- It was too good to be true. We were told we would be
getting evidence of Osama bin Laden's guilt. Instead, close analysis of
the 21-page document put out by the Government on Thursday reveals a report
of conjecture, supposition and unsubstantiated assertions of fact. It uses
every trick in the Whitehall drafter's arsenal to make the reader believe
they are reading something they are not: a damning indictment of Mr bin
Laden for the events of 11 September.
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- No wonder Tony Blair and his officials are delighted
with the reaction to publication of the dossier. One Whitehall source told
the Independent on Sunday they were "chuffed with two newspapers for
hailing it as 'proof' of bin Laden's involvement and delighted it got such
a good reaction overall". Ministers believe the document has sealed
the propaganda war, convincing the country of the need to move against
Mr bin Laden and al-Qa'ida and to accept limited British and civilian
casualties.
To their relief they are not being subjected to rigorous questioning on
the report, either from their own supporters, the Opposition, or much of
the media. Officials are also pleased: the document successfully papers
over the cracks in their own intelligence operations.
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- The report was put together by a committee which included
senior members of MI5 and MI6, working round the clock, with drafts going
backwards and forwards to Washington. Within Whitehall, the dossier was
seen as vital to gaining the approval of a naturally cautious and sceptical
British public. As a paper produced by mandarins anxious to brook no
argument
it is a classic of its kind, straight from the script of Yes Minister:
short on checkable detail; long on bold assertion; highly selective with
the choice of facts.
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- Officials when they prepare such reports operate to a
set of principles. They know that unlike the US, and thanks to their
efforts
in suppressing freedom of information down the years, Britain is a secret
society. We are not used to having anything presented to us about
intelligence
matters and threats to national security. That, plus the British
characteristic
of not defying authority, especially in times of crisis, means that if
the Government says loudly enough that something is "evidence",
even if it is not, we will accept it as such.
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- That is why the very first sentence in the paper, in
the introduction, states: "The clear conclusions reached by the
government
are: Osama bin Laden and Al Qaida, the terrorist network which he heads,
planned and carried out the atrocities on 11 September 2001." This
is the introduction, not the conclusion or an executive summary.
Introductions,
as the authors knew too well, normally set up a document, relating the
background as to why the book or, in this instance, a government document,
has been written. Here, that convention was rejected: from the word go,
the Government wanted to ensure the point of the document was
conveyed.
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- The document carries a health warning that intelligence
material has been withheld to protect the safety of sources. But, lawyers
point out, this is not good enough. Assuming one aim of the military
build-up
is to try to capture Mr bin Laden and put him on trial, that so-far-unseen
evidence would have to be displayed because on the basis of what has been
released there is no chance of his being prosecuted, let alone convicted.
"The Prime Minister told Parliament that this evidence was of an even
more direct nature indicating guilt," said Richard Gordon QC.
"The
document makes it clear that the additional evidence is 'too sensitive
to release'. That may be so, but in any criminal prosecution against bin
Laden the necessary evidence would have to be adduced for the case to be
proved."
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- For page after page, the paper spews out facts about
Mr bin Laden. In 1996, he issued a declaration of jihad, or holy war. In
February 1998 he issued and signed a fatwa which included a decree to all
Muslims that "the killing of Americans and their civilian and military
allies is a religious duty for each and every Muslim to be carried
out..."
In the same year he also said that acquiring chemical or nuclear weapons
for the defence of Muslims was a "religious duty". It might look
like evidence of something, but it is not proof he organised the 11
September
attacks. "All this shows, in the language of the lawyers, propensity,
but it proves little," said Mr Gordon.
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- More pertinent to 11 September were two TV interviews
he gave, in 1997 and 1998, in which he referred to the terrorists who
carried
out the earlier attack on the World Trade Centre in 1993 as "role
models". In December 1999, a terrorist cell linked to al-Qa'ida was
discovered trying to carry out attacks in the US. Other attacks on US
targets
by al-Qa'ida or terrorists trained at bin Laden camps were made in January
and October 2000.
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- Again, said Mr Gordon, it is not enough. "This
material
shows that bin Laden may well have been responsible for the 11 September
massacre but it does not, of itself, prove that he was." The document
goes into great detail about the bombings of the US embassies in Kenya
and Tanzania in 1998. But there is not one single fact presented that was
not already known. While the operation was similar to 11 September well
planned, two attacks on the same day, suicide attackers indiscriminate
killing of civilians, including Muslims it does not prove anything.
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- Officials deny that the minute description of the
previous
bombings was designed to cover up cracks in their own intelligence about
11 September. Nevertheless, it is noticeable that in a 21-page document
the overwhelming bulk of it is devoted to rehashing old information. It
is not until page 18 and paragraph 61 that the reader is told something
new about 11 September.
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- This is that three of the 19 hijackers have been
"positively
identified as associates of Al Qaida" and that one of them "has
been identified as playing key roles in both the East African embassy
attacks
and the USS Cole attack". The word "associates" suggests
the authorities lack intelligence on al-Qa'ida: they think they know who
may be involved but they are not sure, and they are not certain where they
come in the pecking order hence the catch-all, "associates".
The three are understood to be: Khalid Almihdhar and Nawaf Alhazmi, both
filmed secretly in Kuala Lumpur meeting other al-Qa'ida members involved
in the USS Cole bombing in Aden; and Mohamed Atta. Suspected of being the
ringleader, Atta is believed to have been a member of Islamic Jihad, a
major grouping within al-Qa'ida, and the authorities are convinced he
received
training at a bin Laden camp in Afghanistan. The hijacker who played a
key role in the embassy, USS Cole and 11 September attacks, is thought
to refer to Almihdhar. If there is a hijacker linking all three, that is
a crucial piece of evidence since there is no doubt al-Qa'ida committed
the earlier bombings.
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- The next paragraph, 62, promises much and delivers
little.
Prefaced with another rider about names remaining anonymous to protect
sources, it begins by saying how, prior to 11 September, Mr bin Laden
"mounted
a concerted propaganda campaign ... justifying attacks on Jewish and
American
targets". It was well known in the Middle East that, earlier this
year, a bin Laden recruitment video was in circulation, exhorting Muslims
to lay down their lives for the jihad. The video makes no mention of any
coming big assault nor does it refer to 11 September or possible targets
in the US.
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- Last week it emerged that Mr bin Laden called his
adoptive
mother in Syria on 10 September to tell her there would be "big
news",
subsequent to which he might be out of touch for some time. It is hard
to believe that someone as cautious as him would risk such a call. However,
this is understood to be what is being referred to when the document says,
in paragraph 62: "We have learned, subsequent to 11 September, that
bin Laden himself asserted shortly before 11 September that he was
preparing
a major attack on America." The document goes on, saying that in
August
and early September, close bin Laden associates were warned to return to
Afghanistan by 10 September.
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- This is new, and odd. Since the attacks, known al-Qa'ida
associates have been picked up or they are being watched. If there was
advice to go to Afghanistan presumably they ignored it or did not receive
it. The names of the "close associates" are not specified,
neither
is any more detail made available which is a mystery. It is hard to see
why giving a bit more detail would compromise anybody or a foreign
intelligence
service that may be monitoring their calls.
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- Again, this tantalising paragraph by far the most
intriguing
in the document says that just before the attacks "some known
associates
of bin Laden were naming the date for action as on or around 11
September".
What associates? How? When? Again, no detail is supplied.
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- Then, the paragraph continues, "one of bin Laden's
closest and most senior associates was responsible for the detailed
planning
of the attacks". This is thought to be a reference to either Mohamed
Atef, al-Qa'ida's operations chief, or Ayman al Zawahiri, Mr bin Laden's
deputy. Another senior al-Qa'ida member being mentioned by those close
to the investigation is Abu Zubeidah.
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- After all this, the most vital paragraph in the paper
ends with this curious sentence: "There is evidence of a very specific
nature relating to the guilt of bin Laden and his associates that is too
sensitive to release."
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- What this document is not is a detailed exposition of
the investigation to date. To be fair, that is still ongoing, but providing
that amount of information would distract from the paper's main purpose,
to blame Mr bin Laden. This is summarised in the final narrative paragraph,
69: "No other organisation has both the motivation and the capability
to carry out attacks like those of the 11 September only the Al Qaida
network under Osama bin Laden." This smacks of exasperation. To ram
that point home, paragraph 70, "conclusion", repeats the message
of the introduction. This, in the end, is what the paper is for, a
Government
plea for trust: it was Mr bin Laden. To which the response must be: we
believe you but prove it.
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