- The British people were indeed tricked into the Iraq
war. But the trickery was not forensic. It was not really about intelligence
dossiers, whether sexed up by Alastair Campbell or otherwise. It even had
little to do with weapons of mass destruction, whether possessed or programmed
by Iraq.
-
- The deception was always political. It concerned the
true reasons why Britain went to war, stuck by America's side, abandoned
its principal allies and interests in Europe, and played fast and loose
with the United Nations. Like all deceptions, this was not admitted in
public. But it was certainly discussed in private. And now it has been
revealed. Ladies and gentlemen, it looks as if we have a smoking gun.
-
- According to the slightly unreal argument that continues
to bagatelle through parliament and the media, and which did so again at
the foreign affairs committee yesterday, the key to war was proof. This
international battle with Saddam is argued like a criminal trial. Prove
that Saddam had - or might have had - weapons of mass destruction, and
there would be a cause of war. Fail to prove it, tamper with the evidence,
and the case for war falls. That is why the roles of the weapons inspectors
and the intelligence services became so vital in this tussle for public
opinion.
-
- But in the real world, this was all rather beside the
point. Or, rather, it was all secondary. Hans Blix never held the decision
to go to war in his hands at all. Nor did the intelligence chiefs. The
struggle in the real world was about power and politics. This was not a
trial. But it was punishment. And Tony Blair decided early on where he
stood.
-
- The evidence for this has been sitting unremarked in
a book published at the start of this month. Peter Stothard's book, 30
Days, is an inside account of what the subtitle calls "a month at
the heart of Blair's war". It is exceptionally well sourced. The former
editor of the Times was given remarkable access to the inner workings of
10 Downing Street for the build-up and duration of the conflict in March
and April. His account appeared first in a long article in May, when it
was seen by envious rivals as a bit of wasted chance.
-
- Now his account has been extended to book length. And
it is one of the previously unpublished passages in Stothard's account
that alters the evidence for the way that we should look at British policy
towards the Iraq war.
-
- Over the months, many commentators have alleged that
the war with Iraq occurred for one pre-eminent reason - because the United
States wanted it. Clare Short recently said as much, too. But this claim
has been laughed off by insiders. Now, though, Stothard has provided a
compelling piece of evidence that the critics' charge was spot on.
-
- The crucial passage occurs on page 87 of Stothard's diary-style
narrative of the war. It comes as the author reflects on the political
thought processes that had gone into the crafting of Tony Blair's widely
admired speech at the start of the vital eve-of-war Commons debate on March
18. Stothard's reflections are contained in a relatively long passage,
but it deserves to be quoted in full:
-
- "Has Tony Blair become some sort of reckless crusader
over Iraq? He thinks not. In September 2002 his analysis of relations between
Washington, London and Baghdad was clear and cold. It rested on six essential
points to which he and his aides would regularly return:
-
- á Saddam Hussein's past aggression, present support
for terrorism and future ambitions made him a clear threat to his enemies.
He was not the only threat, but he was a threat nevertheless.
-
- á The US and Britain were among his enemies.
-
- á The people of the US, still angered by the September
11 attacks, still sensing unfinished business from the first Gulf war 12
years before, would support a war on Iraq.
-
- á Gulf war 2 - President George W Bush v Saddam
Hussein - would happen whatever anyone else said or did.
-
- á The people of Britain, continental Europe and
most of the rest of the world would not even begin to support a war unless
they had a say in it through the UN.
-
- á It would be more damaging to longterm world
peace and security if the Americans alone defeated Saddam Hussein than
if they had international support to do so.
-
- "These six points - when scribbled on the back of
an envelope or set out on a printed page - are not exceptional. What is
exceptional is the certainty required to follow their logic. It is Tony
Blair's certainty that has been the surprise for many Labour MPs."
-
- Stothard sells himself short here. The six points are
exceptionally important. First, because of the date. Second, because of
the clear implication that Blair is the source of them (if he is not, then
Stothard is sexing up his own dossier). And third, because it shows how
passive British policy really was. Britain did not go to war to overthrow
an evil regime, or even to control WMD. It went to war to keep on the right
side of Washington.
-
- It has long been clear that September 2002 was pivotal.
It was the month when American decision-making reached ramming speed. It
was when the real decisions were taken - taken before Bush went to the
UN, before the UN authorised fresh weapons inspections, and before the
government's first dossier on Iraq's WMD. All of these were simply efforts
to sell a fait accompli.
-
- The two most important of the points are the fourth and
the sixth. They tell us, with great clarity, that in September 2002 Blair
acknowledged that the US would go to war in Iraq "whatever anyone
else said or did". They tell us, too, that Blair believed that Britain
should go to war alongside the US, whatever anyone else said or did either.
-
- Weigh those two points carefully. Neither of them has
ever been heard publicly in the mouth of a British minister or adviser
until now. Yet these points, apparently attributed by Stothard to Blair
in September 2002, transform all accounts of the government's approach.
-
- Not everything about the six points is shocking. That
Saddam's past record made him a threat to his enemies is beyond argument;
Saddam himself boasted of it. That the US and Britain were among his enemies
is not in contention either; Saddam said this repeatedly too. That US public
opinion was up for a war against Saddam is also true; every poll since
9/11 made that clear.
-
- It is therefore not a bolt from the blue to conclude,
as Blair did in point four, that the US would go to war whatever anyone
else said or did. Bush came extremely close to saying it in the 2002 state
of the union. But it is a revelation to have Blair admit it, and then for
him to add that it was in the interests of "long-term peace and security"
for others - ie Britain - to do the same, whatever the circumstances.
-
- As Blair admits in point five, the British public would
only support a war if it was authorised by the UN. For the next six months,
he fought to win UN backing for a war that he knew would happen anyway.
But this was public relations. As Geoff Hoon made clear recently, the same
thing may happen again, for this has now been elevated into a doctrine.
-
- That was the point at which true British interests required
the government to go no further. But Blair's reaction was dictated by points
four and six, not by the logic of the failure of point five. The policy
was always to make the best of a bad job. Blair continues to make the best
of it. But it is still a bad job. And now we appear to have proof that
Blair knew this all along.
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