residue),
controlled dies and self-locking, non-reversible seals. (example: roto-seals)
-
- 3.3.2.2. (AFSPC) Develop local controls for handling,
receipt, storage, issue, inventory, and disposal of TDIs not covered in
technical orders, directives or this supplement.
-
- 3.3.2.2.1. (Added-AFSPC) The Aquila Cobra Seal TDI-1
(ACSTDI-1) is used to maintain certification of the Missile Guidance Set
(MGS) during shipment. Task-qualified personnel must install, remove, and
verify the ACSTDI-1.
-
- 3.3.2.2.2. (Added-AFSPC) The ACSTD-1 system kit requires
special handling. The kit
-
- which includes special tools, camera, printer, video
disks, ACSTDI-1 bodies, and fiber
-
- optic cables does not require special handling. Maintain
the video disk used during the
-
- ACSTDI-1 installation process under proper Two-Person
Concept control until all information recorded on the disk has been properly
verified by the unit receiving the MGS. Maintain the master pictures taken
during the installation process under Two-Person Concept
-
- control until TDIs on MGS shipping containers are verified
by the receiving unit.
-
- 3.3.2.2.3. (Added-AFSPC) Prior to shipping a certified
MGS to another unit, ensure the
-
- receiving unit has a copy of the master pictures taken
during the seal installation process.
-
- Transmit the master pictures by facsimile machine or
overnight mail. Immediately upon
-
- receipt of the master pictures the receiving unit will
contact the sending unit via telephone to confirm that the pictures have
been received and are under Two-Person Concept control. The sending unit
will verify the caller,s identity by immediate call back. Accomplish this
verification procedure prior to shipping the MGS.
-
- 3.3.2.2.4. (Added-AFSPC) The sending unit must inspect
installed ACSTDI-1s immediately prior to loading the MGS shipping container
for shipment. The same inspection is performed upon receipt of the MGS.
-
- 3.3.2.2.5. (Added-AFSPC) Dispose of the ACSTDI-1 by destroying
the body and discarding it along with the cables.
-
- ****
- END OF EXTRACT
-
-
- I challenge anyone who, after reading this documentation,
can state that the missing nuclear weapons were accidentally mounted under
the wings of a B-52.
-
- Without question the order to mount these weapons
UNDER the wings of a B-52 came down FROM THE VERY TOP of the military.
And he lives in a white house.
-
- Ted Twietmeyer
- www.data4science.net
-
-
- NOTE: Since I have been writing about this story my website provider
has suffered from cyber attacks and may termporarily be off-line.
The matter is being resolved at this time. There is an old expression
that "you get the most flack when you're right over the target."
-
- [1] -- CNN quotes government sources that 6 were missing:
- http://www.cnn.com/2007/US/09/05/loose.nukes/
-
- [2] - http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article
/2007/09/22/AR2007092201447_pf.html
-
- [3] - AIR FORCE INSTRUCTION 91-104
-
- [4] - http://www.newsfrombabylon.com/files/
images/galleries/plutonium_pit.preview.jpg
-
- [5] - http://www.acc.af.mil/shared/media/photodb/
photos/030320-F-4539R-004.jpg
|
