- Families of the Pearl Harbor commanders have been
championing
the theory that official Washingon knew when and where the 1941 Japanese
attack would occur. Evidence of secret medical shipments prior to the
attack
is lending credence to it...
-
- A previously unsubstantiated report that President
Franklin
D. Roosevelt requested the national office of the American Red Cross to
send medical supplies secretly to Pearl Harbor in advance of the 7 December
1941 Japanese attack is beginning to look much more feasible.
-
- Don C. Smith, who directed the War Service for the Red
Cross before World War II and was deputy administrator of services to the
armed forces from 1942 to 1946, when he became administrator, apparently
knew about the timing of the Pearl Harbor attack in advance. Unfortunately,
Smith died in 1990 at age 98. But when his daughter, Helen E. Hamman, saw
news coverage of efforts by the families of Husband Kimmel and Walter Short
to restore the two Pearl Harbor commanders posthumously to what the
families
contend to be their deserved ranks, she wrote a letter to President Bill
Clinton on 5 September 1995. Recalling a conversation with her father,
Hamman wrote:
-
- . . . Shortly before the attack in 1941 President
Roosevelt
called him [Smith] to the White House for a meeting concerning a Top Secret
matter. At this meeting the President advised my father that his
intelligence
staff had informed him of a pending attack on Pearl Harbor, by the
Japanese.
He anticipated many casualties and much loss, he instructed my father to
send workers and supplies to a holding area at a P.O.E. [port of entry]
on the West Coast where they would await further orders to ship out, no
destination was to be revealed. He left no doubt in my father's mind that
none of the Naval and Military officials in Hawaii were to be informed
and he was not to advise the Red Cross officers who were already stationed
in the area. When he protested to the President, President Roosevelt told
him that the American people would never agree to enter the war in Europe
unless they were attack [sic] within their own borders.
-
- . . . He [Smith] was privy to Top Secret operations and
worked directly with all of our outstanding leaders. He followed the orders
of his President and spent many later years contemplating this action which
he considered ethically and morally wrong.
-
- I do not know the Kimmel family, therefore would gain
nothing by fabricating this situation, however, I do feel the time has
come for this conspiracy to be exposed and Admiral Kimmel be vindicated
of all charges. In this manner perhaps both he and my father may rest in
peace.*1
-
- Smith first told his story to his daughter and
granddaughter
in the 1970s, Hamman said, and it bothered him a great deal. Hamman had
herself served in the Red Cross on the West Coast during World War II and
never had heard anything about this before. She was surprised by the story,
but she knew, she said, that "Papa would not lie." Unfortunately,
her father had left no papers and never told her of any specific actions
he took to fulfill President Roosevelt's request. She had not thought about
her father's story again until she read about efforts to restore the ranks
of Kimmel and Short.
-
- Because Hamman had nothing but her recollections to
corroborate
the story, without further evidence it was still only a story. Even if
it were true, it would appear to have been a merely quiet shift of
employees,
equipment, and supplies within the overall massive buildup of the Red Cross
in preparation for war, paralleling a similar effort in the military from
the 1940 Soldier and Sailors Act. Supporting information turned up in Red
Cross records at the National Archives, but no "smoking gun"
indicated that such an effort had taken place. Ultimately, however, a copy
of the Hawaii Chapter's Annual Report for the fiscal year ending 30 June
1942 confirmed the secret receipt of medical supplies by the Red Cross
at Pearl Harbor immediately before attack. In part, it reads:
-
- In the latter half of 1941, and indeed prior thereto,
the Hawaii Chapter took the definite position that there was serious
trouble
ahead in the Pacific. In spite of peaceful cooings from both American and
"enemy" sources, and suggestions to slow down, we stepped
up.
-
- . . . We obtained from National Headquarters of the
American
Red Cross in Washington vital medical supplies and drugs to the value of
some $50,000, which were here before December 7th, unbeknown save to a
very few, and were stored in cooperation with the Army. We likewise
obtained
from Washington First Aid equipment and supplies to the value of about
$25,000, which were also available.*2
-
- This seems to correspond with Hamman's recollection of
what her father had told her. So why did the story not come out at the
time? And what about the cooperative efforts with the Army to store the
supplies? Who in the Army knew, and where were the supplies stored? Did
General Short, the Army commanding officer for the Hawaiian Department,
know about these supplies? If he did, then he also would have been better
prepared for the attack. The best answer to these questions is that
Hawaiian
Red Cross officials must have thought the secret transfer of supplies was
in response to previous requests for assistance from national headquarters.
Additional evidence indicates, however, that a few Hawaiian officials may
have received an advance warning.
-
- The supplies might have been kept secret for several
reasons. Hawaiian Red Cross officials might have wanted to protect them
from potential Japanese saboteurs, about whom military officials had been
duly warned. Those officials also were soliciting donations and volunteers
from the community to help in preparing supplies. Publicizing receipt of
the medical supplies might have dampened enthusiasm and support for Red
Cross projects.
-
- Regarding the question of Army cooperation, the Army
had been supportive of the Red Cross and civilian defense preparations
and was undoubtedly supporting these efforts at the time. General Short's
Army Day Speech to the Honolulu Chamber of Commerce on 6 April 1941
corroborates
this. The subject of this major speech was civilian defense
preparation--including
preparations that should be made by the Red Cross--and was deemed important
enough by the Army board and the joint congressional committee to have
been included in the official record.*3
-
- Personnel
-
- Red Cross personnel activities and assignments appear
to support the Hamman story as well. A select number of experienced people
were tapped to go to Hawaii in fall 1941--all of them directed from
Washington.
Some arrived as regular transfers; others appear to have been special
transfers.
Almost all arrived just in time to prepare for the Pearl Harbor attack
in the rapid and massive buildup that resulted from the Selective Service
Act of 1940.*4
-
- From required Red Cross monthly field reports, nurses
recruited for the military by the Red Cross and those who had received
commissions as Army nurses filed reports, noting their times of arrival.
One of the two new Red Cross nurses at Station Hospital Hickam Field in
Honolulu, on duty the morning of 7 December 1941, wrote in a 16 February
1942 letter to Major Julia O. Flikke, Superintendent of the Army Nurse
Corps in Washington:
-
- . . . As you may recall, there were just six of us, who,
on November 15th were transferred to Station Hospital, Hickam Field. We
felt that we were the happiest group of nurses anywhere--a new 30 bed
hospital,
lovely quarters--just two blocks from the Officer's Club, nice working
hours, more social activity than we could possibly crowd in, the
hospitality
of our Medicos, and above all--the grandest chief nurse, Miss A[nnie
Gayton]
Fox, who enjoys everything as much as we do.*5
-
- The writer, who is not identified in the correspondence
but who was one of the two nurses on duty the morning of 7 December (along
with a Miss Boyd, according to the text), had transferred from Walter Reed
Army Hospital in July 1941 and had been transferred again from somewhere
else, arriving for duty in Hawaii at the new hospital on 15 November
1941.
-
- Red Cross Field Director Nell Ennis, at the U.S. Naval
Hospital in Pearl Harbor, filed her first narrative report for November
to December 1941. She wrote:
-
- The greatest difficulty was the fact that the supplies
ordered in October had not been received. This was a real handicap, for,
as we were expecting this shipment daily we did not want to make local
purchases thereby duplicating the order.
-
- . . . the following month [December] brought an avalanche
of work entirely foreign to any previous services I have ever been called
upon to do.
-
- . . . The Red Cross volunteers were my only workers and
without them I could not have carried on. . . . There were six Gray Ladies
who had received training at other naval stations and the medical staff
frequently spoke of their efficiency and endurance.*6
-
- On 22 November 1941, William Carl Hunt, acting manager
of the Eastern Area, sent a memorandum on American Red Cross National
Headquarters
letterhead to the Eastern Area headquarters staff and New England field
staff that read:
-
- Mr. Robert Shepard has accepted an emergency assignmant
[sic] as Executive Director of the Hawaii Chapter. He will be leaving for
this post about the first of December. . . . in these times such changes
of assignment are necessary in order to bring the full strength of the
Red Cross to bear upon whatever emergencies arise.*7
-
- According to the National American Red Cross Human
Resources
office, Shepard was one of the organization's most experienced and capable
people. He arrived in Hawaii a few days after the Pearl Harbor attack,
but he never became executive director. The Honolulu Advertiser recorded
his arrival and qualifications on Christmas Day 1941.
-
- Shepard is not the only national office staff member
sent to Hawaii during this critical period, as a 12 December 1941 national
office press release states. These staff members are not named or
identified,
but another Red Cross document indicates their titles.
-
- Mr. Castle's [Alfred Castle, chairman, Hawaii Red Cross
Chapter] cable also stated that cooperation between the Red Cross and the
local Civilian Defense in the emergency was excellent. The Hawaiian Red
Cross was equipped with large supplies of clothing, made by women
volunteers
in the islands, and also had stores of food and medical supplies. Five
members of the national Red Cross staff from Washington, were sent to the
islands some time ago.*8
-
- Red Cross Activity in Hawaii
-
- The secret cache of medical supplies appears to have
had a bearing on a discrepancy concerning the number of first aid stations
established between 8 December and 12 December. An 8 December 1941 press
release of the American Red Cross News Service states that, "Prior
to the beginning of hostilities the American Red Cross established 10
emergency
medical stations on the islands and made other plans for emergency
operations."*9
-
- According to a 12 December 1941 press release from
American
Red Cross News Service-based Hawaiian Red Cross Cables, "Twelve 50-bed
Red Cross first aid stations had been set up in Hawaii, completely equipped
with doctors, nurses and first aid personnel, the Red Cross
stated."*10
-
- As difficult as it was to get equipment and supplies
to Hawaii, two extra 50-bed first aid stations represented either a large
expectation of casualties or a large error on someone's part, particularly
in light of Ennis's complaint that by November she had not received all
of her supplies ordered in October.
-
- The site where the medical supplies were stored continues
to be elusive. The most complete account for 7 December 1941 is by Betty
MacDonald, the social page editor of The Honolulu Star-Bulletin, in an
article published on Saturday, 13 December 1941. "To the Women of
Hawaii--There Is Work To Be Done" states that the Red Cross Motor
Corps was mobilized completely by 1400 on the 7th at their headquarters
in the Castle Kindergarten Building in downtown Honolulu. The activities
of the motor corps in evacuating civilians through that night and into
the next morning is well documented.
-
- MacDonald, now Betty McIntire, remembers nothing more
than what she wrote in her article, except that the editor had cut out
all graphic details of the condition of the wounded. The editor had revised
significantly what she wrote and may have added material, because McIntire
did not remember some of the points in the article.
-
- The most probable location of the secret supplies was
in downtown Honolulu, somewhere that was accessible from the motor corps
headquarters. An outbuilding at the then-sprawling Fort DeRussy is the
most likely site. The existence and location of the surgical dressings
made by the Hawaii Chapter are well documented and known; these also were
distributed by the motor corps. The motor corps probably began its 7
December
trips downtown, picking up supplies and delivering them to hospital and
medical sites and then picking up evacuees or wounded and delivering them
to medical facilities or civilian relocation centers on the return trip
to Honolulu.
-
- In the book At His Side: The Story of the American Red
Cross Overseas in World War II (New York: Coward-McCann, 1945), George
Gershon Korson writes that the motor corps' "first assignment on 7
December was the delivery of Red Cross surgical dressing and medical
supplies
to the Army and naval hospitals and civilian emergency hospitals set up
in school and government buildings." None of the first-hand accounts
from military hospital personnel and commanding officers records the
delivery
of any Red Cross supplies or the work of Red Cross ambulances, nor can
any reference be found for Korson's statement.
-
- War Volunteer Study and Staffing Levels
-
- In his monthly report for November 1941, American Red
Cross Director of Personnel J. Blaine Gwin made a significant statement
about the escalation in staffing:
-
- It is interesting to note that we have reached the point
where the total number of temporary staff members exceeds the number of
permanent or regular staff members, being 1,505 temporary employees as
compared with 1,029 permanent or regular employees.*11
-
- In order to determine how many volunteers would be
needed,
the National Headquarters conducted a study on the "proposed
utilization
of volunteers on the national organization staff." It was completed
on 29 October 1941, sent to the chairman, and subsequently forwarded to
Red Cross national office area directors by Director of Domestic Operations
DeWitt Smith on 2 December 1941.*12 Only a few positions could be
identified
as suitable for volunteers at the national headquarters, where full-time
permanent employees were needed, but many volunteers would be needed by
the Red Cross chapters.
-
- While it is noteworthy that the study was completed a
month in advance of the Pearl Harbor attack and forwarded to the area
directors
just five days before it, the most significant fact seems to be that the
Red Cross national office had for all practical purposes already staffed
up to wartime operational levels by November 1941, even though war had
not yet begun.
-
- Red Cross Home Service Director Sanderson opened his
November 1941 monthly report, dated 3 December 1941, with the statement:
"Every phase of our Home Service program has continued to develop
new interests and a tremendous increase in activity has been in evidence
during the month." All of the Home Service field representative staffs
had been called in on 10 November for "instructions regarding the
study now being made of Chapters in areas adjacent to military
centers."
Buried in this report is another statement worthy of note:
-
- The report from the Pacific Area shows that the Home
Service staff has been augmented for the special study by the Director
of Disaster Relief, Director of Personnel, Administrative Assistant, and
three General Field Representatives, all of whom met with the Home Service
group on the 10th and 11th [November 1941].*13
-
- These must be the Washington people mentioned in the
previously cited 12 December press release, even though the release said
five were from Washington and six are named here. This group met with the
Home Service group early in the month as part of a special Pacific
emphasis.
When they were deployed to Hawaii is not stated, but it was in time to
be on-site for the Pearl Harbor attack. The national Red Cross office was
giving particular attention to the Pacific, which could be expected. But
does any evidence support the notion that they were given advance planning
information of the Pearl Harbor attack? A possible answer can be found
in the diaries of William Castle, a former Under Secretary of State whose
brother Alfred was the Chairman of the Red Cross in Hawaii. On 26 December
1941, William received his first correspondence from brother Alfred after
the bombing on 7 December and recorded in his diary:
-
- This morning I actually had letters from Alfred in
Honolulu.
. . . Alfred and his family always go to the country for the week-end;
this was the first time this year they had not gone. Alfred said that he
felt the moment to be exceedingly critical and that he did not want to
be out of town. This remark made me think very hard, because it would
suggest
that they knew in Honolulu, far better than we did here, how critical the
situation was.*14
-
- Alfred Castle's daughter Gwendolyn remembers an unusual
conversation with her father about going to the Laie house on Friday, 5
December. She wrote:
-
- Indeed, I do know why Father and Mother didn't go to
Laie the weekend of December 7th. Father felt that, from news he had
received
from letters from Uncle Billy [William Castle] in Washington war with Japan
was imminent. Charlie (my then-husband) and I wanted to use the Laie house
that weekend as we had been invited to the Spaldings' (nearby) for tennis
and lunch on Sunday. On Friday Father called me and said he would rather
we wouldn't go to Laie as he felt a Japanese attack was imminent. I told
Charlie that when he came home that evening, and he said that as the navy
had its patrol planes 2,000 miles out there was no way the Japanese could
have a surprise attack. I told Father this the next day, and he reluctantly
agreed to let us go. So of course that is where we were when the attack
came that Sunday morning.
-
- The timing of this conversation two days before the Pearl
Harbor attack raises a question, especially since William Castle's diary
entries do not support the reason given by Alfred for knowing that an
attack
by the Japanese was imminent. It appears that Alfred was covering another
confidential source by using his brother's name. No one would question
that the former Under Secretary of State would have confidential sources
and that he might convey such information. The Castle family has indicated
that the former Hawaii Red Cross chairman had many confidential sources,
and much of his correspondence or notes of conversations no longer
exist.
-
- Taken alone, this might mean nothing and be merely
coincidental,
but the comments reflect a striking correlation with actions by some of
President Roosevelt's closest staff 6,000 miles away. The President's Naval
Aide, Captain John R. Beardall, had come unannounced to the White House
in full uniform for Sunday duty, a first since his arrival in May 1941.
Beardall testified in the congressional hearings on the Pearl Harbor attack
in 1946 that he also put his staff on 24-hour duty for the first time
beginning
Friday, 5 December 1941. His response to questioning from Senator Homer
Ferguson (R-MI) used almost the same language as Castle, even though they
were recorded years apart and no evidence exists that the two had never
conversed: "The situation was getting more tense in the diplomatic
relations, and I wanted somebody to be there in case I was going out for
dinner or somewhere else . . . ."*15 Beardall was someone with direct
access to MAGIC--the deciphered intercepts of Japanese diplomatic messages.
So how was it that Alfred Castle came up with this language and stayed
home that weekend in Honolulu? This appears to be evidence of contact with
someone who either had access, or was being advised by someone with access,
to MAGIC intelligence.
-
- As Hamman pointed out in her letter, her father had
top-secret
clearance and was privy to other secret operations during the war. Why
not this one?
-
- Budget Activity
-
- In fall 1941, the Red Cross conducted its most aggressive
peacetime annual "Roll Call" fundraising campaigns, with national
coverage and using well-known personalities and heavy business involvement.
Most of the cabinet officers, particularly high military officials, gave
significantly throughout the fall on behalf of the Roll Call. Behind the
scenes, some unusual budgetary activity was taking place. Red Cross records
show the change from peacetime to wartime before the Pearl Harbor
attack.
-
- At the meeting of the American Red Cross Central
Committee
on 24 June 1941, committee members adopted its first resolution moving
it to a war footing:
-
- That the Central Committee hereby approves the following
general provisions with reference to a possible campaign for a national
Defense Fund, or for a War Relief Fund in the event of the involvement
of this country in war. It is recognized that the development of events
and other unforeseen conditions may require some adaptation of these
general
provisions and the Chairman is authorized to take such steps in this
connection
as seem to him wise and necessary.*16
-
- The provisions that follow the resolution
recognize:
-
- That the National Defense activities or the War Relief
activities, if this country becomes involved, will require the
participation
of practically the entire organization and activities of the Red Cross,
and that it is not practicable to segregate these activities in such a
way as to finance some of them from the General Fund and others from the
National Defense or the War Relief Fund or the Foreign War Relief
Fund.
-
- The Chairman is authorized, if in his judgment the timing
of events makes such a step necessary, to combine the fund raising campaign
with the regular annual Roll Call and the Junior enrollment, under such
terms and conditions as he may approve.
-
- At the 16 September 1941 meeting of the central
committee,
the chairman was authorized to make special arrangements for the national
office to receive more than the usual 50 cents from some of the larger
membership gifts in the intensified Roll Call drive.*17 A member was
defined
as anyone giving more than one dollar. The standard peacetime practice
was for the national office to receive 50 cents per membership, and the
remainder of the gift would remain with the chapters to fund their
activities.
The reason for the change appears in the statement approved by the central
committee:
-
- It was recognized that major emergencies might develop
before the Roll Call which would require changes in the fund raising plans
and the Chairman was authorized to take appropriate steps should such
emergencies
occur.
-
- On Saturday, 29 November 1941, DeWitt Smith sent three
memos to key Red Cross managers with an attachment for $1 million to
finance
expenditures not covered in the current budget. This had been approved
by the chairman the day before, using the emergency authority. Smith also
wrote in the cover memo that they should not wait until the end of December
as planned to revamp the budget but should do so at the end of November.
The date of the memo being 29 November, this was an order to make an
immediate
revision of the budget, because the next day was the end of the month.*18
Most of the materials were for running a massive support system for
servicemen
after the war had begun. But the war had not begun; this was eight days
before the Pearl Harbor attack.
-
- Assessment
-
- The role played by the Red Cross at Pearl Harbor has
been neglected by historians, mostly because accounts inevitably focus
on the military attack. In all of the confusion after the Japanese attack
and with military censorship, the arrival and activities of Red Cross
medical
workers at all of the major military locations immediately before the Pearl
Harbor attack were not questioned, most likely because of the high esteem
in which the organization always had been held. Their arrival had been
coordinated quietly from Washington and even most of the workers
themselves--although
some seem to have had more information--thought it a mere coincidence that
they were there just before the attack. But thanks to Don Smith's daughter,
it is now known that it was no accident that specific pieces were in place
in the nick of time. It appears to have been part of a planned operation
within the rapid overall growth of the Red Cross.
-
- In 1941, only a small group of people close to President
Roosevelt were the real players and were actually part of the
decision-making
process. Many of these same people were also on the Red Cross Board. In
effect, the Red Cross became an extension of their policy-execution
process,
which explains why the personnel and budget activities so closely
paralleled
White House insiders' knowledge and decision-making. They could operate
quietly, without the rest of Washington knowing. The location of the Red
Cross two blocks from the White House and the State Department (now the
Old Executive Office Building) made this even easier. And in the case of
the Red Cross, some of President Roosevelt's closest war advisers and some
who received MAGIC intelligence were the same ones who served on the Red
Cross board and sat on its central committee. This included the President's
physician, Rear Admiral Ross T. McIntire, the Navy Department
representative
and the Navy Surgeon General; Sumner Wells, the Under Secretary of State;
and Harry Hopkins (who was closely involved with the Red Cross Roll Call
in fall 1941 and was appointed to the central committee in 1942).*19
-
- The relationship between the Red Cross, the military,
and the White House always has been close, but at no time does it appear
to have been closer than just before the outbreak of the Pacific War at
Pearl Harbor.
- ____
-
- Mr. Borgquist is media affairs officer for the Community
Relations Service Headquarters, U.S. Department of Justice. He also is
a U.S. Naval Reserve public affairs officer. The views reflected here are
his own. This article was not prepared as part of any of his offical
duties.
-
- 1. Department of Defense Investigation, "Memorandum
for the Secretary of Defense: Advancement of Rear Admiral Kimmel and Major
General Short" (also known as the "Dorn Report") signed
by Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, Edwin Dorn,
15 December 1995.
-
- 2. Annual Report for the Year Ending June 30, 1940,
Hawaii
Chapter of the American Red Cross, p. 1. The Hawaii Chapter and the
National
Archives do not have copies in their collections. What is likely the last
existing copy of the document is in the Hawaii War Records Depository,
University of Hawaii, Manoa, document #59.02.
-
- 3. LGEN Walter C. Short, Army Day Speech, Exhibit 1-O,
"Proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board," found at pp.
2607-2610,
Part 30, in the Hearings before the Joint Committee on the Investigation
of the Pearl Harbor Attack, U.S. Congress, 1946.
-
- 4. American Red Cross, 1935-1946, National Archives
Record
Group 200 (Hereafter cited as ARC 1935-1946, RG 200), "1940-1941
Annual
Report of Military and Naval Welfare Service." The general history
of the ARC in World War II is in Box 1.
-
- 5. ARC 1935-1946, RG 200, Box 1705 Serial Code
900.11/6131
P.O.A., File: "Station Hospital, Hickam Field, TH."
-
- 6. ARC 1935-1946, RG 200, Box 1705, Serial Code
900.11/6131,
P.O.A., File: "Hawaii Area--218th General Hospital."
-
- 7. ARC 1935-1946, RG 200, Boxes 456-457, Serial Code
187.211 (C 141.02).
-
- 8. ARC 1935-1946, RG 200, Box 14, Serial Code 020.1801,
Press Release # 67107, 12 December 1941. The success of the civilian
defense
organization and credit for its planning belongs to LGEN Short, who devoted
great effort to this throughout 1941. Correspondence from a major Hawaiian
business owner after the war in Shortis papers at the U.S. Army Military
History Institute and Army War College Library, Carlisle Barracks,
Pennsylvania,
attest to this.
-
- 9. ARC 1935-1946, RG 200, Box 14, Serial Code 020.1801,
Press Release #67047, 8 December 1941.
-
- 10. Same citation as in endnote 8.
-
- 11. ARC 1935-1946, RG 200, Box 164, Serial Code
140.18.
-
- 12. ARC 1935-1946, RG 200, Box 591, Serial # 300.02.
Memorandum of 2 December 1941, with attachments; to Mr. Hunt, Mr. Baxter,
Mr. Schafer; from DeWitt Smith, "Subject: Proposed utilization of
volunteers on the national organization staff."
-
- 13. ARC 1935-1946, RG 200, Box 185, Serial Code 140.14
Document at this location is coded 140.18 H.S.
-
- 14. Diaries of William Richardson Castle, unpublished,
Houghton Library, Harvard University, ms Am 2021, vol. 42, page 320.
-
- 15. Hearings before the Joint Committee of the Pearl
Harbor Attack, U.S. Congress, Part 10, 15, 16, 18, 19, and 20 February
1946, pp. 5280-5283.
-
- 16. "Minutes of the Central Committee Meeting,"
24 June 1941, memorandum dated 25 June 1941. ARC 1935-1946, RG 200, Box
112, Serial Code 114.22, File: "Central Committee."
-
- 17. "Minutes of September 16, 1941, Meeting of the
ARC Central Committee," memorandum dated 18 October 1941. ARC
1935-1946,
RG 200, Box 112.
-
- 18. ARC 1935-1946, RG 200, Box 579, Serial code 240.12
S.A. 7. Memorandum from DeWitt Smith, Director, Domestic Operations to
Mr. Betts, dated 29 November 1941, "Additional
Appropriations."
-
- 19. Two American Red Cross lists provide a good overview
of board composition during this critical time period: "Members of
the Central Committee During the World War II Period" and
"Members
of the Central and Executive Committee for 1941." ARC 1935-1946, RG
200, Box 110. McIntire's whereabouts on 7 December 1941, are described
generally in his autobiography, Ross T. McIntire, White House Physician
(New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1946), pp. 136-137.
-
- First Published May/June 1999
-
- http://www.usni.org/navalhistory
- /Articles99/NHborgquist.htm
|
