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Homeland Security Money
And BSL Lab Upgrades

From Patricia Doyle, PhD
dr_p_doyle@hotmail.com
4-10-3
 
Hello Jeff - As you know, I am quite upset and angry about the fact that patients with SARS are being told to STAY HOME. For some, this is a death sentence.
 
Why? Because the hospital infrastructure and infection control is totally inadequate for the 21st century in a world with potential for bioterrorism and emerging infectious diseases and lab accidents.
 
I was astounded when I read that the Loudon County Virginia SARS patient was treated in hospital in an isolation room. So, why a sparsely populated area like Loudon County would have BSL 4 isolation ward in hospital is a mystery. Well, it really isn't...I am being sacrastic. We KNOW why they have the isocenter floor and no one else does. DC elitists and biotech folks and spooks can get treatment and the rest of us cannot.
 
Now, Boston U is also seeking a BSL 4 upgrade. This also angers me.
 
Homeland security is an enormous farce. Money is not going to the real needs of homeland security, i.e. equipment for first responders and strengthened hospital and medical infrastructure. There should be AT LEAST ONE isocenter facility in major cities like Los Angeles, New York, etc. Especially since these would be cities targeted by bioterrorists...and also they are major international travel hubs.
 
New York City has received NO, I repeat NO homeland security funds. Nada, zilch, nadie. WHY? Well, the Homeland Security farce agency was set up for one purpose: an old cronie club ready to pass out OUR TAX DOLLARS to the old boy network. The Biotech, Pharmaceutical Industrial complex, etc. such as Battelle Medical, The Carlyle Group, Alibek and Hadron are all heading for the big bucks.
 
Meanwhile, Chicago has 8,000+ first responders, and equipment for only 2,000. New York City police and fire first responders have a terrorist kit. That kit only supplies a hood that will allow the responder 10 minutes... just enough time to take himself or herself out of harms way. What do the sheeple have? Nothing. If you get SARS...well, just go home and stay there.
 
So, why isn't the windfall of homeland security money going where it is need? First responder equipment, isocenters (even if only one center in each major city could be established) and better testing techniques. We still do not have a rapid test for SARS. We have to rely on IFA, PCR, ELISA etc. Results take time. How do you test someone coming off a plane from Asia? On the spot at the airport? You don't. This is where the funding should go first.
 
Of course, the old boy networks at the universities are getting their share. More BSL 4 labs have been applied for but NO BSL4 isocenters in the area of those labs. The communities in those areas should DEMAND a BSL 4 isocenter as part of any acceptance package of a BSL 4 lab upgrade in their town. There isn't much we can do. Plum Island will get its upgrade. You can count on that. So, we must demand a facility on that island that will have isocenter wards with enough beds to treat community victims of that lab. Not 3 or 10 beds, but space for 300 people with capability to treat up to 500.
 
I resent the way that these labs are being pushed on us. At least six applications are pending. WHY so many? WHY NOW? MONEY for the industry, resurgance of offensive bioweapons research, translates into more forced vaccinations of the public, more targets for bioterrorists.
 
With all of our biolabs, and all of our hospitals, the only answer for SARS is the old 1800s method of treatment: forced quarantine. We were better able to manage Smallpox back in 1948. WHY?
 
Patty
 
 
Chronicle of Higher Education Biocontainment Facilities
 
 
Closing The Gates - The Money Scramble
 
Colleges rush to capitalize on the government's push for homeland security
 
By Anne Marie Borrego
 
It's a gamble, but Mark S. Klempner and Boston University are going for it.
 
Since last summer, Dr. Klempner, the associate provost for research at the university's medical school, has rounded up research scientists, hired architects, commissioned polls, and negotiated with the mayor, the City Council, and local neighborhood groups. His goal: to build a national biodefense laboratory on the campus. By the time he submitted his proposal, a 120-pound stack of paper and binders, to the National Institutes of Health, in February, BU had spent hundreds of thousands of dollars and committed to spending $50-million to help construct the facility. The project, if approved, would not be finished until 2008.
 
The payoff, though, could be huge: $1.6-billion in federal money over 20 years and the cachet of being one of up to two new labs chosen by the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases to house and study some of the world's deadliest biological agents, like the anthrax and botulism bacteria and the Ebola virus.
 
Dr. Klempner studied infectious diseases at the NIH and plans to assemble a team of 25 principal investigators if Boston University is selected. John R. Murphy, a partner on the proposal and the university's chief of molecular medicine, spent nearly a year working in such a lab at the U.S. Army's research center at Fort Detrick, Md., during the 1980s. BU boasts a rich history of studies in sexually transmitted diseases, a biotechnology park, and a program in bioinformatics. "We have an obligation to the nation," Dr. Klempner says of the institution's bid for the biodefense center.
 
But Dr. Klempner is best known for his work on Lyme disease, and BU is a relative unknown in the small world of bioweapons research. In fact, it is not generally considered to be among the top universities in biomedical research.
 
Which raises the question: Who should be dipping into the multibillion-dollar pot of money that has been offered up for homeland-security research?
 
Boston University is just one of dozens of institutions vying for a piece of the $3.2-billion that the Bush administration has requested for the 2004 fiscal year for research and development to protect the country. That's more than four times the amount spent in 2002, so it's not surprising that many researchers are now wondering how their work might be used to fight terrorism. While certain fields, like microbiology, are an obvious fit for antiterrorism research, "it's clear that some are just relabeling things that have little to do with homeland security," says David M. Hart, an associate professor of public policy at Harvard University, who studies the relationship between science and government.
 
Some universities have made bold plays for NIH mega-grants since the September 11 attacks and subsequent anthrax scare. Others have set up homeland-security centers, institutes, and joint ventures with other universities to strengthen their chances of getting money from the NIH and other agencies.
 
In the 2002 fiscal year, 35 institutions lobbied successfully for $116-million in homeland-security earmarks -- money doled out by Congress rather than won through a competition peer-reviewed by scientists. That's nearly double the $60-million earmarked in 2001, and the volume of projects for 2003 appears to be even higher.
 
Universities are not above sounding patriotic notes in their bids, or even hiring former military personnel to help draw big bucks.
 
To some insiders, such entrepreneurial patriotism seems opportunistic. "There is a sense that people are trying to jump on the bandwagon of bioterrorism research to get their hands on the money," says Julie A. Coffield, a professor of toxicology and neuroscience at the University of Georgia and an expert on botulinum, a bacterium that has been used to make biological weapons.
 
Dr. Coffield says she and other researchers are "a little bit frustrated" that the government is doling out money to institutions not known for their work in biodefense. "You hear about these things on the news and say, 'Why did they get that money?' Because as far as we know, there's nobody there who's ever done any research related to that."
 
Before the terrorist and anthrax attacks, very few people knew anything about bioterrorism or bio-weapons, says Raymond A. Zilinskas, a clinical microbiologist who now directs the Chemical and Biological Weapons Nonproliferation Program at the Monterey Institute of International Studies. "Suddenly, we have thousands and thousands of experts who know everything about it -- at least that's the impression they give."
 
Mr. Zilinskas says biocontainment facilities, like the ones BU and other institutions are bidding to build, should go to institutions with extensive experience with the most dangerous organisms, for reasons not only of safety but also of biology. Moving from a less-harmful virus or toxin to one of the "threat agents, that would take a major adjustment," he says. "You'd have to get people who know about these organisms -- who know how to work in a different environment."
 
Boston University's Mr. Murphy disagrees. "Not to be glib, but if I can do it, anybody can do it," he says of learning the safety procedures required for work in a Biosafety Level 4 lab, as such facilities are known. As for the biological adjustment, he says, "essentially the same techniques are used almost irrespective of the organism that you're working with."
 
Congress seems to share that view. "The fact that a university appears to be a recent convert to this area of concern doesn't mean that they're not highly qualified to do that kind of research," says David J. Goldston, chief of staff to Republicans on the U.S. House of Representatives Science Committee. "This is exactly what the federal-funding system is supposed to do -- direct researchers that have fairly widely applicable expertise to issues of national concern."
 
Looking for Results
 
Besides applying for grants, some universities are rolling their projects into newly created homeland-security institutes and have hired directors just to manage them. Ohio State University, for example, created a Program for International and Homeland Security in April 2002, and -- at a time when the university is hoping to cut $20-million to $25-million over the next five years -- has spent more than $1-million so far to develop proposals to garner federal funds. Part of that amount went to the salary of a retired Air Force major general, Todd I. Stewart, the program's director. He is one of at least three former military officers and scientists recently hired to direct such programs.
 
General Stewart, who has a Ph.D. in management and was a professor at the Air Force Institute of Technology, in Ohio, is clear about his role at Ohio State. "My job," he says, "is to try and encourage the faculty and other researchers and educators there to do research and investigation on various aspects of homeland security" -- not just in the physical and life sciences but also in the humanities and social sciences. Ohio State already boasts of 54 such research projects, courses, and programs on its Web site.
 
Results, not money, are the goal, says General Stewart, because "helping the nation move forward with solutions is the bottom line." Some universities hope high-level politicking will help get their foot in the door.
 
Arizona State University has hired Rick Collins, who was chief of staff to Gov. Jane Dee Hull of Arizona in the 1990s, to help it "clarify" its capabilities, he says. "We need to make sure that we're on the radar screen" as the new Homeland Security Department is set up. "I want to make sure we've got an elevator pitch that we can put in the hands of policy makers that are at the top level."
 
So after lawmakers authorized the department to sponsor regional demonstrations to "improve contact among technology developers, vendors, and acquisition personnel," Arizona State turned to its president, Michael M. Crow, a seasoned fund raiser who had considerable success in winning Congressional earmarks for Iowa State University earlier in his career.
 
Although the division that would create the program was not even fully operational, Mr. Crow sent a letter directly to Tom Ridge, the homeland-security secretary, stating Arizona State's interest in holding one of the regional demonstrations.
 
"Arizona State University is on the cutting edge in promoting revolutionary changes in technologies that would promote homeland security," Mr. Crow wrote. "Americans know how to step up when called upon." (No decision has been made on where the demonstrations will be held.)
 
It will be crucial for Arizona State and its competitors to prove in fairly sophisticated ways that they are uniquely qualified to make America safer, if they want to be contenders for government funds.
 
Under the Bush administration's proposed budget for the new department, 95 percent of the $803-million slated for research grants and contracts would go to applied research rather than basic research, the type most commonly done at universities.
 
Already in the Field
 
Some institutions, like Carnegie Mellon, Oklahoma State, and Pennsylvania State Universities, have conducted national-security research since long before the 2001 attacks. In some cases, that research is now focusing on the federal government's homeland-security priorities. Others hope that their experience will give them an edge in the race for more research funds.
 
Oklahoma State, in Stillwater, has received $15-million since 1999 in grants, contracts, and earmarks from the federal government to fight terrorism.
 
In the fall of 2001, for instance, the university received $1-million to develop lighter, thinner, and cooler gear to protect emergency personnel from dangerous chemicals, says H. James Harmon, a physics professor who has studied nerve-agent sensors since 1992. "It's important to emphasize that we did not jump on the bandwagon," he says, "that it kind of came and rolled over on us."
 
The state sees an opportunity as well. Despite a mounting budget deficit, the Oklahoma Legislature awarded Oklahoma State and the University of Oklahoma $19-million each this year for research and development on homeland security. Oklahoma State will use the money to build a biosafety laboratory to study both biological and agricultural terrorism, says Joe Alexander, the university's vice president for research.
 
Oklahoma State hopes the lab and the state support will be a magnet for federal dollars, including $25-million in grant and contract proposals that it is counting on to "bring more money into the state than what the state invested," says Mr. Alexander. "And then, of course, we're working with our Congressional delegation to hopefully get funds earmarked for this kind of research as well."
 
Homeland-security pork has already drawn the ire of several legislators.
 
Last year, during the final hours before it passed legislation establishing the Department of Homeland Security, the Senate argued over what appeared to be pork in the bill. At issue: the creation of a university-based Homeland Security Center under 15 strict criteria that, it seemed, only Texas A&M
 
University at College Station could satisfy. To be chosen, the university would need to have strong ties to laboratories that study animal and plant diseases; to demonstrate expertise in food safety, wastewater operations, and port security; and to have a relationship with the Department of Agriculture's labs and training centers. Texas A&M is the only institution that appeared to fit that bill.
 
Sen. Joseph I. Lieberman, a Connecticut Demo-crat, called the criteria "nothing short of science pork" during the Senate debate. "Science has thrived through peer review and competition over the best proposals -- which are fundamentals of federal science policy," he said. To date, no university has received money for the center.
 
Despite those heated arguments, this year's federal budget contains page upon page of earmarks for homeland security across several agencies, including the following:
 
a.. University of South Florida: $5-million to build a Center for Biodefense.
 
b.. St. Petersburg College: $3-million for the National Terrorism Preparedness Institute of its Southeastern Public Safety Institute.
 
c.. Auburn University: $1-million for its Canine Detection Center.
 
The first two came courtesy of Rep. C.W. (Bill) Young, the Florida Republican who is chairman of the House Appropriations Committee. The last was introduced by Sen. Richard C. Shelby, an Alabama Republican who leads the Appropriations subcommittee on transportation.
 
Sen. John McCain, a Republican from Arizona, criticized the 2003 pork. The multitude of earmarks "will continue to burden American taxpayers," he said. "They represent a serious diversion away from federal programs that have undergone the appropriate merit-based selection process."
 
Harvard's Mr. Hart agrees. Although "there is something to be said for spreading the money around" to institutions that do not typically receive large grants, earmarks are not always the best way to produce top-notch research, he says. They "won't produce the best results in the short term, compared to other ways of allocating funds."
 
Money should be awarded in a mix of ways, Mr. Hart says, "and peer review should be important, and probably dominant, for some of these homeland-security projects."
 
But others say results should stand on their own. "It's not the motives that are necessarily the most important," says Albert H. Teich, director of science policy at the American Association for the Advancement of Science. "It's the outcome."
 
The Wrong Priorities?
 
While legislative pork has long been assailed as a politicization of the research process, some critics also say the federal government may be allocating its resources unproductively, even in competitive contracts.
 
Take the NIH's proposed National Biocontainment Laboratories, the Biosafety Level 4 labs like the one Boston University wants to build. David R. Franz, vice president of the division of chemical and biological defense of the Southern Research Institute, a nonprofit center affiliated with the University of Alabama at Birmingham, does not specifically object to BU's bid.
 
But he thinks the proposed lab is not the type of facility that the country needs the most right now. Biosafety Level 4 labs require much more security than do Level 3 labs, which are much more common. Among the security measures: Air locks separate Level 4 labs from others in a complex, researchers wear "moon suits" to study deadly microbes, and scientists take chemical showers after they are finished.
 
But that extra cost and security, says Dr. Franz, could be wasted. In his 11 years at the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases, he recalls, "we had 10,000 square feet of BSL-4 and 50,000 square feet of BSL-3, and we ran short more often of BSL-3."
 
Mr. Zilinskas, of the Monterey Institute, agrees. He says existing Level 4 labs should be expanded, instead of building new ones. He also says that an NIH proposal to add several more Level 3 labs would be a better use of federal dollars.
 
Dr. Franz also wonders whether the new labs will steal talent from the existing ones. "I'm afraid that we're going to be pulling people out of our centers of excellence and actually taking a step back as a nation in this area," he says, "until we get those other labs up and running."
 
Shifting so much money to antiterrorism efforts, especially bioterrorism research, also misplaces priorities, Dr. Franz says. "We are putting almost $6-billion in biodefense, and we lose 20,000 to 80,000 people every year to influenza, 40,000 people to automobile accidents, and 440,000 to smoking-related illnesses," he says. "It's more likely that you'll get hit by a car than sickened by a bioterrorist's bug."
 
All that said, he does feel that the risk of bioterrorism requires major spending on certain kinds of research, as long as basic studies of public-health hazards continue to be priorities. And Boston University says that if its proposal gets the nod, its new lab would both fight bioterrorism and aid public health.
 
In the final analysis, most scientists seem pleased by the coming federal windfall, regardless of which researchers end up with it, while a number of policy analysts fret about skewed priorities and wasted resources. But a certain amount of waste is probably inevitable in any shift in scientific priorities.
 
The federal government, after all, has a history of pouring money into major research projects during times of national need, like the cold war and the energy crisis of the 1970s. As Harvard's Mr. Hart puts it: "If there's one thing we've learned in American history, it's that you can get results if you dump a huge amount of money into [major scientific endeavors]. And you have to accept waste with it."
 
Mary Wulff
 
Patricia A. Doyle, PhD Please visit my "Emerging Diseases" message board at: http://www.clickitnews.com/emergingdiseases/index.shtml Zhan le Devlesa tai sastimasa Go with God and in Good Health
 

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