- Two weeks after George Bush's reelection, Porter J. Goss,
the newly appointed Director of Central Intelligence, wrote an internal
memorandum to all employees of his agency telling them, "[Our job
is to] support the administration and its policies in our work. As agency
employees, we do not identify with, support, or champion opposition to
the administration or its policies."[1] Translated from
bureaucrat-speak,
this directive says, "You now work for the Republican Party. The
intelligence
you produce must first and foremost protect the President from being held
accountable for the delusions he has concerning Iraq, Osama bin Laden,
preventive war, torturing captives, democracy growing from the barrel of
a gun, and the 'war on terror.'"
-
- This approach is not new, even though former CIA analyst
Melvin A. Goodman declares that "the current situation is the worst
intelligence scandal in the nation's history."[2] Back in 1973, when
James Schlesinger briefly succeeded Richard Helms as CIA director, he
proclaimed
on arrival at the agency's Virginia "campus": "I am here
to see that you guys don't screw Richard Nixon."[3] Schlesinger
underscored
his point by saying that he would be reporting directly to White House
political adviser Bob Haldeman and not to National Security Adviser Henry
Kissinger. In the contemporary White House, Goss need not bother going
directly to Karl Rove since Bush's outgoing and incoming National Security
Advisers, Condoleezza Rice and Stephen J. Hadley, have both been working
for months under Rove's direction primarily to reelect the
President.
-
- In 1973, Schlesinger wanted to protect Nixon from
revelations
that the CIA had broken into the headquarters of the Democratic National
Committee and illegally infiltrated the antiwar movement within the United
States. His actual achievement was to perpetuate Washington's idée
fixe that the United States could still win the Vietnam War despite
overwhelming
intelligence to the contrary. The same is likely to be true today and the
outcome is likely to be similar. Just as thirty years ago, an
administration
refused to pay attention to its own internal intelligence assessments and
lost the Vietnam War, so another administration has again wrapped itself
in a fantasy bubble of wishful thinking and so is losing the war it started
in Iraq.
-
- Intelligence and the Truth-teller
-
- Part of the background to the Goss memo is a widespread
misunderstanding of why the CIA was created and what it actually does.
For example, Bush apostle David Brooks writes in the New York Times that
the CIA is engaged "in slow-motion brazen insubordination, which
violate[s]
all standards of honorable public service. . . . It is time to reassert
some harsh authority so CIA employees know they must defer to the people
who win elections. . . . If they [people in the CIA] ever want their
information
to be trusted, they can't break the law with self-serving leaks of
classified
data."[4] Brooks seems to think that the CIA is the President's
personal
advertising agency and that its employees owe their livelihoods to him.
About Michael Scheuer, the head of the "bin Laden Unit" in the
agency's Counterterrorism Center from 1996 to 1999 and the anonymous author
of Imperial Hubris: Why the West is Losing the War on Terror, Brooks fumes,
"Here was an official on the president's payroll publicly campaigning
against his boss."
-
- Leave aside the fact that the President doesn't pay any
government official's salary, at least not legally, and that Scheuer was
more interested in educating the public about Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda,
on which he is an authority, than in covering up the President's mistakes;
the point is that the issue of the CIA's intelligence on the Iraq war is
bringing back into our political life once again the figure most feared
by presidents: the truth-teller. During a previous period of falsified
intelligence, National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger said in the Oval
Office in front of President Nixon and his Special Counsel Charles Colson,
"Daniel Ellsberg is the most dangerous man in America. He must be
stopped at all costs."[5] Kissinger and Nixon subsequently ordered
up felonies, such as a break-in at Ellsberg's psychiatrist's office, in
order to try to smear and discredit the man who had revealed to the public
the systematic lying of three presidents -- Eisenhower, Kennedy, and
Johnson
-- about the war in Vietnam.
-
- Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara had ordered a
special
staff to write a top secret History of U.S. Decision-making in Vietnam,
1945-68, known as "The Pentagon Papers," of which Ellsberg was
responsible for the 1961 volume on John F. Kennedy's presidency. Ellsberg's
release of the highly classified Pentagon Papers to the New York Times
resulted in the public exposure of virtually every National Intelligence
Estimate on Vietnam written by the CIA since the end of French colonial
rule. Bush's attempt to squelch information from the CIA then is hardly
unprecedented in the annals of our government, but it is egregious and
ultimately self-defeating.
-
- The term "intelligence" has always rested
uneasily
in the name of the Central Intelligence Agency. There is no question that
the agency was created in 1947 on the orders of President Truman for the
sole purpose of collecting, evaluating, and coordinating -- through
espionage
and from the public record -- information related to the national security
of the United States. Truman was concerned to prevent another surprise
attack on the U.S. like Pearl Harbor and to ensure that all information
available to the government was compiled and presented to him in a timely
and usable form. The National Security Act of 1947 placed the CIA under
the explicit direction of the National Security Council (NSC), the
president's
chief staff unit for making decisions about war and peace, and gave it
five functions. Four of them concern the collection, coordination, and
dissemination of intelligence. It is the fifth -- which allows the CIA
to "perform such other functions and duties related to intelligence
affecting the national security as the National Security Council may from
time to time direct" -- that has turned the CIA into a personal,
secret,
unaccountable army any president can order into battle without first having
to ask Congress to declare war, as the Constitution requires.
-
- Clandestine operations, although nowhere mentioned in
the CIA's enabling statutes, quickly became the Agency's main activity
and as one of its most impartial Congressional analysts, Loch K. Johnson,
has put the matter, "The covert action shop had become a place for
rapid promotion within the agency."[6] The Directorate of Operations
(DO) soon absorbed two-thirds of the CIA's budget and personnel, while
the Directorate of Intelligence limped along writing National Intelligence
Estimates (NIEs) -- summaries of intelligence produced by all the various
intelligence agencies, including those in the Department of Defense --
for the White House.
-
- Meanwhile, CIA covert operations subverted domestic
journalism,
planted false information in foreign newspapers, and covertly fed large
amounts of money to members of the Christian Democratic Party in Italy,
to King Hussein of Jordan, and to clients in Greece, West Germany, Egypt,
Sudan, Suriname, Mauritius, the Philippines, Iran, Ecuador, and Chile.
Clandestine agents devoted themselves to such tasks as depressing the
global
prices of agricultural products in order to damage uncooperative Third
World countries, and sponsoring guerrilla wars or miscellaneous
insurgencies
in places as diverse as the Ukraine, Poland, Albania, Hungary, Indonesia,
China, Tibet, Oman, Malaysia, Iraq, the Dominican Republic, Venezuela,
North Korea, Bolivia, Thailand, Haiti, Guatemala, Cuba, Greece, Turkey,
Vietnam, Afghanistan, Angola, and Nicaragua, to name only a few of those
on the public record. All this was justified by the Cold War, and no one
beyond a very small group inside the government knew anything about it.
The Central Intelligence Act of 1949 modified the National Security Act
of 1947 with a series of amendments that, in the words of that pioneer
scholar of the CIA Harry Howe Ransom, "were introduced to permit [the
CIA] a secrecy so absolute that accountability might be
impossible."[7]
-
- How to Misuse Intelligence
-
- Regardless of what it most enjoys doing, the CIA is still
tasked with providing the president with accurate information to enable
him to avoid a surprise attack and protect the national security. In the
foyer of the CIA's headquarters at Langley, Virginia, is inscribed a
Biblical
quotation: "And ye shall know the truth and the truth shall make you
free" (John 8:32). Loch Johnson conjectures that former Director of
the CIA (DCI) Allen Dulles probably thought it meant, "And ye shall
know the truth -- if ye be me, or the president." Former DCI Richard
Helms once maintained to Bob Woodward that the early warning function of
the CIA "is everything, and underline everything."[8] Even if
true, the CIA's power to provide such unrequested information to a
president
constitutes a potential restraint on his freedom of action and may on
occasion
totally derail his policies, particularly since such intelligence is very
rarely certain or unambiguous. Over the years the powers of the DCI to
compel a president to read an intelligence estimate have been
systematically
diluted, and when information supplied to the president about a possible
attack or any other matter under the CIA's imprimatur has been leaked to
the public, both the Agency and the intelligence have become politically
radioactive.
-
- Such revelations have usually taken one of two forms.
In the first instance, the president, it is argued, has been shielded from
or has refused to read accurate intelligence. In the second instance, the
president is accused of secretly ordering the suppression of intelligence
or of fabricating intelligence to support his preferred policies. President
Bush has engaged in both forms of dishonesty, but he is certainly not the
first president to do so. The examples are legion.
-
- In 1961, at the time of the invasion of the Bay of Pigs,
Richard Bissell, then head of the Directorate of Operations, gained the
ear of President Kennedy and assured him that elated Cubans would welcome
American-supported insurgents, strew rose petals in their path, and help
overthrow the Castro government. Bissell simply did not show Kennedy the
estimates that said Castro had extensive popular support and the invasion
would fail.
-
- Similarly, in May 1970, as President Richard Nixon and
Henry Kissinger plotted their "incursion" into Cambodia, the
Board of National Estimates (BNE) concluded that "an American invasion
of Cambodia would fail to deter North Vietnamese continuation of the
war."[9]
DCI Helms failed to deliver this estimate to the White House, knowing what
the BNE did not -- that the decision to invade had already been made.
Former
DCI Robert M. Gates generalizes: "It has been my experience over the
years that the usual response of a policymaker to intelligence with which
he disagrees or which he finds unpalatable is to ignore
it."[10]
-
- Examples of the distortion or fabrication of intelligence
are rarer, but they do occur. During the Vietnam War, Gen. William
Westmoreland,
U.S. military commander from 1964 to 1968, omitted from his estimate of
enemy forces all Communist guerrillas and informal local defense forces
-- perhaps as many as 120,000-150,000 fighters -- that another estimate
indicated had been responsible for up to 40% of American losses. His
apparent
intent was to make victory in Vietnam look more plausible to the American
public. On March 14, 1967, DCI Helms included Westmoreland's figures in
an NIE going to the White House even though he "knew that the figures
on enemy troop strength in Vietnam provided by military intelligence were
wrong -- or, at any rate, quite different from CIA figures. Yet he signed
the estimate without dissent. The apparent reason, according to his
biographer,
was that 'he did not want a fight with the military, supported by [National
Security Adviser Walt] Rostow at the White House.'"[11]
-
- Another example of the suppression or distortion of
intelligence
occurred in 1969-70 over the issue of whether or not the Soviet SS-9 ICBM
could carry three warheads and whether those warheads could be fired at
separate and distinct targets -- that is, whether or not the SS-9 carried
MIRVs (multiple independently-targetable re-entry vehicles). If true, this
would perhaps have given the Soviet Union a first-strike capability against
the United States. The SS-9 came in four models, the first of which had
its flight test on September 23, 1963, and began to be deployed in the
summer of 1967. All Western intelligence agencies agreed that models one
through three carried a single warhead, some with huge yields (in the range
of 18 megatons). Disagreement arose over model four, which seemed to carry
three warheads. Whether these were independently targetable was in
dispute.
-
- National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger and Secretary
of Defense Melvin Laird contended that the fourth version of the SS-9 was
a MIRVed weapon; the CIA in its NIE on the subject said that it was not.
At first the CIA rejected the pressure coming from the policymakers and,
in fact, added more evidence against MIRVs to its estimate. Ultimately,
however, DCI Helms removed the paragraph arguing against Soviet
preparations
for a first strike after "an assistant to [Laird] informed Helms that
the statement contradicted the public position of the Secretary."[12]
As it turned out, the CIA was right. The SS-9s were armed with MRVs, not
MIRVs -- that is, they could produce only a cluster of explosions in a
single area. The Soviet Union did not deploy MIRVs until 1976, six years
after the United States had done so. [13] So it was we, not they, who
accelerated
the race toward mutual assured destruction -- and did so on the basis of
fake intelligence.
-
- When it comes to ignoring accurate CIA intelligence,
the preeminent example in the Bush administration was National Security
Adviser Condoleezza Rice's indifference to al-Qaeda and her failure to
ensure that the president read and understood the explicit warnings of
an imminent surprise attack that the agency delivered to her. As the
Washington
Post's Steve Coll has summarized the matter in his book Ghost Wars,
"BIN
LADEN DETERMINED TO STRIKE IN U.S. was the headline on the President's
Daily Brief presented to Bush at his Crawford, Texas, ranch on August 6
[2001]. The report included the possibility that bin Laden operatives would
seek to hijack airplanes. The hijacking threat, mentioned twice, was one
of several possibilities outlined. There was no specific information about
when or where such an attack might occur."[14]
-
- Slaying the Messenger
-
- After the extent of its failure became known, and under
extreme pressure from the public and families of the victims of 9/11, the
Bush administration reluctantly authorized the creation of a National
Commission
on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States and permitted National Security
Adviser Rice to testify before it in public. But the fix was in: The
Commission
was to concentrate on "intelligence failures," not on the failure
of policymakers to heed the intelligence, and on the need to
"reform"
the CIA but not to such an extent as to damage the president's ability
to blame it for his mistakes.
-
- On November 20, 2004, right-wing members of the House
of Representatives scuttled the major recommendation of the 9/11 Commission
-- namely, to provide the leader of the American intelligence community
with greater authority to direct and coordinate the analyses of all 15
intelligence agencies. Reflecting the Pentagon's interests in maintaining
control over 80% of the $40 billion annual intelligence budget, Duncan
Hunter (R-CA), Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee and an ally
of Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, withdrew his support. Other
Republican
congressmen joined him, demanding that the bill go even further than was
already the case in harassing so-called illegal immigrants, primarily from
Mexico.
-
- The President and the Speaker of the House both said
they favored enactment of the proposed legislation, but many experienced
observers thought it was all Grand Kabuki by the Republican Party, intended
to make it appear that the White House favored reform while ensuring that
reform did not actually occur. In killing the reform bill, the Pentagon
unambiguously displayed the raw political power of the
military-industrial-congressional
complex. During October 2004, Gen. Richard B. Myers, Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, without the public approval of any civilian leader of
the Defense Department, wrote to Congressman Hunter expressing his support
for sabotaging change.
-
- After the 9/11 attacks and the Bush administration's
decision to go to war with Iraq, the focus shifted from ignoring unwanted
intelligence to actively creating false intelligence. The critical item
was the NIE of October 1, 2002, entitled "Iraq's Continuing Program
for Weapons of Mass Destruction," which became known inside the CIA
as the "whore of Babylon."[15] It explicitly endorsed Vice
President
Cheney's contention of August 26, 2002 -- "We know that Saddam has
resumed his efforts to acquire nuclear weapons" -- and was signed
by DCI George Tenet with "high confidence." "The
intelligence
process," writes CIA veteran Ray McGovern, "was not the only
thing undermined. So was the Constitution. Various drafts of the NIE,
reinforced
with heavy doses of 'mushroom-cloud' rhetoric, were used to deceive
congressmen
and senators into ceding to the executive their prerogative to declare
war -- the all-important prerogative that the framers of the Constitution
took great care to reserve exclusively to our elected representatives in
Congress."
-
- In succeeding months numerous review commissions revealed
that the October NIE was only one of numerous failures by the truth-tellers
to do what the people of the United States pay them to do. The Senate
Intelligence
Committee, the 9/11 Commission, and the CIA's Iraq Survey Group under
Charles
Duelfer all reported that the CIA's so-called intelligence on Iraqi WMD
was fictitious. Even more dangerously for the White House, these reports
suggested that its so-called war on terrorism and its attack on Iraq rather
than on the true perpetrators of 9/11 were based on false intelligence,
much of it manufactured in the Pentagon.
-
- The number three civilian defense official in the
Pentagon,
Douglas Feith, had set up the Office of Special Plans, an operation devoted
to going through all the raw intelligence available to the various spy
agencies and finding items that offered possible evidence of (or hints
of evidence of) links between Saddam Hussein and Osama bin Laden. It was
this effort to get around both the CIA and the Defense Intelligence Agency,
neither of which had found links or ties between Iraq and 9/11, that
eventually
led some officials to break ranks and charge that the war against Iraq
was in fact undercutting the "war on terrorism" -- specifically,
Richard A. Clark, the White House's coordinator for counterterrorism in
both the Clinton and Bush administrations, in his book Against All Enemies:
Inside America's War on Terrorism; and the CIA's Michael Scheuer in
Imperial
Hubris and in his letter to the House and Senate Intelligence Committees
entitled "How Not to Catch a Terrorist"[16]
-
- The new head of the CIA, Porter Goss, is now setting
about knocking off all such messengers and their supporters still inside
the CIA because the agency, despite its frequent co-option and misuse by
presidents, still retains a vestigial role as a truth-teller. Goss had
been ordered to make it appear that the agency misled the President (rather
than the other way round, as actually happened). He is then supposed to
shake up what he calls a "dysfunctional" organization. After
George Tenet resigned as DCI in July 2004 and went on the lecture circuit
at $35,000 a pop -- he had earned well over a half-million dollars by
November
-- Bush appointed Goss to control further truth-telling at Langley and
to head off efforts by Congress to create a powerful intelligence czar,
as the 9/11 Commission has recommended.[17] The Senate confirmed Goss by
a vote of 77 to 17 (six senators did not vote), strongly suggesting the
increasing worthlessness of Senate oversight of the executive
branch.
-
- Goss represented the 14th district of Florida for some
sixteen years in the House of Representatives, but before that, between
1962 and 1971, he worked in the CIA's Directorate of Operations (DO). He
was stationed primarily in Latin America, and rumors persist that he left
the agency under a cloud. In 1995, he was appointed to the House's
Intelligence
Oversight Committee and in 1997 became its chairman. There is no evidence
that he did anything at all in this position, including investigating the
intelligence lapses that preceded 9/11 or the failure of the CIA to have
placed a single spy anywhere within Saddam Hussein's regime. Admiral
Stansfield
Turner, DCI under President Carter, has said that Goss was the worst
appointment
ever made to the position of director of the CIA.
-
- How to Create a Worthless Intelligence Agency
-
- Goss is a highly political bureaucrat, who raised
eyebrows
when he gave speeches earlier this year attacking John Kerry for slashing
intelligence funding without mentioning that, in 1995, he himself had
co-sponsored
a measure calling for firing 20% of all CIA personnel over five years.
Goss has also dismissed the efforts to find out who in the Bush
administration
identified, and so outed, undercover CIA operative Valerie Plame -- wife
of former ambassador Joseph Wilson who had embarrassed the administration
over its Iraqi nuclear claims -- to the press as "wild and
unsubstantiated
allegations," a position that will not reassure operatives at the
Directorate who can be and have been assassinated because of such leaks.
Goss brought with him to Langley a group of Republican Party activist staff
members from the House Intelligence Committee and set them up in prominent
executive positions from which they unleashed a witch-hunt against any
and all intelligence officers who sought to put accuracy and integrity
ahead of service to George W. Bush.
-
- It is interesting that Goss has begun his shake-up of
the CIA by forcing out the director and deputy director of operations,
even though this is not where the alleged failures of the CIA in recent
years occurred. (This, in turn, has lead to speculation that he is trying
to ensure his own service record in the DO will be kept under wraps.)
Within
the coming weeks, he will certainly fire Jami A. Miscik, head of the
Directorate
of Intelligence (DI), who has worked in the agency since 1983 and was a
close associate of former DCI George J. Tenet. She has led the DI since
May 2002, a period in which much of the false reporting on Iraq occurred.
It may be logical and expectable that Miscik be held responsible for the
politicized intelligence produced on her watch; but under the present
circumstances
it is clear that she is actually being punished for following the orders
of President Bush and Vice President Cheney, who ordered up the false
intelligence
in the first place. As Spencer Ackerman has written, "If Goss thought
the CIA was dysfunctional before, he has guaranteed that it is
now."[18]
-
- There is every reason to try to make the CIA at least
slightly more effective in its truth-telling mission, but even the hint
that a Republican Party loyalty test is now being applied will cause an
exodus of experienced analysts and leave the country even more vulnerable
than it is now. With several wars underway (in Iraq, Afghanistan,
Israel-Palestine,
Colombia, Kashmir, Sudan, and Chechnya, to name only the most obvious),
Iran and North Korea on the cusp of becoming nuclear powers, a looming
possibility of a global flight from the dollar, the emergence of China
as an economic powerhouse, and the polar ice caps melting, this is not
exactly a good time to be blinding ourselves. The only groups who will
profit from a crippling of what is left of the CIA's early warning and
analytic capabilities will be the Bush-Cheney White House and Rumsfeld's
Pentagon.
-
- The present sorry chapter in the rise and fall of the
CIA reflects trends in the U.S. that are bolstering an "imperial
presidency"
and its handmaiden, militarism. Although the CIA was created to help inform
presidents about threats to the country, it is clear that the President
and his top officials no longer want or need its intelligence functions,
which have, in any case, been increasingly transferred to the military
establishment, the professional armed forces, and the military-industrial
complex -- groups hardly best known for their reputations as
truth-tellers.
-
- It is true that the CIA, once founded, quickly evolved
into a Praetorian Guard, totally under the president's secret control,
and that every president since Truman, upon discovering such an
extraordinary
source of power privately available, has found its use irresistible. Over
the decades, however, the CIA's ability to intervene covertly and often
violently in the affairs of others almost anywhere on Earth has become
somewhat less interesting to presidents as Congress passed laws
constraining
presidential independence of action when it came to the Agency -- and as
alternatives came into being in the form of the military's various Special
Forces. The president now has an explicit and far more military Praetorian
Guard at his disposal that lacks any form of democratic oversight, although
he risks a future moment in which it might eventually take power into its
own hands, as the original Praetorians of the Roman Empire did two
millennia
ago.
-
- Many presidents have abused their secret powers. When
these violations of law became public, as they did spectacularly during
the Watergate scandal, they led to Congressional efforts to impose
oversight
on the agency. From 1947 to 1974, Congress was completely uninformed about
and exercised no control at all over anything the CIA did. The agency's
budget was buried in the "black" sections of the Pentagon's
budget.
With the amending of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1974 (the
"Hughes-Ryan
Act") and the 1980 Intelligence Oversight Act, the president was
required
formally to authorize all operations in writing and report them to special
committees of Congress or at least to their chairmen and ranking minority
members.
-
- None of these measures has worked well, but they
reflected
a growing public distrust of secret powers. Some members of Congress even
collaborated with unscrupulous CIA officials to subvert controls over
expenditures
and covert operations. When Congressman Charlie Wilson (D-TX) became
chairman
of the House's Intelligence Oversight Committee, he wrote to his friends
at the CIA, who were then secretly enlarging the supply of weapons to the
mujahideen in Afghanistan, "Well, gentlemen, the fox is in the hen
house. Do whatever you like."[19] Similarly, in 1985, the oversight
system virtually collapsed when it was revealed that NSA director Vice
Adm. John Poindexter and his aide Lt. Col. Oliver L. North had secretly
collaborated with DCI William Casey to sell arms to Iran and that no one
in Congress had been informed about it in any way. Somewhat more rigorous
Congressional scrutiny of the CIA ensued, which had the unintended effect
of making CIA officers more risk averse while enlarging the powers of the
Pentagon and our 14 other supersecret intelligence agencies, particularly
the National Security Agency, whose budget the Pentagon controls.
-
- Nonetheless, the CIA still retains its statutory role
of compiling and transmitting to the president objective intelligence on
matters it deems relevant to the nation's security. The Agency may have
become little more than a speed-bump for an imperial president who also
dominates the Congress and the courts, but it is still part of the checks
and balances of power within the executive branch of our government that
make the U.S. a democratic republic and protect us from an imperial
usurpation
of power. With the reelection of President Bush and the appointment of
Porter Goss to bring the CIA under White House control, it becomes
increasingly
hard to see how the republic will survive.
-
- Footnotes
-
- 1. Douglas Jehl, "Chief of CIA Tells His Staff to
Back Bush," the New York Times, November 17, 2004.
-
- 2. Melvin A. Goodman, "Righting the CIA," the
Baltimore Sun, November 19, 2004.
-
- 3. See, among several references, the remarks of a CIA
officer who actually heard Schlesinger: Ray McGovern, "Cheney's Cat's
Paw: Porter Goss as CIA Director," Counterpunch, July 6, 2004.
-
- 4. David Brooks, "The C.I.A. Versus Bush,"
the New York Times, November 13, 2004.
-
- 5. Daniel Ellsberg, Secrets [New York: Viking, 2002],
p. 434.
-
- 6. Loch K. Johnson, America's Secret Power: The CIA in
a Democratic Society [New York: Oxford University Press, 1989], p.
21.
-
- 7. Loch K. Johnson, p. 36.
-
- 8. Bob Woodward, Veil: The CIA's Secret Wars, 1981-87
[New York: Simon & Schuster, 1987], p. 49.
-
- 9. Robert M. Gates, "The CIA and American Foreign
Policy," Foreign Affairs vol. 66, Winter 1987-88, p. 227.
-
- 10. Loch K. Johnson, p. 62.
-
- 11. L. K. Johnson, p. 62; see also Harold P. Ford, CIA
and Vietnam Policymakers: Three Episodes, 1962-1968 [Washington: Central
Intelligence Agency, 1998], pp. 86-104.
-
- 12. 94th Congress, 2nd Session, Senate, Select Committee
to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities
[the Church committee], Final Report [Washington: Government Printing
Office,
1976], vol. 1, p. 78.
-
- 13. See Federation of American Scientists, Weapons of
Mass Destruction, R-36/SS-9 SCARP; and Fred Kaplan, The Rumsfeld
Intelligence
Agency, Slate, October 28, 2002.
-
- 14. Steven Coll, Ghost Wars [New York: Penguin, 2004],
p. 562.
-
- 15. Ray McGovern, "Cheney's Cat's Paw,"
Counterpunch,
July 6, 2004.
-
- 16. Richard A. Clark, Against All Enemies: Inside
America's
War on Terrorism [New York: Free Press, 2004]; Michael Scheuer, "How
Not to Catch a Terrorist," Atlantic Monthly, December 2004, pp.
50-52.
-
- 17. Douglas Jehl, "Ex-CIA Chief Nets $500,000 on
Talk Circuit," the New York Times, November 11, 2004.
-
- 18. Spencer Ackerman, "Killing the Messenger,"
Salon, November 16, 2004.
-
- 19. George Crile, Charlie Wilson's War [New York:
Atlantic
Monthly Press, 2003], p. 494.
-
- Chalmers Johnson's latest books Blowback: The Costs and
Consequences of American Empire (Metropolitan, 2000) and The Sorrows of
Empire: Militarism, Secrecy, and the End of the Republic (Metropolitan,
2004) are the first two volumes in a trilogy on American imperial policies.
The final volume is now being written. Between 1967 and 1973 Johnson served
as a consultant to the CIA's Office of National Estimates.
-
- Copyright c. 2004 Chalmers Johnson
|
