- WASHINGTON -- This spring,
Army Green Berets set off from eastern Afghanistan toward the Pakistani
border because the CIA was convinced that top al-Qaeda leaders were in
the area, possibly including Osama bin Laden, and almost certainly his
No. 2, Ayman al-Zawahiri.
-
- But the military was skeptical and reluctant to launch
the secret raid, which required U.S. forces to stray into Pakistan at a
time when the Pakistani government was denying their presence. Military
intelligence doubted al-Qaeda leaders were there. ''We like to underpromise
and overdeliver,'' one senior Pentagon official said. ''That other agency
likes to overpromise.'' As the Pentagon had expected, the commandos returned
without any prized captives.
-
- CIA-Pentagon friction over that raid illustrates the
running conflict between the two agencies in the war in Afghanistan, CIA
and military officials say. Because the U.S. war against al-Qaeda is carried
out largely in secret, the CIA's paramilitary operatives and their shadowy
local agents are playing an unprecedented role alongside military commandos
and ground forces. That alliance ousted the Taliban from Afghanistan last
fall, but the CIA and Pentagon have clashed over tactics for seizing bin
Laden and his lieutenants.
Now, CIA and military officials are under pressure from President Bush
to draw up plans for using clandestine and conventional forces to overthrow
Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein. Their disputes in Afghanistan suggest the
job of working in concert will be hard.
CIA officials say the military has too often been slow to react, as on
the spring border raid. The CIA officials say the agency provided strong
intelligence, but by the time troops arrived, the prey had escaped.
Pentagon officials counter that CIA operatives have too often sent U.S
troops on wild goose chases or raids on innocent targets.
''Everybody wants great intelligence. You can't do anything without it,''
says Michael Vickers, a former Green Beret and CIA official. ''When you
don't get it, or when you act on bad intelligence, it leaves a bad taste
in your mouth. That can generate bad blood.''
Who lost bin Laden?
In February, an unmanned drone operated by the CIA blasted a tall man clad
in a white robe thought to be bin Laden in the mountains of eastern Afghanistan.
Officially, the Defense Department said the strike was justified. Privately,
a U.S. official says, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld groused that the
CIA was being reckless. ''God help anyone over 5-foot-4 in that country,''
Rumsfeld said.
One Pentagon official said the antagonism between Defense and CIA operatives
is the result of each side preparing to blame the other when the question,
''Who lost bin Laden?'' is asked.
''When no one is having a great deal of success, there is always a lot
of moaning and pointing fingers,'' says Vincent Cannistraro, a former CIA
counterterrorism chief. ''Right now, none of them is exactly covered with
glory.''
Senior officials at the Pentagon and CIA say they are unaware of any difficulties
between their agencies.
''Everything we have heard from the real war fighters has indicated to
us that they are very pleased with the level of cooperation we have given
them,'' CIA spokesman Bill Harlow says.
But other sources say the tension reaches all the way to Rumsfeld and CIA
Director George Tenet. One senior Pentagon official says disputes probably
were unavoidable after Sept. 11: The Defense Department had a war to fight.
But the CIA had a reputation to salvage after it failed to prevent bin
Laden's terrorist network from attacking New York City and Washington.
Pentagon officials cite several concerns:
* The military is held accountable for airstrikes or raids that go wrong,
but CIA operatives have less reason to be cautious about their calls for
strikes. Pentagon officials say a raid on the Afghan village of Hazar Qadam
that left 16 U.S. allies dead in January was prompted by bad intelligence
from the CIA.
* The CIA has asked military forces to provide Afghan warlords with weapons
that the Pentagon fears will inevitably be used against U.S. forces or
the U.S.-backed government in Kabul. In late April, a warlord in eastern
Afghanistan, Padshah Khan Zadran, whose militia has U.S. financial backing,
rained rockets on the town of Gardez and killed at least 25, mainly women
and children.
* The CIA's frequent leaks about progress in the manhunt for bin Laden
have angered top Pentagon leaders, who fear the military looks bad when
forces return to base empty-handed.
CIA officials declined to respond to the Pentagon's complaints.
On the other side, the CIA's charges of military missteps can be summed
up succinctly: Tora Bora. Intelligence placed bin Laden at the Tora Bora
cave complex in eastern Afghanistan in early December, yet he apparently
was able to slip through allied lines and escape into Pakistan. CIA officials
have been grumbling ever since, intelligence sources say.
CIA jumps in
Vickers says the exchange of complaints in Afghanistan appears to mark
a role reversal. Over the past decade, it is the military that at times
has been painted as a group of ''cowboys.''
The CIA, in contrast, has been maligned as risk-averse and over-reliant
on electronic eavesdropping and spy satellites instead of old-fashioned
spy work in the field.
But after Sept. 11, the CIA eagerly jumped into the war in Afghanistan.
The agency pulled hundreds of retired officers back to active duty, especially
those who had worked in Afghanistan after the Soviet invasion there in
1979.
Operatives who had been on and off the CIA payroll were sent back to old
haunts in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Some donned fatigues, picked up guns
and deployed as a small paramilitary unit augmenting the military's own
special operations forces.
One Green Beret officer, speaking on condition of anonymity, says two or
three CIA officers supplemented his unit as it aided anti-Taliban fighters.
The CIA officers brought with them language proficiency, interrogation
skills and Afghanistan expertise that the commandos could not match. They
also had clearance to do some things the soldiers could not: hand out large
satchels of cash and call in weapons drops to buy information and allegiances
from Afghan fighters.
Most CIA paramilitary units were linked to Army commando teams, but others
were what the Green Beret officer called free-floaters who roamed the countryside
independently, collected intelligence and called in airstrikes.
All of the CIA operatives, including operators of the Predator drone, are
supposed to report to the military's Central Command in Tampa. But they
also report to the CIA's Near-East Division, which is responsible for Afghanistan
and Pakistan, Vickers says.
At times, the so-called lash-up of CIA and military forces has been close
and positive for both agencies, military and intelligence sources say.
Ideally, CIA veterans were to make contacts with allies in the fight against
the Taliban and al-Qaeda, introduce them to military commandos and then
step aside.
In reality, military sources say, the chain of command has not always been
followed. Some operations were so chaotic and rushed that CIA and military
forces often had to drop into battle zones together and fight side by side.
In addition, Vickers says, not all CIA paramilitary units have diligently
consulted their military commanders. ''That's why there is friction,''
he says.
Another conflict has stemmed from competing sources of intelligence. There
are reports from informers and officers on the ground and there is CIA
information gathered from what some soldiers refer to as ''the Dark Side'':
electronic surveillance gear.
From the start of the war in Afghanistan, these two intelligence streams
clashed. In January, according to two military sources, CIA operatives
on the ground alerted Green Berets that the Taliban could be using a manure
factory to make bombs. CIA eavesdropping confirmed that the plant needed
to be taken down.
A group of Northern Alliance soldiers and Green Berets personally checked
the plant and decided it was doing nothing but bagging manure for fertilizer.
As they were preparing to leave, they ran into a team of Army Rangers and
Delta Force operatives on their way to assault the plant. A potential fiasco
was narrowly averted.
Copyright © 2002 USA TODAY, a division of Gannett Co. Inc.
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