 Of all the U.S. military programs
facing elimination, the V-22 Osprey program is most deserving. The MV-22
is far too expensive and too unstable to conduct combat assaults. The February
issue of G2mil contains an article "The V-22 Fiasco" which should
convince any sane person that this program is deeply flawed. An April 20,
2001 report by POGO summarizes other MV-22 problems. Early this year, a
"blue-ribbon" panel consisting of a retired Marine General and
two defense industry insiders was convened to ensure continuation of this
program. This bogus review panel traveled the nation to visit manufacturing
plants where the flawed MV-22s were built, but didn't find time to drive
one hour outside Washington DC to talk with the MV-22 test pilots based
in Maryland.
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- The panel recommended that obvious technical problems
should be fixed, and an expensive redesign is now underway. The lightweight
titanium hydraulic lines are too thin, so they will be replaced. Proper
testing should eliminate the software problems. The Bell-Boeing team became
aware of these problems during testing, but never fixed them, and 20 Marines
died as a result. In private business, Bell-Boeing would have paid millions
of dollars to the families of the dead Marines. They would also be expected
to fix flaws in a product they produced, but in the corrupt world of U.S.
military contracting, they will be paid even more money. The Marines also
want a .50 caliber gatling gun mounted, so this will further complicate
matters.
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- Meanwhile, the production line will stay open to produce
incomplete MV-22s, which will be parked until the redesign work is finished.
Then another billion dollars will be wasted to modify these 40 or more
pre-production lemons. This redesigned MV-22C should be ready to fly within
a year, but will it be thoroughly tested as promised? This would cost another
billion dollars, take another two years, and may identify more problems.
As a result, Marine Generals may claim that the redesigned
 Osprey was already tested. The MV-22s will be delivered
to operational squadrons where pilots will face ridiculously stringent
flight limitations to prevent another accident. This is of little concern
to the racketeers at Bell-Boeing and in the U.S. Congress. Their goal is
to produced as many MV-22s as possible, and then collect billions more
dollars to continually "fix" problems. They will never admit
that the MV-22's design is fundamentally flawed, and will continue to look
reporters and Congressmen in the eye and repeat these lies.
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- #1 The MV-22 has twice the range of helicopters.
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- The MV-22 has about the same range as modern helicopters,
like the new Navy MH-60S. The Marine Corps' old CH-53E has twice the range
of the MV-22, which can be verified at the Marine Corps' own website. In
those rare cases when the Marines need to fly long distances for a raid,
the MH-60S can be equipped with external fuel tanks and far outrange the
MV-22. The Special Operations command already operates the MH-60G "Pavehawk"
(right) with a range of 445 nautical miles, almost twice the range of the
MV-22. The MV-22 has "indefinite" range if refueled in the air,
but helicopters can be fitted with booms to refuel in the air too.
-
- #2 The MV-22 has twice the speed of helicopters.
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- The MV-22 can reach 240 knots, while helicopters are
limited to around 148 knots, so its about 62% faster, not 100%. Even the
40-year old CH-46 can fly 145 knots. If the MV-22 carries cargo on an external
hook, it must keep its rotors upright and cannot fly any faster than helicopters.
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- #3 The MV-22's higher speed makes it safer from ground
fire.
-
 Obviously, a faster flying aircraft is
harder to hit. However, helicopter transports flying over enemy territory
are normally escorted by Cobra attack helicopters. The armored Cobras scout
ahead and engage threats, and guide the transports away from dangers. The
Cobras also stand guard over the landing zone to immediately engage threats.
Many Marines have questioned if Ospreys will operate without escorts, or
fly at helicopter speeds so the Cobras can keep up. (see the April issue
of the Marine Corps Gazette) This important issue has been ignored by Marine
Generals.
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- The biggest danger assault transports face is in the
landing zone. To avoid a deadly loss of lift called "vortex ring state"
MV-22s must descend at half the rate of helicopters. In addition, the MV-22s
generate three times more "downwash" as they land, so the danger
of damage from flying debris among a group of MV-22 is higher. The 90knt
downwash is so strong (see photo) that sea rescues are dangerous and landing
in the desert causes a "brown out" where visibility is zero.
The wind is so strong and the flying debris so dangerous that landed troops
must lie down in exposed fields until the MV-22s fly away.
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- Survivability is an even bigger issue. Helicopters can
land after a loss of engine power, by using "autorotation", the
MV-22s rotors are too small, which is why unusual "test waivers"
were allowed. Minor damage to the MV-22 rotors or complex drive system
can cause catastrophic results, as the first two MV-22 crashes demonstrated.
The two rotors must work perfectly in tandem, otherwise the imbalance causes
the MV-22 to roll over, as the third and fourth crashes demonstrated. Finally,
if the rotors become stuck forward, the MV-22 cannot land anywhere because
its rotor blades extend well below the fuselage. During the Vietnam War,
damaged helicopters landed safely thousands of times; damaged MV-22s just
fall out of the sky.
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- #4 The MV-22 can carry 24 combat equipped Marines.
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- The MV-22 is supposed to carry as many Marines as the
CH-46E, but its cargo compartment is almost four feet shorter, and slightly
narrower. Nevertheless, the Marine Corps insists the MV-22B can carry 24
combat-equipped Marines, even after the GAO determined that only 15-18
Marines will fit. Remember that 19 Marines died when the MV-22 flipped
over during the April 11, 2000 full operational evaluation (e.g. 4 crewmen
and 15 troops).
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- The "requirement" that a new Marine helicopter
must carry 24 Marines was invented in someone's head, it is not based on
a real need. A requirement to lift a certain artillery gun or vehicle is
valid, but the exact number of troops is an elastic standard. If moving
the maximum number of bodies is the goal, the Marine CH-53E (right) can
carry 55 Marines, or an armored vehicle. Articles have appeared in professional
journals which argue that the Corps should forward-deploy composite squadrons
consisting of 10 powerful CH-53Es and 4 CH-46Es, rather than 12 CH-46Es
and 4 CH-53Es. This mix could double the squadron's helicopter lift, but
this idea was ignored because it would threaten justification for the MV-22
program.
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- #5 The MV-22 costs only $41 million each.
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- During this year (FY2001), Bell-Boeing was to receive
$1208.5 million to produce 16 V-22 aircraft for the Marines, for an average
cost of $76 million each. Some of this money was recently cut and reprogrammed
for the redesign. The Marine Corps spent an average $90 million for each
"pre-production" MV-22. The Department of Navy (which funds Marine
Corps aviation) had budgeted around $66 million for each full-production
copy, which is traditionally optimistic. Last year, the Navy determined
the MV-22s costs had risen and cut the overall buy from 360 to 348. A GAO
study last year estimated $83 million a copy, and that was before the Marines
decided to add a gun and make other enhancements.
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- #6 It would take years to modify and test a modern helicopter
like the Army's Blackhawk to operate from ships.
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- The new Navy MH-60S "Knighthawk" has already
been fully tested and approved for full production. It can carry a crew
of four and 13 passengers or 10,000lbs of cargo. The Marine Corps can simply
sign a production contract to join in the Navy buy. Navy H-60 spare parts
and training programs have been functioning for years, the Corps already
operates eight VH-60s as part of the Presidential helicopter squadron.
If the Corps joined the Army, Navy, and Air Force by adopting the Sikorsky
H-60 series for basic transport, all services would save money and improve
interoperability. This year, the Navy bought 17 MH-60S for $17 million
each, they would cost even less if purchased at a higher rate with a joint
Marine Corps buy. The MH-60S can carry almost as much as the MV-22, at
one-sixth the price. The Navy is impressed with the MH-60S and plans to
use them to replace their CH-46D helicopters, rather than buying 48 HV-22s.
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- Adopting the H-60 design would allow the Marine Corps
to add a new capability by modifying some MH-60S as EH-60E electronic warfare
aircraft, using components already in service with the Army. Another advantage
is that the MH-60S is equipped to carry 16 Hellfire anti-tank missiles.
This would quadruple the airborne anti-tank firepower of the Marine Corps.
For example, composite squadrons which the Corps maintains forward-deployed
include four Cobra attack helicopters which could be supported by 12 MH-60S
carrying Hellfires and machine guns.
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- Another option is for the Corps to add the 43 MH-53E
heavy lift helicopters which the Navy plans to retire. The Marines plan
to upgrade and overhaul 101 of its fleet of 165 nearly identical CH-53Es
to a CH-53F configuration, at a cost of $20 million each. Apparently, the
funding drain of the MV-22 program will not allow all 165 CH-53Es to remain
in service, even though they carry three times the cargo as the MV-22,
and four CH-53Fs will cost less than one MV-22. Canceling the MV-22 would
free ample funds to rebuild all Marine CH-53Es and Navy MH-53Es to provide
208 powerful CH-53Fs for the Marines.
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- #7 The MV-22 mishap rate is no worse than other new aircraft.
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- In a commentary in the February 12, 2001 issue of the
Marine Corps Times, Steven Danyluk, a former Marine pilot now flying for
American Airlines, wrote: "These accidents give the Osprey, which
has barely 4,000 total flying hours, a mishap rate of nearly 100 per 100,000
flight hours, the statistical standard for measuring an airframe's safety
record. The Marine Corps' overall safety record in 2000, excluding the
MV-22, was 2.65 "Class A" mishaps per 100,000 flight hours. With
MV-22 flights averaging two hours per mission, those riding aboard an Osprey
have had, to date, a 1-in-500 chance of meeting a disastrous fate. If American
Airlines operated with a similar mishap rate, it would suffer five crashes
per day. Osprey advocates say high mishap rates are not uncommon with new
designs. But the new designs that experienced such mishap rates primarily
came at the dawn of the jet age, in aircraft that were mostly single-pilot
configurations equipped with ejection seats. In contrast, the Osprey is
designed to carry 24 combat-loaded Marines with no such escape mechanism."
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- FY96-00 Marine Class A Fght Mishap Rates Data from the
Navy Safety Center
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- Class A Flight Mishaps
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- Flight Hours Flight Mishaps Rate
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- FY 1996 409,338 15 3.66
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- FY 1997 360,586 12 3.33
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- FY 1998 356,804 9 2.52
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- FY 1999 358,334 13 3.63
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- FY 2000 340,095 9 2.65
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- FY 1996-2000 1,825,157 58 3.18
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- MV22 4,000 4 100.00
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- The MV-22s mishap rate is actually worse because a "Class
A" mishap is one where a death occurs or over one million dollars
in damage is suffered, which is not difficult for aircraft which cost around
$50 million dollars. For example, when a MV-22 flipped over and killed
19 Marines in April 2000, the other MV-22 in the flight also lost some
control and suffered damage when it hit the runway hard. It may have suffered
enough damage to qualify as "Class A". The four MV-22 crashes
were total losses where everyone on board died, while most of the "Class
A" mishaps in the chart were repairable damage.
-
- Keep in mind that Marine aircraft average over 20 years
of age, fly dangerous training missions in difficult weather, and are maintained
by young Marines, often based overseas on ships. The new MV-22s have been
flown only carefully scripted test missions, by the best pilots in the
Corps, only in ideal weather, and under care of the Corps best mechanics.
In contrast, none of the new C-17 aircraft have crashed, nor have any of
the new F/A-18E. The F-22 had one mishap where the pilot ejected safely.
The two other new military aircraft under development have suffered no
mishaps; the RAH-66 Comanche helicopter and the Joint Strike Fighter.
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- #8 The MV-22 is essential for future Marine amphibious
operations.
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- Throughout its history, the Marine Corps has conducted
successful amphibious operations without the MV-22. Since the Navy is concerned
about shore-based missile threats, the Marine Corps has embraced a concept
of offloading ships from "over the horizon", which is about 25
miles offshore. Several studies has proven this impractical, including
one from the Naval War College: Logistical Implications of Operational
Maneuver From the Sea, which concluded "the Navy and the Marine Corps
need to keep the laws of logistics in mind if they are to distinguish campaign
plans from fanciful wishes." Even if major "over the horizon"
landings becomes possible, the round-trip required for offload is less
than 50 miles. The time needed to load and offload cargo, and refuel are
the same for MV-22s as helicopters, which lessens the MV-22s advantage
of greater speed, which applies only to internal loads. In any case, a
CH-53E can shuttle far more cargo and troops 50 miles ashore each day than
a MV-22.
-
- The MV-22 program has gutted the Marine Corps
-
- Historically, the Marine Corps has taken pride in a lean,
mean, and economical Fleet Marine Force. During the 1980s, the Corps entered
the world of developing expensive, complex weaponry, like the MV-22. The
Corps has spent $12 billion "developing" the MV-22, which is
more than it has spent on all other programs combined during its entire
history. This money could have bought 1000 new helicopters, but has yet
to produce a safe aircraft. The MV-22 was supposed to enter the fleet several
years ago, but has been delayed as engineers struggle to "fix"
problems.
-
-
- If the MV-22 was safe and cost $30 million each, it would
be a great contribution. Unfortunately, when fatal design flaws emerged
several years ago, Marine Generals refused to admit to a mistake, and committed
the Corps reputation to an impossible goal of fixing a fundamentally flawed
aircraft. The problems were hidden by applying heavy pressure on Marines
involved in testing and evaluating the MV-22 to lie. Even the editors of
the "Marine Corps Gazette" and Naval Institute "Proceedings"
were intimidated to censor negative comments about the MV-22 program or
suggestions about alternatives. Mildly negative comments about the MV-22
in a formal JAG Manual investigation report about the April 2000 crash
were deleted by senior Marine officers. Very few Marine Generals had any
direct responsibly for the MV-22 fiasco, but LtGen Fred McCorkle (left)
deserves much blame. As a Marine MV-22 pilot told the Washington Post,
"people who were my heroes all of my life are no longer my heroes."
-
- Marine Generals refuse to accept that hard work, billions
of dollars, political clout, and lying cannot overcome the laws of aerodynamics.
Billions of dollars in funding for Marine Aviation continue to flow down
the Bell-Boeing rat hole as Marine Corps helicopter lift rapidly deteriorates.
If the MV-22 program were cancelled today, the Marine Corps could immediately
buy dozens of MH-60S helicopters each year "off-the-shelf" at
a far lower cost and free funds for a fleet of 208 powerful CH-53Fs. The
MV-22 program has failed, not because of critics, not because of bad press,
and not because of a lack of funding. The MV-22's design is fundamentally
flawed. Bell-Boeing has built enough MV-22s for every aviation museum in
the nation, its time to donate them.
-
-
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- Carlton Meyer editor@G2mil.com
-
- Carlton Meyer is a former Marine Corps officer and a
graduate of the Amphibious Warfare School.
-
-
- Comment
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- From Bob Barnes
bbarnes@fwi.com
7-8-1
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- With the US boys overhead in the Osprey, the boys on
the ground in the Bradley, and the urban soldiers trying to wedge those
wide-track Hum-Vee's through narrow Arab alleyways it brings a new meaning
to the term "de-ploy-ment." I thing our "ploy" would
be better served (and more easily paid for) with Jeeps, Apaches, and (alas)
Panzers!
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