- There is a well known principle of logic known as "Occam's
Razor" the simplest explanation is usually the best one.
-
- Consider its application in the case of TWA 800: Hundreds
of witnesses watch streaks of light head towards the plane; FAA radar picks
up what appears to be a missile; and the plane explodes catastrophically
without a word from the cockpit.
-
- The New York Times adds detail. On Aug. 14, 1996, four
weeks after the crash, Don Van Natta Jr. reported that "the pattern
of the debris they [investigators] have recovered off the ocean floor has
also persuaded them that a mechanical malfunction is highly unlikely."
Van Natta acknowledged too that "in 10 field tests at Calverton, L.I.,
chemists have detected residue consistent with an explosive" on the
recovered aircraft. These tests, he added, rarely show false positives.
-
- But there is more. The Times article stated emphatically,
"Now that investigators say they think the center fuel tank did not
explode, they say the only good explanations remaining are that a bomb
or a missile brought down the plane off Long Island."
-
- Occam's Razor says, yes, missile but the NTSB had
little use for cutting to the clear conclusion.
-
- If "senior investigators" were telling Van
Natta that "the center fuel tank caught fire as many as 24 seconds
after the initial blast that split apart the plane," NTSB "officials"
were not so ready to concede. They needed a viable alternative explanation,
a politically safe one like a mechanical failure, and would use their considerable
powers to make the obvious explanation go away.
-
- ''I don't think anything rules out anything at this point,''
Robert T. Francis, vice chairman of the safety board, told Van Natta. Although,
as Van Natta reported, this finding "deals a serious blow to the already
remote possibility that a mechanical accident caused the crash," he
also acknowledged that NTSB "officials" were "unwilling
to rule out a mechanical failure." Van Natta then added prophetically,
"By keeping open the possibility of a malfunction, safety board investigators
can continue to pursue all possibilities, no matter how remote."
-
- Truer words were never spoken. The NTSB would pursue
the remotest possibilities imaginable, and with each new test, they would
only move further from the truth. In the next four years they would not
discover one new fact to revive a theory that was discredited within one
month of the crash.
-
- But as Van Natta noted, "While investigators, speaking
not for attribution, said they have concluded that the center fuel tank
did not explode, publicly they have refused to say that." They dared
not. They understood the consequences. With the investigators silenced,
the "officials" would control the microphone. In time, they would
wear the media and the public down and make the story go away.
-
- To make their strategy work, NTSB officials hoped to
find a lab or university somewhere in the world that would validate a mechanical
explanation for the crash in much the way the CIA animation had invalidated
the eyewitnesses. As related in Part 1, they did not succeed. Despite all
the temptations to comply, the science community refused to provide the
necessary cover.
-
- Without facts to back up its contrived hypothesis of
mechanical failure, the NTSB resorted to fiction. It presented its conclusions
to a distracted public and an increasingly docile media in a novella titled,
"Factors Suggesting the Likelihood that a Short-Circuit Event Occurred
on TWA Flight 800."
-
- One is hard pressed to identify a single fact in this
tortured report. Guesswork and supposition run rampant. To reveal the conspiratorial
intent of the NTSB, at least an element within the agency, it is useful
to quote this document at length. Only the italics are added:
-
-
- Much of the insulation on the wiring recovered from the
accident airplane was cracked or otherwise damaged, often exposing the
inner conductor. When powered, such damaged wires would be vulnerable to
short-circuiting. Although some of the damage to the accident airplane's
wiring insulation probably occurred as a result of the accident or search
and recovery operations, the degraded condition of wiring insulation found
during inspections of other transport-category airplanes of about the same
age as the accident airplane suggests that at least some of the damage
to the wiring insulation of the accident airplane very likely existed before
the accident. Given what was found during the inspections of other airplanes,
it is also likely that metal shavings and other contaminants were interspersed
with the wiring system on the accident airplane before the accident.
-
- Evidence of arcing was found on generator cables routed
with wires in the leading edge of the right wing, near the wing root. Although
this arcing might have been caused by the breaking of the forward wing
spar and subsequent fuel fire, it is possible that it could also have been
caused before the explosion. Because this wire bundle included wires leading
to the right main wing tank fuel flow gauge and right wing FQIS wiring
that would have been routed to a connection in the CWT [central wing tank]
at terminal strip T347, a short circuit in this bundle could have carried
excess energy into the CWT FQIS.
-
- A pause here is in order. Consider the choices the NTSB
presents as to what caused the arcing found on the generator: a) the catastrophic
breakup of the forward wing spar and the subsequent fuel fire, which did
take place; b) a short circuit in the wiring, which might conceivably have
taken place before the explosion. An honest investigation would focus on
"a." The NTSB, however, focused on "b." To put this
in perspective, it is as if the L.A. cops completely ignored OJ and went
after the "Colombian drug dealers." The repot stumbles forward:
-
-
- In addition, two non-FQIS wires at body station (STA)
955, which would have been corouted in the same raceway as CWT FQIS wiring,
were found with possible arcing damage. (Although the FQIS wiring recovered
from this area did not contain evidence of arcing, it should be noted that
some of the FQIS wiring from this area was not recovered.) These wires
were located near structural repairs from a burst potable water tank and
numerous other floor repairs. These repairs could have disturbed nearby
wires, cracking or otherwise damaging the wire insulation, and could also
have generated metal shavings. In fact, metal drill shavings were found
adhered to fragments of a floor beam from STA 920, within 2 inches of where
the CWT FQIS wiring would have been routed. This area is also near galley
C, which was the site of numerous reported leaks in the 2 weeks preceding
the accident. Leakage from this area could have dripped onto electrical
wiring located immediately beneath the galley floor and caused a short
circuit that affected the CWT FQIS wiring.
-
- Repairs to the area around the upper flight attendant
lighting panel could also have created conditions conducive to short-circuiting.
A lighting wire and pin in that panel had been repaired on June 20, 1996,
about a month before the accident. Although no evidence of arcing was found
on the repaired wire, during the repair other wires bundled with it might
well have been moved. The repaired wire was part of a bundle that branched
off from a larger bundle that contained CWT and left wing FQIS wires that
led to the upper deck AIDS unit and also contained high-voltage wiring
for lighting; thus, manipulation of wires during the repair could have
resulted in movement and cracking of these wires. In addition, there was
evidence of extensive structural repairs in this area, and the cabin interior
had been altered, both of which could have disturbed these wires and introduced
metal shavings, possibly damaging the wire insulation. Further, condensation,
which is common in transport-category airplanes, could have provided a
mechanism for short-circuiting of such damaged wires when powered. Finally,
in addition to being bundled with FQIS wires, the lighting wires were also
bundled with CVR wires and No. 4 fuel flow wires along some portions of
their path. Therefore, a short circuit involving these lighting wires could
also explain the electrical anomalies indicated on the CVR recording and
the No. 4 fuel flow indicator.
-
- Curiously, this report contradicts what the NTSB experts
had stated in the December of 1997 at the Baltimore NTSB hearings. Although
they acknowledged that the flight crew observed an erratic fuel flow indicator
for engine number 4, 10 minutes after take-off, they rightly dismissed
this as "a common occurrence in the 747."
-
- But now, two and one-half years later, the NTSB was desperate.
They were forced to grasp at any straw. So an erratic fuel indicator once
thought to be routine suddenly became a major lead in pursuit of the mythical
spark that jumped into Flight 800's center wing tank:
-
-
- Although no evidence of arcing was found in any of the
components connected to the CWT FQIS, investigators considered the possibility
that a short circuit in one of those components could have been a source
of excess voltage transferred to the CWT FQIS wiring. The interior of each
of these components contained numerous complex wiring and circuit assemblies
that could have obscured the evidence of a short circuit. Further, it is
also possible that a short circuit at lower power or through moisture could
occur without leaving evidence of arcing. Therefore, there are several
possible locations at which a short circuit of higher-voltage wiring could
have affected the CWT FQIS wires in the accident airplane.
-
- Further, as noted previously, there are several indications
that possible anomalous electrical events occurred in the airplane just
before the explosion. First, the captain's CVR [cockpit voice recorder]
channel recording has two "dropouts" of background power harmonics,
indicating some type of electrical anomaly, less than a second before the
CVR lost power. Second, captain's comment about a "crazy" No.
4 fuel flow indicator were recorded on the CVR about 212 minutes before
it lost power, which also suggests that some type of electrical anomaly
occurred that affected the wiring. And third, the recovered CWT fuel quantity
gauge from the cockpit displayed a reading of 640 pounds, which does not
agree with the quantity recorded by the ground refueler (300 pounds). Safety
Board testing showed that applying power to a wire leading to the fuel
quantity gauge can cause the digital display to change by several hundred
pounds in less time than is required to trip the circuit breaker. This
suggests that an electrical anomaly might have affected the reading of
the cockpit gauge.
-
- These electrical anomalies were not necessarily related
to the same event. However, it is possible that one or more of these anomalies
were a manifestation of an electrical event that resulted in excess voltage
being transferred to the CWT FQIS wiring. On the basis of this and other
evidence previously discussed, the Safety Board concludes that a short
circuit producing excess voltage that was transferred to the CWT FQIS wiring
is the most likely source of ignition energy for the TWA flight 800 CWT
explosion.
-
- No other "evidence" was "previously discussed."
All was vague guesswork, supposition heaped on top of speculation.
-
-
- Exposed conductors on FQIS wiring (caused by either mechanical
damage or cold-flow) within a fuel tank could provide a mechanism that
would lead to arcing inside the tank, which in turn could ignite the flammable
fuel/air vapor. Very little of the CWT FQIS wiring from the accident airplane
was recovered, and, therefore, the degree to which the wiring in the tank
might have been damaged before the accident could not be assessed. However,
investigators found preaccident damage, including exposed conductors, on
some of the recovered FQIS wiring from inside TWA flight 800's wing tanks,
and damaged FQIS wiring was found inside the CWTs of several of the other
747 airplanes examined by the Safety Board. In addition, the presence of
a conductive material, such as metal drill shavings or safety wire, could
have provided a mechanism that would lead to arcing of FQIS components.
Although no clear evidence of arcing was found inside TWA flight 800's
CWT, fire damage along the route of the FQIS wiring was severe enough that
it likely would have obscured any such evidence.
-
- Another potential source of ignition energy is resistance
heating, which could have resulted from a thin filament being heated through
contact with a wire, probe, or compensator exposed to excess voltage. Although
no clear evidence of a filament ignition was found inside TWA flight 800's
CWT, such evidence could also have been physically lost or obscured by
fire damage.
-
- The Safety Board contracted with two research laboratories,
Sandia National Laboratory and Christian Michelsen Research, to develop
computer modeling in an attempt to determine potential ignition locations.
However, because of considerable uncertainties in some aspects of the methodology,
the results of that modeling could not be used to determine the most likely
ignition location.
-
- Nonetheless, investigators examined all the recovered
CWT components, which included portions of all seven fuel probes, one complete
terminal block and one partial terminal block, and the compensator. None
of the recovered probes or terminal blocks exhibited any noteworthy signs
of damage. However, several plastic parts inside the compensator's innermost
tube were found burned, with an apparent upward-flowing burn pattern, which
investigators hypothesized could indicate that a fire initiated inside
the compensator. Similar burn patterns were observed on the compensator
believed by the FAA to be the ignition source for the surge tank fire in
the 747 that experienced a fuel tank explosion in May 1976 near Madrid,
Spain. (Although the Safety Board discounted the compensator as an ignition
source in its October 1978 report of the Madrid accident, a different conclusion
might have been warranted given what is now known about sulfides and other
ignition-related phenomenon.) However, there was insufficient evidence
to conclude that the damage to the CWT compensator occurred before the
explosion, and, therefore, no determination could be reached regarding
the likelihood that the compensator was the ignition location.
-
- 2.3.2.3 Possible Ignition Scenario for TWA Flight 800
Explosion. Therefore, the Safety Board concludes that the ignition energy
for the CWT explosion most likely entered the CWT through the FQIS wiring,
and, although it is possible that the release of ignition energy inside
the CWT was facilitated by the existence of silver-sulfide deposits on
an FQIS component, neither the energy release mechanism nor the location
of the ignition inside the CWT could be determined from the available evidence.
-
- Remember Occam's Razor the simplest explanation
is usually the best. The labored, labyrinthine explanation of the NTSB
has "worst" written all over it.
-
- The NTSB, however, was not the only organization to review
the wiring. The International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers
did its own assessment. These workers have far less interest in the hypotheticals
of how a plane might work than in the reality of how it actually does.
Unlike the NTSB, their analysis cuts right to the chase:
-
-
- We conclude that the existing wiring recovered from flight
800 wreckage does not exhibit any evidence of improper maintenance or any
malfunction that led to a spark or other discrepancy.
-
- What did cause the center wing tank to explode? The IAMAW
does not mince words:
-
-
- A high pressure event breached the fuselage and the fuselage
unzipped due to the event. The explosion was a result of this event.
-
- The IAMAW is describing a missile or some other external
force. But no one wanted to hear what the IAMAW had to say. "We feel
that our expertise was unwelcome and not wanted by the FBI," read
its final report. "The threats made during the first two weeks of
the investigation were unwarranted and unforgettable." When released,
the NTSB quietly tucked the IAMAW report away, and the major media never
bothered to read it.
-
- The actions and the motives of the NTSB are transparent.
By August of 1996, it knew for a fact, as The New York Times reported,
that "the initial blast that severed the plane occurred slightly forward
of the spot where the wings meet the fuselage," not in the center
wing tank.
-
- The agency hoped, however, that somewhere along the line
a scientific test would produce a hypothetical setting in which a contrived
mechanical initiating event would enter the realm of the possible. A compliant
media would then take the hypothetical possibility and turn it into an
established scientific fact. Unfortunately for the NTSB, that scientific
hypothesis never developed.
-
- Instead, the NTSB reverted to what military people mockingly
call SWAG analysis as in "sophisticated wild-ass guess."
But this time it was not even an honest SWAG. The NTSB case sums up thusly:
We don't know how the mythical spark could have gotten inside the CWT and,
once there, where the initiating explosive event occurred, but one thing
we know for certain, it was not a bomb or missile.
-
- Think about this: The NTSB combined a complete lack of
physical evidence for mechanical failure with an equally complete lack
of hypothetical scientific corroboration for mechanical failure to "prove"
that Flight 800 was brought down by what else? mechanical failure,
this despite the flat-out rejection of the same by the IAMAW and by "senior
investigators" as early as August of 1996.
-
- What is shocking is that the NTSB has gotten away with
this, at least to date. This should not happen in America. Please share
this with those who care.
-
- Contact information:
-
- Attorney General John Ashcroft
- U. S. Department of Justice
- 950 Pennsylvania Avenue NW
- Washington, DC 20530-0001
-
- Congressman Dan Burton
- Chairman
- House Government Reform Committee
- 2157 Rayburn Building
- Washington, DC 20515
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