- This essay proposes to consider the long-range effects
of a gradually implemented educational reform within the American military
culture - a form of re-education that was slowly introduced by the psychological
and social scientists after World War II. In a more mitigated form than
the German military's Umerziehung (i.e., re-education) after World War
II, the American military culture seems to have undergone its own transformation
and "instrumentalization" in order to become a more useful, non-authoritarian
professional cadre in the service of a modern, often messianic, and increasingly
imperial democracy.
-
- It would seem that the traditional, more or less Christian,
American military culture had to be re-paganized and neo-Machiavellianized
and made more philo-Judaic - or at least less patently (or latently) anti-Semitic.
-
- The Freudian-Marxist "Frankfurt School" doctrines
could further build upon the educational reforms which had already been
implemented by John Dewey's own theories of pragmatism and instrumentalism.
These combined innovations in military, as well as civilian, education
would seem to have weakened the intellectual and moral character of the
American military officer, and concurrently inclined him to become more
technocratic as well as more passive and neutral as an instrument in the
service of his civilian masters in a "modern democracy" or a
new "messianic imperium" with a "globalist, neo-liberal
ideology." Indeed, some of these innovations were introduced when
I was first being formed as a future military officer.
-
- It was in the autumn of 1960, after Plebe Summer and
the test of "Beast Barracks," that I first heard about the revisions
that the West Point academic curriculum had recently undergone, and which
would be experimentally applied to our incoming class of some eight hundred
men. Colonel Lincoln's Social Science Department, as it was presented to
us, was to be much more influential and more deeply formative than before
upon the education of officers. There were to be several more classes now
in military psychology, sociology, and leadership, and fewer in strategic
military history and concrete military biography. The long-standing and
ongoing process of replacing the Humanities with the academic and applied
social sciences would, we were told, continue and increase.
-
- At the time - especially at 17 years of age - I had little
idea of the implications of these curricular revisions, nor of their underlying
soft "logic of scientific discovery," much less an awareness
of the growing "soft tyranny" of the Social Sciences and their
subtly relativizing "sociology of knowledge" (as in the work
of German sociologist, Karl Mannheim). But I do remember reading two mandatory
books: Samuel Huntington's The Soldier and the State and Morris Janowitz's
The Professional Soldier. Both of these books, we were told, were to help
form the proper kind of officer that was needed in "modern democratic
society."
-
- Janowitz had an intellectual background rooted in neo-Marxist
"critical theory" as it was first propagated by Max Horkheimer
and Theodor Adorno at the Institute for Social Research of the University
of Frankfurt in Germany. (This school of thought became more commonly known
as "the Frankfurt School.") This internationally networked school
of Marxist-Freudian thought - indeed a well-armed ideology - was likewise
active in conducting various "studies in prejudice" and quite
intensely concerned about the dangers of the "authoritarian personality,"
especially because this character type supposedly tended to "fascism"
and "anti-Semitism." The Frankfurt School "critical theory"
claimed to detect and to unmask "anti-democratic tendencies,"
perhaps most notably in traditional military institutions and their more
autocratic cultures - especially because of the recent history of Germany
- but also in traditional, well-rooted, religious institutions of the West,
i.e., Christian institutions in general and the culture of the Catholic
Church most specifically.
-
- The Frankfurt School theorists and activists claimed
to want to produce the "democratic personality" - although they
had originally (and more revealingly) called it the "revolutionary
personality." This purportedly "democratic personality"
was to be a fitting replacement for the inordinately prejudiced and latently
dangerous "authoritarian personality," which allegedly conduced
to the disorder and illness of anti-Semitism.
-
- The combination of Karl Marx's earlier writings and critical
theories and Sigmund Freud's psychiatric theories would be a special mark
of this "neo-Marxist critical theory," not only in the writings
of Wilhelm Reich and Herbert Marcuse, but also in the "anti-authoritarian"
psychology of Erich Fromm.
-
- Morris Janowitz was at the time (1960) a sociologist
at the University of Chicago, and he seemed to want to form a "new
kind of military professionalism" and a new kind of military officer.
That is to say, a military officer who would be a "suitable"
instrument to serve those who are truly "governing a modern democracy."
-
- These last few words in quotation marks were taken from
a recent essay by the candid Irving Kristol (the neoconservative patriarch
and patronus and former Trotskyite) who has for some years been writing
about, and promoting, "the emerging American imperium," first
in the Wall Street Journal in the mid-1990s.
-
- In the 25 August, 2003, issue of the Weekly Standard,
Kristol wrote a forthright article entitled, "The Neoconservative
Persuasion." In this essay he uses words that could also be retroactively
applied to the larger, long-range re-education and cultural project of
the Frankfurt School, of Morris Janowitz, and of his kind of "neo-military
sociologist." Kristol speaks in somewhat elevated but bluntly candid
language as follows:
-
- The historical task and political purpose of neoconservatism
[and also of the "new" military sociology and psychology?] would
seem to be this: to convert the Republican party, and American conservatism
[and also the American military culture?] in general, against their respective
wills, into a new kind of conservative politics [and hence a neo-imperial
American military and its Global Expeditionary Force?] suitable to governing
a modern democracy.[1]
-
- In the article Kristol further argues that, "like
the Soviet Union of yesteryear," the "United States of today"
has "an identity that is ideological" (though he does not specify
the content of this purported ideological identity). Therefore, in addition
to "more material concerns" and "complicated geopolitical
calculations of national interest," the United States, says Kristol,
"inevitably" has "ideological interests" and "that
is why we [sic] feel it necessary to defend Israel today, when its survival
[sic] is threatened." (Israel Shamir, for slightly different reasons,
also thinks that Israel is now threatened, at least as a "Jewish supremacist
state" or as an "exclusionary, apartheid state.")
-
- However, is it conceivable that after our anti-authoritarian
re-education in America's purportedly tolerant, new "democratic military
culture," any active-duty military officers would now be permitted
- much less long tolerated - to make any critique or have any moral reservation
about this pre-eminent "ideological mission" for America, either
for the protection of Israel or for the further expansion of, in Kristol's
own words, "the emerging American imperium"? It would seem not.
The culture of tolerance would seem to be a fiction, especially when truth
is taboo. Furthermore, a sign of real power is who effectively controls
(or is intimidating about) what is permitted to be discussed and critiqued
in open public discourse, and what must not be spoken.
-
- Indeed, to what extent could any general officer or flag
officer today even make a strategic argument - much less a principled,
moral argument - that such "ideological interests" and permanent
missions for America actually undermine true U.S. national interests and
the common good? If any younger military officers were openly, or even
privately, to make such critical arguments, or were known even to have
such principled views, would they not likely be "weeded out"
before they could even become general or flag officers? Nonetheless, the
American military officer, in his Commissioning Oath, still accepts a high
moral obligation when he solemnly swears to defend the (clear and plain,
i.e. un-"deconstructed") Constitution of the United States "against
all enemies, foreign and domestic."
-
- Therefore, from the vantage point of "the emerging
American imperium" in 2004, and in light of our seemingly intimidated
military culture, one may now better consider the strategic, longer-range
cultural project of "anti-authoritarian re-education," which
was gradually implemented by way of a reformed "military sociology
and psychology." This cultural project was, in fact, slowly implemented,
even back in 1960 during the so-called "cold war," and was intended,
it would seem, to be part of the quiet and unobtrusive "re-education"
(Umerziehung) of the "updated" and "progressive" military
officer, so as to make him more "suitable" and docile for helping
his civilian superiors in governing a modern democracy - which is also
now seen to be an emerging American imperium more and more "governed"
by inaccessible and seemingly intractable oligarchies or new elites. In
Antonio Gramsci's terms, a new "cultural hegemony" has been attained,
replacing an older, traditional military and political culture with a new
ethos and orientation. While the United States was fighting the "cold
war" against the more conspicuous revolutionary socialism of the Soviet
Union and Red China, the culture was being quietly, indirectly, and "dialectically"
captured! After seeing these fruits from the vantage point of 2004, we
may soberly ask: To what extent were we cadets being prepared, even back
in 1960, to be compliant officers in a "modern imperial democracy,"
or even a new kind of Praetorian Guard for our new elites and their Proconsuls?
-
- Indeed, it was Samuel Huntington's The Soldier and the
State which was the second mandatory book for us to read as cadets in 1960
as part of our new curriculum, in addition to the writings of Morris Janowitz.
Huntington's book also promoted the ethos of an unquestioningly obedient,
properly subordinated, and docile military officer as a compliant instrument
in the service of a modern State and "democratic society." Huntington's
concept of "civil-military relations" clearly implied that there
was not to be a keen intellectual or strategic culture in the U.S. military,
and certainly nothing resembling the German General Staff concept of well-educated,
strategic-minded, far-sighted, and thinking officers who were to be not
only indispensable senior staff officers but also field commanders with
high qualities of moral and intellectual leadership. (Even the post-World
War II German military culture was permitted to retain the German General
Staff concept in its educational system for future officers, but the American
military culture was, ironically, not permitted to imitate - or even to
know much about - this brilliant achievement. I never learned about it
during my studies at West Point except when I was abroad among the German
military as an exchange-cadet in the summer of 1962.)
-
- Two other men made indispensable contributions to my
deeper understanding of strategic psychological warfare and modern cultural
warfare, as well as the historical instances of Kulturkampf and the re-education
of an enemy: Colonel (later Lieutenant General) Sam V. Wilson and Theodore
Ropp.
-
- During the early 1970s, when I studied military history
under the Austrian-American professor Theodore Ropp at Duke University,
I realized that this great teacher, scholar, and author of War in the Modern
World, understood not only "battlefield" military history but
also the relation of war and society and the subtle influence of war upon
larger civilizations and cultures. And he understood these matters in a
very profound way. Professor Ropp, who taught many West Point officers
in graduate school, cultivated and disciplined the eager minds of his students
to take the longer view of various profoundly differentiated military cultures.
He especially illuminated these different traditions by way of counter-pointed
contrasts and a finely nuanced comparative cultural history of long-standing
military institutions, to include their specific martial effects upon civilization
as a whole.
-
- Under the instruction of Professor Ropp, I realized for
the first time that something serious, important, and substantial was missing
from my formative military education at West Point. Although I had been
on the exchange trip with the German military and their cadets, I was then
still too young and callow to have a deeper appreciation of the formation
of the new German military culture after World War II, in contrast to its
earlier history - and not just its Prussian military history. But Professor
Ropp helped me and so many other students to understand and savor these
deeper matters, for which I am so grateful.
-
- Another important influence in my deeper education was
Colonel Sam V. Wilson, who in 1969 and 1970 was my mentor. He was also
during that time (and during the Vietnam War years in general) the director
of studies at the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center at Fort Bragg,
North Carolina. Sam Wilson was a deep-thinking military officer, especially
in the field of irregular warfare and strategic special operations. He,
too, made me realize, though in an incipient way, the deeper strategic,
moral, and cultural factors in the waging of modern war. West Point, I
then realized, had prepared us very little to take this longer, truly strategic,
view of military culture, history, and war, even though the Academy had
been in fact founded to form and cultivate the discerning mind and moral
character of a future strategos (the Greek for "general officer"),
like the historian Thucydides.
-
- Irving Kristol and Professor Sidney Hook were both involved
in "the cultural cold war" as part of the CIA-supported Congress
for Cultural Freedom, in which they tried to influence and capture the
culture of the so-called "non-Communist left," and to increase
its active resistance to the increasingly "anti-Semitic" Stalinist
form of Soviet Communism. In like manner, there seems also to have been
a quieter "cultural project," by way of the social sciences,
to "update" and "transform" the traditionally authoritarian
and rigid American military culture into a more "dynamic" and
more "democratic form of society." For, as the argument went,
a more authoritarian and explicitly Christian military culture also had
the danger of being at least latently anti-Semitic.
-
- Professor Joseph Bendersky's recent book supports this
suggestion and intuition. Published in 2000, his book - which contains
ironic or sarcastic quotation marks even in his title - is called: The
"Jewish Threat": Anti-Semitic Politics in the U.S. Army.[2]
-
- Bendersky shows how the "Officers' Worldview, 1900-1939,"
as well as their dangerously "elitist" views, had to be corrected
and transformed, especially in light of "Officers and the Holocaust,
1940-1945" and in light of the "Birth of Israel, 1945-1949"
(the quoted periods being also the titles of three of his chapters).
-
- When one finishes reading Bendersky's lengthy and learned
(but not entirely intelligent) ideological book, one realizes that a very
intelligent psycho-cultural project had been designed and conducted, especially
after World War II, to remove and to chasten the "dangerous"
propensities of the "elitist" American military culture - especially
its sometimes "racist" (and "eugenicist") and un-democratic
propensities toward "anti-Semitism." (Bendersky never sharply
defines, though, what he means by anti-Semitism, although he implies that
it constitutes a kind of summum malum - i.e., the greatest of evils.)
-
- In the context of strategic, cultural warfare, Antonio
Gramsci, along with Géorg Lukacs, Walter Benjamin, Ernst Bloch,
and the whole Frankfurt School apparatus, understood the "cultural
channels" of religious and strategic subversion, especially of traditional
Western civilization and its once deeply rooted Christian religious culture.
In like manner, there seems to have been some well-prepared "cultural
warfare" within the United States subtly conducted against the post-World
War II military culture and its Christian moral traditions (which included
formation in the life of the four cardinal virtues, as distinct from the
dialectic of mere "values" and its mostly emotive and subjective
"critical thinking.")
-
- Moreover, I am led to make these observations merely
as a "fruit inspector." For I have seen the fruits of these cultural
and curricular revisions, and I have also seen what was once present and
is no longer. I also see the extent to which the truth is taboo concerning
these matters. Like other matters of historical inquiry, the matter of
the transformation of the American military culture also seems to be "off
limits." Investigators are not welcome.
-
- Nonetheless, I have observed the fruits and shall continue
to examine the cumulative combination of the deeper causes and agents of
this transformation of our military education and culture into something
which is more vulnerable to manipulation; and whose moral and intellectual
resistance to injustice and other disorders is increasingly "dimmed
down."
-
- I have also witnessed - by personal, direct involvement
- how little intellectual and moral resistance there now is within the
military, against our creeping and technocratic neo-Praetorianism in support
of our regional military Proconsuls and their civilian masters (both inside
and outside of the government). Our military culture is altogether inattentive
to an arguably unconstitutional abuse of power; and also to our myopically
"un-strategic" and thoroughly irrational involvement in unjust
aggressive wars (like Iraq), while we are concurrently and centrifugally
over-extended elsewhere throughout the world, and "strutting to our
confusion."
-
- The common good of the United States would be greatly
furthered, I believe, if there were even just one "ferociously honest"
man like Israel Shamir within the U.S. military. This former Israeli commando
and immigrant from the former Soviet Union gives many unflinching "reports
from reality," which are not easily found in other sources. The reader
of this essay will certainly know what I mean if he will only read Shamir's
recently published collection of essays entitled Flowers of Galilee.[3]
-
- In his candid book, Israel Shamir gives more and deeper
cultural and strategic intelligence about Israel than one will find in
all of CIA's unclassified translations, available from its gifted, but
sometimes overly selective (or self-censoring), Foreign Broadcast Information
Service (FBIS). Like the now-deceased Israeli writer and "secular
humanist" Israel Shahak - but, I think, even more profoundly so -
Israel Shamir is truthful and candid in his manifold analyses and presentation
of hard facts, many of which are essentially unknown in the West unless
one reads Hebrew.
-
- What Israel Shamir writes gives not only much "ground
truth" about Israel and its strategic operations and deceptions, but
also larger reports about the "political action of Jewish forces"
in the wider world, and keenly vivid "cautionary tales" plus
even deeper "parables" - all of which will aid our indispensable
knowledge of reality and give good grounds for the United States' strategic
"course-correction" in the Middle East and at home.
-
- Israel Shamir's work would be a great example to our
own military and intelligence officers. For it has been my constant experience
over the years - even as a professor at military colleges and academies,
strategic institutes, and universities - that our military and intelligence
officers are not formed to grasp, nor even to desire, a deeper cultural
and strategic intelligence about foreign countries. That kind of intelligence
(hence understanding) is too often depreciated and considered as "soft
intelligence" rather than "hard" or "quantifiable"
intelligence. As a result, and as we become increasingly secularized as
a nation, we cannot easily take the measure of foreign religious cultures
or gauge the importance of religious world-views such as Zionism and Islam.
-
- Furthermore, because much of cultural-strategic intelligence
can be reliably derived from unclassified open sources or OSINT (Open Source
Intelligence), it is often thought to be too vague and untrustworthy compared
to, say, MASINT (Measurement and Signatures Intelligence) or SIGINT (Signals
Intelligence) or covert-clandestine HUMINT (Human Intelligence).
-
- Properly conceived and patiently conducted "cultural
and strategic intelligence" would, however, illuminate the moral,
religious, and deep-cultural factors of foreign strategy and grand strategy.
It further reveals another country's own strategic culture (as well as
its political culture). For example, in the case of mainland China, one
is thereby made more sensitive to Chinese perceptions of its own vulnerable
geography and its important "strategic thresholds," and, therefore,
its own historical reluctance to have a large blue-water navy.
-
- Moreover, because the U.S. State Department has never,
as an institution, had any larger "regional strategies" or "regional
orientations" of its foreign policy - as distinct from its focus on
policies and strategies designed for individual countries, and to be conducted
by our individual resident Embassies (or "country teams") - the
U.S. military is placed in an awkward situation, which may even involve
it in Constitutional difficulties and illegalities. The senior military
officers of major regional combatant commands - such as Central Command
(CENTCOM) or Pacific Command (PACOM) - must now act as if by default as
Regional Proconsuls, as was the case in imperial Rome, thereby producing
many moral difficulties for our purportedly democratic military culture,
and its proper subordination to civilian leadership in foreign policy.
These senior officers, in their effective role as Proconsuls, appear to
be forming, as well as implementing, foreign policy - not an easy mission
for a traditional military officer in our culture.
-
- For example, let us consider the case of Dennis Blair.
Just before Admiral Blair retired from active duty as Commander-in-Chief
of the U.S. Pacific Command (a position now known simply as Commander,
U.S. Pacific Command, or CDRUSPACOM), I asked him a question after his
strategic luncheon talk at Fort Lesley McNair in Washington D.C., at our
National Defense University (NDU). In its essence, my question went something
like this:
-
- To what extent, Admiral Blair, must you effectively act
as a Regional Proconsul in the Pacific because our State Department has
no coordinated policy and strategy for the region as a whole? And to what
extent are your larger political and grand-strategic missions compromising
your role as a military officer under the requirements of our Constitution,
and in light of our traditional civil-military relations and customs of
proper subordination?
-
- In response to this question, the audience, as well as
the gracious Admiral, gasped. The audience then nervously laughed aloud
(especially one of Admiral Blair's own classmates from the U.S. Naval Academy
- an energetic Marine Major General who was also sitting in the audience)!
Admiral Blair then took a deep breath and said: "How can I give you
a good answer to your serious question - a truthful answer that you deserve
- without getting myself into trouble?" (His initial response and
candor with me produced even more pervasive laughter in the room!)
-
- What is important in this context, however, is that our
Regional Combatant Commanders (former "CINC"s and now simply
"Commanders") and our larger global Functional Unified Commanders
(such as our U.S. Special Operations Command - USSOCOM) actually have not
just military-strategic but higher grand-strategic missions.
-
- But my deeper argument is that our gradated military
educational system - from our formation as cadets up to our higher education
at the National Defense University - does not prepare officers for such
long-range and culturally sensitive missions, much less clarify the deeper
legal and political and Constitutional issues. These issues are illustrated
by the case of the recently established "homeland command" (formally
known as U.S. Northern Command, or USNORTHCOM) with its domestic as well
as Canadian missions, and an altogether ambiguous area of responsibility
within the U.S. - and consequent, but very sensitive, intelligence requirements!
-
- If our military education and deeper-rooted military
culture properly prepared our officers to think in these larger, grand-strategic
terms, they would now also be much more acutely sensitive to, and discerning
of, the moral factors of modern war (and "terrorism"), including
the cultural and religious factors of strategy, which are always involved
when we are intimately working with other (and often quite alien) civilizations.
-
- In this context we should be reminded of the far-sightedness
of Lieutenant General Sam V. Wilson. In 1969 and '70, when he was still
a colonel and a formative leader as well, he saw (and said) what was needed
in the strategic and cultural formation of U.S. military officers. He was,
however (I regret to say), insufficiently appreciated or understood at
the time.
-
- Having had many diverse experiences abroad, Colonel Wilson
long ago realized that the U.S. military needed a cadre of officers who
could take the larger (and nuanced) measure of foreign military cultures
as well as the strategic factors and cultural events of moment in the world.
He wanted U.S. military officers to be able to understand foreign strategic
and military cultures on their own terms and in the longer light of their
own histories and geographies. He knew, as in the case of Turkey and the
Turkish General Staff, that some foreign militaries had their own uniquely
differentiated and distributed roles within their own societies, and which
were in sharp contrast to the roles of a military officer within our own
society and traditions. He knew that - for the common good of the United
States - we needed to understand these often radically different and even
incommensurable military traditions.
-
- He also saw that we needed officers who were truly competent
in strategic foreign languages (e.g., Chinese, Russian, Japanese, Arabic,
Hebrew, Spanish, etc.) and who were desirous and capable of savoring foreign
cultures and their histories as a whole - and not just their military institutions
and their conduct in war: that is to say, to understand their literature
and philosophy and world-view, and their resonant cultural symbols and
aspirations. Yet Colonel Wilson realized that such officers should also
be more than well-educated and deep-thinking "foreign area officers,"
which were then being formed in our Foreign Area Special Training (FAST)
Program. He foresaw that we also needed officers who could intelligently
connect different regions of the world and take a longer view of the whole
- to understand, for example, "Soviet revolutionary warfare"
as a form of "total war," whereby even peace was strategically
considered and employed as "an instrument of revolution" (as
Major General J.F.C. Fuller also very well understood), and to understand
the long-range strategic and religious operations of historic and modern
Islamic civilization, in contrast to the strategic cultures of Great Britain,
China, and Israel, and their uniquely long-range aspirations.
-
- Colonel Wilson's personally designed and implemented
strategic-cultural program was called the Military Assistance Overseas
Program (MAOP). The initial formation of officers in this program was a
six-month course for colonels and lieutenant colonels - and their Navy
equivalents - at the Special Warfare Center. (Colonel Wilson had assigned
me to be an instructor in this new program, and head of the East-Asian
Seminar. He also permitted me, because of my experience with several foreign
militaries, to attend the course and receive the diploma by way of special
exception, because I was then only a captain in our Army Special Forces.)
-
- Originally, Colonel Wilson wanted to have the whole program,
with its strategic courses, in Washington, D.C., and to be part of the
National Interdepartmental Seminar for long-range strategic and cultural
education, which then included the State Department and the Intelligence
Community. However, in 1969 - during the Vietnam War - Sam Wilson's important
ideas were suspect and frowned upon. They were, indeed, too politically
sensitive, even before the development of "the emerging American imperium."
-
- Despite support from thoughtful political leaders, Colonel
Wilson's plan to have the school in Washington was finally rejected because
too many people saw that he was - or could easily be perceived to be -
forming "men on white horseback," i.e., ambitious military officers
who would potentially encroach upon, if not actually usurp, the super-ordinate
role of their "civilian political masters."
-
- Had Sam V. Wilson been more influential, we would not
now, as a nation, have such a passive and unthinking military, or such
an invertebrate military culture, or such a shortsighted strategic culture.
And our military would be much more intelligently resistant to our neoconservative
and pro-imperial civilian masters.
-
- By way of contrast, the American military culture was
to be, I regret to say, much more formatively influenced by John Dewey's
"pragmatic education," in combination with the Frankfurt School's
"critical theory" and subtle anti-authoritarian "re-education."
Our traditional military culture was to be more and more uprooted and cut
off from its Christian roots, and thereby more and more secularized, re-paganized,
and neo-Machiavellianized. This gradually transformed military culture
is now conspicuously acquiescent to its neo-Machiavellian, civilian masters
and mentors (like Michael Ledeen), in unthinking support of the growing
American imperium and of the grand-strategy of the "greater Israel"
(Eretz Israel) not only in the Middle East but throughout the world. Our
military officers, in my experience, no longer know, nor reflect upon,
nor respectfully consider the criteria and standards of just war, as revealed
in the long, articulate tradition of Western Christian civilization. It
is now their usual orientation and preference to think and speak in terms
of a vague and unspecified "preventive war" or a war of "anticipatory
self-defense," both of which concepts are, too often, Orwellian "Newspeak"
for the reality of a war of aggression - the only specific offense for
which the German officers were brought to trial at Nuremberg in 1945.
-
- _____
-
- [1] My emphasis added, along with my suggestive insertions
in brackets.
-
- [2] New York: Basic Books, 2000, 539 pages.
-
- [3] Tempe, Az.: Dandelion Books, 2004, 308 pages.
-
- Robert Hickson, USA (ret.), Ph.D. Robert Hickson, USA
(ret.), Ph.D., is a 1964 graduate of the U.S. Military Academy, retired
U.S. Army Special Forces officer, and Vietnam War veteran. Following his
retirement he served for many years in the intelligence and special-operations
communities in varying capacities. His degree is in comparative literature
and classics from the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, and he
is a founding faculty member of Christendom College. Hickson has held professorships
at the U.S. Air Force Academy, the Joint Special Operations University
at U.S. Special Operations Command, the John. F. Kennedy Special Warfare
Center and School, and the Joint Military Intelligence College.
-
- http://www.neoconned.com/
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