- Hello Jeff:
-
- This is a very important article as it pertains to the
proposed upgrade of this and other labs to BSL 4. Although Tularemia is
not considered to be a major threat and is a disease that is curable with
antibiotics, this event should be noted by those who are hastily upgrading
labs to BSL 4.
-
- We have heard repeatedly, by those who want to research
diseases like Smallpox, 1918 Influenza, Ebola, et al that we need more
BSL 4 labs as a matter of homeland security.
-
- We have also learned that research projects are in the
works that are extremely risky, and, in the opinon of some researchers,
unnecessary. Dangerous projects are in the works, such as taking the
1918 Influenza virus and creating a chimera virus i.e. the 1918 flu reassorted
with a contemporary strain, taking Smallpox Virus and mutating it to evade
vaccine, and, this horror courtesy of the CDC: taking the Avian Influenza
H5N1 (bird flu) and making a chimera with a contemporary influenza virus.
-
- If we have "accidents" with relatively stable
bacteria experimentation like Tularemia, how can we assure the world that
there won't be an accidental escape of altered Smallpox, altered H5N1 or
some other pathogen like Ebola? It happened with SARS on several occassions.
-
- It is questionable and in debate among scientists whether
the H5N1 bird flu would ever mutate and sustain human to human transmission.
In essence, if we take that bird flu and genetically alter it to the extent
that we took the step that in nature would be required to make the transition
to sustained human transmission, and create the monster we fear the most,
it is quite possible that there will be a world pandemic should the virus
escape a lab. Should science do so ethically? I think not, because it
is just too risky.
-
- Patricia Doyle
-
-
- Bacterium Infects Three At Boston U. Biolab
-
- By Stephen Smith
- The Boston Globe
- 1-19-5
-
- Three Boston University researchers became ill in 2004
after being exposed in a laboratory to a potentially lethal disease called
tularemia, university and public health authorities said on Tue 18 Jan
2005. It was the 1st known instance of researchers in a Boston lab becoming
infected with a biological agent they were studying, according to a city
public health official. And it came at an awkward time for BU, as it was
seeking local and federal approval for a high-security lab to study the
most feared infectious diseases in the world.
-
- How the workers became infected remains unclear, although
BU officials said that researchers had violated procedures intended to
protect them from exposure. 2 researchers became ill in May 2004, and a
3rd in September 2004, apparently after separate exposures. But their illnesses
were not linked to tularemia until October 2004.
-
- BU reported the cases to city, state, and federal health
authorities in November 2004, about the time public hearings on the high-security
lab were being held. But neither the university nor the government agencies
disclosed the cases to the public at the time, saying there was no risk
to public health, because tularemia is not transmitted from person to person.
-
- Boston Mayor Thomas M. Menino, who learned of the cases
from BU and city public health officials, also decided against telling
city residents. "Right from the moment that he was made aware of the
situation, the Public Health Commission assured him there was no public
threat whatsoever, and he's made it clear that if there was any public
threat whatsoever, the public would have been advised immediately,"
said Seth Gitell, the mayor's spokesman.
-
- With Menino's enthusiastic backing, the city Zoning Commission
gave its final approval to the high-security biolaboratory last week [2nd
week of January 2005]. The lab still must be approved by the National Institute
of Allergy and Infectious Diseases, which is considered likely, because
it's the same agency that, in 2003, selected BU as one of 2 sites nationally
for sophisticated new labs able to study anthrax, plague, and other deadly
pathogens.
-
- BU and public health officials discussed the cases publicly
for the 1st time yesterday, 18 Jan 2005, after media inquiries. The 1st
exposures happened last spring [2004], with 2 researchers falling ill in
late May 2004. They complained of flu-like symptoms, and one was hospitalized
overnight. The 3rd infected researcher fell ill in September 2004 and required
hospitalization for several days, Moore said. All 3 recovered fully after
receiving antimicrobial agents.
-
- They worked in a lab that, in 2003, received a 5-year
grant from the federal government to develop a vaccine against tularemia,
an illness spread by insects and animals, including rabbits. Often called
"rabbit fever," it is also viewed as a potential agent of bioterrorism.
[Tularemia, a disease caused by the bacterium _Francisella tularensis_,
is indeed a Category A bioterrorism disease - Mod. LL]. In 2000, an outbreak
of tularemia on Martha's Vineyard ignited panic, after a laborer died and
about a dozen other people became infected. [Cases still occur on Martha's
Vineyard - Mod.LL].
-
- The scientists at BU believed that they were working
with a strain of the germ that had been altered specifically for vaccine
research so as not to cause illness. But a highly infectious strain of
tularemia was mixed with the harmless variety. The source of the contamination
is being investigated by federal health officials.
-
- The tularemia linked with the illnesses was supplied
by a laboratory in Nebraska that federal authorities, citing security concerns,
declined yesterday [18 Jan 2005] to identify.
-
- Because the researchers assumed that they were working
with a form of tularemia not known to cause illness, they did not immediately
link their symptoms to their research. It was after the 3rd researcher
became ill that faculty members began to suspect that something could be
seriously wrong in the laboratory inside the university's Evans Biomedical
Research building on Albany Street in the South End.
-
- Subsequent DNA tests on the tularemia being studied in
the BU lab showed that the bacteria identified as coming from Nebraska
contained the harmless strain and a highly infectious type.
-
- "The deck was stacked against [the researchers],
because they were working with something they had no idea they were working
with," Moore said. But Moore acknowledged that researchers in the
lab had violated policies requiring them to work with tularemia inside
an enclosed box, called a hood, that sends air through sophisticated filters.
Instead, the tularemia samples were sometimes worked with in the open,
in part because the enclosed research boxes were sometimes filled with
material that should not have been kept there, Moore said.
-
- Blood tests were performed on about 60 university researchers,
and those tests showed that only the 3 workers who had become ill tested
positive for tularemia. After the exposure was determined, BU, in November
2004, shuttered the lab for decontamination. The part of the lab where
the tularemia research was conducted remains closed.
-
- The investigation into how the exposure happened continues.
Samples of _F. tularensis_ were sent directly from the Nebraska lab for
CDC analysis, and those tests showed no presence of the dangerous strain,
deepening the mystery around the episode.
-
- "At this time, it seems to me there's no evidence
conclusively to link the contamination to Boston or to Nebraska,"
said Jennifer Morcone, a CDC spokeswoman. "Certainly, everyone would
like to determine the source of the contamination to make certain nothing
like this could happen again."
-
- As a result of the exposures, BU, as well as the Boston
Public Health Commission, are moving to tighten oversight of research.
To improve safety in the dozens of public and private research labs in
Boston, the Public Health Commission intends by this spring [2005] to start
a mandatory training program for lab workers, emphasizing the reporting
of illnesses in researchers. The commission also plans to hire a lab safety
inspector who will make unannounced visits to research sites to make certain
they are following safety protocols, said John Auerbach, Public Health
Commission executive director.
-
- http://www.boston.com/
- --
- ProMED-mail
-
- These accidents underscore the importance of confirming
the identities of attenuated microbial strains before they are used in
the laboratory setting. Since bacterial strains are not easily distinguishable,
molecular identification must be used to confirm the identity of strains
before they are employed in anything less than the highest levels of containment.
-
- ProMED has previously posted a thread regarding laboratory
safety and disease dissemination (see below). While it is the case that
tularemia does not spread from person-to-person, the infectious dose to
infect 50 percent of individuals is quite low (less than 100 bacilli),
so environmental contamination from a laboratory is of concern. Just as
important an issue is where and how the attenuated strain became contaminated
with virulent tularemia bacilli. - Mod.LL
-
- Patricia A. Doyle, PhD
- Please visit my "Emerging Diseases" message
board at:
- http://www.clickitnews.com/
- Zhan le Devlesa tai sastimasa
- Go with God and in Good Health
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